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Wyszukujesz frazę "Buccella, Domenico" wg kryterium: Autor

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    Tytuł:
    Strategic trade and FDI policies in a unionized industry
    Autorzy:
    Buccella, Domenico
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/943116.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2019-03-22
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    strategic trade policy, FDI policy, unionized markets.
    Opis:
    This paper analyzes the differences between strategic trade and the competition policies (in the form of inward Foreign Direct Investment) to regulate a unionized monopoly in the domestic country. With decentralized negotiations both policies reduce labour and product market distortions. However the fixed cost for the foreign entrant and the degree of product differentiation determine which policy should be implemented to maximize national welfare, and the cases in which the domestic government can intervene, to achieve a Pareto-improvement.
    Źródło:
    Economics and Business Review; 2019, 5 (19), 1; 12-31
    2392-1641
    Pojawia się w:
    Economics and Business Review
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    “Green” Managerial Delegation and Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility in Different Market Structures
    Autorzy:
    Buccella, Domenico
    Wojna, Michał
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1810532.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2020-01-30
    Wydawca:
    Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego w Warszawie
    Tematy:
    environmental corporate social responsibility
    “green” managerial delegation
    duopoly
    monopoly
    entry deterrence
    Opis:
    Purpose: Assuming a duopoly industry with pollution producing processes, the aim of this work is to study the firms’ choice to engage in Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility (ECSR) by means of “green” managerial delegation, i.e. hiring managers with preferences for environmental concerns to whom owners delegate both sales and decisions to adopt green technology. Methodology: Depending on the firms’ strategic choices, a two/three-stage game takes place solved by the backward induction method to obtain sub-game perfect Nash equilibria. Results: When the market structure is a Cournot duopoly, and the environmental sensitivity of “green” managers is extremely low, then the engagement in ECSR is the firms’ dominant strategy, regardless of the efficiency level of the available abatement technology. Nonetheless, firms are cast into a prisoner’s dilemma. On the other hand, if “green” managers have low-intermediate to intermediate environmental sensitivity, then either no ECSR, multiple symmetric equilibria, or ECSR engagement can emerge as a result in equilibrium. Finally, if managers’ environmental sensitivity is adequately high, then firms do not engage in ECSR. When a market entry game is considered with the Stackelberg competition in which the incumbent adopts ECSR while the entrant does not, socially responsible behaviors cause the market to be more contestable. However, the incumbent’s owners can use ECSR to secure a dominant position in the market, provided that they hire “green” managers with adequate environmental concerns. Implications: In the case of entry, non-trivial policy implications arise. Due to increased competition, the welfare of consumers improves (lower prices for the goods). However, the entry of a polluting firm increases emissions. Higher emissions damage consumers and lower the overall social welfare of an environmentally concerned government. Thus, a complete welfare analysis is required prior to the design of a government’s regulatory intervention. Originality/Value: This paper is the first that introduces the figure of the “green” manager who shows, in its utility function, an environmental concern.
    Źródło:
    Central European Management Journal; 2019, 27(4); 2-22
    2658-0845
    2658-2430
    Pojawia się w:
    Central European Management Journal
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2

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