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Wyświetlanie 1-10 z 10
Tytuł:
Co mówi o prawach przyrody geneza tego pojęcia? Polemika z Ronaldem N. Gierem
What Does the Origin of the Notion of Laws of Nature Tell Us about Them? A Polemic with Ronald N. Giere
Autorzy:
Luc, Joanna
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/968660.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019-10-31
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:
The aim of this paper is to analyze Ronald N. Giere’s claim that the four characteristics associated with laws of nature - truth, universality, necessity, and objectivity - have a theological origin. It is argued that in some important cases theological justification of these features was absent, that some theological ideas made it even more difficult to think about laws of nature in this way, and that there were good reasons internal to science to formulate the notion of laws of nature in this particular way.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2019, 27, 3; 103-116
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Prawo czy forma? Francisa Bacona koncepcja prawidłowości w przyrodzie
Law or Form? Francis Bacon’s Conceptions of Regularities in Nature
Autorzy:
Luc, Joanna
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/968698.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019-03-31
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:
The aim of this paper is to analyze the terms “law” (of nature) and “form” in two works of Francis Bacon: the Novum Organum and The Advancement of Learning. The term “form” belongs to the scholastic tradition, whereas the term “law” is crucial for modern scientific methodology. The analysis starts with general characteristics of both terms and then traces them in Bacon’s writings. Both terms turn out to be important for Bacon, but it is argued that to fully understand his approach, his nominalistic tendencies should be acknowledged as well.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2019, 27, 1; 95-120
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
W gąszczu filozoficznych rozróżnień. Pawła Rojka systematyzacja podstawowych zagadnień dotyczących tropów i uniwersaliów
In the Maze of Philosophical Distinctions: Paweł Rojek’s Systematization of the Basic Issues Concerning Tropes and Universals
Autorzy:
Luc, Joanna
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/909315.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020-06-26
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Tematy:
paweł rojek
tropes
universals
Opis:
This paper reviews Paweł Rojek’s book Tropy i uniwersalia: Badania ontologiczne (Tropes and Universals: Ontological Investigations). The subject of the book are the titular notions of tropes (i.e., abstract particulars) and universals. The first three chapters contain conceptual clarifications and the remaining three chapters are devoted to the interpretation of particular philosophers (Roman Ingarden, Thomas Aquinas, Hegel, and George Frederick Stout) in the light of the previously introduced distinctions. The review summarizes each chapter and discusses some objections to the author’s theses.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2020, 28, 2; 99-111
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Czym jest rozumienie w humanistyce? Próba odpowiedzi Hansa-Georga Gadamera
What is Understanding in the Humanities? An Attempt at Identifying Hans-Georg Gadamer’s View .
Autorzy:
Luc, Joanna
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/423326.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet w Białymstoku. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku
Tematy:
Gadamer
Ricoeur
humanities
understanding
nauki humanistyczne
humanistyka
rozumienie
Opis:
The aim of this article is to extract from Gadamer’s writings his view about understanding in the humanities and to confront the results of this research with analyses of other interpreters. The key to the epistemology of the humanities is the ontology of its subject and, above all, its object. The former has been characterized by its finiteness, historicity and irremovable assumptionism of cognition. To the latter two basic features have been ascribed: dynamism (it exists only as the motion of thinking) and indefiniteness in such, which is connected with the fact that it is not given, but created by the subject. In the humanities understood in such a way we can only have the existential, and not classic, concept of truth. The very humanistic activity is more about creation than cognition.
Źródło:
IDEA. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych; 2013, 25; 125 - 140
0860-4487
Pojawia się w:
IDEA. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Odpowiedź Lowe’a na argument Ramseya przeciwko rozróżnieniu uniwersalia–indywidua
The answer of Lowe to Ramsey’s argument against the distinction universal vs. indivi- dual
Autorzy:
Luc, Joanna
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/437135.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. Komisji Edukacji Narodowej w Krakowie. Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii
Tematy:
ontology; metaphysics; ontological dependence; problem of universals; categories
Opis:
At the beginning of this article Ramsey’s argumentation against universal‐particular distinction is presented. It is based on the assumption that this division requires another one: namely, subject‐predicate distinction. This argumentation was a starting point for Lowe, who does not respect the aforementioned assumption. In his theory, there are not two but four categories, namely: substantial universals, non‐substantial universals, substantial particulars, and non‐substantial particulars. Two of these categories are categories of universals; the other two are categories of particulars. Lowe tries to de ne categories in an ontological way, that is, with essential use of ontological notions. These notions are rigid and non‐rigid existential de‐ pendence, which are themselves de ned in terms of necessity and existence. The contribution of this paper is an analysis of Lowe’s solution. In the rst place, it is con onted with Ramsey remarks. Then other objections are considered. Some of them do not respect the very idea of autonomous ‘ontological way’ in philosophy. Others concern Lowe’s particular version of it. Possible answers to all of these objections are presented, such that Lowe’s theory is defended. However, there is no ultimate conclusion here. In the author’s opinion autonomy and the value of ontology cannot be shown om a purely external position. We should rst assume that this discipline does make sense and then explore its virtues by using its notions.
Źródło:
ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal; 2016, 6, 1; 223-237
2083-6635
2084-1043
Pojawia się w:
ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Zagadnienie redukcjonizmu w filozofii biologii
The Issue of Reductionism in the Philosophy of Biology
Autorzy:
Luc, Joanna
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/690572.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
reductionism
antireductionism
eliminativism
physicalism
philosophy of biology
complex systems
Opis:
The aim of this article was to present one of the methods of reconciling of epistemological antireductionism and ontological physicalism, which explains differences between sciences, through an ontological picture of the most general structure of reality. The main thesis held that accepting this perspective allows us to achieve the above-mentioned reconcilement. First, the main arguments for and against physical reductionism, were described before the ontological assumptions were presented; then the assumptions was analysed in the light of this ontological construction as well as some facts from the fields of methodology and the history of natural sciences. Finally, some conclusions were drawn from the presented vision. They were connected with the epistemological status of analogy and methodological postulate of simplicity.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2013, 52; 179-201
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Cztery współczesne koncepcje kategorii ontologicznych
Four Contemporary Theories of Ontological Categories
Autorzy:
Luc, Joanna
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/966767.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016-12-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:
The aim of this paper is to present and compare four theories of ontological categories proposed in the last decades by: Hoffman and Rosenkrantz, Lowe, Thomasson, and Westerhoff. The paper takes the form of a series of 32 questions concerning ontological categories, grouped under 6 labels: (1) The goal of the project of a given author, (2) The nature of categories, (3) Differences between categories, (4) System of categories, (5) How should the system of categories be obtained? (6) Is there something beyond categories? Each question is followed by four answers that can be found in the works of the mentioned authors. At the end of the paper, there is a short discussion concerning possible ways of deciding between the four theories, and some reasons in favor of Lowe’s theory are tentatively put forward.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2016, 24, 4; 95-128
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Realność problemu zmiany. Polemika z Adamem Andrzejewskim
Genuineness of the Problem of Change. Against Adam Andrzejewski’s Objection
Autorzy:
Luc, Joanna
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/968786.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017-10-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:
The problem of change concerns its inconsistency: according to the principle of indiscernibility of identicals, if two objects are numerically identical, they have the same qualities, so an object cannot change without losing its numerical identity. Andrzejewski (2011) claims that the problem does not even arise, because the principle is false: it links two kinds of identity that are in fact independent. I argue that, despite the apparent independency, numerical identity - in the framework of classical logic - implies qualitative identity, so the principle holds, and thus the problem of change cannot be blocked in this way within this framework.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2017, 25, 3; 137-144
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Prawa przyrody jako przedmioty teoretyczne? Krytyczna analiza koncepcji Michaela Tooleya
Laws of Nature as Theoretical Entities? A Critical Analysis of Michael Tooley’s Ideas
Autorzy:
Luc, Joanna
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/968803.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017-03-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:
This paper examines Michael Tooley’s ideas about laws of nature. His proposal is to treat them as theoretical entities in a sense commonly used in philosophy of science. He uses the so-called “ramsification” procedure in order to make sure that such entities exist in a given theory. However, due to the nature of logical methods used by Tooley, his results do not have much metaphysical significance. Properties and relations are here represented by (or even identified with) set-theoretical constructions from individuals and cannot be interpreted as universals without further strong assumptions.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2017, 25, 1; 49-64
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Poznanie metafizyczne w świetle rozróżnień abstrakcyjne– konkretne i ogólne–jednostkowe
Cognition in metaphysics in the light of distinctions: abstract–concrete and universal–particular
Autorzy:
Luc, Joanna
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/423254.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet w Białymstoku. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku
Tematy:
cognition
metaphysics
universality
particularity
abstraction
poznanie
metafizyka
uniwersalność
szczegółowość
abstrakcja
Opis:
The aim of this paper is to present an approach in metaphysics/ontology, which is founded on two distinctions: abstract–concrete and universal–particular. To different cognitive issues one can assign different “categorical coordinates”, namely: a place in the spectrum of abstractness and one of the three following characteristics: particularity, proper universality, total universality. The thesis of this paper is that metaphysics should be located in the region of universality and high degrees of abstractness. Such a localization is connected with specific cognitive difficulties which are present in this branch of philosophy. I demonstrate some problems from the history of philosophy which could be interpreted as caused by these difficulties. Applicability of my thesis to such concrete cases is treated as its indirect justification.
Źródło:
IDEA. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych; 2015, 27; 215-223
0860-4487
Pojawia się w:
IDEA. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-10 z 10

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