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Wyświetlanie 1-15 z 22
Tytuł:
Is AI case that is explainable, intelligible or hopeless?
Autorzy:
Mścisławski, Łukasz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/28763404.pdf
Data publikacji:
2022
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
AI
externalism
metasemantics
content
Opis:
Wrocław University of Science and Technology, Poland This article is a review of the book Making AI Intelligible. Philosophical Foundations, written by Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever, and published in 2021 by Oxford University Press. The authors of the reviewed book address the difficult issue of interpreting the results provided by AI systems and the links between human-specific content handling and the internal mechanisms of these systems. Considering the potential usefulness of various frameworks developed in philosophy to solve the problem, they conduct a thorough analysis of a wide spectrum of them, from the use of Saul Kripke’s work to a critical analysis of the explainable AI current.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2022, 73; 357-369
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Intentional Identity and Coordination
Autorzy:
Chen, Hsiang-Yun
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/561332.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne
Tematy:
anaphora
attitude ascription
externalism
intentional identity
Opis:
The concept of intentional identity has aroused considerable interests since Geach (1967). I argue, however, that the real import of intentional identity is still not duly appreciated. Drawing on three sets of close-knit data – intersubjective and intrasubjective intentional identity, along with cross-speaker anaphora, I submit coordination as the key to its proper understanding and propose a set of success conditions thereof
Źródło:
Studia Semiotyczne; 2017, 31, 2; 35-51
0137-6608
Pojawia się w:
Studia Semiotyczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Transparent Contents and Trivial Inferences
Autorzy:
Sambrotta, Mirco
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/973301.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019
Wydawca:
Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne
Tematy:
referentialism
transparency
externalism
application conditions
trivial inferences
Opis:
A possible way out to Kripke’s Puzzle About Belief could start from the rejection of the notion of epistemic transparency. Epistemic transparency seems, indeed, irremediably incompatible with an externalist conception of mental content. However, Brandom’s inferentialism could be considered a version of externalism that allows, at least in some cases, to save the principle of transparency. Appealing to a normative account of the content of our beliefs, from the inferentialist’s standpoint, it is possible to state that a content is transparent when name-components of that content are a priori associated with some application conditions and, at the same time, reflection alone provides an a priori access to those application conditions, with no need of any empirical investigation. Nevertheless, such requirements are only met in trivial cases. The aim of this paper is to argue that some application conditions of that sort, albeit trivial, can be ontologically ampliative. As a result, the related contents can be regarded as transparent in a substantial and rich way.
Źródło:
Studia Semiotyczne; 2019, 33, 1
0137-6608
Pojawia się w:
Studia Semiotyczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Metalinguistic Value Disagreement
Autorzy:
Rast, Erich
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/561256.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne
Tematy:
metalinguistic negotiation
value disagreement
relativism
meaning theory
externalism
Opis:
In a series of publications Burgess, Plunkett and Sundell have developed a metalinguistic negotiation view that they call ‘Conceptual Ethics.’ I argue that their position adequately captures our intuition that some cases of value disputes are metalinguistic, but that they reverse the direction of justification when they state that speakers ‘negotiate’ the best use of a term or concept on the basis of its prior social role. Borrowing ideas from Putnam (1975b), I instead suggest distinguishing two meanings of general terms and value predicates. Core meaning represents the lowest common denominator between speakers and is primarily based on our needs to coordinate behavior. In contrast to this, the noumenal meaning of a general term or value predicate is intended to capture an aspect of reality and represents what a term really means. Like many other disputes about theoretical terms, terms for abstract objects, and predicates, metalinguistic value disputes are about noumenal meaning on the basis of a shared core meaning. This direction towards reality is what sets the account apart from mere metalinguistic negotiation.
Źródło:
Studia Semiotyczne; 2017, 31, 2; 139-159
0137-6608
Pojawia się w:
Studia Semiotyczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Knowledge about Our Experience and Distinguishing Between Possibilities
Autorzy:
Matuszkiewicz, Maria
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/600609.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
Tematy:
Robert Stalnaker
externalism
contextualism
self-locating beliefs
phenomenal experience
Opis:
In my article I reconstruct the main threads of Robert Stalnaker’s book Our Knowledge of the Internal World, which focuses on the problem of our epistemic relation to our experience and the relation between experience and knowledge. First, the book proposes an interesting view of externalism, which combines classical externalist claims with a contextualist approach to content ascriptions. The approach accommodates some important internalist intuitions by showing how content ascriptions can be sensitive to the perspective from which a subject perceives the world. Second, Stalnaker proposes a theory of selflocating and phenomenal knowledge, which should be understood in terms of differentiating between real possibilities. The puzzling upshot of this elegant solution is that it commits one to the existence of possibilities accessible only from the first-person perspective. Finally, Stalnaker presents an argument which shows that our knowledge about our phenomenal experience is no more direct than the knowledge about external objects. Stalnaker’s claim that by merely having an experience we don’t learn any new information seems, however, too strict in light of his contextualist approach to content ascriptions.
Źródło:
Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris; 2017, 38 (3)
1689-4286
Pojawia się w:
Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Obiektywność, eksternalizm i sceptycyzm
Objectivity, externalism and skepticism
Autorzy:
Kubić, Andrzej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/577443.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
Tematy:
obiektywność
intersubiektywność
eksternalizm
internalizm
sceptycyzm
objectivity
intersubjectivity
externalism
internalism
skepticism
Opis:
Celem artykułu jest ukazanie problematyki obiektywności w sporze między eksternalizmem a internalizmem oraz wykazanie oddziaływania zwrotnego antysceptycznych koncepcji eksternalistów na umocnienie ideału obiektywności. Przedstawione zostaną koncepcje esternalizmu epistemicznego Roberta Nozicka oraz semantycznego Hilarego Putnama i Donalda Davidsona, jak również zarys stanowisk internalistycznych.
The aim of the paper is to show the relevance of objectivity in the dispute between externalism and internalism and to demonstrate how anti-skeptical externalisms approach strengthens the ideal of objectivity. There are presented the positions of Robert Nozick’s epistemic externalism as well as both Hilary Putnam’s and Donald Davidson’s semantic externalism, and also the internalism issues.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa; 2015, 51, 2(204); 175-182
0044-1619
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Assensum in mente prophetae: William of Ockham and Walter Chatton on Prophecies
Autorzy:
Limonta, Roberto
Fedriga, Riccardo
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1621435.pdf
Data publikacji:
2021
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Szczeciński. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego
Tematy:
Chatton
Ockham
Prophecies
Externalism
Internalism
Future Contingents
Assensum
Divine Foreknowledge
Opis:
The subject of this article is the intertwining between Walter Chatton and William of Ockham’s theories about the cognitive nature of prophetic statements, a topic in the theological debate of the early 14th century. Starting from recent interpretations of Chatton and Ockham’s cognitive theory in terms of the distinction between externalism and internalism, and from a reading of some sources where the topic of prophecy is crucial (for Chatton: Reportatio Super Sententias, I, dd. 38-39, the less investigated d. 41 and Quodlibeta, qq. 26-29; for Ockham: Tractatus de praedestinatione et de praescientia Dei respectu futurorum contingentium, q.1 and Quodlibeta, q. 4) we apply the externalism/internalism distinction to the case study of prophetic statements. Starting from epistemological questions about prophecies, future contingents and divine foreknowledge, we’ll show the outcomes as pragmatic rules of this kind of statements in both conceptual frameworks analyzed.
Tema dell'articolo è il rapporto tra Walter Chatton e Guglielmo di Ockham in merito alle teorie sulla natura cognitiva degli enunciati profetici, un argomento centrale nel dibattito teologico della prima metà del XIV secolo. A partire dalle recenti interpretazioni delle teorie cognitive di Chatton e Ockham alla luce della distinzione epistemica tra esternalismo ed internalismo (e a partire da alcune fonti dove il tema della profezia è cruciale, come la Reportatio Super Sententias, I, dd. 28-29 e i Quodibela 26-29 di Chatton e il Tractatus de praedestinatione et de prescientia Dei respectu futurorum contingentium di Ockham, la nostra analisi applicherà la distinzione internalismo/esternalismo al caso degli enunciati profetici. A partire dalle questioni epistemologiche che riguardano profezie, futuri contingenti e prescienza divina, l'analisi cercherà di mostrare i principi strutturali e le ricadute pragmatiche di questi enunciati nei due modelli analizzati.
Źródło:
Analiza i Egzystencja; 2021, 54; 57-80
1734-9923
2300-7621
Pojawia się w:
Analiza i Egzystencja
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Phenomenology between internalism and externalism. Problem statement
Autorzy:
Płotka, Witold
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1070365.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020-12-31
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie
Tematy:
internalism
externalism
mental content
reduction
solipsism
idealism
Putnam
Husserl
phenomenology
Opis:
The article is an attempt at establishing a theoretical basis for a dialogue between phenomenology and contemporary philosophy, with regard to the problem of internalism-externalism. It is argued, according to Roman Ingarden, that one has to first of all put forward an adequate question about the problem, to be able to understand it appropriately. Moreover, the analysis is limited to the two forms of the internalism-externalism debate, namely semantics and the philosophy of the mind. Within Husserl’s phenomenology one can easily point to basic intuitions that justify thesis that this philosophy refers to the internalism-externalism problem. Ultimately, by using phenomenological terminology, the article arrives at questions about possible internalism-or-externalism within Husserl’s phenomenological project. The questions, however, suggest that phenomenology can be neither clearly nor completely classified either as internalism or as externalism.
Źródło:
Studia Philosophiae Christianae; 2020, 56, S1; 187-206
0585-5470
Pojawia się w:
Studia Philosophiae Christianae
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Is epistemological reliabilism consistent with grammatical evidentiality and conjunct/ disjunct marking?
Autorzy:
Łukasiewicz, Elżbieta
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1047583.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020-12-08
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
reliabilism
epistemic justification
externalism
internalism
evidentiality
conjunct/disjunct
egophoricity
folk epistemology
Opis:
The paper discusses how evidentiality and conjunct/disjunct marking in grammar are related to reliabilism, a contemporary theory of epistemic justification developed within the Anglo-American analytic tradition. It is assumed that many problems and ideas concerned with theories of knowledge, and with justification of beliefs in particular, which are widely discussed in contemporary philosophical debates, are worth reconsidering in the light of what grammars of natural languages impose on the epistemic agent. Section two explains how the notions of knowledge, belief and justification are understood in the paper. The section also outlines the major problems concerning the internalist justification of beliefs. Section three presents an externalist view on the problem of justification: process reliabilism. The reliabilist theory of justification is set in the context of two grammatical categories: evidentiality and conjunct/disjunct marking (egophoricity). Since the two categories are still little known, section four offers a brief presentation of evidentiality and egophoricity in grammar, illustrated with data from two languages. Finally, section five addresses the problem whether the premises of reliabilism are reconcilable with ‘natural epistemology’ encoded in grammar. The final conclusion says that the externalist premises of reliabilism are certainly not congruent with grammatical evidentiality and evidentialityrelated categories, but they are not logically inconsistent therewith. Furthermore, since the reliabilist program declares interest in ‘folk epistemic practices’, the approach might greatly benefit from what ‘natural epistemology’ tells us about epistemic folk concepts and epistemic practices employed by speakers of diverse world languages.
Źródło:
Scripta Neophilologica Posnaniensia; 2020, 20; 133-162
1509-4146
Pojawia się w:
Scripta Neophilologica Posnaniensia
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Knower at Risk: Updating Epistemology in the Light of Enhanced Representations
Autorzy:
Tomczyk, Barbara
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1797158.pdf
Data publikacji:
2021
Wydawca:
Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne
Tematy:
cognitive enhancement
virtue epistemology
active externalism
extended cognitive system
epistemic agency
Opis:
The epistemological consequences of the increasing popularity of artificial cognitive enhancements are still confined to the margins of philosophical exploration, with priority given instead to ethical problems requiring urgent practical solutions. In this paper, I examine the less popular, yet still important, problem of the threats to which the very knowledge-forming process is exposed when its subject uses artificial cognitive enhancers. The theory of knowledge I call upon is borrowed from virtue epistemologists who, together with proponents of active externalism, seek to define the conditions that will protect artificially enhanced agents from a loss of epistemic agency. I invoke three such conditions (authenticity, integration and reciprocal causation), rejecting the last one. Incorporating active externalism into virtue epistemology points to the possibility of treating extended systems, composed of humans and artifacts, as extended subjects of knowledge. In the final part, however, I present two arguments against such an extension of epistemic agency.
Źródło:
Studia Semiotyczne; 2021, 35, 1; 35-54
0137-6608
Pojawia się w:
Studia Semiotyczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Nauka jako racjonalna doxa. Józefa Życińskiego koncepcja nauki i filozofii nauki – poza internalizmem i eksternalizmem
Science as a rational doxa. J. Życiński’s understanding of science and philosophy of science – beyond internalism and externalism
Autorzy:
Liana, Zbigniew
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/690836.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
rationalism
skepticism
internalism
externalism
metascience
scientific revolution
metascientific revolution
philosophy of science
Opis:
Philosophical interests of Joseph Życiński (1948-2011) in the domain of the philosophy of science were focused on the debate concerning the nature of science and philosophy of science that followed the Einstein-Planck revolution in science. The unexpected discovery of the philosophical, extra-scientific presuppositions in science, as well as of the extra-rational factors determining the way these presuppositions are accepted in science were to be explained within the meta-scientific framework. It is the aim of this paper to present ˙ Życiński’s diagnosis of this post-revolutionary situation in the philosophy of science as well as his critique of the metascientific answers to this challenge. The reasons will be given why all those answers are put under two dichotomous rubrics of internalism and externalism. It will be also explained how Życiński intends to supersede this false in his opinion opposition with a new concept of the doxatic rationality. However, the details of the metascientific proposal of Życiński will be given only in the subsequent paper. In order to perform the aim of the paper the metatheoretic tools set out by Popper (1979) will be used.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2019, 66; 147-199
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
„Zewnętrzność” interpretacji. Badanie polityki w ujęciu eksternalistycznym
Externalist Approaches in Political Science
Autorzy:
Pierzchalski, Filip
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1195286.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Jagielloński. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego
Tematy:
solipsyzm metodologiczny
eksternalizm
interpretacja
niekonsekwencje solipsyzmu / methodological solipsism
externalism
interpretation
inconsistencies of solipsism
Opis:
Celem artykułu jest krytyczny namysł nad podejściem solipsystycznym, problematyzującym niektóre szczegółowe rozważania w obrębie interpretacjonizmu. W tym sensie solipsyzm, definiowany jako perspektywa badawcza w nauce o polityce, jest stanowiskiem, w którym w sposób bezkompromisowo konsekwentny, wręcz totalny, odnosi się do subiektywno-podmiotowych czynników i/lub determinant naukowego poznania i badania rzeczywistości politycznej. W artykule polemika w stosunku do solipsyzmu oznaczać będzie przedstawienie aporii solipsyzmu na podstawie ujęcia eksternalistycznego, związanego z argumentacją zaproponowaną przez Hilary’ego Putnama i Freda Dretske.
The aim of this paper is a critical reflection on the solipsist approach, which problematizes some detailed considerations within interpretationism. In this sense, solipsism, defined as a research perspective in political science, is a position in which in an uncompromisingly consistent, even “total” way, it refers to subjective and subject-factors and/or determinants of scientific cognition and research of political reality. In the article, the polemic in relation to solipsism will mean the presentation of the aporia’s of solipsism based on externalistic positions related to the arguments proposed by Hilary Putnam and Fred Dretske.
Źródło:
Teoria Polityki; 2020, 4; 61-77
2543-7046
2544-0845
Pojawia się w:
Teoria Polityki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Watered Down Essences and Elusive Speech Communities: Two Objection Against Putnams Twin Earth Argument
Autorzy:
Hensel, Witold M
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/600598.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
Tematy:
externalism
Twin Earth argument
natural-kind terms
qua problem
interest relativity
speech community
Opis:
The paper presents two objections against Putnam’s Twin Earth argument, which was intended to secure semantic externalism. I first claim that Putnam’s reasoning rests on two assumptions and then try to show why these assumptions are contentious. The first objection is that, given what we know about science, it is unlikely that there are any natural-kind terms whose extension is codetermined by a small set of microstructures required by Putnam’s indexical account of extension determination. The second objection is that there may not be a plausible concept of a speech community whose adoption would classify Oscar and Twin Oscar as members of different speech communities and, at the same time, render Oscar and Twin Oscar as being in the same psychological state. I contend that Putnam’s argument fails because both objections are justified.
Źródło:
Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris; 2017, 38 (3)
1689-4286
Pojawia się w:
Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Semantic Internalism Is a Mistake
Autorzy:
Bielecka, Krystyna
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/600615.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
Tematy:
internalism
externalism
one-factor dimensional account of representation
mental representation
Fodor
methodological solipsism
Opis:
The concept of narrow content is still under discussion in the debate over mental representation. In the paper, one-factor dimensional accounts of representation are analyzed, particularly the case of Fodor's methodological solipsism. In methodological solipsism, semantic properties of content are arguably eliminated in favor of syntactic ones. If “narrow content” means content properties independent of external factors to a system (as in Segal's view), the concept of content becomes elusive. Moreover, important conceptual problems with one-factor dimensional account are pointed out as a result of analysis arguments presented by J. Searle, S. Harnad and T. Burge. Furthermore, these problems are illustrated with psychological and ethological examples. Although understanding content as partially independent from contextual factors allows theorists to preserve content properties, it seems that understanding content in total abstraction from external factors of these properties is implausible. As a result, internalism is rejected in favor of externalism.
Źródło:
Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris; 2017, 38 (3)
1689-4286
Pojawia się w:
Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Strategia antysceptycka eksternalizmu semantycznego
Semantic Externalism and Its Answer to the Problem of Skepticism
Autorzy:
Ebner, Maria
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/909309.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020-06-26
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Tematy:
anti-skeptical arguments
semantic externalism
privileged self-knowledge
disjunctive argument
reductio argument
transcendental arguments
slow switching arguments
Opis:
This paper discusses various answers to the problem of skepticism offered by some advocates of semantic externalism: Putnam’s argument against the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis and its reconstructions presented by Brueckner and Warfield. I argue that all these responses fall short of being successful. Brueckner’s disjunctive argument needs to be supplemented by a disquotational principle that assumes a specific interpretation of the other premises (the vat-English interpretation is excluded). Warfield’s argument rests on the principle of privileged access to the content of one’s own mental states. This additional premise is highly controversial given the externalist theory of meaning. I discuss two kinds of argument against combining semantic externalism with privileged self-knowledge: the reductio argument and the “slow-switching” arguments. The last part of the paper critically examines McKinsey’s attempt to construct a successful anti-skeptical argument.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2020, 28, 2; 75-98
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
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