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Wyszukujesz frazę "Olga, Kazalska," wg kryterium: Autor


Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3
Tytuł:
Zwolnienie z konstytucyjnego wymogu kontrasygnaty – rozważania na tle niekontrasygnowanych obwieszczeń Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej o wolnych stanowiskach sędziego w Sądzie Najwyższym i Naczelnym Sądzie Administracyjnym
Autorzy:
Olga, Kazalska,
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/902506.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019-01-17
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
Tematy:
President of the Republic of Poland
Supreme Court
countersignature
privilege
announcement
official act
Prezydent Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej
Sąd Najwyższy
kontrasygnata
prerogatywa
obwieszczenie
akt urzędowy
Opis:
On June 29, 2018 in Dziennik Urzędowy “Monitor Polski” (the Official Gazette of the Republic of Poland) were published two announcements by the President of the Republic of Poland – from May 24, 2018, on the vacant positions of the judges in the Supreme Court and from May 28, 2018 on the vacant positions of the judge in the Supreme Administrative Court. The obligation to announce the number of vacant judges’ positions is a result of changes in the structure of the Supreme Court introduced by the new law of 8 December 2017 and the obligation to apply these provisions to the judges of the Supreme Administrative Court. The controversy is aroused by the fact that the published announcements were not countersigned – although this competence is not included in the catalog of presidential prerogatives, exempted from the obligation of co-signing by the Prime Minister. The analysis of the constitutional shape of the countersignature and the practice of using by the President of his competences will allow to answer the question whether the President’s announcements require for their validity the signature of the Prime Minister’s or are they exempt from this requirement. In the light of the doctrinal reflections, the recognition of the announcement of the President of the Republic of Poland on vacant judicial positions in the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court may be considered as a derivative or analogous competence to the presidential prerogative of appointing judges. However, this stands in contradiction with the Constitutional Tribunal jurisprudence, which excludes the possibility of a broad interpretation of the constitutional catalog of prerogatives. Nevertheless, due to the informative, non-normative character of the announcements of the President, the issue of qualifying them to the catalog of official acts, for which the countersignature is required, raises reasonable doubts.
Źródło:
Studia Iuridica; 2018, 76; 218-243
0137-4346
Pojawia się w:
Studia Iuridica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
British-Polish Protocol in light of the Court of Justice of the European Union jurisprudence (N.S. v Secretary of State, Bonda, Fransson)
Autorzy:
Olga, Kazalska,
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/902552.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
Tematy:
British-Polish Protocol
Charter of Fundamental Rights
the Court of Justice of the European Union
N.S. v Secretary of State
Bonda
Fransson
Opis:
The Protocol No. 30 on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and to the United Kingdom, so called “British-Polish Protocol”, annexed in 2007 to the Treaties by means of the Lisbon Treaty, led to many interpretational disputes about its legal status and consequences for application of the Charter in Poland and United Kingdom. However, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), continuing the protection of human and fundamental rights contained in the Charter, dispels some doubts concerning the Protocol significance through its case law. Judgment of the CJEU of December 21, 2011 in joined cases N.S. (C-411/10) v Secretary of State for the Home Department et M. E. and Others (C-493/10) v Refugee Applications Commissioner and Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, as well as Advocate General’s Verica Trstenjak opinion delivered on September 22, 2011, confirms the normative content of art. 51 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, so that the applicability of the Charter in the United Kingdom or in Poland is unchallengeable. Significance of the Advocate General’s Juliane Kokott’s opinion, delivered on December 15, 2011, in case General Prosecutor v Łukasz Marcin Bonda (C-489/10) should not go unnoticed. It states that Protocol No. 30 cannot be seen as an opt-out clause, but shall be regarded as having only clarifying character and as construction guidelines. Broad scope interpretation of the Charter was what CJEU called in the case Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson (C-617/10). It allowed to develop common standards for the interpretation and application of European Union fundamental rights.
Źródło:
Studia Iuridica; 2016, 68; 125-140
0137-4346
Pojawia się w:
Studia Iuridica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Domniemanie przyjęcia poprawki senackiej jako konstytucyjny standard procesu legislacyjnego
Autorzy:
Olga, Kazalska,
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/894890.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019-10-05
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
Tematy:
Senate amendment
presumption of adoption of the amendment
legislative procedure
Sejm
Senate
President
Constitutional Tribunal
poprawka Senatu
domniemanie przyjęcia poprawki senackiej
procedura legislacyjna
Senat
Prezydent
Trybunał Konstytucyjny
Opis:
On 5 August 2015, at the plenary sitting of the Sejm, was submitted the motion to adopt the Senate’s amendments. Despite obtaining an absolute majority of votes, the Marshal of the Sejm declared their rejection by the Sejm. Doubts regarding the compliance with all the requirements of the legislative procedure prompted the President of the Republic of Poland to bring the case to the Constitutional Tribunal for consideration. It was necessary to determine whether the presumption of adoption of the Senate amendment, adopted in the Constitution of 1997, is a regulation on the essential elements of the legislative procedure, violation of which determines unconstitutionality of the legislative act.
Źródło:
Przegląd Europejski; 2019, 1; 75-92
1641-2478
Pojawia się w:
Przegląd Europejski
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3

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