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    Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2
    Tytuł:
    Coopetition in international maritime shipping
    Autorzy:
    Lin, D. Y.
    Huang, C. C.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/259566.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2013
    Wydawca:
    Politechnika Gdańska. Wydział Inżynierii Mechanicznej i Okrętownictwa
    Tematy:
    coopetition
    maritime freight
    international shipping
    Jacobi approach
    Backward Induction
    Opis:
    The increasingly competitive nature of maritime freight transport has stimulated carriers to improve efficiency and lower costs. The industry has gradually matured, and it has recently become the case that the larger a carrier is, the more competitive advantage it has. Therefore, carriers form strategic alliances to collaborate with each other so that they can reduce their operational costs due to economies of scale. At the same time, such alliances allow carriers to improve the quality of their service by increasing their network coverage. Although carriers collaborate to improve their operational efficiency, they compete with each other simultaneously. In other words, a game of coopetition among carriers has developed in international maritime freight transport in recent years. In this study, we propose a theoretical framework for characterizing coopetition in international maritime shipping and investigating how carriers can manage their business models. Empirical studies, together with salient analytical results, are presented and discussed.
    Źródło:
    Polish Maritime Research; 2013, S 1; 5-12
    1233-2585
    Pojawia się w:
    Polish Maritime Research
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Solution of Traveler’s Dilemma
    Autorzy:
    Osiecka, Gabriela
    Jasiński, Maciej
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/14471603.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2018-09-27
    Wydawca:
    Wyższa Szkoła Bankowa we Wrocławiu
    Tematy:
    game theory
    Traveler's dilemma
    perfectly rational player
    backward induction
    Opis:
    Aim: The aim of the article is to show: 1) that the reasoning of perfectly rational players presented in 1994 by the author of the Traveler's Dilemma Kaushik Basu is incorrect and therefore leads to wrong conclusions, 2) how the reasoning of these players should look like and what solution it leads to.   Design / Research methods: Logical analysis.   Conclusions / findings: Perfectly rational Traveler’s Dilemma players should use, according to game theory, so-called retrograde (iterative) induction. This is wrong, as in the set of Traveler’s Dilemma games results the principle of transitivity is not met. We believe that perfectly rational players will achieve a better result when they make a random decision from a suitably limited set of decisions. After applying this method of decision making, perfectly rational players will achieve a result similar to those obtained by real players in experiments. Thus, the paradox described in the theory of games disappears, that perfectly rational players achieve worse results than real players   Originality / value of the article: A new way of making decisions in the Traveler’s Dilemma game.   Implications of the research: A new way of making decisions in other games similar to the Traveler’s Dilemma may allow to find new solutions in these games.  Limitations of the research: The described decision-making method can potentially be used in decision-making situations when the following five conditions are met: 1) the set of possible decisions of each player is greater than 2, 2) the winning matrix is known to both players and both know the purpose of their choices, 3) when it is played once with an unknown opponent, 4) when both players have to make their decision without knowing the opponent's choice, 5) when there is no decision, which is a stable balance point or when it is, but its choice means that the player does not achieve a satisfying result.
    Źródło:
    Central European Review of Economics and Management; 2018, 2, 3; 175-196
    2543-9472
    Pojawia się w:
    Central European Review of Economics and Management
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2

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