Informacja

Drogi użytkowniku, aplikacja do prawidłowego działania wymaga obsługi JavaScript. Proszę włącz obsługę JavaScript w Twojej przeglądarce.

English (EN)·Polski (PL)·Yкраїнський (UK)
Przejdź do strony domowej biblioteki Centralna Biblioteka Wojskowa Link otwiera się w nowym oknie Logo biblioteki Prolib Integro - strona głównaCentralna Biblioteka Wojskowa

Wyszukujesz frazę "Brożek, Bartosz" wg kryterium: Autor

  Lista filtrów
Wyrównaj
    Wyświetlanie 1-6 z 6
    Tytuł:
    Legal Interpretation: Towards a New Paradigm?
    Autorzy:
    Brożek, Bartosz
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1195284.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2020
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Jagielloński. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego
    Tematy:
    interpretation
    legal interpretation
    embodied cognition
    mental simulation
    abstraction
    Opis:
    This paper considers the foundations of legal interpretation against the background of the theory of embodied cognition and mental simulation. It is argued that interpretation has a double, concrete-abstract nature. The understanding of concrete language is made possible by the mechanism of mental simulation. In turn, the interpretation of abstract language (and hence of most of legal language) requires to apply the procedures of exemplification, paraphrase and embedding. The relationship between these two modes of language comprehension is analyzed and the thesis is defended that they represent two extremes of a continuous spectrum rather than isolated mechanisms. Finally, the significance of such a conception of interpretation for legal methodology is considered. It is argued that the conception provides a unifying, foundational framework for any theory of legal interpretation, as well as generates fresh insights into the nature of understanding legal statutes. cancelcancel
    Źródło:
    Teoria Polityki; 2020, 4; 79-92
    2543-7046
    2544-0845
    Pojawia się w:
    Teoria Polityki
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    On Nonfoundational Reasoning
    Autorzy:
    Brożek, Bartosz
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/691114.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2014
    Wydawca:
    Copernicus Center Press
    Tematy:
    nonfoundational reasoning
    foundationalism
    hermeneutics
    belief revision
    coherence
    defeasible logic
    Opis:
    The goal of the paper is to describe the role and structure of nonfoundational reasoning, i.e. a kind of argumentation that meets the revisability, the feedback, the background stability and the disputability conditions. I begin by observing that any nonfoundational reasoning has two components: the deductive and the hermeneutic. Next, against the background of Gadamer’s insightful, although somewhat vague, observations I attempt to uncover aspects of the hermeneutic component. I then proceed to reconstruct nonfoundational argumentation with the help of formal theory of belief revision, defeasible logic, and logical conception of coherence. Finally, I argue that nonfoundational reasoning is the backbone of both scientific endeavours and philosophical inquiry.
    Źródło:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2014, 56; 5-32
    0867-8286
    2451-0602
    Pojawia się w:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    O Normatywności prawa. Odpowiedź Sylwii Wojtczak
    Autorzy:
    Brożek, Bartosz
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/927393.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2013-06-01
    Wydawca:
    Stowarzyszenie Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej – Sekcja Polska IVR
    Źródło:
    Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej; 2013, 2(7); 98-104
    2082-3304
    Pojawia się w:
    Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Podmiot matematyczny Hilberta
    Hilbert’s mathematical subject
    Autorzy:
    Brożek, Bartosz
    Olszewski, Adam
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/690816.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2013
    Wydawca:
    Copernicus Center Press
    Tematy:
    philosophy of mathematics
    mathematical subject
    David Hilbert
    Opis:
    The aim of this paper is threefold. First, on the basis of Gordan’s problem and Hilbert’s basis theorem we want to say a few words about the formation of Hilbert’s philosophy of mathematics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Second, we attempt to reconstruct Hilbert’s Program highlighting the role of reasoning which is not conducted within the axiomatic system. Third, we formulate and try to justify the claim that Hilbert’s Program assumes some metaphysics of the subject that – in general terms – is identical with Kant’s transcendental subject.
    Źródło:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2013, 53; 93-132
    0867-8286
    2451-0602
    Pojawia się w:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Poza interpretację. Odpowiedź Jerzemu Stelmachowi
    Beyond Interpretation A Reply to Jerzy Stelmach
    Autorzy:
    Brożek, Bartosz
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/519113.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2011
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Jagielloński. Fundacja Utriusque Iuris
    Opis:
    There are three goals of the essays. First, an attempt at clarifying the concept of interpretation is made. It is argued that the only reasonable way of reconstructing interpretation as an activity is to look at the products of interpretation. From this point of view interpretation should be seen as a process that leads to narrowing down the so called meaning bundle of a given expression, i.e. the set of possible meanings prima facie ascribable to the interpreted expression. Second, two theses of Jerzy Stelmach – that interpretation cannot be objective and that interpretation has no a priori limits – are critically analyzed against the conceptual backdrop proposed in the first part of the essay and rejected. Finally – third – a thesis is defended that interpretation plays no central or essential role in legal reasoning. It is argued that the goal of legal reasoning can best be described as a positive exemplification and resolution of the norm conflicts. Neither of these procedures may serve the process of interpretation, i.e. the narrowing down the meaning bundles of interpreted expressions.
    Źródło:
    Forum Prawnicze; 2011, 2 (4); 19-25
    2081-688X
    Pojawia się w:
    Forum Prawnicze
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Kilka uwag o kryterium Quinea
    Some Remarks on Quines Criterion
    Autorzy:
    Brożek, Bartosz
    Olszewski, Adam
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/966611.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2010-03-01
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
    Opis:
    The aim of the paper is to evaluate the usefulness of W.V.O. Quine's criterion for establishing the ontological commitments of a theory. At the outset, Quine's conception is reconstructed. It is argued that Quine does not provide a particularly clear exposition of the procedure of establishing ontological commitments. It is further maintained that - on a persuasive interpretation - one should distinguish several concepts associated with Quine's conception. These are: ontology, domain tolerated by an ontology, ontological commitments type 1 (categorical), ontological commitments type 2 (individual). Then, the procedure itself is reconstructed. It is argued that it consists of three stages: (1) the reduction of the analyzed theory to so-called basic existential propositions; (2) the paraphrase of the basic existential propositions into the formulae of the I order logic; (3) the reconstruction of the ontology presupposed by the given theory as well as of the ontological commitments type 1 and type 2. The final part of the paper contains three objections against Quine's conception. It is argued, first, that it is impossible to reconstruct the ontology presupposed by the given theory as it requires that the same or a richer ontology is already in use. Second, Quine's procedure is based on a vicious circle: one needs to know the ontological commitments in order to reconstruct them. Third, if one assumes that Quine's procedure is applicable to uninterpreted theories, it is impossible to determine the domain of these theories. The conclusion of the paper is that Quine's criterion seem useless.
    Źródło:
    Filozofia Nauki; 2010, 18, 1; 5-15
    1230-6894
    2657-5868
    Pojawia się w:
    Filozofia Nauki
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-6 z 6

      Ta witryna wykorzystuje pliki cookies do przechowywania informacji na Twoim komputerze. Pliki cookies stosujemy w celu świadczenia usług na najwyższym poziomie, w tym w sposób dostosowany do indywidualnych potrzeb. Korzystanie z witryny bez zmiany ustawień dotyczących cookies oznacza, że będą one zamieszczane w Twoim komputerze. W każdym momencie możesz dokonać zmiany ustawień dotyczących cookies