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Tytuł:
„Adaequatio intellectus et rei” w świetle dyskusji ze sceptycyzmem semantycznym
„Adaequatio intellectus et rei” in the Light of the Discussion with Semantic Skepticism
Autorzy:
Szymura, Jerzy
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2013904.pdf
Data publikacji:
2005
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
sceptycyzm epistemologiczny
sceptycyzm semantyczny
nominalizm
antyrealizm
realizm
uniwersalia
prawda
epistemological skepticism
semantic skepticism
nominalism
antirealism
realism
universals
truth
Opis:
The article juxtaposes modern skepticism stating lack of the criterion of true beliefs about transcendent reality with respect to their contents, but accepting the assumption about existence and cognoscibility of those contents on the one hand, and — after M. F. Burnyeat — ancient skepticism understood as one that questions this assumption on the other. The doubt as to existence of beliefs — resp. propositions as contents of beliefs — is a link joining ancient skeptics with Wittgenstein. Their skepticism is not – as modern skepticism – an epistemological position, but an ontological one — nominalism — questioning existence of universals that are the conditions of meaning and hence the conditions of truth of propositions. This is why the ancient dispute concerning the truth was in fact a dispute over the problem of universals, i.e. over existence of constant rules deciding which ways of connecting the subject and the predicate in a proposition are right and which are not. Realists referred to such rules, sophists denied their existence, and skeptics stated that without having such a rule at their disposal they do not have a basis for deciding the dispute between realists and sophists. This does not have much to do either with so-called correspondence concept of the truth or with the modern understanding of conceptual realism talking about “ideal paradigms” or “common properties” of things. Today’s typologies of philosophical positions do not fit antiquity. Ch. S. Peirce’s and D. Armstrong’s arguments lead to the conclusion that Plato was a… nominalist in the modern meaning of the world. P. T. Geach’s and N. Wolterstorff’s analyses allow stating the same about St Thomas Aquinas. This places under the question mark the statement that the latter could be an advocate of the generally ascribed to him correspondence theory of truth, which also cannot be derived from Aristotle’s philosophy without any doubts.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2005, 53, 2; 237-267
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
In Defense of Knowing, In Defense of Doubting: Cicero Engages Totalizing Skepticism, Sensate Materialism, and Pragmatist Realism in "Academica"
Autorzy:
Prus, Robert
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2138833.pdf
Data publikacji:
2006-12-21
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
Tematy:
Knowledge
Skepticism
Pragmatism
Realism
Relativism
Symbolic interactionism
Postmodernism
Cicero
Plato’s Academy
Opis:
Whereas contemporary scholars in the social sciences and humanities often envision themselves as exceptionally, if not uniquely, attentive to the problematics of human knowing and acting, the competing philosophies of totalizing skepticism, sensate materialism, divine worldviews, and pragmatist realism have a much more enduring presence in Western social thought. Plato (c420-348BCE) introduces a broad array of philosophic standpoints (theological, idealist, skepticist, materialist, and pragmatist) in his texts and Aristotle (c384-322BCE) addresses human knowing and acting in more distinctively secular, pluralist terms. Still, more scholarly considerations of human knowing and acting would be comparatively neglected by Cicero’s time and even more so after his era. Although much overlooked by those in the human sciences, Cicero’s Academica re-engages a number of highly consequential issues pertaining to the matter of human knowing and acting. Likewise, whereas Christian theologians often were hostile to heathen (relativist, materialist, pragmatist) philosophic viewpoints, important residues of these approaches would remain part of the Western intellectual tradition though Augustine’s (c354- 430 BCE) works. Academica is centered on the historically sustained skepticist emphases of Plato’s Academy (c350-50CE) but Cicero’s text also attends to some competing viewpoints that developed along the way. In addition to (1) acknowledging some of the intellectual shifts in Plato’s Academy over three centuries, this statement also (2) provides a pragmatist critique of the totalizing skepticism of the Academicians, and (3) illustrates the ways in which Cicero, as a representative and defender of Academician skepticism, deals with critiques pertaining to the problem of human knowing and acting. Thus, whereas Cicero is best known as a rhetorician and his text is presented as an instance of rhetorical interchange, Cicero’s Academica also may be seen as “a defense of knowing” and “a defense of doubting,” two of the most central features of scholarship.
Źródło:
Qualitative Sociology Review; 2006, 2, 3; 21-47
1733-8077
Pojawia się w:
Qualitative Sociology Review
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Leszek Kołakowski (1927-2009): Remembrances and some comments
Autorzy:
Szacki, Jerzy
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/704348.pdf
Data publikacji:
2009
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
Tematy:
censorship
Christianity without denomination
communism
contemporary culture
democratic opposition in Poland
heresy
history of ideas
the left
Marxism
philosophy
religion
revisionism
Roman-Catholic Church
skepticism
Opis:
Author tells the story of his close and very long-lasting acquaintance with Leszek Kołakowski as well as commentates on his intellectual biography and achievements as political and literary essayist, philosopher, historian of ideas, and public figure. In particular he describes in details the first half of Kołakowski’s life, namely the period when he made his long journey from being communist in his student years to becoming as a young scholar the leading figure of Marxist revisionism in the late fifties and after a time a principled critic of Marxism itself and a fervent anti-communist. In many respects Kołakowski’s itinerary was not exceptional but it had at least two noteworthy characteristics. First, in opposition to quite a few other cases his way away from communism turned out to be scholarly fruitful as it resulted in an uniquely in-depth historical research covering the founders, the golden age and the breakdown of so called “scientific socialism” (his voluminous work Main Currents of Marxism remains one of the best and the most comprehensive monographs of the topic). Second, Kołakowski’s abandoning of his former Weltanschauung was followed by his discovery of religion as an extremely important part of human experience and sine qua non condition of the survival of civilization permanently menaced by barbarians. However it is to be doubt whether he may be considered as a convert or a religious thinker in the strict sense of the word since he believed in horrors of the absence of God rather than in the real presence of his in the world. As defender of transcendence and tradition Kołakowski certainly became a kind of catholic-Christian without denomination but as a critical philosopher remained at the same time highly sceptical about everything. Dreaming of solid fundamentals he was all his life an uncompromising enemy of any fundamentalism. Being nostalgic about the Absolute he was incurable antiabsolutist.
Źródło:
Nauka; 2009, 3
1231-8515
Pojawia się w:
Nauka
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Zdrowy rozsądek i sceptycyzm
Common Sense and Skepticism
Autorzy:
Leszczyński, Damian
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2012864.pdf
Data publikacji:
2011
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
sceptycyzm
filozofia
zdrowy rozsądek
skepticism
philosophy
common sense
Opis:
In Part One of the present text a philosophical characterization of common sense is presented, focusing first of all on its epistemological aspects. Part Two is devoted to these types of doubt or skepticism that may be defined as popular and do not require a philosophical background. Part Three is concerned with strictly philosophical skepticism, whose characterization and confrontation with common sense requires a general and introductory answer to the question about what in fact philosophy is. In Part Four examples are presented of difficulties and antinomies to which confusing the level of commonsensical thinking with the level of philosophical thinking leads. The difficulties result from, on the one hand, attempts at solving philosophical problems by referring to popular intuitions, and, on the other, the willingness to infer consequences related to everyday life from philosophical deliberations. The disquisition seeks to justify the thesis that skepticism and undermining common sense – alien to popular thinking – belong to the nature of philosophy, and hence postulates to decide philosophical problems by referring to common sense, as well as charges sometimes leveled against philosophy that it does not give any actual solutions to practical problems should be regarded as misunderstandings.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2011, 59, 1; 5-34
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Filozofowie i filozofia w Geografii Strabona z Amasei
Philosophers and Philosophy in Strabo’s Geography
Autorzy:
Wilczewska, Sylwia
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1929082.pdf
Data publikacji:
2012
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
Strabon
Eratostenes
Homer
stoicyzm
sceptycyzm
filozof
filozofia
Strabo
Eratosthenes
stoicism
skepticism
philosopher
philosophy
Opis:
Strabo of Amasia in his Geography often mentions philosophers, under whose name he includes the thinkers related to particular schools as well as Indian and Egyptian priests, Celtic druids, and Homer—the only poet referred to in the Geography as philosopher. In the narrower meaning, Strabo gives the name of philosophers only to the first group, but in the broader sense he includes all universal scholars, in accordance with the Stoic understanding of philosophy; the introduction to the Geography reflects also a general view of the Stoics that ethics stems from the natural sciences. The remarks in the introduction which concern philosophy serve also Strabo’s polemical goals in his dispute with Eratosthenes of Cyrene about the credibility of Homeric epics as a source of geographical and historical knowledge: Eratosthenes, a Platonist under the influence of Academic skepticism, claims that poetry aims at entertaining and not at educating, whilst Strabo, a convinced Stoic, takes poetry to be the first form of philosophy which allows for delivering the truth about the world to unlearned recipients. Philosophical differences of Eratosthenes and Strabo are also connected with their different perception of the role of particular disciplines—Eratosthenes separated them from each other, but Strabo, in accordance with the traditional view, united them in service of philosophy, which teaches the art of achieving happiness in one’s life and thus is the most important area of knowledge.
Źródło:
Roczniki Humanistyczne; 2012, 60, 3; 65-74
0035-7707
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Humanistyczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Philosophy and Ataraxia in Sextus Empiricus
Autorzy:
Massie, Pascal
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/633484.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
Sextus Empiricus
Skepticism
epochē
ataraxia
Apelles
Opis:
This essay addresses two interconnected questions: (a) In what sense is Skepticism a philosophy? (b) How can ataraxia emerge out of epochē? Skepticism is a practice that articulates three moments: equipollence, epochē (suspension of judgment), and ataraxia (freedom from disturbance) and Sextus’ account of how one can move through these moments demonstrates the its philosophical nature. However, to clarify the transition from epochē to ataraxia Sextus offers only one clue: the story of Apelles. If this story is paradigmatic, it is also ambiguous since the transition from epochē to ataraxia can neither be causal nor inferential. Apelles achieves his goal purely by chance. Contrary to a common interpretation, this doesn’t mean that the Skeptic abandons the inquiry (just as Apelles doesn’t abandon painting). Lastly, the essay argues that Skepticism is not only the practice of a certain dialectical method but also a practice upon oneself. The Skeptic must learn to dissociate herself from the thoughts she entertains. Sustained inquiry can coexist with ataraxia because the Skeptic has discovered that her consciousness is distinct from its intentional content now bracketed by epochē. To free ourselves from our attachment to dogmatic beliefs is to opens up a space of self-detachment.  
Źródło:
Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2013, 4, 1; 211-234
2082-7539
Pojawia się w:
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
[tłum.] David Chalmers, Matriks jako metafizyka
[transl.] David Chalmers, The Matrix as Metaphysics
Autorzy:
Chalmers, David
Jarocki, Jacek
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/488170.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
matriks
metafizyka
sceptycyzm
mózg w kadzi
matrix
metaphysics
skepticism
brain in a vat
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2015, 63, 4; 187-229
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Authenticity in marketing: a response to consumer resistance?
Autorzy:
Marks, Christine
Prinsloo, Melani
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/540586.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Zarządzania
Tematy:
authenticity
authentic marketing
consumer resistance
marketing skepticism
Opis:
Prior research points out the emerging phenomenon of consumer resistance in terms of resistance towards the marketing discipline. At the same time, extant literature suggests the increasing importance of authenticity in marketing. This study investigates the research question whether and by which means authenticity in marketing can be a response to consumer resistance. The authors conducted qualitative research within which one part of the interviews was conducted with marketing-resistant participants, another one with non-resistant respondents. This permitted to elaborate on divergences between the two groups concerning the evaluation of authenticity. The results illustrate that resistant consumers showed a greater sensitivity for authenticity and clear preferences for authentic brands compared to a more indifferent assessment of the comparison group. Resistant consumers were more likely to identify themselves with the presented authentic brands and appreciated their bene fits such as autonomy, closeness, quality assurance, individuality and economic rebellion that directly contrast with the elaborated points of criticism about marketing. This suggests that, in order to regain consumers that are critical towards the marketing discipline, the elaborated authenticity facets could be applied to brands as an ‘antidote’.
Źródło:
Journal of Marketing and Consumer Behaviour in Emerging Markets; 2015, 2(2); 15-32
2449-6634
Pojawia się w:
Journal of Marketing and Consumer Behaviour in Emerging Markets
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Człowiek ponowoczesny jako podstawowy problem nowej ewangelizacji
Postmodern man as a basic problem of new evangelization
Autorzy:
Sienkiewicz, Edward
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/469549.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Szczeciński. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego
Tematy:
nowa ewangelizacja
nowa apologia
prawda
panowanie Boga
ponowoczesność
myśl starogrecka
redefinicja
dekonstrukcja
narracja
relatywizm
sceptycyzm
pesymizm
modernizm
new evangelization
a new apology
truth
the reign of God
postmodernism
ancient Greek thought
re-engineering
deconstruction
narrative
relativism
skepticism
pessimism
modernism
Opis:
Podstawowym kryterium rozumienia nowej ewangelizacji jest dzieło Jezusa Chrystusa. Ogłoszone przez Niego bliskie panowanie Boga przesądza o istocie nowości Jego wydarzenia wobec Starego Przymierza. Dodatkowym aspektem tej nowości jest każdorazowy kontekst, do którego należy obecnie postmodernizm jako wyjątkowe wyzwanie wobec misji ewangelizacji. Wyznacznikiem rozumienia kontekstu jest najpierw postępowanie historycznego Jezusa, a następnie Jego uczniów i pierwszych nauczycieli wiary wychodzących na spotkanie antycznego świata z jego kulturą, charakteryzującą się dążeniami uniwersalistycznymi. Najbardziej skuteczną podstawą spotkania kultur i zarazem zachodniej cywilizacji okazało się chrześcijaństwo stawiające w centrum poznanie obiektywnej i wszystkich zobowiązującej prawdy. Ponowoczesność hołdująca relatywizmowi i negująca obiektywny charakter prawdy dąży do radykalnej redefinicji obrazu rzeczywistości. Jej początkiem ma być dekonstrukcja rozumiana jako negacja dotychczasowych osiągnięć kulturowych i cywilizacyjnych, jednak bez propozycji jakiejkolwiek nowej wizji świata oraz człowieka. Stąd ponowoczesność należy określić jako radykalną formę współczesnego sceptycyzmu i pesymizmu, czemu chrześcijanie muszą przeciwstawić wciąż aktualną apologię – jako obronę wiary i ewangelizację – jako jej świadectwo. Przymiotnikowe ich dookreślenie – „nowa apologia” i „nowa ewangelizacja” podyktowane jest ich nowym kontekstem.
The basic criterion for understanding new evangelization is the work of Jesus Christ. Announced by Him the close reign of God prejudges the novelty essence of His event to the Old Covenant and in the universalist sense. Another aspect of this novelty is every-time context that postmodernism belongs to and that is as a unique challenge to the mission of evangelization. For better understanding of the context we have to, first and foremost, carry out a historical investigation of Jesus, and then His disciples and the first teachers of the faith, that go out to meet the ancient world with its culture which is characterized by universalistic aspirations. The most effective basis for the meeting of cultures and the Western civilization was Christianity that puts in the center of learning the all requiring objective truth. The postmodernism that favours relativism and recognizes that truth impossible to determine, and the desire to know her as dangerous, calls for a radical redefinition – the reconstruction of the image of reality. Its beginning is to be deconstruction understood as a negation of the existing cultural and civilizational achievements. Unfortunately, postmodernists just stop at that point without offering any systematic and competitive vision of the world and of man. Postmodernism should therefore be defined as a radical form of modern skepticism and the collapse of the meaning of pessimism which Christians must still resist still the current apologia – as a defense of faith and evangelization – as her testimony. The adjectival clarification – „a new apology” and „new evangelization” is dictated by their new context.
Źródło:
Studia Koszalińsko-Kołobrzeskie; 2015, 22; 145-163
1230-0780
2719-4337
Pojawia się w:
Studia Koszalińsko-Kołobrzeskie
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Metoda sceptycka w filozofii Kanta i Husserla
The skeptical method in Kant’s and Husserl’s philosophy
Autorzy:
Łaciak, Piotr
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/423215.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet w Białymstoku. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku
Tematy:
phenomenology
criticism
dogmatism
skepticism
suspension of judgment
fenomenologia
krytycyzm
dogmatyzm
sceptycyzm
zawieszenie sądu
Opis:
The article presents Kant’s and Husserl’s philosophy from the point of view of the skeptical method, understood as an attitude of suspending judgment. Both philosophers make a distinction between skepticism and the skeptical method: skepticism comes down to negative dogmatism, while the skeptical method is characterized as a part of the critical procedure because criticism consists in a suspension of judgments (epoché) which we formulate without previous research of their origins and limits. The aim of the article is to indicate analogy between Kant and Husserl with reference to the suspension of judgments. This analogy opens new interpretational possibilities of the phenomenological epoché from the critical perspective.
Źródło:
IDEA. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych; 2015, 27; 5-23
0860-4487
Pojawia się w:
IDEA. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Obiektywność, eksternalizm i sceptycyzm
Objectivity, externalism and skepticism
Autorzy:
Kubić, Andrzej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/577443.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
Tematy:
obiektywność
intersubiektywność
eksternalizm
internalizm
sceptycyzm
objectivity
intersubjectivity
externalism
internalism
skepticism
Opis:
Celem artykułu jest ukazanie problematyki obiektywności w sporze między eksternalizmem a internalizmem oraz wykazanie oddziaływania zwrotnego antysceptycznych koncepcji eksternalistów na umocnienie ideału obiektywności. Przedstawione zostaną koncepcje esternalizmu epistemicznego Roberta Nozicka oraz semantycznego Hilarego Putnama i Donalda Davidsona, jak również zarys stanowisk internalistycznych.
The aim of the paper is to show the relevance of objectivity in the dispute between externalism and internalism and to demonstrate how anti-skeptical externalisms approach strengthens the ideal of objectivity. There are presented the positions of Robert Nozick’s epistemic externalism as well as both Hilary Putnam’s and Donald Davidson’s semantic externalism, and also the internalism issues.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa; 2015, 51, 2(204); 175-182
0044-1619
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
THE COMMON SENSE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JAMES WILSON (1742–1798)
Autorzy:
Bayer, Roberta
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/507620.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015-09-30
Wydawca:
International Étienne Gilson Society
Tematy:
natural law
Étienne Gilson
constitution
James Wilson
William Blackstone
Alasdair MacIntyre
John Locke
Richard Hooker
David Hume
skepticism
liberty
freedom
despotism
Opis:
James Wilson (1742–1798), lawyer, Justice of the first Supreme Court of the United States, and Constitutional Framer argued, as did Étienne Gilson, that a citizenry who have adopted philosophical skepticism will lose their political freedom, as self-rule requires that citizens be able to reason rightly about the natural law. He advocated a common sense philosophical education in natural law for all lawyers, so that they might know the first principles of moral reasoning.
Źródło:
Studia Gilsoniana; 2015, 4, 3; 187-207
2300-0066
Pojawia się w:
Studia Gilsoniana
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Gilson on Dogmatism
Autorzy:
Nnamdi Konye, Michael
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/507522.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016-06-30
Wydawca:
International Étienne Gilson Society
Tematy:
philosophy
dogmatism
skepticism
scholasticism
Étienne Gilson
Peter Abelard
Al-Ghazali
William of Ockham
Opis:
The article aims at uncovering reasons why philosophy may become conducive to dogmatism which inevitably leads to the failure of philosophy. In the light of Gilson’s considerations contained in his The Unity of Philosophical Experience, the author concludes that philosophy is always exposed to the influence of dogmatism when it is done from a non-philosophical standpoint. For each time when the engagement in the philosophical enterprise is driven by non-philosophical needs, it is usually the case that the goal of philosophy is misconstrued as merely that of providing an instrumental ontology to non-philosophical areas of knowledge. To avoid such mistakes as logicism, theologism or psychologism, philosophy must recover its proper object that is the real world of persons and things, and its proper method that is metaphysics.
Źródło:
Studia Gilsoniana; 2016, 5, 2; 307-326
2300-0066
Pojawia się w:
Studia Gilsoniana
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
On the Motivations of a Skeptic, and Her Practice
Autorzy:
Maddox, Bryan
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/633536.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
Skepticism
Pyrrhonism
Motivation
tarache
Opis:
The aim of Pyrrhonism is deceptively simple: to achieve a state of ataraxia, of tranquility and relief from perturbation. But what is the extent of the ataraxia envisioned? Must the Skeptic admit a hard distinction between disturbances apparently related to belief and therefore subject to suspension of judgement, and extra-doxastic disturbances (e.g. everyday anxiety and frustration, or even hunger and fear) that are beyond the scope of the Skeptical method? In this paper I examine passages from Sextus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism that indicate that such a distinction may not stand up to Skeptical scrutiny and that the Skeptical method does not only apply to “philosophical” speculative dogma or to “intellectual” perturbation, contra Barnes’s claim that the person who perceives the fewest anomalies may make “the perfect Pyrrhonist”. But I also, following Massie’s critique of unwarranted causal inferences regarding the relation between equipollence and ataraxia, distinguish cases where tarache (disturbance) presents itself as anomalous and thus lends itself to inquiry from cases where it presents itself with an apparent cause and does not provoke inquiry. Thus, though an apparently extra-doxastic disturbance may actually be rooted in unconsciously-held dogma, the Skeptic cannot demarcate a special class of potentially doxastic disturbances without employing a dogmatic psychology of her own. She must instead suspend judgment regarding the entire scope of her method, entertaining the possibility that any disturbance could be relieved through the Skeptical method. In the process, ataraxia is divested of definite parameters and the Skeptical method becomes effectively endless.
Źródło:
Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2016, 7, 1; 229-248
2082-7539
Pojawia się w:
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Fonti umanistiche nel pensiero di Christian Francken
Autorzy:
Biagioni, Mario
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/602621.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Historii im. Tadeusza Manteuffla PAN w Warszawie
Tematy:
unbelief
radykalna reformacja
sceptycyzm
Sekstus Empiryk
Pomponazzi
Francken
niewiara
Radical Reformation
skepticism
Sextus Empiricus
Opis:
Radykalny reformator Christian Francken (1552–1610?) pozostawał pod ogromnym wpływem Pietra Pomponazziego, a później Sekstusa Empiryka. Znacznie mniej istotny był wpływ neoplatonizmu. Jego wczesne teologiczne i filozoficzne teksty, od Breve colloquium Iesuiticum (1579) do Praecipuarum enumeratio causarum (1584), czerpały przede wszystkim z prac Pomponazziego. Wpływ Sekstusa Empiryka stał się fundamentalny około 1587 r., kiedy Francken zaczął pracę nad dziełem Disputatio de incertitudine religionis Christianae, w którym ujawnił zdecydowanie sceptyczną postawę, graniczącą z niewiarą. The radical reformer Christian Francken (1552–1610?) was deeply influenced by Pietro Pomponazzi and, later, by Sextus Empiricus. Much less important was the influence of Neoplatonism. Pomponazzi’s works were the main sources in his early theological and philosophical writings from the Breve colloquium Iesuiticum (1579) to the Praecipuarum enumeratio causarum (1584). The influence of Sextus Empiricus became crucial from around 1587, when Francken began writing the Disputatio de incertitudine religionis Christianae, where he exhibited a sharp skeptical attitude that led him not far from unbelief.
Źródło:
Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce; 2017, 61
0029-8514
Pojawia się w:
Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
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