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Tytuł:
Metodologia nowoczesnej rozprawy naukowej według Diogenesa z Apollonii
The Methodology of a Modern Scientific Dissertation according to Diogenes of Apollonia
Autorzy:
Narecki, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1954791.pdf
Data publikacji:
2001
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
metodologia rozprawy naukowej
logos
Diogenes z Apollonii
przedsokratycy
methodology of research dissertation
Diogenes of Apollonia
Presocratics
Opis:
Diogenes of Apollonia, a philosopher-eclectic of the second half of the fifth century BC, opens his treatise On Nature in a different way than pre-Socratics, proposing a novel methodological model in scientific research. This introduction is the subject matter of the paper, that is fragment B 1, in which there appears the concept of logos, a key word in Diogenes' methodology. On the grounds of a semantic analysis one may say that fragment B 1 is a first attempt in the history of science at a formulation of methodological presumptions, such that are required of all research which are to be fixed in a written form of a scientific dissertation. Diogenes' proposal bears the signs of universal method, for it deals with any dissertation (λόγου παντός) and anyone who sets to edit it (ἀρχόμενον). In line with Diogenes' presuppositions, anyone who undertakes a scientific research should assume: 1) an indubitable assumption (= evident axiom − ἡ ἀρχὴ ἀναμφισβήτητος) on which his whole argumentation is based and to which it always returns (as his point of departure), and 2) one should speak seriously, i.e. to be as comprehensible as possible, responsible and in accord with the theme under discussion (ἡ ἑρμηνεία ἁπλῆ καὶ σεμνή). Satisfying the above requirements, each scholar will achieve his desired goal and will accomplish a reliable dissertation with a true character of a scientific paper, his logos, having studied the assumed topic (τὸ ξύμπαν εἰπεῖν). One should bear in mind that its roots should be sought as early as Diogenes of Apollonia, who in the concept of „logos” combines closely and balances in proportion both the rational element (methodology) and the expressive one (under the form of the language of scientific work). Consequently, having such considerations based on clear and unquestioned methodological presuppositions, there appears a transparent and harmonious dissertation, put in proper words, an ancient ”prototype” of our contemporary scientific studies.
Źródło:
Roczniki Humanistyczne; 2001, 49, 3; 5-13
0035-7707
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Humanistyczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Λόγος w myśli Parmenidesa z Elei
Λόγος in the Thought of Parmenides of Elea
Autorzy:
Narecki, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1955625.pdf
Data publikacji:
1999
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Opis:
The paper is a continuation of the studies on the concept λόγος [see the author's articles: Rozwój pojęcia λόγος we wczesnej myśli greckiej. Część I: Epika i liryka (The Development of the λόγος Concept in the Early Greek Thought. Part One: Epics and Lyrics), “Roczniki Humanistyczne”, 44 (1996), fasc. 3, pp. 21-51; Rozwój pojęcia λόγος we wczesnej myśli greckiej. Część II: Idea Logosu u Heraklita z Efezu (The Development of the λόγος Concept in the Early Greek Thought. Part Two: The Idea of λόγος in Heraclitus of Ephesus), “Roczniki Humanistyczne”, 45 (1997), fasc. 3, pp. 5-41; Λόγος we fragmentach Epicharma (Λόγος in Epicharmus' Fragments), “Roczniki Humanistyczne”, 46 (1998), fasc. 3, pp. 5-29]. The main subject matter of our studies is a semantic and philosophical dimension of the word λόγος in the fragments by Parmenides of Elea which have been preserved up to date. The concept λόγος appears in Parmenides only three times, yet in the light of our analyses it fulfills a very important role. Apart from its use in fragment B 1 (l. 15: μαλακοῖσι λόγοισιν), where in the sense “sweet words ≈ well-formed and clever arguments” it reveals its expressive character. In the remaining two cases we deal with a decidedly rational aspect of the word logos. In fragment B 7 λόγος - “reason” is a superior cognitive faculty; on the one hand, it coordinates the functions of other mental and sense structures, on the other it is ranked an exclusive intellectual power, capable of understanding (by means of “thought”), evaluate (= “distinguish”) and accept the dogma about the only existence of Being, and at the same time to reject the false statement about the existence of non-being (κρῖναι λόγῳ ἔλεγχον − l. 5). Now the truth about Being becomes a principal object of “reliable interpretation (= science)” of the goddess (πιστὸν λόγον − fragment B 8, l. 50). Thus it is in logos that the divine thought about Truth is expressed (νόημα ἀμϕὶς ἀληϑείης), which is and which constitutes the only Being (= “that which is”, [τὸ] ἐόν). It is through goddess's mouth that Parmenides makes it possible to identify three levels of the reality under study: linguistic (λόγος), mental (νόημα, νόος) and ontological (ἀλήϑειη = [τὸ] ἐόν). Therefore the human logos (“reason”), previously endowed with divine knowledge, may evaluate words (i.e. names) from the perspective of an ontological status ascribed to their objects (designates). The reality alone sanctions the truthfulness of that evaluation; here only that which exists (being). Should it be otherwise, that is when the words do not name something that actually exists, then they are only idle names, or rather, deprived of reliability, erroneous views that mortals hold. Therefore they may no longer be regarded as reliable epistemological tools. Such being the case, the best solution is to trust the message (λόγος ≈ μῦϑος) of the goddess. She appears to be both the only source of knowledge about being, and a reliable guide on the way to Truth. Without that aid, the human logos − “reason” would be totally helpless: without a revealed knowledge, for it is only when that knowledge has been acquired that it can set to analyze the mortals' views and their opinions about reality (δόξαι βροτεῖαι). One of the few “divine” disciples, who have been honoured with the knowledge of the truth, is the poet himself, Parmenides. As an exceptionally able student, he shows us that in order for the process of cognition to succeed, one should employ, both on the way of Truth and falsehood (= non-truth), an appropriate research instrument, i.e. logos. It is by means of that instrument that the young philosopher does not concentrate on the illusory phenomena, but reaches into a more profound sphere, into the very foundations of reality, for he can properly interpret the message (= science) that has been revealed to him. Therefore in order to gain a real knowledge about Being, everybody must behave like the poet-philosopher does, in other words, his own reason (λόγος), must become absorbed in the story (μῦϑος) and thought (νόημα) of the goddess. It must absorb her logos (λόγος), and only then did he decide (κρῖναι) to reject (ἔλεγχος) non-being and accept the true Being (τὸ ἐόν = ἀλήϑεια). In this approach to logos (i.e. “reason”, together with its inferior intellectual faculties), as the only guarantee of the final cognitive success, one should find − as we think − the most important convergence in the thought of Parmenides and Heraclitus of Ephesus. The question, however, to what extent it is a direct influence of the Ephesian, an to what extent it is a creative continuation of his solutions, must remain without an answer, as our evidence is insufficient.
Źródło:
Roczniki Humanistyczne; 1999, 47, 3; 5-27
0035-7707
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Humanistyczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Λόγος we fragmentach Epicharma
Λόγος in Epicharmus Fragments
Autorzy:
Narecki, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1957162.pdf
Data publikacji:
1998
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Opis:
The paper seeks to examine the semantic-philosophical dimension of the word λόγος in Epicharmus' fragments, the Sicilian poet, who owing to his philosophical interests is often rated among the pre-Socratics. In our analyses here, we deal with seven „in a measure” authentic fragments (9 K = Kaibel; 87-89 tit. 1/K; 254 K = B 6 DK = Diels-Kranz; 295 K = B 65 DK; 279 K; 278 K = B 39 DK; 170 K = B 1 + B 2 DK) and one pseudo-Epicharmean text by Chrysogonos (B 57 DK = 255-257 K). Their careful reading (taking into account, as far as it is possible, a broad context), allow us to draw several conclusions. It should be noted, above all, that in Epicharmus' texts the „rational” aspect of the word λόγος is dominating. Such meanings as „reason, consciousness, intellect” testify to it. It is, therefore, human cognitive faculty, assessment of facts (e.g. under the angle of their possible use for man − see frag. 9 K: λόγος γινώσκων) and drawing proper conclusions (by means of analogy and induction) about the universal character of a continuous change, both in inanimate and animate reality (the animate reality is represented by man who changes everyday − see frag. 170 K = B 2 DK). The „rationality” of Logos is proved by its other uses. Here we should quote the title of the play Λόγος καὶ Λογίνα, that is a personification of both concepts: He-Word and She-Word. According to us, this title should rather be understood as male (i.e. correct) „Argument” and woman's (= female, i.e. naive and unwise) „Argumentation,” therefore there are antagonistic figures who conduct a „dialectic” argument and reason in two ways: a better one − man, and a worse one − woman (such reflection seems to be justified by fragment 87 K, taken probably from this play). The „arguments” (οἱ ἐμοὶ λόγοι οὗτοι − frag. 254 K = B 6 DK) have an equally rhetorical overtone. They are skillfully (resp. wisely) constructed and flow from the mouth of the mythic Palamedes, a probable subject of the statement. Aside to its rational character, Epicharmus' Logos retains also its traditionally „expressive” (in other words, enunciative) form as a „beautiful word” in the form of „artistic prose” or „regular poetry,” i.e. rhythmic (λόγοι καλοί + τὸ μέτρον − frag. 254 K = B 6 DK). A similar meaning should be found in the „sweet words” (λόγοι ἅδυμοι − frag. 279 K), obviously pertaining to an „elaborate speech,” or else to a „neat and clever argumentation.” There is another title in which we are interested here, entitled „An Address to Antenor” (Λόγος πρὸς ᾽Αντήνορα − frag. 295 K), although due to Epicharmus' interests in philosophy and science the sense of such a title may equally well point to the „Treatise Dedicated to Antenor.” Eventually, we find an „expressive” case of the word λόγος used in a gnomic fragment 278 K (= B 39 DK), in which the literally taken „words,” speaking more precisely „verbal (i.e. empty) boasts,” turn out to be only „false empty promises” (resp. they are falsehoods) in comparison with the genuine reality of an „act,” a reality which is at the same time (at least according to an average man) available for the senses. The opposition „word” ↔ „act” (λόγος ↔ ἔργον) thus becomes a universal (i.e. commonly used in everyday language) statement of ontological incompatibility between the uttered „word” (τῷ λόγῳ) and its actual embodiment in the form of a concrete action and its result (τῷ ἔργῳ). Consequently, the comparison of these concepts may be considered simultaneously at two levels: epistemological and ethical, as a confrontation of „false” (= pretence, illusion) and „truth” (identical with the real, physical reality). Especially important among the fragments under consideration here is the pseudo-Epicharmean fragment B 57 DK (= 256-257 K). It has been included into our considerations, among other things, due to its authorship ascribed to Epicharmus. In this fragment we deal with the Heraclitean doctrine about Logos; for the „divine Reason” (ϑεῖος λόγος) under discussion here, identified with „God” himself (ὁ ϑεός), is the highest power governing human fortunes, the only source of human reason, and the only discoverer and teacher of any utilitarian arts. Epicharmus himself might have come to the same conclusions, since we find with him some other traces of the doctrine of Heraclitus, if only an express note about the doctrine of the permanent variability of the world (we find its plastic representation in frag. 170 K). Epicharmus' original testimonies, and also those which were ascribed to him (especially frag. B 57 DK), confirm that there is in Heraclitus' thought not only the theory of variability, but also the idea of Logos, a power governing the river-like variable universe. We do not know, however, to what extent such references to the thought of the Ephesian resulted merely from a willingness to make its „dramatic” (= „comic”) travesty (as in the case of the mythological themes and figures) or compete with the philosopher himself; or, to what extent they were attempts to penetrate into the sense of its exceptionally thought. We shall never know the truth. From our point of view, the most essential thing is that such testimonies exist. Owing to them our knowledge about the philosophy of Heraclitus becomes less hypothetical, for it is grounded on considerably firmer sources. In terms of time they are close to them. It is these testimonies that bridge a gap between his doctrine and its most effective development with the Stoics. A general conclusion from the analysis of the fragments with the word λόγος is that Epicharmus remained under an apparent influence of the Heraclitean Logos. He gives voice to it by bringing to mind similar meanings, among which the „rational” senses dominate; equally striking is the polyvalence of Logos, especially there where a profound „rationality” lies behind its expressive character (e.g. in frag. 87-89 tit. 1/K and 254 K/6 DK „argument” is a neatly constructed, verbal statement, that is „speech,” and at the same time its contents in the form of a logically correct „reasoning”). Both aspects of Epicharmus' logos continue the etymology, i.e. the rational-enunciative value of the noun λόγος, and at the same time confirm its twofold development. As it has been proved by our analyses, the way in which it is used in some fragments may be interpreted as a special response Epicharmus gave to Heraclitus' innovative attempt to entirely „rationalize” that word, thanks to which it has become one of the most important concepts in the whole history of Greek philosophy.
Źródło:
Roczniki Humanistyczne; 1998, 46, 3; 5-29
0035-7707
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Humanistyczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
„Mneme” w „Dziejach” Herodota
Mneme in the Histories of Herodotus
Autorzy:
Narecki, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1045897.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019-03-21
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
mneme – memory
semantics
the Histories
Herodotus
Opis:
The word mneme, “memory”, appears 16 times in the Histories of Herodotus. The author, using the philological analysis of all its occurrences, investigates not only its significance in specific contexts but also defines and names functions that the word has in its place of use. Finally, the author classifies the identified meanings of the word mneme (in combination with the accompanying verbs) and compares its functions (as defined by the context).
Źródło:
Symbolae Philologorum Posnaniensium Graecae et Latinae; 2018, 28, 2; 5-25
0302-7384
Pojawia się w:
Symbolae Philologorum Posnaniensium Graecae et Latinae
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
O zasadzie tożsamości przeciwieństw w myśli Heraklita z Efezu
On the Principle of Identity in Diversity in the Thought of Heraclitus
Autorzy:
Narecki, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1964510.pdf
Data publikacji:
1993
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Opis:
The present paper is a study in which one proves, by way of an accurate analysis of the chosen passages, the thesis that Heraclitus of Ephesus fully deserves to be called the creator of the theory of opposites. The latter is also called in scientific literature the principle of identity, unity or coincidence of opposites which has a Latin name to it, i.e. coincidentia oppositorum. The thought of a fluctuating nature of reality, made up of opposites, played a fundamental role in Heraclitus’ philosophy. Almost the fourth part of the fragments which have been preserved to date deal with opposites. According to the Ephesian, the world can be understood only by way of the categories of opposites, i.e. as a reality whose existence, and that both in the physical and theological sense, guarantees a continuous tension (motion) between these opposites. The author seeks to prove that the contradictory nature of the Heraclitean being has its source and justification in the theory of the unity in diversity. What makes the author think so is an analysis of the majority of fragments in which the said principle is made use of. The fragments in question have been divided in the paper into a few basic groups. First, there are statements in which the principle of opposites directly or indirectly touches on the being named God. The final fragments of the study discuss this (that is God’s) contradictory nature, called Fire. The names which have been mentioned here are: God (B 67) and Fire which occur also in the texts as Strife (B 53, B 80), Harmony (B 51, B 8, B 54), the only Wisdom (B 32). These are names, as it seems, of the same Being whose presence in the world had various embodiments according to Heraclitus. Each figure of the Being, however, manifests a contradictory nature and reaches out to opposites as its justification. That is why Heraclitus regarded the embodiment of fire as the most appropriate one of that Being. Its fluctuating nature was the most handy to visualise and explain the same fluctuating nature of the world. Heraclitus illustrates such a novel teaching about the world made of opposites with examples in which the principle of unity in diversity embraced various kinds of kinships: 1) mutual sequence and change of qualities or things placed on the opposite poles of the same continuum (that is, continuous and repeatable cycle as seen in day and night, summer and winter, want and surfeit (B 67); 2) relativity of things vs the experiencing object (subject); there is no basic difference between pleasant (good) and unpleasant (bad) aspect of the sea water, mire, clean water, chaff and gold which is proved by contradictory feelings and judgements of fish, pigs, donkeys and people (B 61, B 13, B 37, B 9, B 4, B 58); 3) unity of two opposites comes from the fact that none of them could exist without the other as its „fellow-partner” (B 111, B 84); 4) „identity” of opposites is also guaranteed by various aspects of the same thing (the example with a bow − B 48). All kinds of kinships between opposites mentioned here are, as it were, „links” (B 10) which describe various kinds of relations between particles of the universe in which there dominate two tendencies: from unity to plurlity, and its opposite tendency towards unity. They are the same time foundations of the theory of opposites, because the unity of the world is based on the dynamic contradiction of things, that is to say, on a continuous change between opposites which create those things. Ultimately, all opposites may be embraced only by God (B 67) and His contradictory nature − Fire, making real two hypostases: kindling (want) and going out (surfeit − comp. B 65), beginning and end of life, that is those basic opposites which grant existence to all things. Ultimately, contradictoriness rooted in Fire becomes in the thought of Heraclitus a cosmic power which constitutes the world, that is God in a new, not traditional, image of divinity.
Źródło:
Roczniki Humanistyczne; 1993, 41, 3; 5-45
0035-7707
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Humanistyczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Rola zmysłów i duszy człowieka w heraklitejskiej teorii poznania
Die Rolle der Sinne und der Seele des Menschen in der heraklitischen Erkenntnistheorie
Autorzy:
Narecki, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1965587.pdf
Data publikacji:
1986
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Opis:
Der vorliegende Artikel stellt den Versuch einer Beantwortung der Frage dar, welche Funktion die Sinne und die Psyche in der Erkenntnistheorie des Heraklit von Ephesus spielen. Die Analyse einiger ausgewählter Äusserungen berechtigt uns zu der Feststellung, dass man dem Denken dieses Philosophen zufolge die objektive Wahrheit über die Welt erlangen kann, wenn die Erkenntnisinstrumente in Gestalt der menschlichen Sinne und der Seele auf die richtige Weise benutzt werden. Das Ziel der Seelentätigkeit ist das Erlangen von Wissen über die Realität und über sich sowie die Lenkung des Menschen diesem Wissen entsprechend. Der Erlangung eines solchen Bewusstseinzustandes gehen viele komplexe Erkenntnisprozesse voraus, deren Ausgangspunkt die Zeugnisse der Sinne bilden (Fragmente B 55, B 101a, B 7, B 107, B 3). Die Rolle des Koordinators der Sinnetätigkeit erfült das wie sich zeigt − wichtigste Vital-, Vernunft- und Erkenntniselement im Menschen, seine Psyche. Damit die Seelentätigkeit jedoch korrekt verrläuft (d. h. damit nicht barbarisch wirch, vgl. B 107), muss sie das physische Gleichgewicht behalten (siehe B 36), was bedeutet, dass eine übermässige Seelenfeuchtigkeit die Erkenntnisfähigkeit beeinträchtigt, was durch das Bild des betrunkenen Mannes sehr schön veranschaulicht wird (B 117). Die Psyche, deren physische Struktur den oben beschriebenen Bedingungen entspricht, vermag die Zeugnisse der Sinne umzuformen und dann mit Hilfe des Logos (der Sprache) den für uns schon voll verständlichen Schlusseffekt zu formulieren und zu artikulieren, nämlich die objektive Wahrheit über uns selbst und die umgebende Realität.
Źródło:
Roczniki Humanistyczne; 1986, 34, 3; 5-19
0035-7707
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Humanistyczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Księga Heraklita z Efezu i jej losy
Autorzy:
Narecki, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1965678.pdf
Data publikacji:
1984
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Opis:
Some scholars doubt whether Heraclitus wrote any philosophical work. Since this opinion cannot be refuted by means of testimonies, "the book of the philosopher" should be considered as "the book ascribed to him by the ancients". Nevertheless, basing ourselves on their opinion, we must thoroughly check it to prove our conclusion. Moreover, the texte of the ancients are always appreciated without the testimonies of their genuine parts in order to show a real difference between the impression the book "as a whole" made on the ancients and the impression made by its fragmentary parts. Heraclitus wrote a single work in one "book" (i. e. on a single standard papyrus). There is no original title. Περὶ φύσεος  became a typical title in the middle of the 5th century BC. Μοῦσαι means probably quaestiones ("researches, inquiries") and has nothing to do with the Muses or else the "poetic" style of the work. A poem by Diodotos constitutes the motto. The last title is probably a deformation of the very beginning of the book (none of the suggested lessons is really convincing while γνώμη with an object in genitive speaks for an early date). Division into three λόγοι was not made by Heraclitus but it partially reflected the real structure of the book. The division was probably made by a philosophical school (not the Stoics in any case: in the Stoic terminology to pan meant "restricted world", τὸ ὅλον "unlimited vacuum". It is improbable that there were two separate parts: dealing with the world and God since περὶ τοῦ παντός  means "about all things" contrarily to the two remaining parts: on politics and theology (= physics). The first part was devoted to more misscallenous subjects. Diodotos and Sextus’ views do not prove in any way that the book as a whole dealt with politics; they do not speak for the ethic theory of Heraclitus, either. Hipolyt understands τὸ κεφάλαιον "the main point" (but not a "chapter"). It refers to the theory of the identity of opposites, the theory defining God. Heraclitus’ "darkness" was interpreted by the ancients as either conscious (esoterism) or unconscious (stylistic shiftlessness, innate impulsiveness). It followed from the deepness of his thought (symbols and allegories) and frequently appeared above his readers’ understandling. There were two reasons for the difficulties in understanding: 1) lack of "joining words", 2) syntactic homonimy. The book was laid as a votive offering to be protected from distruction and to serve those who would need its copy. It is quite possible it was discovered in a "secret way" after Heraclitus’ death. The story of Euripides and Socrates was probably true. The dramatist could bring the book frome his travel and give it to Aristotle. It was still attainable at the beginning of the 3rd century AC. Most of the commentators lived in the 4th and 3rd century BC. In the second half of the 3rd c. AC all direct quotations disappeared from the ancient texts. The same happened with the book. It was probably connected with the shift to the parchment codex as well as with the growing role of Christianity in the literary tradition.
Źródło:
Roczniki Humanistyczne; 1984, 32, 3; 5-20
0035-7707
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Humanistyczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Człowiek w myśli Heraklita z Efezu
Man in Heraclitus’s Philosophy
Autorzy:
Narecki, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1965810.pdf
Data publikacji:
1982
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Źródło:
Roczniki Humanistyczne; 1982, 30, 3; 5-20
0035-7707
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Humanistyczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Z badań nad pojęciem pamięci – mneme w dramacie greckim. Część I: Mneme w utworach Ajschylosa i Sofoklesa
From the Study on the Concept of Mneme – “Memory” in Greek Drama. Part I: Mneme in Aeschylus’ and Sophocles’ Plays
Autorzy:
Narecki, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/648690.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
Tematy:
mneme – memory
semantics
ancient Greek tragedy
Aeschylus
Sophocles
Opis:
The aim of the study, which is a continuation of this type of research (based on Greek literary sources of the Presocratic era), is to determine the meanings of the concept of mneme – “memory” in the works of Aeschylus and Sophocles, as well as to determine the function it plays in a given place. Linguistic and literary analysis of 12 instances of a noun mneme in Aeschylus (3) and Sophocles (9) shows that this concept reveals hitherto unknown semantic shades. Aeschylus gives mneme a new meaning of “worship” (in Suppliants). He also uses the already known: intellectual “power of memory” and for the first time in the history of Greek literature identifies “memory” with the mother of all muses – Mnemosyne (in Prometheus Bound). More often mneme appears in the works of Sophocles, which results from the functions performed there. After all, the intellectual “power of memory” and “memories” as the effects of its actions allow the characters to: (1) do well (and thus keep the moral order), (2) get to know the truth about ourselves (to recognize our own identity) changing the course of dramatic action as part of the peripeteia (the case of Oedipus), (3) lead (as the driving force) to destruction of heroes (Jocasta, Oedipus), (4) drive the action (as “thought”), (5) serve as a moral compass (in a new semantic shade “attention”, in Oedipus at Colonuss), (6) store a resource (memories) as a deposit in collective memory as a warning for posterity. And finally, for the first time in history, the concept of mneme as a tool of mimesis is used in Oedipus Rex in the new sense: “the ability to (re)create” (inspired by Mnemosyne) or otherwise: “poetic art of reconstruction” of dramatic events. Defined meanings (semantic shades) of mneme can be divided into 2 groups. The first group includes those that take rational value: “power / ability to remember”, “thought”, “attention”), while the other holds the expressive meanings: “worship, honour, commemoration”, “(re)creative, poetic reconstruction”. It seems that the Greek tragedians were aware of the role that mneme can play in their works: whether in the depiction of the characters, or as an element that drives the action, or in recalling, in various ways, the past and its cultivation.
Źródło:
Collectanea Philologica; 2018, 21; 5-23
1733-0319
2353-0901
Pojawia się w:
Collectanea Philologica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Z badań nad pojęciem pamięci – mneme w dramacie greckim. Część II: Mneme w utworach Eurypidesa
From the Study on the Concept of Memory – Mneme in Greek Drama. Part II: Mneme in the Eurypides’ Plays
Autorzy:
Narecki, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/648684.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
Tematy:
mneme – memory
semantics
ancient Greek tragedy
Euripides
Opis:
Study on the concept of mneme – “memory” in the plays of Euripides is a continuation of our research (based on the works of Greek tragedians), whose aim is not only to establish meanings, especially new ones, but also to define the role that this concept plays in the works of Euripides. Linguistic and literary analysis of 8 instances of a noun mneme shows that this concept reveals hitherto unknown semantic values and it also performs functions that are important for the plot. Among the meanings of mneme there are five new ones: (1) “testimony, proof” (Suppliant Women), whose role is a ‘media’ message to guarantee the preservation of memory about Theseus’ feats among descendants, (2) “account, balance” (Heracles), rational argument, which the hero must use in a critical situation caused by divine power, (3) specific “history”, which creates the plot (Ion), (4) “reason, rightness” (Iphigenia at Aulis), i.e. evidence of predominance of the woman over the man (in terms of character), (5) “image”, twice in this sense (Iphigenia at Aulis): 1. as a panorama, vivid memory of panegyric and cognitive nature (Greek expedition), 2. as scenes from Iphigenia’s childhood cited in order to change the decision of Agamemnon. In addition to the new ones, Euripides also uses known meanings: mneme with negation, i.e. the lack of “mentions, memories” (= concealment) becomes an important element of the plot of Helen, guaranteeing its happy ending; in turn mneme as Kreon’s “thought” is a tool for mastering feelings and influencing the development of stage events. All meanings defined by Euripides can be divided into two groups. The first group includes meanings that have rational value: (1) “account, balance”, (2) “thought”, (3) “reason, rightness”. In the other group there are expressive meanings: (1) “testimony, proof”, (2) “mention, memory”, (3) “history”, (4) “image”. Undoubtedly, Euripides not only broadened the semantic scope of the concept of mneme, introducing its new values, but creatively used them in his plays, whether to describe the main characters, or as an element influencing the action, or finally as a testimony of the past that is important for the plot.
Źródło:
Collectanea Philologica; 2018, 21; 25-38
1733-0319
2353-0901
Pojawia się w:
Collectanea Philologica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
„Euthymia” we fragmentach Demokryta z Abdery
Euthymia in the fragments of Democritus of Abdera
Autorzy:
Narecki, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1806860.pdf
Data publikacji:
2021-10-12
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
euthymia (euthymiē)
euestō
eudaimonia
Democritus
cheerfulness
contentment
wellspiritedness
good disposition
well-being
Democritean ethics
Opis:
The author carries out a thorough philological analysis of 9 fragments of Democritus, in which both the noun εὐθυμίη and related verbs and adjectives appear. This allows to establish the contextual semantic scope of the basic concept and to define the role it plays in Democritus’ ethical thought.
Źródło:
Symbolae Philologorum Posnaniensium Graecae et Latinae; 2021, 31, 1; 179-204
0302-7384
Pojawia się w:
Symbolae Philologorum Posnaniensium Graecae et Latinae
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Mneme w greckich źródłach literackich epoki przedsokratyków. Część I: literatura archaiczna i przedsokratycy
Mneme in Greek Literary Sources of the Presocratic Era. Part I: Archaic and Presocratic Literature
Autorzy:
Narecki, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1806921.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019-10-23
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
mneme; termin „pamięć”; etymologia; semantyka; starożytna literatura grecka; okres archaiczny (przedklasyczny) (Hezjod, Bias, Ezop); poezja liryczna (Teognis, Simonides, Ion); przedsokratycy (Heraklit, Anaksagoras, Epicharm, Demokryt)
mneme; the term of “memory”; etymology; semantics; ancient Greek literature; archaic (preclassical) period (Hesiod, Bias, Aesop); lyric poetry (Theognis, Simonides, Ion); Presocratics (Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, Epicharmus, Democritus)
Opis:
Celem artykułu jest prześledzenie (w porządku chronologicznym) występowania i jednocześnie zbadanie zakresu semantycznego pojęcia mneme (μνήμη) w zachowanej literaturze greckiej epoki przedsokratyków (VIII-V w. przed Chr.). Rzeczownik mneme należy do tzw. nomina actionis, oznacza bowiem z jednej strony czynność (1) „pamiętania” należącą do sfery psychologicznej, jak i (2) „pamięć”, tj. samą ‘zdolność’ czy ‘władzę umysłową’, za pomocą której osoba dokonuje aktu zapamiętywania. Analizie filologicznej, uwzględniającej zachowany kontekst, poddano 11 miejsc użycia mneme w tekstach 10 autorów. Jej wynik pokazuje wyraźnie, iż konstytuujący mneme rdzeń *mnā- nadaje temu pojęciu szerokie pole semantyczne, o wiele bardziej pojemne niż we współczesnym polskim terminie „pamięć”, ujawnia bowiem takie sensy, których nie zarejestrowały jeszcze całościowe słowniki języka greckiego, zwłaszcza dwa największe słowniki: Greek-English Lexicon (Liddell, Scott, Jones) oraz The Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek (Montanari), a także leksykony do twórczości poszczególnych pisarzy. Ustalone przez nas znaczenia można uporządkować następująco: (1) intelektualna „władza, zdolność zapamiętywania” (u Simonidesa, Eleg. 14; takie znaczenie mneme pojawia się po raz pierwszy w historii tego terminu); (2) „pamięć o kimś lub o czymś” (Hezjod, B 8 D.-K.; Teognis, Elegiae I, 798; Heraklit, B 126a D.-K.); (3) „podziw, szacunek, uznanie, sława” (Hezjod, B 8 D.-K.; Bias, 10 [73a] Die Sieben Weisen, D.-K.; Epicharm, B 6 D.-K. / 254 Kaibel) – to nowe znaczenia semantyczne mneme, nieobecne w słownikach języka greckiego, podobnie jak kolejne: (4) „świadomość” (u Ezopa, Proverbium 111), (5) „wiedza” (u Anaksagorasa, B 21b D.-K.), (6) „myśl” (u Iona, Jacoby F 3b, 392, F fragment 1; u Demokryta, B 191 D.-K.), (7) „czas” (u Demokryta, B 191 D.-K.) i (8) „troska, dbałość” (u Teognisa, Elegiae I, 1114). Pojęciu mneme, niemal u progu jego rozwoju, zostają zatem nadane nieznane i nieodnotowane w czasach nowożytnych znaczenia, które w kolejnych okresach historii kultury greckiej znalazły szerokie zastosowanie zarówno w języku codziennym, jak również w literaturze i filozofii, zwłaszcza w myśli Platona i w pismach jego najwybitniejszego ucznia Arystotelesa.
The aim of the article is to trace, in chronological order, the occurrence and the semantic scope of the term mneme (μνήμη) in the preserved Greek literature of the Presocratic period (8th-5th century BC). The noun mneme is an example of the so-called nomina actionis for it designates the activity of „remembering,” i.e. it belongs to the psychological sphere, on the one hand; and „memory”, i.e. the ability or mental power itself by means of which one performs the act of remembering, on the other. Taking into account the preserved context, philological analysis includes 11 instances of using the word mneme in the texts of 10 different authors. The results show that the root *mnā- constituting the word mneme allows for a wide scope of the term – much wider than the contemporary Polish term “pamięć” (memory). The root reveals meanings not recorded by the complete Greek dictionaries, including the largest ones: Greek-English Lexicon (Liddell, Scott, Jones) and The Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek (Montanari), as well as the lexicons of individual writers’ works. The meanings deciphered here can be classified in the following order: (1) intellectual “power or ability to remember” (Simonides, Eleg. 14) – such meaning of mneme appears for the first time in the history of the term; (2) “memory/recollection of somebody or something” (Hesiod, B 8 D.-K.; Theognis, Elegiae I, 798; Heraclitus, B 126a D.-K); (3) “admiration, respect, recognition, fame” (Hesiod, B 8 D.-K.; Bias, 10 [73a] Die Sieben Weisen, D.-K.; Epicharmus, B 6 D.-K. / 254 Kaibel) – these are the new semantic meanings of mneme, absent from Greek dictionaries, similarly to the subsequent meanings: (4) “awareness” (Aesop, Proverbium 111); (5) “knowledge” (Anaxagoras, B 21b D.-K.); (6) “thought” (Ion, Jacoby F 3b, 392, F fragment 1; Democritus, B 191 D.-K.); (7) “time” (Democritus, B 191 D.-K.) and (8) “care” (Theognis, Elegiae I, 1114). Thus already at the beginning of its development, the term of mneme was assigned meanings which have remained unknown and unrecognised in modern times. These meanings were widely used both in everyday language and in literature and philosophy of the subsequent periods of Greek culture, especially in Plato’s thought and in the writings of his most distinguished student, Aristotle.
Źródło:
Roczniki Humanistyczne; 2018, 66, 3; 207-231
0035-7707
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Humanistyczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Język grecki – współczesna koine w terminologii medycznej
Greek Language – Modern Koine of Medical Terminology
Autorzy:
Narecki, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1933363.pdf
Data publikacji:
2011
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
Greek language
koine dialect
Latin
etymology
history of medicine
medical terminology
Opis:
The article touches upon the issue of the provenance of the vast majority of modern medical terms (about 90-95%), used in the language of professionals (doctors, pharmacists, etc.) and in the so called professional literature. The author attempts to: (1) first, outline historical conditions of the development of medicine and its terminology, justifying the thesis formulated in the title; (2) then, in a simplified manner, indicate the rules of technical terms' formation, thus, demonstrating the dominant role of the two classical languages, Greek and Latin (with the overwhelming supremacy of the former), in the structure of the created neologisms. The history of medicine and the analysis of its language, carried out on the selected examples, lead to the following conclusions: (1) „classical” (especially ancient Greek) vocabulary is the universal key to understanding contemporary medical terminology; (2) knowledge of the vocabulary and of the rules that govern the system of creating new terms, facilitates, firstly, mastering the terminology by a medicine student, secondly, its understanding among other professionals (for instance, pharmacists, veterinary surgeons, etc.) and even „laymen” (through etymology); and finally, (3) it is possible for the translators to provide a universal (in most cases) translation by means of almost identical terms, regardless of the target language.
Le grec – la koinè moderne de la terminologie médicaleLe présent texte concerne la question d’origine de la grande majorité des termes médicaux modernes (entre 90 et 95%), employés par les spécialistes (médecins, pharmaciens, etc.) et par la littérature du domaine. Tout en expliquant la thèse posée dans le titre, l’Auteur tente premièrement d’esquisser le développement de la médecine dans son contexte historique, ensuite, passant par des simplifications nécessaires, il essaie d’indiquer les règles de formation des termes techniques, montrant le rôle dominant de deux langues classiques – du grec et du latin (où ce premier prime d’une manière tout à fait naturelle) – dans la structure des néologismes créés. L’histoire de la médecine et l’analyse de son langage, menée à l’aide de quelques exemples choisis, conduisent l’Auteur à une série de conclusions: (1) le lexique « classique » (surtout celui du grec ancien) constitue la clé de voûte pour la compréhension de la terminologie médicale moderne; la connaissance de ce lexique, ainsi que la conscience des règles qui régissent sur le système de formation des termes nouveaux, facilitent (2) la maîtrise de la terminologie spécialisée et son intercompréhension parmi d’autres spécialistes (pharmaciens, vétérinaires); enfin, elles offrent (3) aux traducteurs la possibilité d’une traduction universelle (dans la plupart de cas), recourant aux termes quasi-identiques, indépendamment de la langue cible.
Źródło:
Roczniki Humanistyczne; 2011, 59, 8; 151-165
0035-7707
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Humanistyczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
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