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Wyszukujesz frazę "Szypszak, Charles" wg kryterium: Autor


Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2
Tytuł:
Legal Protection of Property Rights in the Self-Regulating United States Local Recording System
Autorzy:
Szypszak, Charles
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/684845.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
property rights
land recording
registers of deeds
real estate conveyances
Opis:
In all legal systems with private property, the government provides a mechanism for owners and lenders to make a public record of their rights. In most countries, the gov-ernment restricts access to this public record and allows entries into it only after a public official approves it. By contrast, no government entity in the United States regulates, confirms, or guarantees the typical real estate ownership transfer. How this works is not readily understood even within the United States, where owners and lenders rely on attorneys and other professionals to examine and understand the public record and to record instruments that protect their clients’ property rights. This article describes the laws and legal customs that underlie this self-regulating system, including how they dif-fer fundamentally from land registration in other countries, and the emerging challenges to its reliability.
Źródło:
Adam Mickiewicz University Law Review; 2019, 9
2450-0976
Pojawia się w:
Adam Mickiewicz University Law Review
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Stare decisis and information abundance in a common law jurisdiction
Autorzy:
Roscoe, Emily
Szypszak, Charles
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2106678.pdf
Data publikacji:
2022-05-30
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II
Tematy:
legal research
case law
stare decisis
common law
American law
Opis:
In a common law jurisdiction, according to the principle of stare decisis judges are bound to interpret a constitutional or common law principle by applying authoritative cases already decided. Parties in disputes pending before the courts must find and assess the prior cases on which they can expect that judges will rely. Not very long ago, research for such precedent involved reviewing known cases and linking them to other cases using topical digests and citators. Success with this approach required a patient, persistent, thorough, and open-minded methodology. Modern information accessibility gives previously unimaginable quick access to cases, including with tools that promise to predict judicial tendencies. But this technological accessibility can have negative side effects, including a diminished research aptitude and a stilted capacity to synthesize information. It can also lead to an inadequate account of the human factors that often cause judges to depart from predictions based on logical inference from prior cases. This article considers the extent to which the identification of precedent is essential in legal analysis, yet is of limited value in predictability as a result of judges’ unavoidably human perspectives. With examples from landmark cases, the article illustrates that judges sometimes make decisions based on considerations that will not be revealed in a mechanistic application of precedent. The article considers how evolving legal research tools and methods give access to precedent that in some respects makes the process more scientific, but in other respects can obscure the realities of how cases are decided. The article also gives examples of this paradox as demonstrated by today’s students who are learning how to do research, drawn from years of the authors’ teaching experience.
Źródło:
Review of European and Comparative Law; 2022, 49, 2; 7-32
2545-384X
Pojawia się w:
Review of European and Comparative Law
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2

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