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Wyszukujesz frazę "Kemple, Brian" wg kryterium: Autor


Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2
Tytuł:
Evaluating the Metaphysical Realism of Étienne Gilson
Autorzy:
Kemple, Brian
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/507342.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015-12-30
Wydawca:
International Étienne Gilson Society
Tematy:
realism
critique
metaphysics
being as first known
ens reale
Thomas Aquinas
epistemology
Opis:
While there is an absence of treatises devoted to the question of ens ut primum cognitum, there is no shortage of brief and implicit treatments; indeed, nearly every Thomist of the past seven centuries seems to have at least something to say about the notion that being is the first of our intellectual conceptions. Most recent Thomist thinkers—including Gilson—assume this ens to be nothing other than the ens reale of things entitatively considered, operating as they do out of a framework within which realism and idealism are presumed to be exhaustive and mutually exclusive attempts to answer the question of human knowledge. It is the intent of this essay to examine how Gilson arrives at his position, which he calls “metaphysical realism,” and to point to some of the difficulties it entails.
Źródło:
Studia Gilsoniana; 2015, 4, 4; 363-380
2300-0066
Pojawia się w:
Studia Gilsoniana
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
THE PREEMINENT NECESSITY OF PRUDENCE
Autorzy:
Kemple, Brian
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/507691.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017-12-30
Wydawca:
International Étienne Gilson Society
Tematy:
prudence
counsel
deliberation
virtue
practical reasoning
practical judgment
Thomas Aquinas
Opis:
Thomas Aquinas holds not only that prudence, the virtue of right practical reasoning, is necessary for living well, but emphatically asserts that it “is the virtue most necessary to human life.” This essay argues that the force of Thomas’ assertion should not be understood as simply contradicting the objection—that “it seems that prudence is not a virtue necessary to living a good life”—with vigor, but rather, as we intend to show, that although all the moral virtues are necessary for the good life, there is a superior importance to the need for prudence, as that whereby the parts of virtuous living are not merely stacked up like building blocks of moral righteousness, but coalesced into a complete whole. To make clear the reasons for this preeminent necessity, we shall first consider the parts and constitution of prudence itself, its relationship to the other virtues, and conclude with its principal act, praeceptum.
Źródło:
Studia Gilsoniana; 2017, 6, 4; 549-572
2300-0066
Pojawia się w:
Studia Gilsoniana
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2

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