- Tytuł:
- Vulnerabilidade: da ontologia à fenomenologia pela teologia
- Autorzy:
- Borges de Meneses, Ramiro Délio
- Powiązania:
- https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2131004.pdf
- Data publikacji:
- 2016
- Wydawca:
- Instytut Studiów Międzynarodowych i Edukacji Humanum
- Tematy:
-
ethics
philosophy - Opis:
- To understand the Socratic assertion that it is better to suffer injustice than to practice it, we must bear in mind that this was said against the Sophists. One of the interlocutors of Socrates had planned as an ideal the life of a tyrant, that is, of someone who can do what he wants, without any other consideration, and nothing can contradict him. For this sophist it is inconceivable that there are those who do not wish to be able to suffer others, as is possible. It would be unthinkable if he could impose his interests on others if he did not know. Hu- man excellence consists in your life, being without hindrance. Socrates considers that the sophist was mistaken about the tre nature of happiness, since the life of a tyrant is a miserable life, which nothing in his judgment should desire. A tyrant can not trust anything or anything. His life is based on power over others, and not receive from them a true recognition, not being able to expect any friendship. Rather you should take a lot of precautions to enter into a “likeness” relationship. The mutual reciprocity of friendship would shake the invulnerable core of his position. The tyrant can not and should not configure something like a confidence towards the world. For Socrates, justice is a kind of relationship with the world that enables mutual trust and abandonment. From here we can say that injustice causes discord and hatred, while justice brings harmony and friendship. Thus, not even the tyrant can be confident in himself. The will to live according to his desires makes him a slave to these desires, preventing him from acquiring a stable relationship with himself and thus makes it impossible for him to live as a friend of himself, that is, as a person who respects and protects Own well-understood interest. Ordinary life is for Plato the place of true happiness, where he can only be friends with himself, who is capable of being friends with others. But the friendship of others is only within reach of those who behave generally - in the face of those who are not friends - in such a way that they cultivate the form of a potentially friendly tract with others. Justice is that virtue that guides action in this common way of life. That is why Socrates can say that it is better to suffer injustice than to commit it. He who commits injustice destroys the foundations of his happiness, while the sufferer, in spite of adversity, does not lose the goals to achieve happiness. Here begins the sense of vulnerability, from ontology to phenomenology, through ethics.
- Źródło:
-
Humanum. Międzynarodowe Studia Społeczno-Humanistyczne; 2016, 4(23); 7-28
1898-8431 - Pojawia się w:
- Humanum. Międzynarodowe Studia Społeczno-Humanistyczne
- Dostawca treści:
- Biblioteka Nauki
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