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Tytuł:
Godność osoby ludzkiej i obiektywne normy moralne jako reguły w działalności gospodarczej
Dignity of the human person and objective moral norms as rules in economy
Autorzy:
Mazurek, Franciszek Janusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1852622.pdf
Data publikacji:
2006
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
osoba ludzka
godność
normy moralne
prawa człowieka
wartości uniwersalne
wartość pracy ludzkiej
bezrobocie
human person
dignity
moral norms
human rights
universal values
value of human work
unemployment
Opis:
The author subjects to revision the economic liberalism supporters’ views, according to which there is no room for universal moral norms in the area of economy. The conception of homo economicus accepted in economy and the exclusive rule of profit are a manifestation of reductionism. The conviction that the free competition – free market – acts mechanically and impersonally and solves all economic-social problems in the best way is basically incorrect. In free competition there are positive and negative elements. Free competition – “yes, but what kind?” In the article a possibly complete picture of man is shown. Man is a reasonable creature, he is internally free and able to recognize good and evil (owing to his conscience) and owing to this he is the most perfect being in the created world. In his nature, man is a social being (ens sociale); a spiritual-bodily unity; he is not completely actualized but he is open to development; he is a religious and working creature (laborem exercens, homo economicus); he is able to do good, devote oneself to others, to build just – albeit not ideal –systems: legal, cultural, social and economic. But man is also able to do evil: to kill others, to steal, to lie, to wage wars, to commit acts of terrorism and of genocide, to build concentration camps, to manipulate the needs and mentality of whole societies and to enslave others by means of mass media – that is to form a one-dimension man. In the theological-biblical language this is called sinfulness of the human nature. And finally, man is capable of – as H. Marcuse writes – “scientific idiotism”. The highest value is the inborn, n a t u r a l, dignity of the human person, which is pointed to by his mind, inner freedom and conscience. Man is created in God’s image (imago Dei). Christ’s incarnation and redemption of man show his s u p e r n a t u r a l dignity. This is theological-biblical justification. Also philosophical (rational) justification is given. The former one is binding for believers, and the latter is for unbelievers. In the Catholic social teaching both justifications are given. The ontic structure of the human person in itself gives rise to obligations, it is the highest norm. It is defined in the following form: the human person should be respected for himself, because he is a person, and not for any other reason (persona est affirmanda propter se ipsam). The very human person, his dignity, is the fundamental norm of morality that is searched for. The Decalogue, objective and universal moral norms as principles show how to respect and protect the human person. It is not recognizing and complying with moral norms and human rights for themselves that is meant here – art for the art’s sake (pure formalism) – but protection of one’s own dignity and the dignity of every other person. Both moral norms as principles and human rights have been discovered slowly, step by step, but regressions also occur; this especially happened in the 20th and at the beginning of the 21st century. Human persons are the subjects of all communities – the family, the nation, the universal human society (familiae humanae), production and service institutions. The communities do not exist by themselves, but human persons are their foundation. Human persons, and not various systems, are the subject of any activity, for the systems are not persons or super-persons – Super Ego. Hence the thesis put forward by some economists that the system is ruled by an invisible hand is absurd. In human rights three elements are distinguished: their source, contents and protection. These constitute an integral whole. However, identifying a part with the whole (pars pro toto) is a logical mistake. The debate about man’s right to work can be solved after removing this logical mistake and introducing a new term: “the right for work”; showing that work is one of man’s fundamental needs, that it is a universal phenomenon, has a multi-aspectual dimension of values. Work is an anthropological (personal), moral, social, cultural, historical and economic value. Together with the multidimensional value of work the multidimensional evil of unemployment can be seen. There have been various economic models, even in capitalism. After the fall of socialism the thesis is proclaimed that capitalism is the only alternative (logical quantifier). Recognizing the priority of the real capital over work treated as a tool and commodity bought in the so-called work market is the essential feature of capitalism. John Paul II perceives numerous positive elements in capitalism, but he also sees a few negative ones: “We have found out that the thesis saying that after the defeat of real socialism capitalism remains the only model (logical quantifier) of economic organization is unacceptable.” He does not suggest another model, but generally he states that it is “… a society in which there are: freedom of work, enterprise and participation” that is meant here. He adds: “Economy that does not take into consideration the ethical dimension and does not attempt to serve the good of man – each man and the whole man – in fact does not even deserve the name of «economy» understood as reasonable and benevolent management of material resources”. Although he sees positive elements in the process of globalization, he puts forward an imperative demand to base it on the principle of the dignity of the human person and his rights, and the good of the whole human family (familiae humanae). In the area of economy “ … in the field of economy nobody may insult the human dignity without a punishment, which dignity God himself respects greatly” (Leo XIII).
Źródło:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych; 2006, 34, 1; 19-53
0137-4176
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Prawa człowieka a prawa rodziny
Human rights and family rights
Autorzy:
Mazurek, Franciszek Janusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1857663.pdf
Data publikacji:
2001
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
prawa człowieka
prawa rodziny
Karta Praw Rodziny
human rights
family rights
Chart of Family Rights
Opis:
Human persons living in a family have universal and indivisible rights that are based on man's inborn dignity. From the philosophical point of view that dignity is a substantial, autonomous and self-defining being. From the legal point of view it is a physical subject. On the other hand, family, from the philosophical point of view, is a sui generis reality – an accidental being. Family is not recognised as a legal subject in the Polish family law or in the new Constitution (of April 2, 1997). In the Chart of Family Rights family is recognised as a subject of law. The Chart does not have a character of a legal document – it does not have a binding legal force – so it can be said that family only is a subject of morality and not of law. However, in the Pact of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights family is recognised as a subject of law. A two-plane relationship occurs here. The foundation of the rights of a human person is his inborn dignity, whereas the rights of family members are the foundation of family rights. They are not collective human rights but the rights of another subject, that is of family. Family has social, freedom and solidarity rights with corresponding correlative duties.
Źródło:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych; 2001, 1; 97-128
0137-4176
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Godność osoby ludzkiej czy prawo naturalne podstawą praw osoby ludzkiej w ujęciu Jacquesa Maritaina
The Dignity of the Human Person or Natural Law as the Basis of the Rights of the Human Person According to Jacques Maritain
Autorzy:
Mazurek, Franciszek Janusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1860754.pdf
Data publikacji:
1997
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Opis:
It is true that Maritain writes that natural law (la loi naturelle) is the foundation of human rights, yet he proves that rights are natural rights in the strict sense of the term, whereas others are necessarily bound with it, and yet others are bound only in a contingent manner. The French philosopher considered natural law at two levels: ontological and cognitive. The human being possesses, likewise all other living creatures, a unique structure and goals, a normal way of its functioning (normalité de son foncionnement) - law. The goals are as follows: maintenance of existence and development. For man this law bears a moral character, for man is person, i.e. a rational, free being that has conscience, and he is the master of his own acts. Maritain calls this right a non-written law (la loi non écrite). Now in the ontic fabric of man reside goods which are his due: existence (life) and freedom. Apart from these goods he is entitled to the rights: to life and freedom. In this ontic fabric resides a natural inclination to maintain life, to give life, and to develop. One may maintain one’s existence and reach integral development by acquiring other goods and fulfilling good deeds (working). He, too, has the duty to do good, without which he will fail to maintain his existence and will not reach his goal. Following St Thomas, Maritain lays down the first principle of natural law: do good and avoid evil acts. In this principle reside the most fundamental rights and duties of the human person. It is characteristic of its interpretation that it puts rights before duties. Either of them has a personal and social aspect. The foundation of natural law is the dignity of the human person. Dignity is a metaphysical absolute value, residing in the ontic fabric of person. The core of dignity is in the soul of man, who was created in the likeness of God (imago Dei). Maritain writes: „The dignity of the human person is a word which denotes nothing, if it does not mean that the person of his or her own natury possesses [...] rights”. To know natural law - its gnoseological aspect - is a different problem. It is known spontaneously, in a nonreflective manner, and progressively as regards the degree of civilizational development of mankind, which is pinpointed by ethnology and history of societies. It was exposed to the hazard of errors just as in all other affairs, due to the fact that human reason is imperfect. However, the sound line of moral experience of the binding power of natural law was still developed and will further be developed. Following St Thomas, Maritain lists natural law, the law of nations (ius gentium), the positive revealed Divine law and (established) human law. He incorporates natural law known by way of reflection, and not spontaneously by inclination, within ius gentium and calls it the common law of civilisation (la loi commune de la civilisation). Now ius gentium is linked with natural law in a necessary manner, whereas human law is linked with it only conditionally and contingently. The author of paper proposes to call human law the law of culture. Following the above division, Maritain gives three groups of human rights: rights which belong to natural law, to ius gentium and to positive law. The rights of the human person which belong to natural law and ius gentium are inalienable, unforfeitable - absolute, yet in the aspect of their being granted to human beings. In the aspect, however, of their application they do not have the character of absolute rights, for the human person is a little god. Maritain has also given a different division of human rights: the rights of the human person as such (droits de la personne humaine comme telle), the rights of the civil person (droits de la personne civique), and the rights of the social person, in particular the working person (droits de la personne sociale, et plus particulièrement de la personne ouwrière). Speaking about the rights of the social person, he lists the rights of the people fulfilling some social, economic and cultural functions: producers, consumers, technicians, creators of culture and science. There is still a debate about the right to work, and some Catholic authors negate it, yet Maritain recognizes this right as a basic right and ranks it first among the rights of the person-labourer. He predicted that along with the progress of economic organization a new right to the title of labour (au titre de travail) would be read out, a right which he also called the title of labour (le titre de travail). Not only does the title of possessing property entitle one to manage enterprise, but also to have the title of labour. He pointed to the necessity to take up reform of capitalism and to shape a new socio-economic order. This order should be an order of the aristocracy of labour, that is such in which social, economic and political life will be run by people who are best in their job. To put this regime into effect requires a „moral revolution”.
Źródło:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych; 1997, 25, 1; 33-61
0137-4176
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Godność osoby ludzkiej jako wartość absolutna
Dignity of the Human Person as an Absolute Value
Autorzy:
Mazurek, Franciszek Janusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1861513.pdf
Data publikacji:
1993
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Opis:
The author analyzes the relations between various values and he establishes their ultimate criterion and hierarchy. He is of opinion that an incorrectly established criterion of values and an incorrectly constructed and accepted hierarchy of them leads to what Carl Schmitt called − in reference to Nikolai Hartman − the tyranny of value (die Tyrannai der Werte). The author critically appraises the views of those who maintain that there is a conflict, a dilemma or tension between freedom and equality (justice). He shows that the dilemma is not immanent in the mentioned values but in the incorrect conception of freedom as presented by the liberals on the one hand, and in the erroneous (objective) conception of equality as explicated by the Marxists. In fact the dilemma occurs between those philosophical-social trends. Secondly, the dilemma always appears where these values are confronted with each other in the wrong way and separated from other values − especially from the truth about dignity of the human person. And thirdly, in all the views in which it is admitted that there is a conflict between freedom and equality there is a „methodological” error. It consists in the fact that the conflict of interests of individuals or social groups is reduced to tensions between humanistic values − freedom and equality. Egoistic interests are sought to be hidden behind the screen of the values. Freedom without equality (justice) and the truth about dignity of the human person becomes freedom of élites whereas it is a tyrannizing value for most other classes. The situation is analogous in the case of equality without freedom and the truth dignity of the person. The author shows that dignity of the person is the central, absolute value, as the person is related to the Absolute; it is created in God's image and is redeemed by Christ (supernatural dignity). The author also writes about natural dignity to which the mind, conscience and freedom point. All other values, even objective and universal ones − moral norms and human rights − have an adpersonal (relative) character. Accepting freedom or equality as an absolute value without the truth about dignity of the human person lies at the foundations of all forms of totalitarian systems. According to the author dignity of the human person creates an obligation. He formulates the rule: persona est affirmanda propter se ipsam. He shows that dignity of the human person integrates nations as well as the international system of human rights. In the introduction to the United Nations Chart belief in dignity and value of the human person is expressed. In the introductions to both Human Rights Pacts (1966) it is recognized that human rights follow from the inborn dignity of the human person. The notion of dignity of the human person is also found in the constitutions of many countries, e.g. of West Germany (1949). In West German commentaries it is said that dignity of the human person (Art. 1 p. 1) is the highest value (der oberste Wert), it is the norm of norms (Norm der Normen). Dignity of the human person should be − as it not always is − the criterion of all programs and social economic and political systems.
Źródło:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych; 1993, 21, 1; 261-271
0137-4176
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Integralność praw, człowieka
Integrity of Human Rights
Autorzy:
Mazurek, Franciszek Janusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1849411.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020-05-14
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
prawa człowieka
prawa człowieka do wolności sumienia
wolności religijnej i wolności opinii
human rights
human rights for freedom of conscience
religious freedom and freedom of opinion
Opis:
The leading motif in the Church’s teaching is the inborn and supernatural dignity of each human being that is the only and supreme moral norm. It is from this norm that human rights and other principles follow. The first and fundamental way of the Church is recognizing each human being’s dignity, and reminding: Respect the dignity and freedom of every human person! During the meetings of the OSCE the Holy See mainly promoted the right to freedom of conscience and of opinions in connection with all human rights. It postulated recognition of human rights as a principle of the international law. Overcoming the dispute concerning the contents of the concept of human rights was possible, among others, at the Vienna Conference. There it was said that all human rights follow from the dignity of the human person and from the human being’s inherent value; it was also stated that the human person is the main subject of human rights and fundamental freedoms, so he should be their main addressee and actively participate in the realization of the rights. In the document accepted at the Copenhagen Conference the human person was recognized as the supreme value that is the foundation of the inborn and inalienable human rights. Moreover, the contents of the concept of the right of man to freedom of conscience, to religious freedom and to freedom of opinions is contained in Art. 18 and 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and developed in the same articles of the International Convention for Personal and Liberation Rights. The human rights may be protected in democracy and in a law-governed state. John Paul II stressed that real democracy is possible in a law-governed state on the basis of the correct concept of the human person. The essence of democracy is respecting all the human rights.
Źródło:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych; 2009, 37; 7-31
0137-4176
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Prawo do rozwoju
The Right to Development
Autorzy:
Mazurek, Franciszek Janusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1872878.pdf
Data publikacji:
1983
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Opis:
The development of the human person should be full i.e. it should add to the development of every man and the whole man. The development is achieved through education, rearing, one’s own work, food, clothing, home and medical care. In the present world there live about one thousand million illiterate people (including the old and children under school age). According to UNICEF's report on 1981—82. 17 million children died of hunger and it is estimated that about haft of all the children living in the Third World countries is underfed and over 300 million is physically or mentally retarded. Every man has the right to education and modicum of living, however, the universalism of these rights is not parallelled by their universal protection. It is seems to be a hypocrisy that the problem of human rights is being politicalized and the quarrel over human rights between the East and West still continues in the face of a blatant threat to the rights to living and to development. In this situation the humanism of modern industrial societies appears as egoistic and selective. In the paper the author associates human rights with human needs but does not identify them. The level and range of satisfying the needs are the level and range of the realization of human rights. The author includes, after K. Vasak, the right to development to the rights of the third generation. In his opinion this right is a synthesis of all human rights. The synthesis expresses the unity of human rights and indivisibility of their realization. All rights have a universal dimension, but when the right to development is considered as a synthesis, not only its universal dimension is emphasized in the sense of its applying to every individual but also the universal dimension of its realization. The right to development is a solidarity right for „the full development of man must go together with the development of the whole mankind in solidarity” (Pope Paul VI). This is a dynamic right since it obliges individuals, national minorities, nations, countries and the whole public in the world to act for the benefit of human development and demands changes of unjust socio-economic structures. The objects of the right to development are individual persons, states, national minorities, nations, and the whole mankind. The author treats this right as a human right when he considers an individual person as an object of the right; when other objects are considered, the right is treated as a collective one. The author disagrees with these who consider the right to development as a collective right only.
Źródło:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych; 1983, 11, 1; 215-247
0137-4176
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Godność człowieka a prawa człowieka
Human Dignity and Human Rights
Autorzy:
Mazurek, Franciszek Janusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1873047.pdf
Data publikacji:
1980
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Opis:
The author narrows down his subject to consider whether the idea of human dignity as found in the documents of the United Nations Organization is inspired by the Christian doctrine. The article also sets out to clarify the relation between natural law and human rights. Human rights are all those rights that follow directly from human dignity; they are for that reason universal, inviolable and inalienable; they are adequate to human dignity and they protect it. Dignity is indicated to be the source of human rights by the entire philosophical tradition regarding natural law as developed within the doctrine of the Church, and also by the documents of the United Nations Organization, in particular the Pacts of Human Rights. Human rights can appear in the form of non-positivized natural law or in the form of positive law, laid down in state or international documents. The author shows the terms „human nature” and „human dignity” to be synonymous. Pacem in terris employs them interchangeably, and the United Nations documents use the term „human dignity”. Much attention is devoted to human dignity in the Scripture, ancient philosophy, patristics, the philosophy of the Middle Ages (Thomas Aquinas), the Renaissance (Picco della Mirandola), the Enlightenment (I. Kant), and in modern thought (J. Messner). Human dignity is considered from theological and philosophical viewpoints. From the point of view of theology it is defined in terms of man’s creation in the image of God and of his adoption as a son of God by grace. From the philosophical, viewpoint, it is defined in terms of reason, conscience and freedom. Dignity is a value that is innate, permanent, inalienable, universal and dynamic, proper only to man. Since human rights follow directly from human dignity, they share its attributes. The contemporary ideas of human dignity and human rights are inspired by the Christian doctrine, as has also been pointed \it by non-Christian thinkers, e.g. E. Bloch and L. Kolakowski. In the author’s opinion, the connection between the idea of human dignity as found in the United Nations documents and the Christian doctrine is manifested by the fact that both make use of the same elements to define human dignity within the natural order. Man, man’s dignity, is the central value for Christianity. Pope John Paul II writes in Redemptor hominis: „In reality, the name for that deep amazement at man’s worth and dignity is the Gospel, that is to say: the Good News’\ That deep amazement, he says, „is also called Christianity”.
Źródło:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych; 1980, 8; 19-48
0137-4176
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Zagadnienie urbanizacji w społecznych dokumentach Kościoła
Fragen der Urbanisierung in sozialen Dokumenten der Kirche
Autorzy:
Mazurek, Franciszek Janusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1876188.pdf
Data publikacji:
1979
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Opis:
Der Verfasser beweist, dass Prozesse der Urbanisierung auf verschiedenen Gebieten vorlaufen, und zwar auf einem wirtschaftlichen, demographischen, kulturellen und gesellschaftlichen Gebiet. Dieses Prozess soll unter diesen unterschiedlichen Aspekten bewertet werden. Unter einem wirtschaftlichen Gesichtspunkt kennzeichnet sich die Urbanisierung durch einen ständigen Zuwachs von Zinsen der Menschen, die in ausserlandschaftlichen Berufen tätig sind. Je besser das Land entwickelt ist, desto grösser ist sein Urbanisierungsgrad, in der ersten Phase der Urbanisierung lenkte man grosse Aufmerksamkeit auf Befriedigung der materiellen Bedürfnisse, die heutige Zivilisation enthüllt immer neue Bedürfnisse, die mehr mit „sein" als mit „haben" verbunden sind, woauf Mater et Magistra hinweist Für Ausdruck eines Fortschritts des Humanismus nimmt dieses Dokument das menschliche Streben, mehr einen Beruf und Bildung zu erreichen, als zürn Vermögen zu kommen. Vom Standpunkt der Demographie aus, äussert sich die Urbanisierung im Prozess der Migra tion der Bevölkerung vom Lande in die Stadt. Im Brief des Apostolischen Stuhls vom 11V 1965 an gesellschaftliche Tage in Spanien wurde festgestellt, dass es erfolglos sein wäre, alte paternalistiche Strukturen, in deneu grosse Menschenmenge viele Jahrhunderte lang lebte, zu bedauern. Der Autor beweist, dass sich der Schwerpunkt des Urbanisierungsprozesses unter einem demographischen Gesichtspunkt verschoben hat, und zwar zu den Ländern der dritten Welt wo sich es anders, als in europäischen Ländern im 19 Jahrhundert vollzieht. Die Stadt lockt nicht mehr, sondern das Dorf stosst hinaus. Patologie des Gesellschaftslebens (Rauschgifsucht, Prostitution, Alkoholismus, Zuwachs an Kriminalität) haben ihre Gründe — Autors Meinung nach — nicht so im Mieleu der Stadt als im Mangel an Vorbereitung der Dorfleute zum Leben in einem neuen Milieu der Stadt. Oer Autor meint, dass die. Urbanisierung, die eine unwiderrufliche Stufe in Entwicklung von einer menschlichen Gemeinschaft sei, kann und soll vom Menschen gesteuert werden. Unter einem kultur—gesellschaftlichen Gesichtspunkt vollzieht sich die Urbanisierung als ein neues Lebensstil — Erscheinung von neuen Denkweisen, neuen Bedürfnissen, neuen gesellschaftlichen Verhältnissen Gaudium et spes deutet, dass immer deutlicher das Bewusstsein des Gefühls der Menschenwürde {n 26) und eine übermässige Empfindlichkeit, wenn es um Freiheit geht (n. 4). wachsen Das Prpzess der Urbanisierung begleitet stellt Octogesima Adveniens fest, eine egalitaristische und demokratische Tendenz Die Urbanisierung bringt den Begriff von Freizeit, die zur Vervollkommnung eigener Persönlichkeit und Entwicklung der Kultur ausgenutzt sein (GS n 61) Die Urbanisierung ist ein Prozess der Entstehung eines neuen Weltmusters, und Christen sind verpflichtet, diesem Prozess eine Richtung und einen Inhalt anzugeben. Das Leben in einer Grossstadt hat seine Vor und Nachteile. In der Heiligen Schrift werden Städte oft als Herd des Bösen, des Hochmuts und des Atheismus dargestellt, andererseits wurde Jerusalem zum Bild einer heiligen Stadt, zum Bild des vom Himmel hinabgestegenen (Ap. 3. 12).
Źródło:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych; 1979, 7; 49-61
0137-4176
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Henryka Pescha koncepcja solidaryzmu społecznego
Henry Pesch’s Conception of social Solidarism
Autorzy:
Mazurek, Franciszek Janusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1876350.pdf
Data publikacji:
1977
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Opis:
Henry Pesch is acknowledged as a creator of Catholic social doctrine. It is he who first completely embraced the social and economic philosophy, in a system named by him the social solidarism. Although he refers to an idea of social solidarity, very vividly developed in 19th century, but also criticises its positivistic and utilitaristic principles. He also sharply criticised the principles of liberal economy and the capitalistic system based on them, where man became an instrument and a means of exploitation and labor a merchandise, where the division occurred between work and capital followed by the social division on two antagonistic classes. Pesch took advantage of achievements of Catholic social schools, based himself on the thomistic philosophy, on encyclicals of Leo XIII and achievements of economic schools. Although he saw a possibility of building up the solidarism based on so-called pure humanism, in fact derived it from theological and philosophical universalism. Starting point of his consideration is the thesis: „Man, according to God’s will, is the master of the world within the society” . Here is designed man’s goal, pointed at his dignity and his supremacy over the surrounding world, and his social nature. At foundations of the socio-economic life lies distribution and unity of work. This gives a reason for describing man as a social being. Pesch refers to the Aristotle’s and Thomas’ conceptions of the social nature of man, but gives to it more distinctly economic interpretation, approaching him in a sense to Marx’ formulations. The interdependence between human person and society Pesch calls the solidarity principle. In grasping the relation between man and society he assigns to man an autonomy and to the society a real existence. In formation society area Pesch assigns a great role to authority. It is authority constitutes the social being. This granting the role in socialbeing creation to authority and not to its goal is a consequence of instrumental understanding of common good. , In this respect Pesch did not overcome the individualistic conception, which recognizes as a factor unifying citizens in a social unit not the common-good-goal, but rather authority. While Pesch gave an outline of so-called social-work-system conception, he did not elaborate more precisely in its frame the rules concerned with co-administration of enterprises nor the profitsharing problem. The Pesch’s notions concerning the auxiliary character of each society, social justice and classprofession order had been reflected in Pius XII’s encyclical Quadragesimo anno. His- social-solidarism conception have developed many authors, e.g.G. Grundlach or O.v. Nell-Breuning. Alongside with the social solidarism in the Catholic social doctrine there appeared the social personalism, political personalism and a natural law school. The mentioned tendencies do not exclude each other but are complementary. The principles elaborated by Pesch are, by Church Magistery, applied to the universal society. „The duty of solidarity put down on each individual pertains also to nations” — states the pope Paul VI in his encyclical Populorum progressio.
Źródło:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych; 1977, 5; 25-49
0137-4176
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Problem sprawiedliwości międzynarodowej
International Justice
Autorzy:
Mazurek, Franciszek Janusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1876952.pdf
Data publikacji:
1976
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Opis:
In party I of the article the author attempts to present the relationship between justice and other values; Part II deals with the subjects of universal community; Part III discusses planes and forms of dispensing social justice. Nowadays international justice is mentioned besides traditional forms of justice, i. e. substitutional, distributional, social and legal. It seems to result from the birth of international community. All kinds of justice possess a common feature. Termed the principle of justice, it encourages granting what is lawfully due to other subjects as well as legalizing the right to achieve individual aims. Justice may be understood as moral competence, moral principle, social order founded upon the principle, and action which follows from respecting the law and duties. The author is essentially interested in justice as action. Being the realization of natural law, justice is moral action by means of which what is rightfully suum, cuique reddendi his is given to the other. It is also an activity through which man attains his own aims to which he is entitled. Justice is related to other values, such as truth, liberty and good (common). Just action must be founded upon the true knowledge of man, his dignity, equality, rights, duties, aims and tasks. It also implies liberty since any enforced action is not truly human and as such it can serve to realize neither action nor laws of both the individual and the community. Justice is also connected with good (common) which constitutes its subject, these are personal good i. e. integrated development, and instrumental one, i. e economic and cultural goods. In Part II the author attempts to present the subjects of laws and duties in the international community. He analyses theological, philosophical and sociological aspects of the problem, and lays down moral and legal norms that should be in face in the community. If we consider the philosophical and theological aspect, then it is possible to discuss the existence of universal (international) community; the sociological aspect implies merely the framework of such a community, while its full realization is still the postulate of the common good. The attitude of many authors, including the Code of International Morality which treats particular states as subjects of this community, cannot be maintained according to the notins of natural law. Already F de Vittoria proved that individuals and states constitute the subjects of this community, and at present the same opinion is expressed by many sociologists interested in international relations. It is worth adding that also international organizations and nations (ethnic minorities) are its subjects. The same subjects are the subjects of rights and duties in the universal (international) community. One should look for the foundations of legal force of the norms valid in the universal community in the value of an individual. The same natural law which determines the norms of conduct between particular citizens should also rule the relationships within the universal community. Natural rights of every national (state) community and other social groups result from the very nature of man and the demands of social life. As there exist mutual rights and duties of particular countries, their mutual relations should be founded upon the principle of justice. The author accepts J. Messner’s definition of international justice. He stresses the existence of two interrelated elements, suum cuique, and economic and cultural cooperation as in important factor of accomplishing the cuum. International justice is realized by means of varied cooperation rather, than sharing the their goods by the developed countries. The latter form can lead merely to the short- -lived satisfaction of the consumer’s needs. Although such equality is of a passive nature, it is necessary now. The teachings of bona superfluora formulated by Fathers of the Church, are extended by Populorum progressio from the individual plane to the international relations. Christian ethics always has stressed the universal appropriation of economic and cultural goods and the universal natural law entitling to their use. The idea of universal appropriation of mundane goods is of absolute and timeless value, independent of historical or social determinants and there is no need to verify it. Teachings of the Church concering the economic goods (ownership) and cultural are considered from the viewpoint of universal international community. The author stresses that scientific and technological as well as economic and cultural cooperation constitute the proper form of dispensing international justice. It is cooperation rather than aid since poverty and illiteracy cannot be abolished without the participation and effort of the developing countries themselves. They have to change their social and economic structures as well as the mentality of social groups. Cooperation but not aid demands changes in the structure of world economy. This is not only a moral postulate but also one resulting from the interests of both developed and developing countries. Individual national interests and universal interests are identical as nowadays common good of a particular state cannot be separated from the good of the whole family of men. Development and welfare of one nation at the same time both follow from and prompt welfare and development of other nations. Peace constitutes the common interest of all peoples of the world. The author thinks that to a certain extent the duty of developed countries to help the developing ones may follow the principle of restitution. It is a historical fact that the rich countries have achieved their present economic level by means of, among other things, colonial exploitation. International justice should be realized through: — respect of dignity of the human being, preservation of the rights of man as well as rights of nations and countries to existence and development;— cooperation in the field of science, technology, economy and culture;— proper and just, fixed prices of agricultural raw materials and products;— participation of the developing countries in the decisions concerning economic problems of the international community.
Źródło:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych; 1976, 4; 19-40
0137-4176
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Prawa człowieka w nauczaniu papieża Piusa XI
Autorzy:
Mazurek, Franciszek Janusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1871730.pdf
Data publikacji:
1987
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Opis:
Der Autor analysiert die Menschenrechte in der Soziallehre von Pius XI. auf dem Hintergrund der Weltwirtschaftskrise (1929-1932), der Festigung des sozialistischen Staates in Russland sowie des faschistischen Staates in Italien und des Nazistaates in Deutschland. Er ist der Ansicht, dass Pius XI. sich auf die Würde der menschlichen Person als die Quelle der Menschenrechte beruft. PiusXI. schrieb in QA, dass sich die Rechte des Menschen "aus seiner menschlichen und christlichen Würde" ergeben, die nach dem Bild Gottes, Ihm ähnlich, geschaffen wurde. Auf die Würde der menschlichen Person werden sich auch seine Nachfolger berufen. Pius X. verstand die Freiheitsrechte - das Recht auf religiöse Freiheit, das Recht der Eltern auf die Erziehung ihrer Kinder, auf die Wahl der Schule, das Recht der Kinder und Jugendlichen auf wahre Information in der Schule und auf richtige Erziehung - weitergefasst als LeoXIII. In der Enzyklika QA befasste er sich mit den Gesellschaftsrechten des Menschen -dem Recht auf gerechten Lohn, auf den Besitz von Eigentum, auf Versammlung, dem Recht auf Sozialversicherung, dem Recht auf Arbeit und entsprechende Arbeitsbedingungen, dem Recht auf Erholung und Freizeit, dem Recht auf Partizipation an der Mitregierung des Unternehmens und auf einen Anteil am Gewinn und dem Recht auf den Schutz dieser
Źródło:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych; 1987, 15, 1; 43-49
0137-4176
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Wkład Stolicy Apostolskiej w ochronę prawa człowieka do wolności sumienia i wolności religijnej w Konferencjach Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie (KBWE i OBWE)
The Holy See’s Contribution to the Protection of the Right to Freedom of Conscience and the Religious Freedom in Conferences on Security and Cooperation in Europe and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE and OSCE)
Autorzy:
Mazurek, Franciszek Janusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1835193.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020-05-12
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
prawa człowieka
wolność sumienia
wolność religijna
Stolica Apostolska
godność osoby ludzkiej
human rights
freedom of conscience
religious freedom
Holy See
dignity of the human person
Opis:
The article is the first part of a discussion of the issue of the part taken by the Holy See in the Conferences of Security and Cooperation in Europe. In the analyses the origin and the motives for participation of the Holy See in the international discussion on protecting human rights for the freedom of conscience and the religious freedom are presented. In the area of documents concerning human rights a special attention is paid to the significance of John XXIII’s encyclical Pacem in terris. Also, the Holy See’s postulates and suggestions that deal with the question of the value and dignity of the human person are discussed. The final analyses include the issue of the personal dimension of the right to the freedom of conscience and the religious freedom.
Źródło:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych; 2008, 36, 1; 45-72
0137-4176
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł

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