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Tytuł:
Концепция подготовки магистрантов педагогики к производственной практике в вузе
Concept of pedagogical postgraduates preparation to practical training at university level
Autorzy:
Гребенюк, Татьяна
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/443094.pdf
Data publikacji:
2011
Wydawca:
ADVSEO
Tematy:
PRACTICAL TRAINING
PREPARATION PROCESS
CONCEPTUAL POINTS
MODELS OF PREPARATION PROCESS
Opis:
The problem of postgraduate preparation to the practical training is examined in the paper. The author explains the actuality of this problem, expounds conceptual points for solving the problem. Static and dynamic models of preparation process are proposed and described in the paper. The implementation of the idea of student-teachers’ independent work is shown in the article.
Źródło:
General and Professional Education; 2011, 2; 10-13
2084-1469
Pojawia się w:
General and Professional Education
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The Anti-Mechanist Argument Based on Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems, Indescribability of the Concept of Natural Number and Deviant Encodings
Autorzy:
Quinon, Paula
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1796973.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020
Wydawca:
Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne
Tematy:
the Lucas-Penrose argument
the Church-Turing thesis
Carnapian expli-cations
natural numbers
computation
conceptual engineering
conceptual fixed points
conceptual vicious circles
deviant encodings
structuralism
Opis:
This paper reassesses the criticism of the Lucas-Penrose anti-mechanist argument, based on Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, as formulated by Krajewski (2020): this argument only works with the additional extra-formal assumption that “the human mind is consistent”. Krajewski argues that this assumption cannot be formalized, and therefore that the anti-mechanist argument – which requires the formalization of the whole reasoning process – fails to establish that the human mind is not mechanistic. A similar situation occurs with a corollary to the argument, that the human mind allegedly outperforms machines, because although there is no exhaustive formal definition of natural numbers, mathematicians can successfully work with natural numbers. Again, the corollary requires an extra-formal assumption: “PA is complete” or “the set of all natural numbers exists”. I agree that extra-formal assumptions are necessary in order to validate the anti-mechanist argument and its corollary, and that those assumptions are problematic. However, I argue that formalization is possible and the problem is instead the circularity of reasoning that they cause. The human mind does not prove its own consistency, and outperforms the machine, simply by making the assumption “I am consistent”. Starting from the analysis of circularity, I propose a way of thinking about the interplay between informal and formal in mathematics.
Źródło:
Studia Semiotyczne; 2020, 34, 1; 243-266
0137-6608
Pojawia się w:
Studia Semiotyczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2

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