Temat: Agency theory - Katalog OPAC zbiorów

Skocz do pozycji: 1.

Tytuł:: Nierówności z pozycji interesów akcjonariuszy mniejszościowych
Ownership Inequalities: Protection of Minority Shareholder Rights
Autorzy:: Szewc-Rogalska, Alina
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/575653.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2006-10-31
Wydawca:: Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie. Kolegium Analiz Ekonomicznych
Tematy:: inequality
interests
minority shareholders
agency theory
Opis:: The article deals with the unequal treatment of company shareholders. The analysis is conducted from the perspective of minority shareholders and their interests. The author uses a research method that presents the position of minority shareholders in companies on the basis of the agency theory. Szewc-Rogalska shows the influence of dominant shareholders and top managers on the market value of companies (in light of both Polish and foreign empirical studies), along with a review of ways to limit inequality among shareholders. The analysis reveals that the position of minority shareholders can be threatened by agency conflicts that occur in companies. In companies with concentrated ownership, these conflicts are different than in companies with scattered ownership. After a dominant shareholder exceeds a certain level of ownership, the company is likely to face problems resulting from the shareholder’s desire to pursue their own interests at the expense of other shareholders. Inequalities among shareholders cannot be eradicated completely, and there is no single fully efficient mechanism to protect minority shareholder rights. A diverse range of activities is needed, including improved information transparency of companies and better corporate supervision, in addition to increased activity of minority shareholders and the creation of legal mechanisms to protect their interests.
Źródło:: Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics; 2006, 211, 10; 49-60
2300-5238
Pojawia się w:: Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 2.

Tytuł:: Podwójny problem agencji na przykładzie odpowiedzialności zawodowej pośrednika w obrocie nieruchomościami w Polsce
Double agency problem on the example of professional liability of a real estate agent in Poland
Autorzy:: Mulawa, Kacper T.
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/570012.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2014
Wydawca:: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu
Tematy:: real estate
brokerage
agent
agency theory
Opis:: The aim of this paper is to present regulations related to professional liability of a real estate agent, and an indication of the effectiveness of information issues. First of all, economic theory of agency will be used as a tool to characterize the relationship between the parties of a transaction. Next liability will be discussed, i.e. the agency contracts and agent’s professional liability − distinguished from civil and criminal liability. The theory of agency exists as a research tool in the new institutional economics. Its assumptions can be summarized as follows: The agent as a subject is acting on behalf of the principal who, in terms of the indicated target, according to his own preferences and possibilities performs actions leading in his opinion to the desired result by the principal. The relationship may form problems of information asymmetry, because the agent does not have to reveal his knowledge and capabilities, so the principal is not able to affect the method of implementation of an order. The identification of professional liability of a real estate agent comes directly from the set of his contract. Basic regulations defining agency agreements and identifications of professional liability arose during the political changes in Poland. Patterns come from different countries and different legal systems. Polish business practice used them in accordance with its capabilities. The observed patterns of work of agents’ representatives lead to the conclusion that they may lead to strengthening the presence of information asymmetry problems in the form of adverse selection or moral hazard. As a result, they can lower the information efficiency. A real estate agent can provide mediation activity by acting on the basis of multiple sources of contractual provisions. These include a contract of employment, contract work, self-employment or running a company. Regardless of the basis for their relationship with an employing person an additional (and primary) source of responsibility are agency agreements. Two types of contracts (open and with an exclusivity clause) impose different qualitative responsibilities on a agent. Regardless of the form of the activity they are associated with high risks connected with the provision of services on asset markets with high specificity and uniqueness of the transaction. Therefore, from an economic point of view attempts trying to reduce the occupational risk and market risk should be regarded as reasonable.
Źródło:: Ekonomia XXI Wieku; 2014, 1(1); 42-57
2353-8929
Pojawia się w:: Ekonomia XXI Wieku
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 3.

Tytuł:: Agency costs of overvalued equity and earnings management in companies listed on WSE
Autorzy:: Kałdoński, Michał
Jewartowski, Tomasz
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/557811.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2017-03-30
Wydawca:: Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Poznaniu
Tematy:: overvalued equity, earnings management, agency costs, agency theory, corporate finance, corporate governance
Opis:: The aim of the paper is to study earnings management activities of companies listed on Warsaw Stock Exchange from the perspective of Jensen’s agency theory of overvalued equity (Jensen, 2005). Specifically, we analyze relations between equity overvaluation and various types of earnings management used by public companies between 2005 and 2015. We provide evidence partially consistent with Jensen’s theory. Specifically, our study reveals that overvaluation intensifies income-increasing accrual earnings management activities. However, we also find that overvaluation is not followed by real transactions management activities, as opposed to previous studies based on the US market. We provide some evidence that this difference might be driven by external monitoring executed by large institutional investors.
Źródło:: Economics and Business Review; 2017, 3(17), 1
2392-1641
Pojawia się w:: Economics and Business Review
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 4.

Tytuł:: Problem przedstawicielstwa w otwartych funduszach emerytalnych – wybrane aspekty
Agency Problem in Open Pension Funds – Selected Aspects
Autorzy:: Samborski, Adam
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/597057.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2016
Wydawca:: Łódzkie Towarzystwo Naukowe
Tematy:: fundusz emerytalny
problem agencji
teoria agencji
pension fund
agency problem
agency theory
Opis:: W artykule podjęto problem przedstawicielstwa w otwartych funduszach emerytalnych. Całość rozważań osadzono w założeniach pozytywistycznej teorii agencji. W tekście poddano analizie stosunki, w jakie wchodzą otwarte fundusze emerytalne (OFE) i powszechne towarzystwa emerytalne (PTE) – organ zarządzający OFE. Zwrócono uwagę na relacje zachodzące pomiędzy członkiem OFE a akcjonariuszem PTE. W opracowaniu jako cel przyjęto ocenę mechanizmów ukierunkowanych na łagodzenie konfliktu interesów pomiędzy członkami OFE a PTE. Analizie poddano dwa rodzaje mechanizmów, a mianowicie: bodźce i monitoring. Zdaniem autora w zakresie bodźców przyjęte przez ustawodawcę rozwiązania nie do końca odpowiadają potrzebom członków OFE. Autor proponuje powiązanie większej części wynagrodzenia PTE z wynikami inwestycyjnymi OFE. Towarzyszyć temu jednak powinno zniesienie ustawowych ograniczeń inwestycyjnych dla środków zgromadzonych w OFE i stworzenie możliwości wyodrębnienia z OFE kilku subfunduszy o różnym poziomie ryzyka inwestycyjnego. Autor zaznacza przy tym, iż o profilu ryzyka planu emerytalnego decydować powinien członek OFE. Przyjęte natomiast przez ustawodawcę rozwiązania z punktu widzenia mechanizmu monitoringu nie budzą większych zastrzeżeń. Pewnej poprawy wymagałyby jednak relacje wewnątrz PTE, a dokładniej kwestie dotyczące rad nadzorczych.
The article discusses the agency problem in open pension funds. All these considerations embedded in the assumptions of the positivist agency theory. The text analyzed the relationship between the open pension funds (OFE) and general pension societies (PTE) – OFE governing body. Attention was paid to the relationship between members of the open pension funds and PTE shareholders. The study adopted as a goal: to assess the mechanisms that solve the conflicts of interest between members of OFE and PTE. Author analyzed two types of mechanisms, namely: incentives and monitoring. According to the author, adopted solutions by the legislator in the area of incentives do not fully meet the needs of OFE members. The author proposes to link the greater part of the PTE remuneration with the results of OFE investment. The author also proposes the abolition of statutory investment limits on OFE and separation within the OFE several sub-funds with different levels of investment risk. OFE member should decide about the risk profile of a pension plan. Adopted solutions by the legislature in the field of monitoring do not raise major objections. One improvement would require, however, relations within the PTE, and more specifically issues concerning supervisory boards.
Źródło:: Studia Prawno-Ekonomiczne; 2016, C; 329-348
0081-6841
Pojawia się w:: Studia Prawno-Ekonomiczne
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 5.

Tytuł:: Bariery współpracy pomiędzy regulatorem a przedsiębiorstwami w zakresie regulacji z perspektywy ekonomii behawioralnej
Barriers to Cooperation between Regulatory Authority and Companies in the Field of Regulation from the Perspective of Behavioural Economics
Autorzy:: Szkudlarek, Piotr
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/22619580.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2023
Wydawca:: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu
Tematy:: regulacja
teoria agencji
ekonomia behawioralna
regulation
agency theory
behavioural economics
Opis:: Celem artykułu była ocena znaczenia barier we współpracy pomiędzy regulatorem a przedsiębiorstwami w zakresie regulacji z perspektywy ekonomii behawioralnej. Do osiągnięcia celu badawczego wykorzystano wyniki badań ankietowych przeprowadzonych w urzędach regulacyjnych w Polsce: w Urzędzie Komunikacji Elektronicznej (UKE, n = 107) oraz w Urzędzie Regulacji Energetyki (URE, n = 157). Wyniki badania wykazały relatywnie większe znaczenie barier dotyczących skłonności do ryzyka, oceny rynku i wyboru narzędzia regulacji, a także braku partnerskich stosunków współpracy i zaufania. Jednocześnie badani wskazali na relatywnie mniejsze znaczenie braku potrzeby współpracy, zniechęcania do współpracy i nieuczciwości działań. W kilku przypadkach stwierdzono istotne statystycznie różnice w ocenie tych barier pomiędzy urzędnikami UKE i URE. W analizie barier z perspektywy ekonomii behawioralnej wskazano na znaczenie teorii perspektywy, heurystyki zakotwiczenia, efektu ramowania, efektu nadmiernej pewności, efektu status quo oraz na zjawiska szumu.
The aim of the article was to assess the importance of barriers to cooperation between regulatory authority and companies in the field of regulation from the perspective of behavioural economics. To achieve this goal the results of survey research conducted in Poland in the Office of Electronic Communications (OEC, n = 107) and the Energy Regulatory Office (ERO, n = 157) were used. The results of the research showed relatively greater importance of barriers in the form of risk propensity, market assessment, and choice of regulation tool, as well as the lack of partner relations and trust. It was indicated that the lack of need for cooperation, discouragement from cooperation and dishonesty are relatively less significant barriers. In several cases statistically significant differences in the assessment of these barriers between UKE and URE officials were also found. From the perspective of behavioural economics the importance of prospect theory, anchoring heuristic, framing effect, overconfidence effect, status quo effect and noise phenomenon was indicated.
Źródło:: Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu; 2023, 67, 4; 143-152
1899-3192
Pojawia się w:: Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 6.

Tytuł:: Reducing information asymmetry in IT projects
Autorzy:: Wachnik, Bartosz
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/432121.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2014
Wydawca:: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu
Tematy:: asymmetry
access to information
management support IT systems
game theory
agency theory
Opis:: An IT project consisting in implementing a management support information system is characterised by information asymmetry between the supplier and the client. The presented research results are part of the author’s broader research pointing to imperfections in the access to information amongst the providers and buyers of IT projects. The scope of this article is to present the methods of avoiding information asymmetry as part of an IT project implementation. The research results may be interesting for researchers specialising in the subject matter of IT project implementation and for practitioners completing IT projects.
Źródło:: Informatyka Ekonomiczna; 2014, 1(31); 212-222
1507-3858
Pojawia się w:: Informatyka Ekonomiczna
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 7.

Tytuł:: Governance of director and executive remuneration in leading firms of Australia
Autorzy:: Riaz, Zahid
Kirkbride, James
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/943135.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2017-12-20
Wydawca:: Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Poznaniu
Tematy:: Corporate governance; globalization; agency theory; institutional theory;
disclosure level of director and executive remuneration
Opis:: The aim of the paper is to examine how the introduction of state regulation and self-regulation impacts on the disclosure of director and executive remuneration in Australia. In doing so, we step beyond the simple state-market dichotomy in the extant literature, and proposes a symbiotic association between both regulatory modes for remuneration governance. The study reveals that remuneration disclosure levels are significantly higher after the advent of both self-regulatory and state regulatory reforms rather than state regulation alone. Furthermore, foreign-MNCs which experience increased agency problems due to spatial complexities and increased liabilities of foreignness do not have a superior disclosure level of director and executive remuneration: findings with important messages for policy makers and for regulators.
Źródło:: Economics and Business Review; 2017, 3(17), 4; 66-86
2392-1641
Pojawia się w:: Economics and Business Review
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 8.

Tytuł:: Źródła konfliktu agencyjnego w towarzystwach funduszy inwestycyjnych
The sources of agency conflict in the investment fund companies
Autorzy:: Gad, Dagmara
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/951336.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2014
Wydawca:: Łódzkie Towarzystwo Naukowe
Tematy:: teoria agencji
konflikt agencji
towarzystwo funduszy inwestycyjnych
agency theory
agency conflict
investment fund company
Opis:: Investment Fund Company sets up and manages investment funds that collect funds from many investors. Decisions taken by Investment Fund Company are supported by the experienced managers (investment advisors or Asset Management Company). It seems that those decisions are optimal. It turns out, however, that between Investment Fund Company, participants in the Investment Fund and the managers (investment advisors or Asset Management Company) can be identified the agency problem. The purpose of this article is to present, on the basis of literature studies, the sources of agency theory in Investment Fund Company. In the empirical part of the paper is presented the potential sources of the Agency Theory on the example of AXA Investment Fund Company.
Źródło:: Studia Prawno-Ekonomiczne; 2014, XCI (91)/2; 89-104
0081-6841
Pojawia się w:: Studia Prawno-Ekonomiczne
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 9.

Tytuł:: (Re)-structuring the CEO’s compensation—the case of Israel
Autorzy:: Mroczek-Dąbrowska, Katarzyna
Shemesh, Yaron
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1837941.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2020-09-30
Wydawca:: Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Poznaniu
Tematy:: CEO compensation
inequalities
compensation gap
agency theory
principal– agent conflict
corporate governance
Opis:: The executive compensation issue continues to cause protest due to the increasing number of cases of an unjustifiably high level of pay. The main conflict arises from the misalignment of interests between the short-term expectations of the manager and long-term needs of the shareholders. Since there are no universal rules on how to price the executive performance companies reach for different means of establishing the CEO’s compensation and ascertaining manager’s commitment towards maintaining a company’s value. The issue becomes more complex once the compensation rules are not a direct effect of the market power game but are additionally restricted by government. The aim of the paper is to discuss corporate government policies introduced in Israel and their impact on executive compensation level and structure. Israel is amongst those countries that partially regulate CEO compensation and thus the Israeli experience can add to the understanding of the effectiveness of modern corporate governance.
Źródło:: Economics and Business Review; 2020, 6, 3; 105-117
2392-1641
Pojawia się w:: Economics and Business Review
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 10.

Tytuł:: CONTROVERSIES ABOUT AGENCY THEORY AS THEORETICAL BASIS FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Autorzy:: Kultys, Jan
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/489081.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2016
Wydawca:: Instytut Badań Gospodarczych
Tematy:: corporate governance
agency theory
stewardship theory
team production theory
shareholder primacy model
director primacy model
Opis:: The issue of corporate governance is being taken up by different branches of science. Particular views on the nature and goals of a firm, as well as on corporate law, determine various approaches to the issue. The ongoing debate on corporate governance is being stimulated by notorious scandals and economic crises. The agency theory (prevailing today), which assumes egoism and pursuit of one’s own interests, forms the basis for shareholder primacy model, while team production theory forms the basis for director primacy model. Stewardship theory, which assumes convergence of management’s and stakeholders’ interests, may be competing or complementary towards the agency theory, depending on situation. According to management theory, efficient management requires law regulation of managers’ status. This paper is aimed at presenting controversies about traditional agency theory as theoretical basis for corporate governance, as well as at discussing other perspectives on the issue, which are extensions of the traditional theory or are based on substantially different premises. The analysis shows that going beyond agency theory allows for better understanding of the whole range of models of corporate governance as well as of the changes that are being proposed in the area. The method utilized in this paper is descriptive and comparative in character.
Źródło:: Oeconomia Copernicana; 2016, 7, 4; 613-634
2083-1277
Pojawia się w:: Oeconomia Copernicana
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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