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Wyszukujesz frazę "Godlewski, Roman Piotr" wg kryterium: Autor


Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2
Tytuł:
Znaczenie logiczne a psychologiczne czyli Davidson vs Kuhn (rozprawa z zakresu filozofii analitycznej)
Logical and Psychological Concept of Meaning: Davidson vs Kuhn
Autorzy:
Godlewski, Roman Piotr
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/909852.pdf
Data publikacji:
2005-06-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Tematy:
logic of science
meaning
psychology of science
Opis:
The objection raised by Davidson against Kuhn in article "On the Very Idea of Conceptual Scheme" that the argument presented in "The Structure of Scientific Revolution" was inconsistent is incorrect. Kuhn's conception belongs to psychology and sociology and his work could be titled "An Outline of Psychology and Sociology of Scientific Research". Consequently he is interested only and only in psychologi-cal reasons that affect scientists' theoretical decisions. E.g. his considerations concerning neutral observational language are polemous against thesis that language like that could be somehow useful for interpretation of what scientists do and also against thesis that it could be useful for scientists themselves. The difficulty of un-derstanding above paradigmata does not consist on conceptual schemata meant logically as Davidson reads it but on different cognitive attitude and different manual sets of concepts. To explain the controversy logical and psychological concepts of meaning are distinguished. Davidson means the proper, Kuhn does the latter. Psy-chological meaning concists on what associations and feelings are evocated by utterances in the recever's mind. When Kuhn says that after a revolution scientists live in another world he means only that the language with witch they describe the reality has different psychological meaning. And this is that kind of meaning that cannot be translated and is lost when you discuss above paradigmata. From Kuhn's point of view it is possible to translate logical meaning of scientific utterances from before a revolution, and he does it. The psychological meaning can be only described but not translated.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2005, 13, 2; 69-86
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Zagadnienie istnienia świata
Does the World Exist?
Autorzy:
Godlewski, Roman Piotr
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/909983.pdf
Data publikacji:
2005-12-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Tematy:
coherentialism
davidson d.
disquotationism
ostension
Opis:
Let us ask: do the objects we think that exist, really exist? Davidson concludes, from rejection of dualism of content and conceptual scheme, that most of them really exist (coherentialism). Unfortunately, his reasoning is wrong, because though the rejection makes it impossible to doubt our knowledge as a whole, it is still possible to doubt all its elements one after another. The two main points of Davidson's theory are the following: (1) disquotationism (semantic terms are used only to speak about speaking) and (2) ostensivism (words refer to what they refer to independently of what it could be; their meanings are established as the result of the process of learning). (1) and (2) are the real reasons for Davidson's coherentialism. Ostensivism apparently allows to avoid the problem of induction, though it only transforms the problem into the question of ostension. Moreover, consistent ostensivism makes analytic sentences impossible. Yet it is claimed, that ostensivism is wrong in general, because besides ostensives there are also categorials (expressions, meanings of which belong to certain ontological categories) and without the latter logic and mathematics would be impossible. Davison's coherentialism is wrong because it is not true that one cannot have any believes without having any language. Hence, no theory of language is crucial as far as existence is concerned. It is shown considering ascription of believes to mute persons and learning languages by children. Coherentialism lets Davidson bring down the idea of a demon that could make us see the world completely different than it is and not know if it is true.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2005, 13, 4; 15-35
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2

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