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    Wyświetlanie 1-8 z 8
    Tytuł:
    Synkretyczne pouczenie jogiczne w Ćarakasanhicie (Śarirasthana 1.137-155)
    Autorzy:
    Budziszewska, Nina
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2188246.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2021-12-20
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. Komisji Edukacji Narodowej w Krakowie. Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii
    Tematy:
    Ayurveda
    Yoga
    Sāṃkhya
    meditation
    Upaniṣads
    Mahābhārata
    Opis:
    A syncretic yogic instruction in Carakasanhita (Śārīrasthāna 1.137-155): Śārīrasthāna (ŚS) .1137-155, contained in Book 4 of the Ćarakasaṃhitā (1st century BCE - 2nd century CE), is a short treatise on yoga presented for āyurvedic purposes. In its yogic interpretation, the work comprises the Upaniṣads, the Mahābhārata, some Sāṃkhya's and Vaiśeṣika's notions as well as the meditative interpretation present in the Buddhist tradition. The ŚS gives a threefold path (ayana) leading to mokṣa (ŚS 150-151), the state of supreme brahman with which the conscious being, bhūtātman, becomes one (ŚS 155): yoga, smṛti, and sāṃkhya. The path to liberation is based on yoga, which is the reinforcement of the manas in the ātman (ŚS 138) and the stopping of sufering by breaking the connection between the erroneous identification of ātman with manas and the senses (ŚS 138-139). On the path of yoga, a powerful eight-fold magical power (eight siddhis) is created through which the yogi is able to overcome external adversities (ŚS 140-141). In the next step, the recognition of the one's true identity - according to the sāṃkhya - is made through buddhi by the power of jñāna (ŚS 152-153). However, in order for this recognition to be realized, the state of purity of sattva (ŚS 141) must first appear, induced by the practice of the eight-step smṛti realized by eighteen perfections (ŚS 143-147).
    Źródło:
    ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal; 2021, 11, 2; 497-508
    2083-6635
    2084-1043
    Pojawia się w:
    ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Mahan atman, czyli zapomniany poziom wyższej świadomości jogicznej w naukach przedklasycznej sankhji i jogi
    Mahān ātman: the Forgotten Level of Higher Yogic Consciousness in the Teachings of the Pre-classical Sāṃkhya and Yoga
    Autorzy:
    Budziszewska, Nina
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/578002.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2016
    Wydawca:
    Polskie Towarzystwo Orientalistyczne
    Tematy:
    pre-classical Sāṃkhya
    pre-classical Yoga
    consciousness
    mahān ātman
    Indian philosophy
    Opis:
    The epistemology of the pre-classical Sāṃkhya and Yoga from the Upaniṣads and the Mokṣadharma presents two supplementary levels of consciousness: mahān ātman (or budhyamāna) and brahman, sometimes called the 26th, buddha or Viṣṇu/Śiva. Although the mahān ātman (and the budhyamāna) disappeared in classical teachings, in the upaniṣadic period it had functioned as very important level of yogic consciousness. It was a dyke between the empirical I (the citta or the liṅga) and the pure consciousness of the ātman. The classical Sāṃkhya has joined the 26th level and the mahān ātman in the puruṣa as 25th state, although the Patañjali’s Yoga seems to keep the pre-classical budhyamāna (the mahān ātman) in the notion and in the soteriological function of Īśvara.
    Źródło:
    Przegląd Orientalistyczny; 2016, 1-2; 57-72
    0033-2283
    Pojawia się w:
    Przegląd Orientalistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Niedualna uważność a stan samādhi w kontekście badań neurofenomenologicznych
    Nondual awareness and the state of samādhi in the context of the neurophenomenological research
    Autorzy:
    Płaneta, Piotr
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/437409.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2016
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. Komisji Edukacji Narodowej w Krakowie. Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii
    Tematy:
    meditation
    dhyāna
    nirbīja‑samādhi
    classical sāṁkhya‑yoga
    theravada buddhism
    tibetan
    buddhism
    Opis:
    The aim of this paper is to compare various meditative states, such as Buddhist dhyāna‐s, yogic nirbīja samādhi and nondual awareness (Tib. gñis‐med). The primary sour‐ ce texts I refere to are Yogasūtras of Patañjali, Ānāpānasmṛtisūtra (MN 118), Samādhisūtra (AN 41), The Tibetan Yogas of Dream and Sleep. I also discuss some relevant claims of contemporary empirical studies. First, I define the key terms used in Eastern meditation studies as well as in neurophenomenology, a contemporary method applied to examining the meditative states of mind, such as samādhi, dhyāna, and śamatha. Inspired by Shinzen Young, I distinguish three groups of meditative states that might be identified with nondual awareness. These three groups are: the second, the third and fourth Buddhist dhyāna being equivalent to nirvicāra samādhi and nirānanda samādhi in the classical Indian yoga; nirbīja samādhi and nondual awareness, typical to the Mahayāna contemplative traditions. I explain why we can recognize each of the above states as nondual awareness and how they differ from each other. Then, I make a comparison between meditation practice explained in Ānāpānasmṛtisūtra and nondual awareness presented in the Tibetan Buddhism. Besides, I discuss the above kinds of mental states in terms of recent neurophenomenological findings. While doing so, I am trying to demonstrate that our understanding of meditation can benefit from the empirical studies which help us to objective this kind of subjective experience, to some degree, if they are given an adequate place in our study.
    Źródło:
    ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal; 2016, 6, 2; 373-390
    2083-6635
    2084-1043
    Pojawia się w:
    ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Does the not-Self (anattā) teaching in the Nikāyas presuppose the existence of a special type of consciousness?
    Autorzy:
    Polak, Grzegorz
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2188272.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2022-10-24
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. Komisji Edukacji Narodowej w Krakowie. Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii
    Tematy:
    early Buddhism
    viññāṇa
    the mind
    citta
    the aggregates
    khandha-s
    cognitive science
    Sāṃkhya
    Āgamas
    Opis:
    According to the historically dominant interpretation of the anattā teaching, human being is a conglomerate of the five aggregates (khandha-s). However, several early Buddhist Nikāya texts seem to suggest that within human being there exists a dichotomy of the aggregates and their counterpart. The latter may cling to the khandha-s but also become dissociated from them. In this paper, I critically consider a hypothesis forwarded by several scholars that the early Buddhist texts presuppose the existence of a special type of consciousness (viññāṇa) which is not identical with viññāṇa-khandha, as the counterpart to the aggregates. According to this interpretation, such consciousness is considered pretty much synonymous with nibbāna, the ultimate state of liberation. I argue that despite its value and advantage over the historically dominant interpretation of anattā teaching, this hypothesis is nonetheless problematic on many levels. In the first part of the paper, I consider the textual problems of the hypothesis in question. In particular, I focus on the implications of the Kevaṭṭa Sutta and the Dhātuvibhaṅga Sutta as well as on the problematic interrelation of citta and viññāṇa in the Nikāyas. I also argue that the hypothesis of special consciousness as nibbāna is difficult to reconcile with the apophatic approach and strong emphasis on ineffability present in the substantial portion of the Nikāyas. In the final part of the paper, I consider philosophical problems of the theory in question. In particular, I argue that it is difficult to conceive pure transcendental type of consciousness as an agent of attitudes such as clinging or abandoning, thus making it an unlikely candidate for being the counterpart of the aggregates. In order to make better sense of the problems in question, I consider certain parallels of the Nikāya doctrine with modern philosophy of mind as well as with ancient Indian Sāṃkhya doctrine.
    Źródło:
    ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal; 2022, 12, 1; 129-146
    2083-6635
    2084-1043
    Pojawia się w:
    ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Samkhya Philosophy, Deep Ecology and Sustainable Development
    Filozofia Sankhja, głęboka ekologia i zrównoważony rozwój
    Autorzy:
    Biswas, Nanda Gopal
    Prakash, Gyan
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2080899.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2022
    Wydawca:
    Polska Akademia Nauk. Komitet Człowiek i Środowisko PAN
    Tematy:
    Samkhya philosophy
    deep ecology
    ethics
    religion
    sustainable development
    filozofia Sankhja
    głęboka ekologia
    etyka
    religia
    rozwój zrównoważony
    Opis:
    Samkhya philosophy is one of the oldest philosophies in the Indian philosophical system. This philosophy is independent in origin and mainly known for its evolution theory. Samkhya philosophy has accepted the two ultimate and independent realities, Nature and pure Consciousness. This paper is an attempt to comprehend the notion of deep ecology from the Samkhya’s evolution theory perspective. In this paper, firstly, we have elucidated the Samkhya philosophy of suffering and the solution to the problem. In the second part of the article, we have argued that how Samkhya’s philosophical notion of Nature demonstrates our embeddedness in Nature. Therefore, the idea of deep ecology is always there in one or another form in Samkhya philosophy. It has also connections to the idea of sustainable development
    Filozofia Sankhja jest jedną z najstarszych filozofii indyjskiego systemu filozoficznego. Ma niezależne pochodzenie i znana jest głównie z teorii ewolucji. Filozofia sankhji zaakceptowała dwie ostateczne i niezależne rzeczywistości: Naturę i czystą Świadomość. Niniejszy artykuł jest próbą zrozumienia pojęcia głębokiej ekologii z perspektywy teorii ewolucji Sankhji. Po pierwsze, wyjaśniamy filozofię cierpienia Sankhji i pokazujemy rozwiązanie problemu. W drugiej części artykułu dowodzimy, że filozoficzne pojęcie Natury stosowane przez Sankhję ukazuje nasze zakorzenienie w Naturze. Dlatego idea głębokiej ekologii jest zawsze obecna w tej czy innej formie w filozofii sankhji. Ma ona także powiązania z ideą rozwoju zrównoważonego.
    Źródło:
    Problemy Ekorozwoju; 2022, 17, 1; 288--292
    1895-6912
    Pojawia się w:
    Problemy Ekorozwoju
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Sāṃkhya on the Validity (prāmāṇya) and Invalidity (aprāmāṇya) of Cognition
    Autorzy:
    Łucyszyna, Ołena
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2035891.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2022-01-14
    Wydawca:
    Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Kultur Śródziemnomorskich i Orientalnych PAN
    Tematy:
    Sāṃkhya
    means of valid cognition (pramāṇa)
    validity (prāmāṇya) and
    invalidity (aprāmāṇya) of cognition (jñāna)
    intrinsic (svatas) validity
    extrinsic (paratas) invalidity
    Opis:
    One of the well-known polemics of Indian thought, in which many darśanas participated, is concerned with the problem of the validity (prāmāṇya) and invalidity (aprāmāṇya) of cognition (jñāna). The problem has two main aspects: the origination and ascertainment of validity and invalidity. Mādhava’s Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha and other external sources attribute to Sāṃkhya (a tradition of thought recognising the authority of the Vedas) the view that both validity and invalidity are intrinsic, and many researchers hold that this view is Sāṃkhyan. In this article, I reconstruct the Sāṃkhya view on validity and invalidity of cognition on the basis of classical and postclassical Sāṃkhya texts, that is, all extant Sāṃkhya texts from Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s Sāṃkhyakārikā to Aniruddha’s Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti. I come to the conclusion that the Sāṃkhya view is different from the view attributed to Sāṃkhya. According to Sāṃkhya texts, validity is intrinsic and invalidity is extrinsic in terms of both origination and ascertainment.
    Źródło:
    Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia; 2021, 34; 145-176
    0860-6102
    Pojawia się w:
    Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Experiments and Research Programmes. Revisiting Vitalism/Non-Vitalism Debate in Early Twentieth Century
    Eksperymenty i programy badawcze. Krytyczna analiza debaty między witalizmem a nonwitalizmem toczącej się na początu XX wieku.
    Autorzy:
    Mukherjee, Bijoy
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/437539.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2012
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. Komisji Edukacji Narodowej w Krakowie. Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii
    Tematy:
    Jagadish Chandra Bose
    realism
    theory change
    research programme
    hardcore
    progress
    vitalism
    nervous mechanism of plants
    Sāṃkhya / Sankhya
    reformed Vedānta / Vedanta
    Opis:
    Debates in the philosophy of science typically take place around issues such as realism and theory change. Recently, the debate has been reformulated to bring in the role of experiments in the context of theory change. As regards realism, Ian Hacking’s contribution has been to introduce ‘intervention’ as the basis of realism. He also proposed, following Imre Lakatos, to replace the issue of truth with progress and rationality. In this context we examine the case of the vitalism — reductionism debate in biology inspired by the works of Indian physicist-turned-biologist Jagadish Chandra Bose (1858–1937), in the early twentieth century. Both camps had their characteristic hardcores. Vitalists led by John S. Burdon-Sanderson and Augustus D. Waller accepted religious metaphysics to support their research programme, which ultimately degenerated. Bose worked more with the ideals of science such as Occam’s razor, large-scale systematization of phenomena and novel prediction. I argue that his religious metaphysics, instead of acting as a protective shield, helped him to consolidate his position and allowed further problem shift resulting in a research programme that involved consciousness too. His research programme remains relevant even today.
    Źródło:
    ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal; 2012, 2, 1; 171-197
    2083-6635
    2084-1043
    Pojawia się w:
    ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    The purpose of non-theistic devotion in the classical Indian tradition of Sām khya-Yoga
    Autorzy:
    Jakubczak, Marzenna
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/437569.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2014
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. Komisji Edukacji Narodowej w Krakowie. Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii
    Tematy:
    Indian philosophy
    non-theism
    atheism
    religious practice
    meditation
    iśvara
    svabhavika
    Samkhya
    Yoga
    God in Yoga
    filozofia indyjska
    nie-teizm
    ateizm
    praktyka religijna
    medytacja
    īśvara
    bóg w jodze
    svābhāvika
    sankhja
    joga
    Opis:
    The paper starts with some textual distinctions concerning the concept of God in the metaphysical framework of two classical schools of Hindu philosophy, Sāṃkhya and Yoga. Then the author focuses on the functional and pedagogical aspects of prayer as well as practical justification of “religious meditation” in both philosophical schools. A special attention is put on the practice called īśvarapraṇidhāna, recommended in Yoga school, which is interpreted by the author as a form of non-theistic devotion. The meaning of the central object of this concentration, that is puruṣa-viśeṣa, is reconsidered in detail. The subject matter is discussed in the wider context of yogic self-discipline that enables a practitioner to overcome ignorance ( avidyā) and the narrowness of egotic perspective ( asmitā), recognized in the Hindu darśanas as the root-cause of all suffering or never-fulfilled-satisfaction ( duḥkha). The non-the¬istic devotion and spiritual pragmatism assumed by the adherents of Sāṃkhya-Yoga redefines the concept of “God” ( īśvara) as primarily an object of meditative practice and a special tool convenient for spiritual pedagogy.
    Źródło:
    ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal; 2014, 4, 1; 55-68
    2083-6635
    2084-1043
    Pojawia się w:
    ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-8 z 8

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