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Tytuł:
Джеймс. Привлекательность разумности и защита „common sense”
James. The attractiveness of rationality and the protection of “common sense”
Autorzy:
Михина, Франтишек
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/501381.pdf
Data publikacji:
2012
Wydawca:
Instytut Studiów Międzynarodowych i Edukacji Humanum
Tematy:
W. James
philosophy
common sense
Opis:
The author of the article presents the analysis of the pragmatic position or the classic pragmatists’ position concerning rationality and rationalism. Such position is explained with reference to substantialistical thinking interpreted by rationalism which manifests itself not only in the contemporary philosophical thought though. Most attention has been focused on the philosophical conception of W. James.
Źródło:
Społeczeństwo i Edukacja. Międzynarodowe Studia Humanistyczne; 2012, 2(10); 51-68
1898-0171
Pojawia się w:
Społeczeństwo i Edukacja. Międzynarodowe Studia Humanistyczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
COMMON-SENSE LEGITIMATION OF INFORMAL PRACTICES IN PRESENT-DAY SERBIA
Autorzy:
JOVANOVIĆ, MILOŠ
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1036396.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019-08-14
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
Serbia
Informality
Legitimation
Common-sense
Doxa
Opis:
As a part of a larger research within the Horizon 2020 project Closing the Gap Between Formal and Informal Institutions in the Balkans, 38 semi-structured interviews with citizens of Serbia have been conducted in the period  July – October 2017. These comprise the database used for analysis of “narratives of informality” – stories of how the research participants legitimize (or rationalize) informal practices (using connections and acquaintances to “get things done”, giving/receiving bribe, exchange of favors, etc.), supplemented by the analysis of participants’ attitudes towards informal practices, particularly when using them themselves. An insight into the respondents’ ideas of informality was gained through describing and understanding doxa – beliefs of an individual as “a quasi-perfect correspondence between the objective order and the subjective principles of organization (with which) the natural and social world appear as self-evident” (Bourdieu) or senso comune (Gramsci) – “naturalized”, unreflected, practical knowledge taking the form of self-explanatory content of common sense, that which is taken for granted, what “everybody knows“, the knowledge of the world that is undisputed – “just the way it is”, the domain of indefinite beliefs and incoherent views of the world, the knowledge which “legitimizes with the absence of legitimizing”. The assumption is that the “quality” of doxa, in the sense of its positive or negative orientation, has a large impact on the possibility of changes in formal practices and procedures – in some cases serving as a stimulus for change, and as an obstacle to changes in others – situations in which the new/imported rules remain “empty shells” with little influence in social life.
Źródło:
Society Register; 2019, 3, 1; 105-120
2544-5502
Pojawia się w:
Society Register
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The Epistemological Side of Ontology
Autorzy:
Marsonet, Michele
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2158879.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023-01-05
Wydawca:
Academicus. International Scientific Journal publishing house
Tematy:
epistemology
ontology
metaphysics
science
common sense
Opis:
Is it possible to draw a border line between ontology and epistemology? A positive answer to this question looks attractive, mainly because it reflects convictions deeply entrenched in our common sense view of the world. However, anyone wishing to clarify the distinction between the ontological and the epistemological dimensions meets problems. This is due to the fact that the separation between factual and conceptual is not clean, but rather fuzzy. It is certainly correct to state that science means to offer correct information about the world, but the extent to which it succeeds in accomplishing this task is always questionable. We cannot claim that the picture provided by today science - our current scientific image of the world - is absolutely correct, because the history of science itself shows us that any such statement is likely to be rejected by future generations. While it may be recognized that science purports to offer a correct description of the real world, the past experience should also prompt us to accept its claims sub condicione, and to view them as merely provisional.
Źródło:
Academicus International Scientific Journal; 2023, 14, 27; 11-19
2079-3715
2309-1088
Pojawia się w:
Academicus International Scientific Journal
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The “Archaeology” of Popular Culture: Common Sense and the Past
Autorzy:
Kaźmierczak, Marek
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/30148729.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
common sense
memory
communication
popular culture
oblivion
Opis:
This paper demonstrates the influence of common sense on the perception of facts from the past. In order to understand the mechanisms of reduction, instrumentalisation and banalisation of the Holocaust in popular culture, we need to understand the influence of common sense on the understanding and misunderstanding of the past, represented in this paper by the testimonies of the massacre of 1500 Jews in the forest of Niesłusz-Rudzica.The main premise of the paper is that common sense is the dominant form of knowledge and the description of reality, which is reproduced by the mechanisms at function in popular culture. This paper is an example of ‘archaeological’ work in this context.
Źródło:
Poznańskie Studia Slawistyczne; 2023, 24; 85-115
2084-3011
Pojawia się w:
Poznańskie Studia Slawistyczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Unreasonable science
Autorzy:
Pierański, Piotr
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/703759.pdf
Data publikacji:
2007
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
Tematy:
unreasonable science
common sense
Banach-Tarski paradox
Opis:
It is argued that most of the great discoveries in science, in particular in mathematics and physics, are from the point of view of the common sense unreasonable. A few examples of such discoveries are discussed, among them the Banach-Tarski paradoxical duplication of a sphere, the non-Euclidean geometry, the special theory of relativity and the quantum mechanics.
Źródło:
Nauka; 2007, 1
1231-8515
Pojawia się w:
Nauka
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
COMMON SENSE APPROACH TO THE RESTORATION OF SACRED ART
Autorzy:
Lopez Pinto, Alphonso
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/507352.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
International Étienne Gilson Society
Tematy:
historia
imitation
sacred art
contemplation
common sense
Opis:
In this paper, Sacred Art is examined as an imitation of historia. Historia interprets historical human events as empirical, material and real while seeking to understand their moral and spiritual significance. It is from historia that sacred art can be understood, where Christ and the saints are portrayed in the integrity of their human natures united to symbols representing Divinity or grace in order to present a visual/contemplative narrative. Mortimer Adler rightly sees that the vision of the beautiful is inherently contemplative, thus sacred iconography provides a language that can form the common sense of men and women.
Źródło:
Studia Gilsoniana; 2014, 3: supplement; 537-545
2300-0066
Pojawia się w:
Studia Gilsoniana
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Lumière naturelle jako common sense w ujęciu Błażeja Pascala
Lumière Naturrelle as the Common Sense according to Blaise Pascal
Autorzy:
Janeczek, Stanisław
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/423387.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet w Białymstoku. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku
Tematy:
Pascal
Thomas Reid
common sense
zdrowy rozsądek
Opis:
This paper depicts one of the essential elements in the tradition of European philosophy, namely a belief in the commonsensical endowment of the human mind. This position founds the non-evidential beliefs with regard to fundamental questions in theoretical knowledge and in human action. In particular, it combines the approach typical of the Scottish common sense philosophy with the philosophy of Blaise Pascal. In each case it shows the integral character of human knowledge, transcending the set of truths accessible in the knowledge based on discourse (raison). It pinpoints the role Pascal attributed to intuition defined in the categories of sentir or even instinct, working on such categories as esprit de finesse, identified with sens droit or esprit de justesse, categories essential in relation to the knowledge of principes. At the same time thus understood endowment of the human mind (lumière naturelle) corresponds, in certain aspects, to the knowledge based on coeur, the knowledge set in opposition to the rationalistic interpretation of raison, where on the grounds of religion lumière naturelle is complementary to inspiration or révélation.
Źródło:
IDEA. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych; 2015, 27/t.t.; 41-56
0860-4487
Pojawia się w:
IDEA. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Taste(s) and Common Sense(s)
Autorzy:
Pourhosseini, Behrang
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/31317906.pdf
Data publikacji:
2024-04-30
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Tematy:
common sense
taste
sensible
judgement
universality
public space
Opis:
This paper explores the relationship between common sense and taste in the history of aesthetic thought. “Common sense” guarantees the communication of tastes through different modalities. It can either facilitate agreement among individuals, fostering mutual understanding and envisaging a universal aesthetic community, or provoke disagreement. In the former scenario, common sense is literally common to everyone, while in the latter case, it implies diversity and dissensus. By associating the concept of taste with judgement and the sensible (Arendt and Rancière), we scrutinize some contemporary political interpretations of Kantian aesthetics. Through this analysis, we illustrate that common sense is intertwined with certain metaphysical assumptions that not only hinder its claims of universality but also introduce structural paradoxes within the system of aesthetic judgment. In the last section of the article, we explore these paradoxes, proposing another communicability beyond the confines of the judgment of taste or subjective limitations.
Źródło:
Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture; 2024, 8, 1; 13-38
2544-302X
Pojawia się w:
Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Zdrowy rozsądek i sceptycyzm
Common Sense and Skepticism
Autorzy:
Leszczyński, Damian
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2012864.pdf
Data publikacji:
2011
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
sceptycyzm
filozofia
zdrowy rozsądek
skepticism
philosophy
common sense
Opis:
In Part One of the present text a philosophical characterization of common sense is presented, focusing first of all on its epistemological aspects. Part Two is devoted to these types of doubt or skepticism that may be defined as popular and do not require a philosophical background. Part Three is concerned with strictly philosophical skepticism, whose characterization and confrontation with common sense requires a general and introductory answer to the question about what in fact philosophy is. In Part Four examples are presented of difficulties and antinomies to which confusing the level of commonsensical thinking with the level of philosophical thinking leads. The difficulties result from, on the one hand, attempts at solving philosophical problems by referring to popular intuitions, and, on the other, the willingness to infer consequences related to everyday life from philosophical deliberations. The disquisition seeks to justify the thesis that skepticism and undermining common sense – alien to popular thinking – belong to the nature of philosophy, and hence postulates to decide philosophical problems by referring to common sense, as well as charges sometimes leveled against philosophy that it does not give any actual solutions to practical problems should be regarded as misunderstandings.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2011, 59, 1; 5-34
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
THE CULTURAL DANGERS OF SCIENTISM AND COMMON SENSE SOLUTIONS
Autorzy:
Delfino, Robert A.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/507414.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
International Étienne Gilson Society
Tematy:
scientism
science
religion
philosophy
metaphysics
culture
common sense
Opis:
In his article the author begins by defining what is meant by ‘science’ and ‘scientism.’ Second, he discusses some of the cultural dangers of scientism. Third, he gives several arguments why scientism should be rejected and why science needs metaphysics. Fourth, and finally, he concludes by noting how some of the questions and arguments raised in the article can be appropriated to help the general public understand the limits of science and the dangers of scientism.
Źródło:
Studia Gilsoniana; 2014, 3: supplement; 485-496
2300-0066
Pojawia się w:
Studia Gilsoniana
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Science and Different Images of the World
Autorzy:
Marsonet, Michele
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1036727.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Academicus. International Scientific Journal publishing house
Tematy:
science
language
common sense
scientific image
manifest image
Opis:
It has often been claimed in contemporary philosophy that the scientific world-view will necessarily replace the view of the world provided by common sense. It may be argued, however, that common sense holds a sort of methodological primacy over the aforementioned scientific world-view. For example, the thesis of the indeterminacy of radical translation entails the impossibility of establishing what a scientific theory is talking about. We can say what a scientific theory deals with only by having recourse to our ordinary language, i.e., by assuming that we know and understand in advance what we are talking about normally, in our daily life. It follows that science cannot be conceived of as a form of knowledge which is totally independent of ordinary language and, therefore, alternative to it. According to such a stance, even scientific theories stem from the universe of meanings that belong to common language. On his part Davidson, in challenging the scheme-content dualism, mentions both “a dualism of total scheme (or language) and uninterpreted content”, and “a dualism of conceptual scheme and empirical content”. What we have here is a real dichotomy between these two elements, in the sense that the (conceptual) scheme is “other than” the (non-conceptual) content that is opposed to it. Now, Davidson’s rejection of the scheme-content distinction is supported by a set of arguments purporting to reject, first of all, the thesis that totally different conceptual schemes can actually exist. To put things in a very sketchy manner, he equates having a conceptual scheme with having a language, so that we face the following elements: (1) language as the organizing force; (2) what is organized, referred to as “experience”, “the stream of sensory experience”, and “physical evidence”; and, finally, (3) the failure of intertranslatability. It follows that “It is essential to this idea that there be something neutral and common that lies outside all schemes”. If this is the situation, he goes on, then we could say that conceptual schemes that are different in a radical way from each other correspond to languages that are not intertranslatable. How can we, however, make sense of a total failure of intertranslatability among languages? For sure “we could not be in a position to judge that others had concepts or beliefs radically different from our own”. Davidson’s conclusion is that if one gives up the dualism of scheme and world, he will not give up the world, but will instead be able to “re-establish unmediated touch with the familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions true”. Davidson’s solution is radical, but we are bound to ask at this point what the expressions “reality” and “world” mean for him. They seem to coincide with the world of common sense which is formed by the familiar objects whose antics - as he says - make our sentences and opinions true or false. These familiar objects are tables, chairs, houses, stars, etc., just as we perceive them in our daily life. One is not entitled to ignore, however, that the current discussions on the problem of scientific realism arise because there appears to be a strong asymmetry between the commonsense view of the world and the scientific one. For instance, the table that we see with our eyes is not the same table that we “see” through the mediation of scientific instruments, and this fact is not trivial. It is rather easy to reach a high level of inter-subjective agreement among the individuals present in a room about the color, size and weight of a table, and it can also be granted that we form our beliefs in this regard by triangulating with our interlocutors and the surrounding environment. Such an agreement, however, may turn out to be problematic when we try to reconcile this vision of the world with what today science tells us about it. So, being in touch with such familiar objects as tables, chairs and stars “all the time” - as Richard Rorty adds - has a fundamental bearing only on the ontology of common sense, since our actual science shows that quite a different representation of reality can actually be provided (or, even better, it shows that those objects might not exist as men perceive them). Naturally, one can always resort to an objection of the following kind: Why should we deem the table viewed as a collection of subatomic particles more important than the table that our eyes see in daily life? After all, we can conduct our life well enough even ignoring what science claims (just like men did for many thousand years). This, however, may be judged as a serious underevaluation of the scientific enterprise. As a matter of fact, in the last centuries we are confronted not by one world-view, but by two complex images, each of which means to be a complete picture of man in the world. Wilfrid Sellars called these two perspectives, respectively, the manifest and the scientific image of man in the world. They are both intersubjective and non arbitrary. What are, however, these two images, and are they really alternative? Let us note, from the onset, that the two images we just mentioned are both idealizations in the same sense of Max Weber’s “ideal types”. This means that, in order to discover their actual presence, we need having recourse to a good deal of philosophical abstraction. In other words, they are not disclosed by mere empirical recognition. For instance, we live in the commonsense view of the world, and only a complex process of reflection makes us understand that we, as human beings, share a common view of the world, which is in turn determined by the fact that our physical structure bounds us to conceive of reality in a certain way rather than in another. Think about the importance that light, for example, has not only in daily life, but even in our philosophical conceptualization of the world. The story is complicated by the fact that each image has a history, and while the manifest image dates back to pre-history, the scientific image is constantly changing shape.
Źródło:
Academicus International Scientific Journal; 2016, 14; 14-27
2079-3715
2309-1088
Pojawia się w:
Academicus International Scientific Journal
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Realizm filozoficzny w ujęciu Étienne Gilsona
Étienne Gilson’s Philosophical Realism
Autorzy:
Kunat, Natalia
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/507424.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017-09-30
Wydawca:
International Étienne Gilson Society
Tematy:
Étienne Gilson
realism
idealism
common sense
philosophy
reality
existence
Opis:
This paper attempts to analyze realist philosophy as the way of knowing reality in the thought of Étienne Gilson. The French Philosopher was a defender of philosophical realism who rationally justified the thesis about knowing things existing in the world independently of the knowing subject. Philosophical inquiry, carried out in a realist way, should start with the being which really exists. The basic philosophical method aims to rationally understand reality as well as explain the multifaceted cognition of reality. Gilson’s contribution to the development of philosophical realism includes the promotion of a realist philosophical awareness and the opposition to idealistic philosophies (Cartesianism, Kantianism).
Źródło:
Studia Gilsoniana; 2017, 6, 3; 365-379
2300-0066
Pojawia się w:
Studia Gilsoniana
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Afterthoughts on biases in history perception
Autorzy:
Dymkowski, Maciej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/430109.pdf
Data publikacji:
2010
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
Tematy:
cognitive bias
common-sense psychology
historical interpretation
history perception
Opis:
Contemporary social psychology describes various deformations of processing social information leading to distortions of knowledge about other people. What is more, a person in everyday life refers to lay convictions and ideas common in his/ her cultural environment that distort his/her perceptions. Therefore it is difficult to be surprised that authors of narrations in which participants of history are presented use easily available common-sense psychology, deforming images of both the participants of history and their activities, as well as the sequence of events determined by these activities. Which cognitive biases, how often, and in what intensity they will be presented in historical narrations depend on statements of dominating common-sense psychology. The article outlines some biases made by historian-lay psychologists, such as attributional asymmetry or hindsight effects, whose occurrence in their thinking, as formed in the cultural sphere of the West, influences history perception and conducted historical interpretations.
Źródło:
Polish Psychological Bulletin; 2010, 41, 2; 84-90
0079-2993
Pojawia się w:
Polish Psychological Bulletin
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
„Wyznania antysemioty” - z semiotyki średniowiecznej kultury Europy Zachodniej
Autorzy:
Jakóbczyk, Stanisław
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/631031.pdf
Data publikacji:
2011
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
cultural semiotics
pansemiotics
hermeneutics
interpretations
methodology
common sense
European Middle Ages
Opis:
The purpose of this paper is to discuss extreme views on the sign (interpretable, hermeneutic) character of “humanist objects”, the so called artefacts, and the abuse of methodological choices which produce them. Apart from several introductory sen-tences, I shall remain, however, concerned with these objects, the thing in itself, rather than pseudo-philosophical meanderings “beyond the thing”. Simply, I would like to provide several examples, arguments against the criticised views.inning of the 1930s. Some of the travellers visited the state seeking to be reassured in their negative opinion. Others, in contrast, went there convinced that they travelled to a country of universal social justice. However, they did not realise to what an extent the programme of their visit depended on the Soviet propaganda machine. The combined reading of texts by Antoni Słonimski, Andre Gide, Melchior Wańkowicz and Bernard Shaw shows the USSR as a country whose directions of development are difficult to foresee.
Źródło:
Studia Europaea Gnesnensia; 2011, 3; 195-210
2082-5951
Pojawia się w:
Studia Europaea Gnesnensia
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
In defense of common sense. David Hume on ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’
Autorzy:
Osmola, Szymon
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/429103.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Papieski Jana Pawła II w Krakowie
Tematy:
Hume David
is
ought
common sense
ethical rationalism
Clarke Samuel
moral sentimentalism
Opis:
In the article the author rejects traditional, logical interpretation of the famous“Is-Ought Paragraph” from David Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature.He argues that most of the interpreters failed to grasp the wide philosophicalbackground of the IsOP, which is, generally speaking, a passionate discussionbetween ethical rationalists and ethical anti-rationalists in the 17th and 18thcentury British philosophy. The author shows that the Hume’s main aim inthe IsOP is to strengthen his previous arguments against ethical rationalismand to reinforce (and not subvert at all) the common-sense (vulgar) systems ofmorality, likewise he did in the first book of the Treatise… in case of the theoryof knowledge. The author argues that there is no putative thesis of logic in theIsOP, which some scholars call “Hume’s Law”.
Źródło:
Semina Scientiarum; 2017, 16
1644-3365
Pojawia się w:
Semina Scientiarum
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
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