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Wyszukujesz frazę "Kaczmarek, Ryszard" wg kryterium: Autor


Tytuł:
Niemiecka polityka narodowościowa na Górnym Śląsku (1939–1945)
German nationality policy in Upper Silesia (1939–1945)
Autorzy:
Kaczmarek, Ryszard
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/477462.pdf
Data publikacji:
2004
Wydawca:
Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu
Opis:
The author of the article is trying to analyze the policy concerning nations during WW II in Upper Silesia, or, to be more precise, in the area included into Upper Silesian province by the Third Reich. The main elements of the policy were: classification of residents based on nation and race criteria (made by the police census in 1939 and within so called German National List (Deutsche Volksliste) in 1941–1945), displacement of Poles, settling down Germans from the territory of the USSR and extermination of Jews. The nationality policy in Upper Silesia was different than in other Polish areas included into Reich. The reason for it was usually seen in the different economic conditions and the necessity to keep qualified manpower essential in Silesian heavy industry. In some historical researches it has also been noticed, although less explicitly, that nationality policy of local German elites was also consciously different. It seems that gauleiter Josef Wagner, as well as his successor at the post, Fritz Bracht, saw the necessity to exclude Silesian people from qualification made only on the basis of race criteria which were emphasized by Heinrich Himmler when he was a Reich commissar for strengthening the Germanity. Fritz and Bracht used also political criteria, which made the situation similar to Pomerania and western areas included into Reich (e.g. Alsace and Lorraine). It resulted in comparatively low (when compared to demographic potential of Upper Silesia) number of displacements and in accepting the rule that majority of Upper Silesians could gain German citizenship, although their rights were limited compared to other German citizens. Those differences were underestimated after the end of the war by new communist Polish authorities, the representatives of which knew little about them. After 1945 Upper Silesians were treated suspiciously by Polish communist authorities and their loyalty towards Poland was questioned. Consequently in the fifties the area was acknowledged as endangered with so called revisionism.
Źródło:
Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość; 2004, 2(6); 115-138
1427-7476
Pojawia się w:
Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Kolaboracja na terenach wcielonych do Rzeszy Niemieckiej
Collaboration in the Territories Incorporated into the Third Reich
Autorzy:
Kaczmarek, Ryszard
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/477751.pdf
Data publikacji:
2008
Wydawca:
Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu
Opis:
The article analyzes the phenomena of collaboration and collaborationism in all territories incorporated into the Third Reich. Nowhere, apart from a specific situation in Luxembourg, one may find in those territories national collaboration, that is to say the creation of state institutions collaborating with the Germans. The reason was the lack of initiative on the part of Germans. All territories incorporated into the Reich were treated offi cially or unoffi cially as parts of the Third Reich, and that is why the possibility to create there state semi-sovereign institutions was not planned. The support of collaboration in the annexed territories looked different. Simultaneously when integrating with the Reich the attempts were made to develop collaborative attitudes by Nazifi cation. The process of Nazifi cation was very unequal and was taking place differently in every analyzed territory. In the Polish incorporated territories the process of establishing the Nazi Party (National Socialist German Workers Party) and transmitting organizations were nearly instantly being initiated. They acquired members nearly solely from the circle of the representatives of the pre-war German minority members who were politically active before 1939. The membership in the Nazi Party was elitist in the east and amounted to 2–3 per cent. In the west the intermediary solution was adopted, that is to say – the national socialist movements were being created which constituted the step in the path to the membership in the Nazi Party. The membership in those organizations in Luxembourg, Alsace and Lorraine was a mass scale phenomenon, and was not restricted by ‘racial’ limitations. After the end of the war, there were no precise criteria how to differentiate between the collaboration attitudes in the incorporated territories from those which are described as adjustment and passive and active resistance. It resulted in accusing a large part of the native population of collaboration without differentiation between that group and the German minority which in fact participated in that process on a mass scale. The indicator factor of collaboration in the eastern territories was rather the membership in Nazi organizations, than the active engagement in the activities of the German state apparatus, party structures and terror apparatus.
Źródło:
Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość; 2008, 1(12); 159-181
1427-7476
Pojawia się w:
Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Rekrutacja do Waffen SS na polskich ziemiach okupowanych w opiniach dowódców SS (1939—1941)
The Waffen-SS recruitment in the Polish lands occupied by Nazi Germany in the opinions of the leaders of the SS (1939—1941)
Autorzy:
Kaczmarek, Ryszard
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/27315997.pdf
Data publikacji:
2022
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego
Tematy:
Waffen-SS
II wojna światowa
Generalne Gubernatorstwo
Polska
volkslista
the Second World War
the General Government
Polska
Volksliste
Opis:
W artykule omówione zostały próby rekrutacji obywateli polskich do Waffen-SS w pierwszym etapie wojny (w latach 1939—1941). Z korespondencji dowódców SS wynika, że w Generalnym Gubernatorstwie Niemcy chcieli zmobilizować wówczas, ze względów rasowych, tylko etnicznych Niemców (volksdeutschy). Jednak ta grupa przedwojennych polskich obywateli była tak znikoma, że nie dała szans na utworzenie osobnej formacji. Fiaskiem zakończyła się też próba stworzenia oddziałów Waffen-SS z tzw. ludności mieszanej pod względem rasowym, do której zaliczono Górali, Kaszubów i Ślązaków, którzy mieli dopiero otrzymać obywatelstwo niemieckie. Od 1942 roku, po wprowadzeniu volkslisty na tzw. polskich ziemiach wcielonych do Rzeszy Niemieckiej i po rezygnacji z obowiązujących do tej pory ograniczeń rasowych, pobór do Waffen-SS był przeprowadzany jako część przymusowego wcielenia do armii niemieckiej. Przynależność do Waffen-SS, odpowiedzialnego za zbrodnie wojenne, ludobójstwo i eksterminację ludności cywilnej na polskich ziemiach okupowanych, była przez Polaków oceniana jednoznacznie jako kolaboracjonizm i aktywny udział w zbrodniach nazistowskich Niemiec.
The articles discusses the attempts at recruiting Polish citizens to Waffen-SS during the first stage of the war (the years 1939—1941). According to the correspondence of the SS leaders, at the time Germans wanted to conscript only ethnic Germans (Volksdeutsche). However, the said group of the pre-war Polish citizens was so negligibly small that it stood no change of having been organized as a separate armed formation. Another advanture that wounded up as a fiasco was the attempt to forma a Waffen-SS unit composed of the so-called racially mixed folk, which included the Gorals (Highlanders), the Kashubians, and the Silesians, who were yet to be granted German citizenship. From 1942 onwards, after the Volksliste had been introduced in the so-called Third Reich-annexed Polish lands and after the previously enforced racial restrictions had been lifted, the Waffen-SS draft was conducted as a part of compulsary enlistment. Being in the Waffen-SS, that was responsible for war crimes, genocide and extermination of civil population, for was by the Poles unequivocally meant collaboration and equalled with the active participation in the atrocities perpetrated by the Nazi Germany.
Źródło:
Wieki Stare i Nowe; 2022, 17, 22; 1-19
1899-1556
2353-9739
Pojawia się w:
Wieki Stare i Nowe
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Politycy i żołnierze Spór Karla Hoefera i Bernharda Hülsena o znaczenie bitwy o Górę św. Anny podczas III powstania śląskiego w 1921 roku
Politicians and Soldiers. The Dispute between Karl Hoefer and Bernard Hülsen over the Significance of the Battle of St. Anne’s Mountain during the Third Silesian Uprising in 1921
Autorzy:
Kaczmarek, Ryszard
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2058104.pdf
Data publikacji:
2021-12-30
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego
Tematy:
Górny Śląsk
Selbstschutz
Góra św. Anny
III powstanie śląskie
Republika Weimarska
Hoefer
Hülsen
rok 1921
Upper Silesia
St. Anne’s Mountain
III Silesian Uprising
Weimar Republic
1921
Opis:
Po I wojnie światowej doszło do konfliktu polsko-niemieckiego o Górny Śląsk, którego apogeum było polskie powstanie w 1921 roku. W niemieckim dowództwie powstał spór podczas zwycięskiej kontrofensywy, znanej jako bitwa o Górę św. Anny. Autor pokazuje uwarunkowania polityczne podejmowanych wówczas decyzji wojskowych i skomplikowane relacje demokratycznego rządu Republiki Weimarskiej z sympatyzującymi z nacjonalistyczną prawicą oficerami.
After World War I, a conflict broke out between Poland and Germany over Upper Silesia. It was to be settled, according to the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, by a plebiscite. However, on May 3, 1921, the Polish uprising broke out. Insurgent troops occupied the eastern part of the plebiscite area. On May 21, 1921, German troops of the so-called Upper Silesia Self-Defense (Selbstschutz Oberschlesiens) carried out an effective counteroffensive, known as the Battle of St. Anne’s Mountain. In this article, Ryszard Kaczmarek discusses the dispute that has been going on for many years among historians about who had planned and who commanded this military operation. The main opponents in this operation were: Karl Hoefer, the commander-in-chief of the Self-Defense, and Bernhard Hülsen, the commander of one of the Self-Defense’s units. For many years, until the outbreak of World War II, both these officers claimed victory in the Battle of St. Anne’s Mountain. On the basis of the extant correspondence stored in the military section of the Federal Archives in Freiburg, Kaczmarek reconstructs the course of events during the operation. He author shows the political conditions of military decisions and the complicated relations of the democratic government of the Weimar Republic with officers who were associated with the nationalist right.
Źródło:
Wieki Stare i Nowe; 2021, 16, 21; 133-161
1899-1556
2353-9739
Pojawia się w:
Wieki Stare i Nowe
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł

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