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Wyświetlanie 1-6 z 6
Tytuł:
Etyczne konsekwencje ewolucji
Ethical consequences of evolution
Autorzy:
Elżanowski, Andrzej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1196059.pdf
Data publikacji:
2009
Wydawca:
Polskie Towarzystwo Przyrodników im. Kopernika
Opis:
Darwin's discoveries have profound ethical implications that continue to be misrepresented and/or ignored. In contrast to socialdarwinistic misuses of his theory, Darwin was a great humanitarian who paved the way for an integrated scientific and ethical world view. As an ethical doctrine, socialdarwinism is long dead ever since its defeat by E. G. Moore although the socialdarwinistic thought is a hard-die in the biological community. The accusations of sociobiology for being socialdarwinistic are unfounded and stem from the moralistic fallacy that is, a false assumption that morality is good by definition. Both social and developmental psychology demonstrate that the moral agency is a motivational device for executing reciprocity that remains at the core of any morality across all studied societies and throughout the ontogeny of moral judgment. The level of true universalizing ethical reflection (Kohlberg's postconvential stages or Gibbs's existential phase) is achieved by a small minority of humans, thus showing that Homo sapiens is a moral but not an ethical animal. While the origin of reciprocity has been perfectly explained by sociobiology, the evolutionary assembly of affective and cognitive elements that make up the moral agency is being successfully studied by the social/personality/developmental psychology as extended to non-human primates. As Darwin (1871) expected, the key innovation for the evolution of moral agency was the emergence of empathy that evolved independently at least three times: in elephants, dolphins and primates. Empathy has a motivational power of its own; it is also necessary for moral agency that requires two cognitive abilities: reflective self-consciousness and understanding of causality; the two make possible the attribution of responsibility. All these requirements are met by the chimpanzees whose moral agency operates in dyads. In contrast, the human moral agency allows for a third party intervention that opens up vast opportunities for ideologies, especially religions, to use and misuse the moral agency to enforce a reciprocation that may be harmful to both individuals and the entire group. Also, the moral agency is known to enforce enhanced intragroup cohesion and loyalty in response to conflict and war, which suggests that the two prima facie opposed human universals, morality and warfare, may have coevolved. The most important ethical consequence that follows from the increasing understanding of the primate moral agency is that every received morality is ethically flawed, none can be taken as a paragon of goodness, and each needs corrections by science-informed ethics. In fact, Darwin pioneered the integration of science and ethics, an approach that has come to be appreciated only recently under the heading of consilience.
Źródło:
Kosmos; 2009, 58, 3-4; 585-593
0023-4249
Pojawia się w:
Kosmos
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Moral Progress: A Present-day Perspective on the Leading Enlightenment Idea
Autorzy:
Elżanowski, Andrzej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/437312.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. Komisji Edukacji Narodowej w Krakowie. Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii
Tematy:
ethics
value
axiology
moral development
metaethical incompetence
etyka
wartość
postęp moralny
rozwój moralny
metaetyczna niekompetencja
Opis:
Postęp moralny. Współczesna perspektywa przewodniej idei Oświecena. Większość myślicieli epoki Oświecenia wierzyła, że ład panujący w świecie, jako oparty w ostatecznej instancji na prawie bożym, jest dobry, a więc każdy przyrost wiedzy będzie miał dobre konsekwencje. Zakładano, że rozwój naukowy pociąga za sobą rozwój moralny. Chociaż faktycznie w cywilizacji zachodniej nastąpił pewien postęp moralny, to jednak jest on bardzo niewspółmierny z postępem nauki. Oświeceniowe pojęcie ciągłego postępu nauki i moralności okazało się w dużej mierze błędne. Złożyło się na to kilka powodów: (1) Moralność publiczna i nauka rozwijają się niezależnie i mogą się zarówno wzajemnie wzbogacać, jak też hamować. (2) W porządku świata nie ma żadnych obiektywnych wartości, które można by odczytać, a potem kierować się nimi. Wartości, które faktycznie realizujemy, są względne. Zostały wygenerowane i ukształtowane przez ewolucję, a zatem powinniśmy raczej je nadzorować, niż ich przestrzegać. (3) Nasza moralność, która jest tworem ewolucji, jest wadliwa i niewystarczająca. Z trudem podlega postępowi; łatwo zaś — doktrynalnej manipulacji. (4) Większość ludzi wykazuje metaetyczną niekompetencję, czyli niezdolność do zajęcia uzasadnionego krytycznego stanowiska wobec zastanych norm, co sprawia, że postęp moralny zależy od tych, którzy osiągnęli metaetyczną kompetencję, wychodząc poza konwencjonalne fazy rozwoju moralnego.
Most Enlightenment thinkers believed that the World’s order (as ultimately based on divine laws) is good and thus every gain of knowledge will have good consequences. Scientific process was assumed to entail moral progress. In fact some moral progress did occur in the Western civilization and science contributed to it, but it is widely incommensurate with the progress of science. The Enlightenment’s concept of a concerted scientific and moral progress proved largely wrong for several reasons. (1) Public morality and science evolve largely independently and may either enhance or inhibit each other. (2) There are no objective values to be read in the World’s order and simply followed. Instead, our real, subjective values and the moral systems they fuel have all been generated and shaped by evolution rather than designed to be universally good, a nd thus ought to be managed rather than simply followed. (3) Our evolved morality is flawed, deficient, prone to doctrinal manipulation and refractory to progress. (4) The majority of people show metaethical incompetence in failing to take a reasoned critical stand toward the principles and assumptions of received morals. This makes moral progress largely dependent on those who reach metaethical competence by transcending the conventional stages of moral development.
Źródło:
ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal; 2013, 3, 1; 9-26
2083-6635
2084-1043
Pojawia się w:
ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Motywacja i moralność łowiecka
Autorzy:
Elżanowski, Andrzej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/692114.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego
Opis:
Andrzej Elżanowski Uniwersytet WarszawskiWydział Artes Liberales Abstract Hunting motivation and morality There is a growing public disapproval of the recreational persecution and killing of wild mammals and birds who share with us basic emotional experience that conveys intrinsic value to their lives. Contrary to hunters’ propaganda, both scientific research and testimonies from prominent hunters-writers demonstrate that the thrill of killing is the main and ultimate motive of recreational hunting. The majority of simple-minded hunters are satisfied by any killing, including a canned hunt. However, some recreational hunters combine the killing drive with biophilia which makes them psychologically comparable to rapists. Both the thrill of killing and biophilia are primitive drives that evolved as adaptations in hunter-gatherers. Killing for pleasure (with or without biophilia) has always been evil in terms of both intentions and consequences. At present it is also barbaric in the sense of the opposite of civilization which progressed by increasing the control of primitive drives, in particular aggression. Keywords:hunting, morality, cruelty, biophilia, instrumental aggression
Źródło:
Zoophilologica. Polish Journal of Animal Studies; 2018, 4
2719-2687
2451-3849
Pojawia się w:
Zoophilologica. Polish Journal of Animal Studies
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Jak wzrasta złożoność organizmów
On the growth of organismal complexity
Autorzy:
Elżanowski, Andrzej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1196052.pdf
Data publikacji:
2009
Wydawca:
Polskie Towarzystwo Przyrodników im. Kopernika
Opis:
The genetic reduction or "genocentrism" of the Synthetic Theory of Evolution was unconducive to its integration with evolutionary morphology and did not leave any room for even addressing the complexity of organisms. For the same reason the concept of function was effectively ignored in the conceptual scheme of this theory that pooled all phenotypic and genetic determinants of reproductive success under the heading of fitness. In fact the concept of function is critical to understanding the complexity of any goal-directed system and the growth of organismal complexity comes down to an increase in the number of functions even it may be easier to measure by morphological diversity. It is a great realization of the 20th century that body parts at all levels are commnly coopted to new functions and thus genuine multifunctionality (i.e., performing multiple, discrete and unrelated functions) is constantly generated by an evolving organization. What seems to be less well understood is that new fuctions arise from ubiquitous nonfunctinal interactions of body parts with their environment that may be external (Umwelt, niche) or internal (milieu intérieur) to the organism. While these interactions arise as inevitable causal by-products of a structure's functioning or static properties, their impact is accidental to any organismal needs (that is, ultimately, any current functions) and only sometimes happens to be useful in which case an interaction becomes a function. The is exactly the way mutations are used by natural selection, hence the dynamics of nonfunctional interactions that are generated by body parts is considered here to be a major factor of evolution and referred to as parafunctional variation. The growth of complexity as observed in the evolution of organims would not be possible without multiplication of parts. This is because cooptions to new functions lead to adaptive (and sometimes also direct, functional) conflicts with old ones and because all functions tend to be crude and generalized (euryfunctional) at the beginning and need refinements through a subdivision of tasks. The escape from adaptive conflict between unrelated functions (as acquired via the mechanism of cooption) is resolved through Dohrn's exchange of functions between duplicated structures (serial homologues or paralogues) where one of them takes over a minor function of the ancestral structure and becomes adapted to it as to the main function. Most cases described as neofunctionalization of duplicated genes are in fact cases of the exchange of functions. Refinements of generalized functions are achieved by the way of Severtsov's subdivision of function into partial tasks or subfunctions, which generates the complexity of organismic apparatuses (e.g., osteomuscular devices) and molecular quaternary structures such as heteromers that arise by duplication and coaptation of molecules (as in the heterotetramers of hemoglobin). Some cases described under the heading of subfunctionalization fall into this category while others represent cases of simple divergence of paralogues under independent expression control. The latter is facilitated by the mobility of genomic sequences and the relative freedom of association between regulatory and structural genes. Other than that, the complexity of both organs and molecules seems to evolve under similar rules that have yet to be better understood and integrated. The combined action of natural selection, genetic variation, and parafunctional variation is deemed suffcient to explain the evolutionary growth of complexity. While natural selection seizes upon any beneficial effects including those afforded by the thermodynamic propensities of organic configurations, there is no good reason or evidence to believe in the spontaneous generation of higher levels of organization such as multicellularity.
Źródło:
Kosmos; 2009, 58, 3-4; 417-428
0023-4249
Pojawia się w:
Kosmos
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Zwierzęta jako nieosobowe podmioty prawa
Animals as Non-personal Carriers of Legal Rights
Autorzy:
Elżanowski, Andrzej
Pietrzykowski, Tomasz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/518662.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Jagielloński. Fundacja Utriusque Iuris
Opis:
The current body of knowledge about the subjectivity (cognition and value-laden experience) of some non-human vertebrates makes the juristic dichotomy between commodities and persons untenable. While the great apes may (with some limitations) be treated as persons, most vertebrates are non-personal agents that lack the awareness of their own agency, which does not necessarily diminish the intrinsic value of their lives. Unfortunately, the ongoing efforts to raise the status and thus improve the treatment of all sentient animals are hindered by the lack of realistic conceptual framework for translating the current knowledge of their subjectivity and ensuing individual interests into politics and legislation. Referring to Western philosophers of law (H. Kelsen, A. Ross, N. MacCormick, L. Petrażycki) we therefore propose to grant vertebrates (and possibly some other animals if their subjectivity is recognized by science) legal rights that are appropriate for non-personal subjects even if the scope of such rights has to be very limited in comparison to the rights of human beings.
Źródło:
Forum Prawnicze; 2013, 1 (15); 18-27
2081-688X
Pojawia się w:
Forum Prawnicze
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-6 z 6

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