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Tytuł:
Parmenides Fragment B 3
Autorzy:
Marcinkowska-Rosol, M.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/702685.pdf
Data publikacji:
2005
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
Tematy:
GREEK PHILOSOPHY
PARMENIDES
PRESOCRATICS
Opis:
The article discusses possible meanings of Parmenides' fr. B 3 Diels-Kranz (to\ ga\r au)to\ noei=n e)sti/n te kai\ ei)=nai) and its grammatical structure. Special attention is given to the question of continuity between that fragment and fr. B 2, 7-8.
Źródło:
Meander; 2005, 60, 3; 285-299
0025-6285
Pojawia się w:
Meander
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The Meaning of Being
Autorzy:
Xinyan, Zhang
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2130838.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018
Wydawca:
Instytut Studiów Międzynarodowych i Edukacji Humanum
Tematy:
being
metaphysics
ontology
Heraclitus
Parmenides
Opis:
With many different concepts, definitions, equations and examples, the author tries in this article to tell one and the same thing: The meaning of the ontological concept “being”, the most asked and answered question in philosophy. The author puts forward here the notion: “Being” might mean nothing more or less than Parmenides’ one in Heraclitus’ flux. He holds that the one and the flux are the same in reality. And we may not experience Heraclitus’ flux if without the one and can also not understand Parmenides’ one if without the flux.
Źródło:
Humanum. Międzynarodowe Studia Społeczno-Humanistyczne; 2018, 4(31); 91-96
1898-8431
Pojawia się w:
Humanum. Międzynarodowe Studia Społeczno-Humanistyczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Structure and Relevance of the Aristotelian Critic toward the Eleatics (Ph. I 2–3)
Structure and Relevance of the Aristotelian Critic toward the Eleatics (Ph. I 2–3)
Autorzy:
Volpe, Enrico
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/633475.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
Aristotle
Physics
Parmenides
Melissus
Eleatism
Opis:
The first book of the Aristotelian Physics may be considered as a sort of general introduction to the whole work. In particular, chapters 2 and 3 result very interesting for the foundation of the science of nature according to Aristotle; indeed, in these two chapters, the Stagirite criticizes the position of the Eleates Parmenides and Melissus. These two philosophers are considered as those who claim that change does not exist because the existence of the not-being is impossible to suppose. For this reason, since the Eleates deny that motion and change really exist, the refutation of their thesis results essential for the logical and ontological foundation of the Aristotelian science of nature. This paper wants to make light on the argumentations that Aristotle uses against Parmenides and Melissus. Indeed, since the Stagirite makes often use of his philosophical categories (like substance; the categories, the continuum and so on), it seems that his critics sound a little bit anachronistic. In many passages of the text is seems that Aristotle “simply” replace the presupposition of the Eleatic philosophy (i.e. the being is and not-being does not) with the thesis of the evidence of moving and plurality, in general. The aim of this contribution is to reflect on the critics present in Ph. I 2–3 in order to underline the importance of the Eleatic philosophy for the Aristotelian science of nature.
The first book of the Aristotelian Physics may be considered as a sort of general introduction to the whole work. In particular, chapters 2 and 3 result very interesting for the foundation of the science of nature according to Aristotle; indeed, in these two chapters, the Stagirite criticizes the position of the Eleates Parmenides and Melissus. These two philosophers are considered as those who claim that change does not exist because the existence of the not-being is impossible to suppose. For this reason, since the Eleates deny that motion and change really exist, the refutation of their thesis results essential for the logical and ontological foundation of the Aristotelian science of nature. This paper wants to make light on the argumentations that Aristotle uses against Parmenides and Melissus. Indeed, since the Stagirite makes often use of his philosophical categories (like substance; the categories, the continuum and so on), it seems that his critics sound a little bit anachronistic. In many passages of the text is seems that Aristotle “simply” replace the presupposition of the Eleatic philosophy (i.e. the being is and not-being does not) with the thesis of the evidence of moving and plurality, in general. The aim of this contribution is to reflect on the critics present in Ph. I 2–3 in order to underline the importance of the Eleatic philosophy for the Aristotelian science of nature.
Źródło:
Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2016, 7, 1; 149-166
2082-7539
Pojawia się w:
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Melisso e il problema del vuoto: apologia e/o fraintendimento del monismo parmenideo?
Melissus and the Problem of the Void: Apology and/or Misapprehension of the Parmenidean Monism?
Autorzy:
Volpe, Enrico
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/938296.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
Melissus
Parmenides
Leucippus
void
monism
Opis:
With respect to Parmenides’ thought Melissus was regarded as a dissident thinker already in antiquity. His polemical introduction of the concept of void and the relative idea of infinite Being seemed particularly controversial. The aim of the present paper is to examine the origins of the Melissian understanding of void in order to trace its philosophical genesis to the criticism of the Atomist Leucippus. According to the philosopher from Abdera, the Eleatic fundamental principles had to conform to the obviousness of bodies’ motion, which is why the Eleatic not-Being had to be understood as void. Melissus took issue with this view and criticized the idea of the void’s reality by means of a methodical argument. In the course of doing so, the philosopher from Samos distorted the original Parmenidean ontology, which is why his theories were often criticized severely as theoretically weak.
Źródło:
Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2017, 8, 1; 91-106
2082-7539
Pojawia się w:
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Melissos z Samos – doksografia i fragmenty
Melissos of Samos – Doxography and Fragments
Autorzy:
Wesoły, Marian A.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1178755.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020-12-23
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
Melissos
Parmenides
Eleatic arguments
monism
Opis:
There are several recent and noteworthy studies on the testimonies and fragments of Melissos of Samos: Laks-Most (2016), Brémond (2017). Furthermore, one can learn a great deal about Melissos from the lectures and discussions undertaken in the framework of “Eleatica 2012” (Mansfeld A. et al. 2016). When taken together, these studies enable us to fully appreciate Melissos’ original work in terms of its sources, its audacious arguments and its later criticisms. Melissos is here presented as a spokesman of the Eleatic school in an order that aims to do justice to the ancient testimonies that relate and refute his arguments as well as to the verbatim fragments (these are given here in the original). For the sake of clarity, however, various secondary testimonies have been omitted.
Źródło:
Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2020, 11, 1; 13-32
2082-7539
Pojawia się w:
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Monism in Aristotle’s Metaphysics I.3–5
Autorzy:
Johansen, Thomas Kjeller
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2016432.pdf
Data publikacji:
2021-12-13
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
Parmenides
Aristotle
monism
materialism
causes
Opis:
Scholars have often seen Parmenides as entirely opposed to earlier materialistic philosophy. In this paper I argue that what is more striking in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Book I is the degree of continuity that he sees between Parmenides and the material monists. I explore this coupling of Parmenides with the material monists to understand better what he takes to be distinctive and problematic with Parmenides’ monism.
Źródło:
Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2021, 12, 1; 19-40
2082-7539
Pojawia się w:
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Recenzja książki W.K. Gródka OFM Jedno, wiele, nic u Zenona i Gorgiasza. Analiza terminów ἕν, πολλά, οὐδέν w kontekście teorii Parmenidesa:, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jana Pawła II, 2018
Review of W.K. Gródeks book Jedno, wiele, nic u Zenona i Gorgiasza. Analiza terminów ἕν, πολλά, οὐδέν w kontekście teorii Parmenidesa:, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jana Pawła II, 2018
Autorzy:
Pacewicz, Artur
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1621485.pdf
Data publikacji:
2021
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Szczeciński. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego
Tematy:
Parmenides
Zeno
Gorgias
Zenon
Gorgiasz
Opis:
Recenzja książki W.K. Gródka "Jedno, wiele, nic..."
Review of W.K. Gródek's book "Jedno, wiele, nic..."
Źródło:
Analiza i Egzystencja; 2021, 53; 113-117
1734-9923
2300-7621
Pojawia się w:
Analiza i Egzystencja
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Aristotle’s Solution for Parmenides’ Inconclusive Argument in Physics I.3
Autorzy:
Angioni, Lucas
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2016431.pdf
Data publikacji:
2021-12-13
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
Aristotle
sophistical argument
Parmenides
predication
being
Opis:
I discuss the argument which Aristotle ascribes to Parmenides at Physics 186a23–32. I examine (i) the reasons why Aristotle considers it to be eristic and inconclusive and (ii) the solution (lusis) that he proposes against it.
Źródło:
Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2021, 12, 1; 41-67
2082-7539
Pojawia się w:
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Melisso, il tempo e l’eterno
Melissus, Time and Eternity
Autorzy:
Pulpito, Massimo
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/938290.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
Melissus
Parmenides
Time
Eternity
Atemporality
Eleatism
Opis:
The traditional interpretation of Eleatism has it (1) that Melissus was a disciple of Parmenides (albeit with some divergences) and (2) that Parmenides believed in the timeless eternity of Being. It seems, on the contrary, (3) that Melissus acknowledged the reality of time by conceiving eternity as infinite time. Failing to justify this particular divergence from Parmenides’ approach, certain authors held that it was necessary to reinterpret the Melissan eternity as a form of infinite timelessness. This paper attempts to demonstrate that this reading is groundless and that if the traditional interpretation is questioned then one should reconsider the assumptions (1) and (2) but not (3).
Źródło:
Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2017, 8, 1; 107-124
2082-7539
Pojawia się w:
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Parmenide e l’Uovo argenteo degli Orfici in Simplicio, Damascio e Proclo
Autorzy:
Licciardi, Ivan Adriano
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/28408733.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
Egg
Orphism
Parmenides
Proclus
Damascius
Simplicius
Opis:
When commenting on Aristotle Ph. 1.3, 187a1, Simplicius in Ph. 1.3, 146, 29–147,2 establishes an equivalence between the shining «silver egg» (ὤεον ἀργύφεον) of Orpheus (fr. 70 Kern) and the Parmenidean being or, rather, one of the determinations with which Parmenides, in the section of his Poem devoted to the so-called Way of Truth, indicates the ἐόν, i.e., «resembling the mass of a well-rounded sphere» (εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκωι – DK 28 B 8.43). The equivalence established here is found in the great digression about Parmenides (in Ph. 142, 28–148, 24), where Simplicius puts forward an interpretation of Parmenides that identifies the Parmenidean being-one (τὸ ἓν ὄν) with the intelligible (τὸ νοητόν), which, in another passages of the same commentary, is also qualified with the metaphysical concept of “unified” (τὸ ἡνωμένον) that is taken from Damascius. The aim of the present paper is to trace back the Neo-Platonic assumptions of this identification. In particular, we will focus on Damascius Pr. 2.55.40, 14–19 and 3.123.160, 1–3 Westerink, since these passages contain insights into the Orphic theology that is referred to as “usual”, “common” or “rhapsodic”, as well as a contextual “translation” of various Orphic concepts (e.g. ὤεον ἀργύφεον) in terms of Neo-Platonic metaphysics. The metaphysical transposition of the mythical image of the silver egg goes back, however, to Proclus (in Ti. 1.428, 8–9), who assumes the identity between Plato’s being (“being in the primary sense”, τὸ πρώτως [...] ὄν) and the Orphic egg (ταὐτὸν τό τε Πλάτωνος ὂν καὶ τὸ Ὀρφικὸν ὠόν). One cannot, at the same time, exclude a priori the possibility that the Orphic motif of the silver egg circulated in the Magna Graecia of Parmenides already from at least the 6th century BC. It is possible, as Colli hypothesised, that already Ibycus (who certainly knew Orpheus, fr. 25 Page) betrays a certain knowledge of it in fr. 4.4–5 Page, where we find the expression ἐν ὠέωι ἀργυρέωι. This article demonstrates that Proclus and Damascius embedded the Orphic concept of ὤεον ἀργύφεον into their Neo-Platonic metaphysics by showing its potential for speculative order.
Źródło:
Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2023, 14, 1; 99-124
2082-7539
Pojawia się w:
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Parmenide: suoni, immagini, esperienza. A proposito di una nuova lettura.
Parmenides: Sounds, Images, Experience. A Suggestion of a New Reading
Autorzy:
Fratticci, Walter
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/633605.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
Parmenides
Gemelli Marciano
Kingsley
logos
mythos
ontology
Opis:
This essay aims to analyse the Parmenides’ interpretation that Laura Gemelli Marciano offered in the Eleatica lectures. The scholar represents the Parmenidean Poem as a mystical experience where sounds, words and images communicate and produce a real approach to the divine reality at the same time. This intriguing reading, which closely follows that offered by Kingsley, understimates the problems and cognitive structures of rational thought in the poem. Thus Parmenides appears to be a shaman rather a philosopher.
Laura Gemelli Marciano, Parmenide: suoni, immagini, esperienza, a cura di L. Rossetti e M. Pulpito, Academia Verlag, Sankt Augustin, 2013, pp. 304.
Źródło:
Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2015, 6, 1; 295-330
2082-7539
Pojawia się w:
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Aristotle, Eleaticism, and Zeno’s Grains of Millet
Autorzy:
Boeri, Marcello D.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2016376.pdf
Data publikacji:
2021-12-13
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
Aristotle
Eleaticism
Parmenides
Zeno
motion
mathematical proportions
Opis:
This paper explores how Aristotle rejects some Eleatic tenets in general and some of Zeno’s views in particular that apparently threaten the Aristotelian “science of nature.” According to Zeno, it is impossible for a thing to traverse what is infinite or to come in contact with infinite things in a finite time. Aristotle takes the Zenonian view to be wrong by resorting to his distinction between potentiality and actuality and to his theory of mathematical proportions as applied to the motive power and the moved object (Ph. VII.5). He states that some minimal parts of certain magnitudes (i.e., continuous quantities) are perceived, but only in potentiality, not in actuality. This being so, Zeno’s view that a single grain of millet makes no sound on falling, but a thousand grains make a sound must be rejected. If Zeno’s paradoxes were true, there would be no motion, but if there is no motion, there is no nature, and hence, there cannot be a science of nature. What Aristotle noted in the millet seed paradox, I hold, is that it apparently casts doubt on his theory of mathematical proportions, i.e., the theory of proportions that holds between the moving power and the object moved, and the extent of the change and the time taken. This approach explains why Aristotle establishes an analogy between the millet seed paradox, on the one hand, and the argument of the stone being worn away by the drop of water (Ph. 253b15–16) and the hauled ship, on the other.
Źródło:
Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2021, 12, 1; 107-121
2082-7539
Pojawia się w:
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Les deux manières d’expliquer la réalité proposées par Parménide
Parmenides’ Two Ways of Explaining Reality
Autorzy:
Cordero, Nestor Luis
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/28408711.pdf
Data publikacji:
2022
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
Truth
Opinions
Doxography
Fülleborn
Simplicius
Plato
Being
Parmenides
Opis:
Towards the end of fragment 1 of his Poem, Parmenides puts forward two methods or paths that a priori explain the same object of study: the existence of the fact or state of being. One of the options leads to the core of the truth and is, therefore, pursued. The other is merely a set of contradictory opinions and is, accordingly, abandoned. These two paths are expounded in the rest of the Poem, while fragment 4 shows that even the erroneous conception, which had to be set aside, can still be fruitful. Once the firm foundation of truth has been established, fragments 10 and 11 propose to widen the inquiry to the whole of reality. This interpretation suggests a rejection of the arrangement of the Poem that has become canonical, and a criticism of the doxographic tradition that since Aristotle has “Platonised” the philosophy of Parmenides by assimilating the “opinions” (which are only points of view) to the “appearances” (in the Platonic sense of the term).
Źródło:
Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2022, 13, 1; 13-24
2082-7539
Pojawia się w:
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Poemat Parmenidesa. Fragmenty B 9-17, B 19
Poem of Parmenides
Autorzy:
Mrówka, Kazimierz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/691282.pdf
Data publikacji:
2012
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
Parmenides
ancient philosophy
being
epistemology
ontology
metaphysics
truth
Opis:
This is a new translation of the Fragments of Parmenides of Elea, the fifth century B.C. thinker. The text includes: a Greek poem with the fragments B 9-17, B 19, a critical apparatus which takes into consideration some new editions and a new English translation.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2012, 50; 118-139
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The Illusion of a Crossroads: Parmenides, Arendt, Mamardashvili and the Space for Truth
Autorzy:
Sushytska, Julia
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2197114.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023-03-31
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Tematy:
truth
propaganda
art
Arendt
Mamardashvili
Parmenides
Ukraine
Aseyev
Opis:
If “classical” lies aimed to conceal truth and “modern” ones attempted to destroy it, “postmodern” propaganda targets the self and the certainty of thinking. The organized lies of our times aim to silence the self by sabotaging our ability to make sense of the world. As a result, it is difficult to speak truth today. It is equally difficult to hear it, not in the least because truth, unlike propaganda, is unwilling to admit that it is one opinion among others. An artificial form – a metaphor, a paradox, a novel, or a painting – can help truth be heard. Literature can help me decide something that has already been decided. Hannah Arendt’s essay “Truth and Politics,” the text written by Parmenides, Merab Mamardashvili’s concept of artificial organs, and Stanislav Aseyev’s recent memoir help me establish these claims.
Źródło:
Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture; 2022, 6, 4; 21-31
2544-302X
Pojawia się w:
Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
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