Informacja

Drogi użytkowniku, aplikacja do prawidłowego działania wymaga obsługi JavaScript. Proszę włącz obsługę JavaScript w Twojej przeglądarce.

Wyszukujesz frazę "Nash solution" wg kryterium: Temat


Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4
Tytuł:
On the Non-Symmetric Nash and Kalai–Smorodinsky Bargaining Solutions
Autorzy:
Gerchak, Y.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/375971.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Akademia Górniczo-Hutnicza im. Stanisława Staszica w Krakowie. Wydawnictwo AGH
Tematy:
Nash bargaining solution
Non-Symmetric
Kalai–Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution
supply chain coordination
Opis:
Recently, in some negotiation application areas, the usual assumption that negotiators are symmetric has been relaxed. In particular, weights have been introduced to the Nash Bargaining Solution to reflect the different powers of the players. Yet, we feel that operating with non-symmetric bargaining solutions and their implications is not well understood. We analyze the properties and optimization of the non-symmetric Nash Bargaining Solution and of a non-symmetric Kalai–Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution. We provide extensive comparative statics, then comment on the implications of the concepts in supply chain coordination contexts.
Źródło:
Decision Making in Manufacturing and Services; 2015, 9, 1; 55-61
1896-8325
2300-7087
Pojawia się w:
Decision Making in Manufacturing and Services
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
From optimal control to non-cooperative differential games: a homotopy approach
Autorzy:
Bressan, A.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/970911.pdf
Data publikacji:
2009
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Badań Systemowych PAN
Tematy:
optimal control
non-cooperative differential games
Nash equilibrium solution
optimal feedback control
Opis:
We propose a new approach to the study of Nash equilibrium solutions to non-cooperative differential games. The original problem is embedded in a one-parameter family of differential games, where the parameter 0 ∈ [0,1] accounts for the strength of the second player. When 0 = 0, the second player adopts a myopic strategy and the game reduces to an optimal control problem for the first player. As 0 becomes strictly positive, Nash equilibrium solutions can be obtained by studying a bifurcation problem for the corresponding system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations.
Źródło:
Control and Cybernetics; 2009, 38, 4A; 1081-1106
0324-8569
Pojawia się w:
Control and Cybernetics
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Online learning algorithm for zero-sum games with integral reinforcement learning
Autorzy:
Vamvoudakis, K. G.
Vrabie, D.
Lewis, F. L.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/91780.pdf
Data publikacji:
2011
Wydawca:
Społeczna Akademia Nauk w Łodzi. Polskie Towarzystwo Sieci Neuronowych
Tematy:
learning
online algorithm
zero-sum game
game
infinite horizon
Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation
approximation network
optimal value function
adaptive control tuning algorithm
Nash solution
Opis:
In this paper we introduce an online algorithm that uses integral reinforcement knowledge for learning the continuous-time zero sum game solution for nonlinear systems with infinite horizon costs and partial knowledge of the system dynamics. This algorithm is a data based approach to the solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation and it does not require explicit knowledge on the system’s drift dynamics. A novel adaptive control algorithm is given that is based on policy iteration and implemented using an actor/ disturbance/critic structure having three adaptive approximator structures. All three approximation networks are adapted simultaneously. A persistence of excitation condition is required to guarantee convergence of the critic to the actual optimal value function. Novel adaptive control tuning algorithms are given for critic, disturbance and actor networks. The convergence to the Nash solution of the game is proven, and stability of the system is also guaranteed. Simulation examples support the theoretical result.
Źródło:
Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Soft Computing Research; 2011, 1, 4; 315-332
2083-2567
2449-6499
Pojawia się w:
Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Soft Computing Research
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
A communication network routing problem: Modeling and optimization using non-cooperative game theory
Autorzy:
Dubey, Sapana P.
Kedar, Ganesh D.
Ghate, Suresh H.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1838181.pdf
Data publikacji:
2021
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Zielonogórski. Oficyna Wydawnicza
Tematy:
communication network
routing problem
game theory
focal points
Nash equilibrium
Pareto optimal solution
sieć komunikacyjna
teoria gier
punkt ogniskowy
równowaga Nasha
Opis:
We consider a communication network routing problem wherein a number of users need to efficiently transmit their throughput demand in the form of data packets (incurring less cost and less delay) through one or more links. Using the game theoretic perspective, we propose a dynamic model which ensures unhindered transmission of data even in the case where the capacity of the link is exceeded. The model incorporates a mechanism in which users are appropriately punished (with additional cost) when the total data to be transmitted exceeds the capacity of the link. The model has multiple Nash equilibrium points. To arrive at rational strategies, we introduce the concept of focal points and get what is termed focal Nash equilibrium (FNE) points for the model. We further introduce the concept of preferred focal Nash equilibrium (PFNE) points and find their relation with the Pareto optimal solution for the model.
Źródło:
International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science; 2021, 31, 1; 155-164
1641-876X
2083-8492
Pojawia się w:
International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4

    Ta witryna wykorzystuje pliki cookies do przechowywania informacji na Twoim komputerze. Pliki cookies stosujemy w celu świadczenia usług na najwyższym poziomie, w tym w sposób dostosowany do indywidualnych potrzeb. Korzystanie z witryny bez zmiany ustawień dotyczących cookies oznacza, że będą one zamieszczane w Twoim komputerze. W każdym momencie możesz dokonać zmiany ustawień dotyczących cookies