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Wyszukujesz frazę "Landowski, Witold" wg kryterium: Autor


Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2
Tytuł:
PROBLEM DOBRA WSPÓLNEGO
THE PROBLEM OF COMMON GOOD
Autorzy:
Landowski, Witold
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/507288.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
International Étienne Gilson Society
Tematy:
human nature
common good
society
individualism
collectivism
realism
Opis:
The main purpose of this article is to discuss the relation between the understanding of human being and the concept of common good. On the one hand, materialist and spriritualist concepts of man lead to the univocal understanding of bonum commune, on the other hand, dualist anthropology entails a breakdown of the unity of common good. The author reveals weak points of these approaches and undertakes an attempt of examining realist vision of man and its impact on the notion of bonum commune. He starts with analyzing the complex structure of human being, which includes the potential and actual nature of human person. Against the background of the personalist anthropology, the author concludes that the common good has not only a material or instrumental, but above all a personal dimension, which makes this good both common and non-antagonistic.
Źródło:
Studia Gilsoniana; 2013, 2; 107-128
2300-0066
Pojawia się w:
Studia Gilsoniana
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
KRYTYKA KONWENCJONALIZMU SPOŁECZNEGO NA PRZYKŁADZIE FILOZOFII SPOŁECZNEJ T. HOBBESA I J. LOCKE’A
CRITICS OF SOCIAL CONVENTIONALISM ON EXAMPLARS T. HOBBES’ AND J. LOCKE’S THOUGHT
Autorzy:
LANDOWSKI, WITOLD
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/512373.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Diecezjalne Adalbertinum
Tematy:
SOCIAL CONVENTIONALISM
T. HOBBES
J. LOCKE
Opis:
The paper shows theoretical difficulties in Hobbes’ and Locke’s philosophical theory. The attempt at proving legitimacy of society hade been made by philosophers turned out to be pointless because of false anthropological presuppositions. Even though the term of human nature in axiological aspect is exremely negative in Hobbes’thought while neutral in Locke’s theory but both philosophers define man as a physical, self-directed, self-awareness individual. If such individuals in supposed state of nature have every rights and liberty then arises question of how assign such units to something other than individuals itself, this mean to public institution (state). The anthropological fallacy made the matter over much difficult and justification of social existence impossible, neither account of guarante civil safety do not justify the type of absolutist state or account of protection of property rights do not justify the type existence of liberal state, which has an insufficient competitives and power (minimal state). The state in both cases is rather an alienated from people, which treated public institutions and government as necessary evil in fact. It is since being based on the self preservation (Hobbes) or egoistic self – interest (Locke). In view on basis of social life, the philosophers failed to take spiritual and personal dimesion of human being. They did not notice that human nature is compositive, natural and rational inclinations to live with each others (in community) and humane desire for a versatile, personal development. According to fallacy their conception of society and state only partly is rational but it is a type of pragmatic rationality.
Źródło:
Studia Ełckie; 2014, 16, 1; 9-26
1896-6896
2353-1274
Pojawia się w:
Studia Ełckie
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2

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