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    Wyświetlanie 1-11 z 11
    Tytuł:
    Being as sacred: on Heidegger’s ontological wanderings
    Autorzy:
    Antonelli, Emanuele
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/36795098.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2023-09-28
    Wydawca:
    Wydawnictwo Naukowe Chrześcijańskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Warszawie
    Tematy:
    Being
    aletheia
    sacred
    victim
    ens causa sui
    non-instinctual attention
    metaphysics
    Opis:
    René Girard’s Mimetic Theory has put forward a very compelling toolbox whose hermeneutical valour we are willing to test by reading Heidegger’s ontological wandering in the semantic constellation of Being. Finding a lead in Heidegger’s reading of Œdipus’ peripeties as presented in Sophocles’ Œdipus Rex, we will try to translate the fundamental notions of Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics into Girard’s jargon to see if any clarity is gained. It is time to go after Heidegger, both as in following him in his own wandering but also as in chasing him, out of his Holzwege, and eventually go further. Hopefully, some of the obscurities of Heidegger’s text will find in this perspective a new light, without losing any of its fascination.
    Źródło:
    Studia z Teorii Wychowania; 2023, XIV(2 (43)); 219-236
    2083-0998
    2719-4078
    Pojawia się w:
    Studia z Teorii Wychowania
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Alētheia in Gorgias of Leontini. An Excerpt from the History of Truth
    Autorzy:
    Leeten, Lars
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/28408713.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2022
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    Gorgias of Leontini
    sophists
    history of truth
    alētheia
    Pindar
    Encomium of Helen
    Opis:
    It is often assumed that the concept of alētheia, or ‘truth’, in Gorgias of Leontini belongs to the art of rhetoric. Along these lines, it is usually understood as an aesthetic concept or even a mere ‘adornment’ of speech. In this paper, it is argued, by contrast, that Gorgianic alētheia is a definable criterion of speech figuring in the practice of moral education. While the ‘truth’ of a logos indeed has to be assessed on aesthetic grounds, the underlying concept of alētheia is predominantly ethical. For Gorgias, speech is ‘true’ when it promotes virtue (aretē) by being expressive of virtue. The principle stated in the opening passage of the Encomium of Helen, that a speaker has ‘to praise what is praiseworthy and to blame what is blameworthy’, explains precisely this understanding of alētheia.
    Źródło:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2022, 13, 1; 45-64
    2082-7539
    Pojawia się w:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Czcigodne jarzmo metafory. Kilka uwag na marginesie Platońskiej paraboli jaskini
    The Honorable Yoke of Metaphor: Some Remarks Inspired by Plato’s Allegory of the Cave
    Autorzy:
    KOT, Dobrosław
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1046881.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2020-01-12
    Wydawca:
    Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II
    Tematy:
    światło, prawda, dobro, sens, metaforyka światła, pozaświatowość światła, aletheia
    light, truth, the good, meaning, the metaphor of light, transcendent nature of light, aletheia
    Opis:
    Nie ma chyba w filozofii silniej zakorzenionej metafory niż światło, mające wypowiadać prawdę, poznanie, sens. U Platona jest ono niezbędnym łącznikiem między tym, co widziane, a widzeniem samym. Łącznik ten Platon nazywa jarzmem. Hermeneutyczny namysł nad tą metaforą rodzi wiele pytań, z których bodaj najważniejsze, a na pewno najbardziej niepokojące brzmi: czy to wszystko, co wiemy i przeczuwamy na temat prawdy (poznania, idei Dobra itd.), wynika z wiedzy o tych doniosłych sprawach, czy też jest konsekwencją pieczołowitej i szczegółowej analizy samej metafory światła? Innymi słowy: ile wiemy o prawdzie samej, a ile o tym, jak działa światło? Być może napięcie w jarzmie pomiędzy prawdą a światłem nie okaże się tak radykalne i aporetyczne, jak w wypowiedzianej właśnie alternatywie. Zapewne warto jednak zobaczyć, co sama metaforyka światła wnosi do naszego rozumienia prawdy, przyglądając się metaforze można bowiem dostrzec fundamentalne aporie i napięcia. W artykule analizowana jest między innymi pozaświatowość światła. W filozofiach tak od siebie różnych, jak platonizm, fenomenologia transcendentalna czy filozofia spotkania, ujawnia się pewien wspólny wzór: wszędzie tam, gdzie wykorzystana zostaje metaforyka światła, światło umiejscowione zostaje – na różne sposoby – poza światem. Takim źródłem sensu może być idea Dobra, ale też transcendentalne Ja czy Buberowskie Ty. Poprzez przywołanie rozważań Heideggera o alethei autor dochodzi do kolejnego problemu: w świetle nie widać ciemności. Czy to stwierdzenie odnosi się do natury tego, co ciemne (np. zła), czy też jest tylko i wyłącznie grą językową, ważną jedynie w ramach metafory światła? Wszystko to prowadzi do pytań o niezastępowalność metafory światła w myśleniu filozoficznym.
    Apparently there is no metaphor more firmly established in philosophy than that of light which denotes truth, cognition, and meaning. In Plato, light is the bond that yokes together visibility and the faculty of sight. A hermeneutic analysis of the metaphor of ‘yoke’ engenders numerous issues, and the most important among them, as well as the most disturbing, is whether all we know and intuit about truth (or about our cognition, the idea of the Good, etc.) results from our knowledge of these important concepts, or rather it is a consequence of a thorough and detailed analysis of the metaphor of light itself. In other words, how much do we know about truth as such, and how much of this knowledge is our insight into the workings of light? Or is it rather the case that the tension between truth and light, the tension within the ‘yoke’ Plato refers to, does not prove as radical or aporetic as the initial alternative would suggest? Regardless of how we answer this question, it is indubitably worthwhile examining what the metaphor of light introduces into our understanding of truth, since an analysis of the metaphor in question may bring out the fundamental cognitive aporias and tensions we experience. The article analyzes, among others, the transcendent nature of light. Philosophies as diverse as Platonism, transcendental phenomenology, and the philosophy of encounter manifest a uniform approach to the understanding of light and tend to perceive its source outside the visible reality, whether they locate this source in the idea of the Good, in the transcendental ego or in Buber’s ‘Thou,’ thus considering each of them, respectively, a source of meaning. Heidegger’s considerations of the truth (aletheia) make the author confront another problem, namely, that of light obscuring darkness. However, does the issue in question concern the nature of the dark (e.g. evil) as such, or rather, does it manifest merely a language game valid within the scope of the metaphor of light? All these ideas prompt the conclusion about an irreplaceable status of the metaphor of light in philosophical thinking. Translated by Dorota Chabrajska
    Źródło:
    Ethos; 2017, 30, 3 (119); 77-92
    0860-8024
    Pojawia się w:
    Ethos
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Originary experience of art in Martin Heidegger’s philosophy
    Źródłowe doświadczenie sztuki w filozofii Martina Heideggera
    Autorzy:
    Krawiec, Andrzej
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2096333.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2019
    Wydawca:
    Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
    Tematy:
    aletheia
    phenomenology
    M. Heidegger
    essence
    eyeblink
    art
    dread
    origin (Ursprung)
    fenomenologia
    istota
    okamgnienie
    sztuka
    trwoga
    źródło (Ursprung)
    Opis:
    Martin Heidegger in The Origin of the Work of Art (Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes) developed a whole new way of thinking about art, going beyond traditionally understood aesthetics or even philosophy of art. Some of Heidegger’s thoughts, however, appear to be understated and only signal a huge complexity of both experiencing works of art and the very issue of the origin of the work of art. The analysis of the terms ‘dread’ and ‘eyeblink’ from Time and Being presented in this article complement and develop Heidegger’s ideas included in his essay. Linking art to these two crucial phenomena of fundamental ontological analysis of Dasein casts light on the status of art and its existential significance. The author aims mainly at demonstrating the aletheic connection (based on unclosedness) between the experience of ‘originary source’ of a piece of art and ‘dread’, and also, in conclusion, he points to the ‘event of Being’ as the essential, non-metaphysical origin of art.
    Źródło:
    Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria; 2019, 1; 93-113
    1230-1493
    Pojawia się w:
    Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    The Propedeutic of the Theory of Judgment in Ancient Philosophy from the Sophists to Plato’s Theaetetus
    Autorzy:
    Gajda-Krynicka, Janina
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/665185.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2019
    Wydawca:
    Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego
    Tematy:
    judgment, logos, truth/aletheia, falsehood/pseudos, opinion/doksa, referential function of language, predicative function of language
    Opis:
    In the ancient epistemology, precisely stated definition of judgment (axioma) appears only in the 3rd century B.C. It was formulated by Chrysippus of Soli, the founder of the Stoic logic. However, on the other hand, the analysis of the extant utterances in which the knowledge had been objectified since the first Greek thinkers, allows us to state that the evolution of the theory of judgment was a long process. In this development, Greek epistemology had to deal with a number of problems connected with the object of the judgment –– knowledge, with the form of its objectification –– predication, and also with the predicates of the true and false judgment –– categories of “truth” (aletheia) and “falsehood” (pseudos). The first definition of the false judgement (logos pseudes) and the true judgment (logos alethes) can be found only in the late dialogue of Plato, Sophist, which delivers precisely established terminology of the theorem. Yet, such a definition could be formulated only when Greek epistemology re-defined the scope of the meaning of the key terms-concepts, aletheia and pseudos. The term-concept aletheia was identified with the term-concept being, functioning in the ontological-axiological sphere. On the other hand, pseudos did not mean false in the sense of negating the truth, but something, which is different than truth, is its imperfect copy. Thus, the pre-Platonic philosophy has not yet formulated the terminology in which predication of something inconsistent with the actual state of being, with the truth, could be verbalized. Often to express such a form of predication, a phrase “to utter things, which are not” was used. The other problem was connected with –– characteristic ofthe Greek language –– dual function of the verb to be/einai, which included both existential and truthful function. Accordingly, every utterance, in which the predicate was the verb einai or its derivates, was ex definitione a true predication –– “it spoke beings (things, which are).” In such a situation, there was noneed in epistemology to precisely define judgment as such, and to state the conditions which the true judgment hadto meet. The problem is definitely solved by Plato in his dialogue Theaetetus, in which the philosopher defines the object of the judgment, which is knowledge (however, its object is not stated yet) and introduces the project of verification of the utterances/opinion, thanks to which an opinion ––doxa can reach the status of judgment ––logos. An opinion needs to be verified with the dialectical procedures.
    Źródło:
    Folia Philosophica; 2019, 42, 2; 21-45
    1231-0913
    2353-9445
    Pojawia się w:
    Folia Philosophica
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Wychowanie dziecka jako wyraz ludzkiej tragedii
    Raising a Child as an Expression of Human Tragedy
    Autorzy:
    Dembiński, Mariusz
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/916268.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2019-12-15
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    raising
    wy-chowa-nie
    aletheia
    veritas
    tragedy
    Opis:
    Raising, reduced to the formula of up-bringing does not (Polish: wy-chowan-nie), allows us to reveal what is hidden, and by denying it (-not), it enables a person to experience the sense of his essence and see the tragedy of his upbringing and the sense of his life. Featured upbringing and up-bringing-does not (written separately) results from the difference in the approach to truth. Today, upbringing in its objectifying children truth refers to the concept of veritas, and because it lost its original meaning or aletheia, in search of the truth of upbringing, it was reduced to the formula of up-bringing-does not. With the help of this formula, an attempt was made to reveal the real sense of upbringing and the conditions that should be met in order for human up-bringing-does not to have a human (aletheia) dimension.
    Źródło:
    Studia Edukacyjne; 2019, 55; 93-108
    1233-6688
    Pojawia się w:
    Studia Edukacyjne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    „Rzekł mu Piłat: Co to jest prawda?” ’Emet i alētheia w tradycji żydowskiej i grecko-rzymskiej. Kulturowo-teologiczne odczytanie J 8,31-32 i J 18,37-38a. Cz. 3
    “Pilate saith unto him: What is truth? Part III
    Autorzy:
    Gajewski, Wojciech
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/425404.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2016
    Wydawca:
    Parafia Ewangelicko-Augsburska w Gdańsku z siedzibą w Sopocie
    Tematy:
    Truth
    Lexeme „alētheia”
    New Testament
    Corpus Johanneum
    Opis:
    Discussion regarding the use and nature of the term “truth” in John’s (Corpus Johanneum) has a long record going back to the XIX century. Scholars of such a calibre as were Dodd or Bultmann drew their attention to Hellenic circles (including Platonic and Gnostic) as the main source of inspiration for John’s interpretation of truth. However, over the course of time, we have noticed a turn towards enhancement of literature of Judaism of that time, including texts from Qumran. After discussing status questionis lexeme alētheia was analysed in the texts of Corpus Johanneum.Conclusions resulting from the analysis lead to the view focusing on non-homogeneous influences and also on a considerable contribution of John’s own circles and that of the early Church.
    Źródło:
    Gdański Rocznik Ewangelicki; 2016, 10; 169-192
    1898-1127
    Pojawia się w:
    Gdański Rocznik Ewangelicki
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    „Rzekł mu Piłat: Co to jest prawda?” ’Emet i alētheia w tradycji żydowskiej i grecko-rzymskiej Część II
    „Pilate saith unto him: What is truth?” Emet and alētheia in Jewish and Greco-Roman Tradition. Part 2
    Autorzy:
    Gajewski, Wojciech
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/425366.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2014
    Wydawca:
    Parafia Ewangelicko-Augsburska w Gdańsku z siedzibą w Sopocie
    Tematy:
    Truth
    lexeme alētheia
    New Testament
    intertestamental Jewish literature
    Opis:
    The article continues to analyze the lexeme alētheia in the NT texts, aside from the Corpus Johanneum. The conclusions of the analysis point to a heterogeneity of influence. The inspiration has been observed to come both from the classic interpretation of the term (that of conformity to the reality) as well as its usage in the Old Testament or the literature of the Second Temple Judaism. The Synoptic authors in the vast majority used the lexeme alētheia in the meaning of the correspondent definition (that of conformity to the physical and metaphysical reality), and also in a manner similar to the Hebrew meaning of amen. Referring to the Old Testament announcements, they pointed to the fulfillment of the promises in the person of Jesus Christ and in the life of the early Church. According to Matthew and Mark, Jesus did not use this term, while Luke recorded several such instances, one of which is particularly interesting (Luke 16:11). His use of the adjective alēthinos in the parable shows physical goods in juxtaposition with true goods, and the context indicates the initiation base, similar to Jas 1:18 and 2 Pt 2,12. Paul used the lekseme alētheia in its various shades and configurations (the truth of God, the word of truth, the knowledge of truth, the reception of truth, and the truth of Christ). Besides the classic interpretation, he can be said to have contributed to the emergence of synonymy between the concepts of "truth" and "The Gospel". The term was used in a similar way in the letters of James and Peter. This shows the influence of the Qumran literature or – in more general terms – the theological and linguistic concepts of the early Judaism. We can also find specific examples of associating truth directly with the person of Jesus of Nazareth. Truth possesses not only intellectual value, nor is it equal to doctrine, but there has to be consistency between words and deeds, doctrine and morality.
    Źródło:
    Gdański Rocznik Ewangelicki; 2014, 8; 246-264
    1898-1127
    Pojawia się w:
    Gdański Rocznik Ewangelicki
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    The ontological impossibility of a flourishing self in the absence of the other
    Autorzy:
    Mahoney, Michelle
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/431187.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2014
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie
    Tematy:
    Aletheia
    art
    authencity
    Dasein
    Eros
    Ego
    good
    Other
    Sorge
    self
    death
    aletheia
    sztuka
    autentyczność
    ego
    dobro
    Inny
    ja
    śmierć
    Opis:
    This paper follows Iris Murdoch in an ongoing critique of existentialism that saw the beginnings of her philosophical work with Sartre and its conclusion with her manuscript on Heidegger. The continuity of her critique focuses upon her concern with the magnetism of the ego over and against attention toward the other. Heidegger, as a metaphysician working to close the post-Enlightenment subject/object separation, engages her thought regarding new possibilities for a future metaphysics. For Murdoch, seeking an ontology that rejects a transcendent God requires a notion of goodness that provokes a point of contention with Heidegger’s ontology of Being, where a new dualism of authenticity and inauthenticity toward Being undermines any ethos of the other.
    Źródło:
    Studia Philosophiae Christianae; 2014, 50, 1; 233-248
    0585-5470
    Pojawia się w:
    Studia Philosophiae Christianae
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    „Rzekł mu Piłat: Co to jest prawda?” ’Emet i alētheia w tradycji żydowskiej i grecko-rzymskiej. Kulturowo-teologiczne odczytanie J 8,31-32 i J 18,37-38a Cz.1
    „Pilate saith unto him: What is truth?” Emet and alētheia in Jewish and Greco-Roman tradition. Cultural-theological reading of J 8,31-32 and J 18,37-38a. Part 1
    Autorzy:
    Gajewski, Wojciech
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/425516.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2013
    Wydawca:
    Parafia Ewangelicko-Augsburska w Gdańsku z siedzibą w Sopocie
    Tematy:
    Truth
    'emet
    alētheia
    Old Testament
    Greek philosophy
    Opis:
    During the interrogation of Jesus before the tribunal of Pilate a question is posed: “What is truth?” (Gospel of John). The author makes it a canvas of the article and on this basis in the first part he wants to present similarities and differences in perception of truth in Jewish and Greco-Roman tradition. He starts from the meaning of the Hebrew term ’emet and analyses its use in the Old Testamental environment as well as in the intertestamental period (Qumran, Philo of Alexandria). The term ’emet is much more capacious than its Polish equivalent and it means the truth as well as faithfulness, reliability, stability. In the OT writings it plays an important role in relation to God and His word as well as God’s deeds (eg. the Law, the Covenant), and together with the word hesed it constitutes a characteristic hendiadys. The Jews, however, knew also use of the term ’emet similar to the contemporary (compliance of a spoken judgment with reality; in this way it was used in everyday speech and the judiciary). In later texts it appears in the sense of knowledge hidden from the profanes, having its source in heaven and passed by messengers-angels to sages and prophets. Those in turn were to instruct worthy people, who in this way are acquainted with God’s plans. In the Greek culture, at least from the times of Parmenides, the truth (alētheia) was identified with being. Some philosophers identified pre-being with Deity (Xenophanes) or the Rule/Rules of the world (archē/archai). This concept was professed, among others, by Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, although each one of them within specifically conceived metaphysics. The objective nature of truth was negated by sophists, followed by agnostics. In other philosophical schools alētheia was conceived in close relation to ethics. However, depending on the schools and even on the period of their development, certain changes occurred, as in the case of intermediate and younger Academy (moderate skepticism and probabilism). In Rome, where the stoic mainstream and eclecticism (Cicero) dominated, awareness of the variety of definitions of truth led to the attitude of keeping distance to any certainties. Philosophising Romans, especially the skeptics and eclectics, referred to the principle of probability and common sense.
    Źródło:
    Gdański Rocznik Ewangelicki; 2013, 7; 267-295
    1898-1127
    Pojawia się w:
    Gdański Rocznik Ewangelicki
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Heinricha Rickerta krytyka teoretycznego intuicjonizmu
    Autorzy:
    Kubalica, Tomasz
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/705408.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2013-03-01
    Wydawca:
    Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
    Tematy:
    intuicja
    poznanie bezpośrednie
    intuicjonizm
    teoria odbicia
    prawda
    aletheia
    H. Rickert
    M. Heidegger
    Opis:
    Przedmiotem rozważań jest teoriopoznawczy intuicjonizm, uznający intuicję za podstawę poznania i wiedzy. W artykule przeanalizowane zostały argumenty krytyczne wysuwane przez Heinricha Rickerta w ostatniej fazie jego działalności filozoficznej. Głównym adresatem krytyki Rickerta jest aletejologiczna koncepcja prawdy i poznania Martina Heideggera. Podstawowym motywem krytyki Rickerta jest odrzucenie teorio-odbiciowego modelu poznania, zakładanego przez intuicjonizm.
    Źródło:
    Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria; 2013, 1; 299-306
    1230-1493
    Pojawia się w:
    Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
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