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Tytuł:
„Wanderer zwischen den Disziplinen”. O twórczości Georga Simmla
„Wanderer zwischen den Disziplinen”. To the Work of Georg Simmel
Autorzy:
Cieśla, Stanisław
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1857668.pdf
Data publikacji:
2001
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
historia socjologii
Georg Simmel
poznanie
Kant
kultura
społeczeństwo
wzajemne oddziaływanie
socjologia
pragmatyzm
history of sociology
knowledge
culture
society
mutual influence
sociology
pragmatism
Opis:
„Wanderer zwischen den Disziplinen”. Zum Schaffen von Georg Simmel Das Ziel dieses Aufsatzes war nicht nur eine Darstellung des umfangreichen Werkes von Georg Simmel, sondern auch eine Beschreibung der wichtigsten Probleme, mit denen er sich in seinen Werken auseinandergesetzt hat. Der Aufsatz ist also verstanden als Beitrag zur Überwindung der auch in der polnischen Fachliteratur vorhandenen Stereotype über Georg Simmel. Die Analyse geht von drei Phasen der intellektuellen Entwicklung Simmels aus: von Forschungen des jungen Simmel, über Studien zur Kultur und Gesellschaft, bis hin zur Lebensphilosophie. Soziologie, obwohl sehr bedeutend in seinem Schaffen, war nie das einzige Forschungsfeld Simmels. Mit der Begründung der Soziologie als Wissenschaft beschäftigt er sich zwar sein ganzes Leben lang, er gehört als Soziologie zu den Klassikern der Soziologie, ist Soziologe, aber keinesfalls „nur Soziologe”. Genauso beschäftigt er sich mit den Problemem der Erkenntnis, Kultur, Ästhetik, Philosophie. Das was sein Werk verbindet, sind eben die Probleme. Er wandert zwischen den Disziplinen, um die ihn interessierenden Probleme aus der Perspektive verschiedener Disziplinen zu beleuchten und zu erörtern.
Źródło:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych; 2001, 1; 69-96
0137-4176
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Kant jedzie do Bagdadu : dialog filozofów : rozmowa André Glucksmanna z Immanuelem Kantem z okazji 200. rocznicy jego śmierci
Powiązania:
Rzeczpospolita 2004, nr 45. Dod. Plus Minus", s. A5-A6
Współwytwórcy:
Glucksmann, André. Opracowanie
Dobiecki, Grzegorz. Tłumaczenie
Data publikacji:
2004
Tematy:
Kant, Immanuel (1724-1804)
Opis:
Dot. fikcyjnej podróży Immanuela Kanta do Bagdadu, współczesnej polityki międzynarodowej i sytuacji w Iraku.
Rys.
Dostawca treści:
Bibliografia CBW
Artykuł
Tytuł:
O argumencie moralnym za istnieniem Boga
On the Moral Argument for the Existence of God
Autorzy:
Wojtysiak, Jacek
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2015607.pdf
Data publikacji:
2004
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
argumenty na istnienie Boga
moralność (etyka)
Immanuel Kant
rekonstrukcja logiczna (logika)
najwyższe dobro
szczęście
arguments for the existence of God
morality (ethics)
logical reconstruction (logic)
the ultimate good
happiness
Opis:
The text analyses various examples of moral arguments for the existence of God. Taking advantage of the ideas from the writings of Kant and his interpreters, we sought to reconstruct them logically, conferring on them a form as reliable as possible. All the arguments have been divided into three groups: practical version, theoretical version, mixed version (thought to be optimal).1) Practical version. It starts from our desires, beliefs, obligations etc. and combines them with desires, beliefs, and obligations with regard to God. There are different varieties of this version. We have discussed in more detail its deontic variety based on the assumption: „we should carry out the ultimate good” (the state of happiness conditioned by virtue). Owing additional assumptions (conceptual and psychological) and corresponding simple logical operations we arrive at the conclusion: „we should believe that God exists.” Reliability, however, of such a week conclusion is undermined by the ambiguous character of the statement „we should carry out the ultimate good.” Rather, we should say that we are obliged to carry out moral law, and thereby expect a just reward. Faith in God is conducive to such efforts, inasmuch as they refer to the morality comprehended in a maximalist manner, justice, and happiness.2) Theoretical version. We have pinpointed its two varieties: „the requirement of the lawgiver” and „the requirement of justice.” In the first variety on the basis of the existence of morality we deduce the existence of God as its „author,” for no other creature has a corresponding power, moral and metaphysical, to establish (execute) universal and unconditional moral obligations. In the second variety God appears to safeguard the carrying out a just reward (punishment, inherent in morality itself) for the satisfaction (violation) of these obligations. The debate about the value of the first argument is reduced to the debate about whether morality is indeed characterised by such features whose existence cannot be explained without reference to God. The main debate connected with the second argument is whether the fact of morality entails the ontic (not only deontic) necessity of a just judgement (and its related reward or punishment) of those who are submitted to morality.3) Mixed version. According to some varieties of the practical version, it takes on a human desire to reach the ultimate good at the point of departure. This desire, natural and right, regards the existence of this good as an indicator. Hence it is possible to transfer from the practical sphere to the theoretical one. If it is well-known that the ultimate good exists, we can ask about its cause. Reasoning – similar to the one given in the previous point – leads to a belief that God is this cause. One may doubt, however, whether our natural and right desires are always reliable indicators that their objects exist.4) The above analyses have unveiled the assumptions and difficulties of all the versions of the family of arguments under consideration. Does this mean that the arguments are not efficient? Not in the least. This means only that they are efficient under certain conditions. These conditions, like anything in philosophy, make up the object of everlasting debates.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2004, 52, 2; 391-428
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Pokusy i grzechy wiary pragmatycznej. Immanuel Kant o wewnętrznym kłamstwie
Temptations and Sins of Pragmatic Faith – Immanuel Kant on the Internal Lie
Autorzy:
Galewicz, Włodzimierz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2015648.pdf
Data publikacji:
2004
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
Immanuel Kant
wiara pragmatyczna
wewnętrzne kłamstwo
moralność (etyka)
Bóg
pragmatic faith
internal lie
morality (ethics)
God
Opis:
The paper an analytical-interpretative commentary on several excerpts from I. Kant. The first one with an example of a doctor who thinks he knows his patient's illness deals with the concept of pragmatic faith. The author seeks to explicate this concept by giving three interpretations of Kantian example. In a further part of the paper the internal lie is defined as a sin which may fall part of any „believers not careful enough” of the titular faith. The first example is this sin is an internal profession of faith in God („just in case”) without actual participation in it. The second example is a false worship to the Creator, the one that is motivated by fear or punishment. When interpreting these examples, the author refers to the Kantian distinction between homo noumenon (moral being) and homo phaenomenon (physical being). This distinction is related to the interdiction of using homo phaenomenon only as a means (an instrument to speak).
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2004, 52, 2; 111-121
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Ontologizm, czyli Siemiona Franka polemika z pokantowskim epistemologizmem
Ontologism – S. Frank’s Polemic with Post-Kantinian Epistemologism
Autorzy:
Obolevitch, Teresa
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2013335.pdf
Data publikacji:
2007
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
S. Frank
I. Kant
neokantyzm
epistemologia
metafizyka
I
Kant
neo-Kantism
epistemology
metaphysics
Opis:
In this article I compare philosophical investigations of S. Frank and epistemology of Kant and neo-Kantians of Marburg school. In accordance with Kant’s conclusions, neo-Kantians claimed that an object of cognition is unknown (x) which is not “given” but “made” by a subject during the process of cognition. Whereas Frank, beginning with an analysis of judgment concluded that an object of cognition (unknown x) is Absolute or all-unity which really exists. Frank insisted that Absolute enables every cognition. Contrary to neo-Kantians, Frank stressed the primacy of being over cognition. These characteristics in Russian philosophy and was named by the term “ontologism.”
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2007, 55, 2; 67-79
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Cztery motywy idealizmu Kanta i ich krytyka
Four Motives of Kant’s Idealism and their Criticism
Autorzy:
Judycki, Stanisław
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2013207.pdf
Data publikacji:
2008
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
Kant
metafizyka
idealizm
wiedza a priori
metaphysics
a priori knowledge
Opis:
The paper presents some principal motives that made I. Kant take the position of transcendental idealism. They are the following: the question of a priori synthetic judgements, the question of the cognitive and ontic status of space and time, the problem of the constitution of the phenomenal world, and the problem of the objectivity of empirical judgments (the so-called transcendental deduction). In relation to Kant’s solutions some objections have been formulated and a thesis that neither separately nor in combination can the main four motives be treated as conditions sufficient for idealism and agnosticism. The author also seeks to show the relationship between transcendental idealism and Kant’s belief of the impossibility to solve the “great” metaphysical problems, therefore the problem of the existence of God, soul, and freedom.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2008, 56, 1; 123-140
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Kant vo filozofických štúdiách Ch. S. Peircea
Autorzy:
Mihina, František
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2147475.pdf
Data publikacji:
2008
Wydawca:
Instytut Studiów Międzynarodowych i Edukacji Humanum
Tematy:
Kant
pragmatism
noetic pluralism
idealism
Opis:
What is of central importance in Kant ́s thought is the idea that sensory experience is permeated with the order. Idealism to which Kant refers is subjective. It holds that the world is constituted by an order which is mental in character but which is quite independent of the human mind. For Peirce, but not only for him, pragmatism is not a philosophical weltanschauung or metaphysics of truth and reality – rather it is a method of rendering ideas clear and distinct and ascertaining the meaning of words and concepts. Pragmatism is form of the monumental revolt against cartesianism – in this sense this project was influenced by congenial intellectual predecessors – namely by the I. Kant and his critical philosophy. Pragmatism accepts the hypothesis of the noetic pluralism, which is not strictly derivated from the kantian thought. Anyway, pragmatic noetic theory striktly defends hypothesis of noetic pluralism as a fundament for shaping of the conception of the world, which is different, when we compare its in different people. According to Peirce (and others pragmatists) among the German philosophers Kant especially seemed to him to have „possessed in a high degree all seven of the mental qualifications of a philosopher: to ability to discern what is before one ́s conciousness; inventive originality; generalizing power; subtlety; critical severity and sense of fact; systematic procedure; energy, diligence, persistency and exclusive devotion to philosophy“.
Źródło:
Humanum. Międzynarodowe Studia Społeczno-Humanistyczne; 2008, 1(1); 81-94
1898-8431
Pojawia się w:
Humanum. Międzynarodowe Studia Społeczno-Humanistyczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Wpływ filozofii kantowskiej na poglądy filozoficznoprawne Eugeniusza Jarry
Autorzy:
Kuźmicz, Karol
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/621739.pdf
Data publikacji:
2008
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet w Białymstoku. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku
Tematy:
Kant’s philosophy of law, natural law
Opis:
Eugeniusz Jarra (1881–1973) was a historian of philosophy of law, working on Warsaw University till 1939, then he emigrated to France and subsequently to England. Although he wasn’t a member of Kant’s school of philosophy, but you can find distinct connections with Kant’s philosophy. Jarra was closer to Christian philosophy and to social doctrine of the Catholic Church. He believed that the natural law is a psychical experience and this places him among the representatives of so called gnoseological theories of natural law with changing content. For him the natural law was the internal „voice of equity” and also the ideal pattern of positive law. Eugeniusz Jarra treated natural law as a demand addressed to legislative power and as an element of state’s policy of law. Jarra also saw connections between Kant’s conception of state as „unification of human beings under the power of acts” with his idea of citizens’ unity. The concept of state presented by Jarra, in which citizens’ duties play dominant role, can be close to authoritarian or even totalitarian concept of state. This shows that Jarra was only superficial in sharing Kant’s views.
Źródło:
Miscellanea Historico-Iuridica; 2008, 6; 79-95
1732-9132
2719-9991
Pojawia się w:
Miscellanea Historico-Iuridica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Elementy kantyzmu w myśli Normana Bowiego oraz R. Edwarda Freemana
Kantian Aspects of Norman Bowie and R. Edward Freeman Business Ethics
Autorzy:
Stanny, Dominik
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/468884.pdf
Data publikacji:
2009
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii PAN
Tematy:
stakeholder
stakeholder theory
R.E. Freeman
N. Bowie
I. Kant
Kantianism
utilitarianism
Opis:
The aim of the article is to present the Kantian aspects of N. Bowie and R.E. Freeman business ethics. Both authors are well-known in English-area business ethics as the thinkers working on stakeholder theory. R.E. Freeman, a founder of the stakeholder theory, stated the position called “Kantian capitalism” in 1988-1993. N. Bowie has been working on Kantian business ethics since 90‘s till now. R.E. Freeman uses the second formulation of categorical imperative to redefine the aim of the corporation. According to him the traditional definition is false, because it treats stakeholders (excluding shareholders) as means to profi t (as a traditional firm’s aim). Thus, he defines the new aim as acting for interest of all stakeholders. However, this position is sensitive to strong objections what probably caused the author himself to reject it. Furthermore, Freeman’s position seems to be rather utilitarian than Kantian: acting for other’s interest as an aim of morally good company, weighing and sacrificing interest as a method of morally good acting. N. Bowie’s application of Kantian ideas is wider and more systematic than Freeman’s approach. Nonetheless, it is also sensitive to many particular objections, especially misunderstanding of Kantian ideas. Bowie rejects the idea of purity of motive in Kantian ethics in order to justify the possibility of rational Kantian ethics application to area of business. Finally, making the possibility of application seems to be a proof for economical usefulness of Kantian ethics what makes this position close to utilitarianism too (like in Freeman case).
Źródło:
Prakseologia; 2009, 149; 89-105
0079-4872
Pojawia się w:
Prakseologia
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Kant a problem treści percepcji
Kant and the Content of Perceptual Experience
Autorzy:
Tomaszewska, Anna
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2013025.pdf
Data publikacji:
2009
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
Kant
McDowell
konceptualizm
treść reprezentacyjna
niepojęciowa treść doświadczenia
formy naoczności
conceptualism
representational content
nonconceptual mental content
forms of intuition
Opis:
The first part of the article discusses one of the more important issues in the contemporary philosophy of perception and mind, i.e. the problem of the relation between experience and concepts, and that against the background of the conceptualism vs. nonconceptualism debate. On the conceptualist account of empirical cognition, perceptual contents are (throughout) conceptual in the sense that concepts constitute (through and through) the contents of perceptual experience. It is a necessary condition of the ascription of an experience and an empirical belief to a subject that he or she possessed concepts figuring in the characteristic of his or her experience. The relation between experience and belief is described as rational (or logical) rather than causal. I suggest a critical approach towards the conceptualist view in that I spell out some of its inconsistencies. Further, I focus on some selected kinds of nonconceptualism supported by such theorists as Ch. Peacocke, F. Dretske and J. L. Bermúdez. In the second part of my paper, I criticize McDowell’s conceptualist reading of Kant, on which the author of the Critique of Pure Reason is considered as representing the originally conceptualist position. Some of the theses Kant argues for in the “Transcendental Aesthetic” and earlier on in his 1770 Inaugural Dissertation allow us to conclude that, on a certain interpretation of the forms of empirical cognition (space and time), perception, on Kant’s theory, could be regarded as an active but not a concept-involving cognitive process.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2009, 57, 2; 117-133
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł

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