Autor: Baczkowski, Michał - Katalog OPAC zbiorów

Skocz do pozycji: 1.

Tytuł:: Koncepcje ugody austriacko-polskiej w latach 1790–1815. Niezrealizowana szansa porozumienia?
Autorzy:: Baczkowski, Michał
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/708034.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2011
Wydawca:: Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
Źródło:: Studia Historyczne; 2011, 2
0025-1429
Pojawia się w:: Studia Historyczne
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 2.

Tytuł:: Włosi w Legionach Dąbrowskiego w Italii
Autorzy:: Baczkowski, Michał
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/640404.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2006
Wydawca:: Uniwersytet Jagielloński. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego
Opis:: Italians in the Dąbrowski Legion in ItalyIn the agreement of 1797 signed between general Jan Henryk Dąbrowski and the government of Lombardy concerning the creation of the Polish Legion, there was no mention of the possibility of Italian citizens joining the Legion. In spite of this, in the years 1797–1807, 53 Italians obtained an officer status in the Legion; among them, there were 31 physicians, and military surgeons, 9 quartermasters, 9 junior officers, 4 chaplains, and 1 officer whose function had not been specified. A small group of Italians who were recruited mainly from among the dissolved Piedmont divisions, also served as non-commissioned officers and private soldiers. As regards the geographical origin of the Italians, the majority of the officers and army officials came from Milan and Lombardy, as well as from Piedmont and Bologna. The majority of the Italians obtained the above posts in the effect of being nominated by the authorities of the Republic of Lombardy which was subsequently transformed into a Cisalpine Republic and finally into the Italian Republic The above decisions were due to the lack of suitable specialists in the Polish Legions, as well as a lack of posts for Italian volunteers in the Cisalpine army.The most valuable group consisted of army physicians who were highly praised for their professional knowledge, intelligence as well as their dedication to the sick and wounded soldiers in their care. The Poles did not have an equally high opinion of the junior officers, as they considered them to be inferior with regard to training and moreover, they thought that the Italians blocked the possibility of promotion for the Polish soldiers. The group which had the worst opinion among the Poles, were the quartermasters, among whom there were many adventurers and careerists. The majority of them had left the Legions following a series of defeats in the II coalition war.4 Italian officers had remained in the Polish army after the liquidation of the legions and they participated in the next Napoleonic campaigns. In spite of the many years of common service in the Legions, no closer ties between the Poles and the Italians had been formed. This fact was largely due to the differences in the social standing of the officers representing the two nations (the Poles represented mainly the nobility, while the Italians chiefly the middle classes), as well as the linguistic and cultural differences, and last but not least different political aspirations. The idea of the common struggle for independence of the Poles and the Italians originated only in the thirties of the 19th century.
Źródło:: Prace Historyczne; 2006, 133
0083-4351
Pojawia się w:: Prace Historyczne
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 3.

Tytuł:: Kraków jako ośrodek wspomagający Wielką Armię podczas wyprawy na Rosję w 1812 roku
Autorzy:: Baczkowski, Michał
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/640714.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2013
Wydawca:: Uniwersytet Jagielloński. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego
Tematy:: Duchy of Warsaw, History of Poland 19 century, Napoleonic Wars
Opis:: Krakow as a center offering assistance to the Great Army during the Russian campaign of 1812 In the Napoleonic plans concerning the war with Russia in 1812, Kraków was not supposed to play any major role. The marches of Napoleonic army troops did not lead through the city nor were there plans of locating any major food storage places for the Great Army here. During the several drafts to the army of the Warsaw Duchy, conducted in 1812, 381 recruits were drafted from the city of Krakow; moreover the Krakow regiment of the National Guards, consisting of 160 soldiers, took part in the campaign. Shortly before the outbreak of the war, the soldiers of the 7th and 8th corps of the Great Army were supplied with food at the expense of the city. However the organization of food supplies was not carried out well; it was delayed and the city authorities were not able to collect the supplies and dispatch them on time. During the war, Krakow did not realize any major military orders; it was only in December 1812 that the government imposed on the city the obligation to gather a bigger food contingent which led to vehement protests of the city council. In the opinion of witnesses, Krakow and its surroundings came out of the war of 1812 relatively unscathed; the city itself had not suffered at the hands of the marauders of the Great Army and was able to play a decisive role in the reorganization of the Polish troops in 1813, as a logistic and supply center for the units of the Warsaw Duchy.
Źródło:: Prace Historyczne; 2013, 140, 1
0083-4351
Pojawia się w:: Prace Historyczne
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 4.

Tytuł:: Czy Kraków mógł zostać stolicą Galicji na początku XIX wieku?
Autorzy:: Baczkowski, Michał
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/640372.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2009
Wydawca:: Uniwersytet Jagielloński. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego
Opis:: Could Cracow Have Become the Capital of Galicia at the Beginning of the 19th Century?In the years 1796–1809 Cracow belonged to Austria. Up until the year 1803, it was the capital of the so called Western Galicia which in this very year became incorporated into the crown land of Galicia which up until then had included the Polish territories incorporated into Austria in 1772, with the capital in Lvov. The latter city which was bigger and better developed than Cracow, was however rather badly positioned lying on the north-easterly borderlands of the state. In this situation, in the year 1807 the military circles came forward with the conception of extending the institutions associated with the provincial administration in Cracow. This idea was subsequently taken up by a large section of Austrian officials who suggested that for political and propaganda reasons the capital of Galicia should be transferred from Lvov to Cracow, the old capital of Poland. The above conception was associated with a wider program of reforms of the Polish territories under Austrian domination; the main goal of these reforms was the winning over of the Polish public opinion and drawing away of the Polish nobility from cooperation with Napoleon and with the Duchy of Warsaw. Establishing the capital of Galicia in Cracow and the coronation of Austria’s emperor as the king of Galicia in the Cracow cathedral was to have been a gesture addressed to the conservative Polish nobility. Yet, the above plans had fallen flat due to the outbreak of the war with France in the year 1809, in the consequence of which Austria had lost Western Galicia to the Duchy of Warsaw.
Źródło:: Prace Historyczne; 2009, 136
0083-4351
Pojawia się w:: Prace Historyczne
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 5.

Tytuł:: Antoni Morbitzer jako prezes krakowskiej Rady Municypalnej (1812–1815)
Autorzy:: Baczkowski, Michał
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/640581.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2013
Wydawca:: Uniwersytet Jagielloński. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego
Tematy:: dzieje Krakowa w XIX wieku, dzieje samorządu krakowskiego w XIX wieku
Opis:: Antoni Morbitzer as the President of the Krakow Municipal Council (1812–1815)The article is devoted to the activity of Antoni Morbitzer (1757–1824), a Krakow merchant, economic and political activist and president of the Krakow Municipal Council in the years 1812–1815, that is the final years of the existence of the Warsaw Duchy. Contrary to the letter of the existing law, while standing at the helm of the Municipal Council, Morbitzer, managed to transform this rather superfi cial institution into an authentic organ of municipal authority which co-governed the city of Krakow. Despite a diffi cult political and economic situation (Napoleon’s war with Russia in 1812, the two-year occupation of Krakow by the Russian army in the years 1813–1815), he tried to realize an investment program in the city (charting out new roads, paving the streets, laying down sewage pipes, demolishing derelict buildings); he supported Krakow’s activity as a trading center and opposed the city’s excessive supplies for the Polish and then the Russian armies which according to him ruined the city budget. Thanks to his own industriousness and cooperation with the city mayor and department prefect, as well as his ability to impose his own point of view on the Municipal Council, he contributed to a relatively effi cient functioning of the city and to continuing modernization work in this difficult period. Due to the different political system, (which operated in the city at the time of the Austrian rule and in the period of the Free City of Krakow), he was the only president of Krakow municipal self-government in the first half of the 19th c.
Źródło:: Prace Historyczne; 2013, 140, 3
0083-4351
Pojawia się w:: Prace Historyczne
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 6.

Tytuł:: Przestępczość wojsk garnizonu krakowskiego na przełomie XVIII i XIX wieku
Autorzy:: Baczkowski, Michał
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/923555.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2012
Wydawca:: Uniwersytet Jagielloński. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego
Tematy:: military crime
history of krakow
napoleon’s army
the russian army
punishment
order
military justice
Opis:: In 1796–1815 Cracow had a relatively large military garrison, composed at first (until 1809) by the Austrian, and later (until 1813) by the Polish army. The garrison was eventually (until 1815) made up of the Russian troops. The presence of the military units caused conflicts with the civilians mostly due to the assignment of living quarters, arbitrary seizure of apartments by the officers and due to drunkness. What was also reported were the robberies, batteries and, in single cases, the homicide. The largest incidence of offences as committed by the Austrian army was reported in 1809 during its war against the army of the Duchy of Warsaw while the largest number of offences commited by the Russian soldiers was observed at the time when they occupied the town (1814–1815). This shows that the scale of crime was bound with the current political situation and with the absence of supervision as exercised by the officers over the soldiers, the officers’ attitude toward the inhabitants of Cracow being, as a rule, hostile.
Źródło:: Krakowskie Studia z Historii Państwa i Prawa; 2012, 5, 2
2084-4115
2084-4131
Pojawia się w:: Krakowskie Studia z Historii Państwa i Prawa
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 7.

Tytuł:: Trzy okupacje Krakowa przez wojska rosyjskie w latach 1809–1831. Analiza porównawcza
A Comparative Analysis of the Russian Army’s Three Occupations of Cracow between 1809–1831
Drei Besetzungen von Krakau durch russische Truppen zwischen 1809 und 1831: eine vergleichende Analyse
Autorzy:: Baczkowski, Michał
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2162160.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2022-12-22
Wydawca:: Wojskowe Biuro Historyczne
Tematy:: wojsko rosyjskie
okupacja wojskowa
Kraków
XIX wiek
Russian army
military occupation
Cracow
nineteenth century
Russische Armee
militärische Besetzung
Krakau
19. Jahrhundert
Opis:: W pierwszej połowie XIX w. Kraków trzykrotnie znalazł się pod rosyjską okupacją wojskową: w 1809 r., gdy należał do Austrii, w latach 1813–1815, gdy należał do Księstwa Warszawskiego i w 1831 r., gdy był stolicą Wolnego Miasta Krakowa. Każda z okupacji rosyjskich miała inne cele i charakter. W 1809 r. głównym (niezrealizowanym) celem było niedopuszczenie do przejęcia miasta z rąk austriackich przez Księstwo Warszawskie. W latach 1813–1815 okupacja miasta była efektem przegranej Napoleona pod Moskwą i ofensywy wojsk rosyjskich na państwa napoleońskiej Europy. W 1831 r. okupacja miała charakter ekspedycji karnej za wspomaganie powstania listopadowego przez mieszkańców Krakowa. Każdorazowy pobyt wojsk rosyjskich w Krakowie wywoływał perturbacje gospodarcze i wzrost przestępczości. Dla załogi okupacyjnej największym zagrożeniem okazała się masowa zachorowalność żołnierzy na choroby weneryczne, najlepiej poświadczona dla lat 1813–1815. Polityczne znaczenie trzech okupacji wojskowych Krakowa przez wojsko rosyjskie było stosunkowo niewielkie. Koszty utrzymania żołnierzy były znaczne, ale nie doprowadziły do zrujnowania finansów miasta. Zachowanie się wojsk okupacyjnych, w wielu wypadkach naganne, nie odbiegało jednak od standardów pierwszej połowy XIX w.
During the first half of the nineteenth century, Cracow found itself under Russian military occupation three times: in 1809, when the city belonged to Austria, between 1813–1815, when it belonged to the Duchy of Warsaw, and in 1831, when it was the capital of the Free City of Cracow. Each period of Russian occupation had different aims and character. In 1809, the main (unrealised) goal was to prevent the Duchy of Warsaw from capturing the then Austrian city. The Russian offensive against the states of Napoleonic Europe, launched aft er Bonaparte’s defeat near Moscow in 1812, resulted in the second occupation between 1813–1815. In 1831, the city was occupied for a third time as punishment for the city’s strong support of the November Uprising. Each period of occupation resulted in economic perturbations and an increase in crime. For the occupying forces, the greatest threat turned out to be the mass morbidity of soldiers caused by venereal diseases attested to 1813–1815. The political importance of the three Russian occupations of Cracow was relatively minor. The cost of housing and maintaining the soldiers was considerable but did not deplete the city’s finances. The behaviour of the occupying forces, reprehensible in many cases, did not differ from the standards that prevailed during the first half of the nineteenth century.
In der ersten Hälft e des neunzehntes Jahrhunderts befand sich Krakau dreimal unter russischer militärischer Besatzung: 1809, als es zu Österreich gehörte, 1813–1815, als es Teil des Herzogtums Warschau war, und 1831, als es die Hauptstadt der Republik Krakau war. Jede der russischen Besetzungen hatte andere Ziele und einen anderen Charakter. Im Jahr 1809 bestand das (nicht erreichte) Hauptziel darin, die Einnahme der Stadt durch das Herzogtum Warschau aus österreichischer Hand zu verhindern. Die Besetzung der Stadt zwischen 1813 und 1815 war die Folge der Niederlage Napoleons bei Moskau und der Offensive der russischen Armee auf die Länder des napoleonischen Europas. Im Jahr 1831 hatte die Besetzung den Charakter einer Strafexpedition aufgrund der Unterstützung des Novemberaufstandes durch die Krakauer Bevölkerung. Jeder Aufenthalt der russischen Armee in Krakau führte zu wirtschaft lichen Turbulenzen und einem Anstieg der Kriminalität. Die größte Bedrohung für die Besatzungsarmee stellte das massive Auft reten von Geschlechtskrankheiten unter den Soldaten dar, das am besten für die Jahre 1813–1815 belegt ist. Die politische Bedeutung der drei militärischen Besetzungen von Krakau durch die russische Armee war relativ gering. Die Kosten für den Unterhalt der Soldaten waren beträchtlich, ruinierten aber nicht die Finanzen der Stadt. Das Verhalten der Besatzungstruppen, das in vielen Fällen verwerfl ich war, wich jedoch nicht von den Standards der ersten Hälfte des neunzehntes Jahrhunderts ab.
Źródło:: Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy; 2022, XXIII (LXXIV), 4(282); 96-121
1640-6281
Pojawia się w:: Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 8.

Tytuł:: The disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian army in 1918
Rozkład armii austro-węgierskiej w 1918 r.
Autorzy:: Baczkowski, Michał
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/11344244.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2019
Wydawca:: Uniwersytet Papieski Jana Pawła II w Krakowie
Tematy:: First World War
Austro-Hungarian army
military rebellions
I wojna światowa
armia austro-węgierska
bunty wojskowe
Opis:: The internal disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian army in 1918 was one of the chief causes of not only the defeat of the Habsburg monarchy in the First World War but also of the breakup of the dual state. That long-term process began in the winter of 1917/18 with the shortages in supplies for the soldiers. Its dynamic was strongly boosted by the return of prisoners of war from Russian captivity on the power of the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March–October 1918), and the defeat by the Piave (July 1918). There were increasing instances of marauding and local rebellions in the rear ranks from the spring of 1918 resulting in the breakdown of discipline and a huge wave of desertions in the summer of that year. The response of the authorities was poor for fear of a civil revolution or a rebellion stimulated by the national context in the event of a brutal use of force. The weakened army limited its activity on the front, passively awaiting the signing of a peace. The last phase of the demise came in October 1918 and resulted from the lack of faith in a quick conclusion to the conflict combined with the hopes of rank-and-file soldiers for the establishment of national states on the wreckage of Austria-Hungary, which was to result in immediate termination of hostilities. In such circumstances, the beginning of the Italian offensive at Vittorio Veneto led to a series of rebellions of line troops. This caused the collapse of the front, the unauthorised return of entire corps to their homes, and the signing of the Armistice of Villa Giusti by the declining monarchy and capitulation to the conditions of the on Italians.
Rozpad armii austro-węgierskiej w końcowej fazie I wojny światowej wynikał ze splotu kilku czynników. Były to: kryzys aprowizacyjny dotykający nie tylko ludność cywilną, lecz także żołnierzy; brak wiary w zwycięstwo, spotęgowany klęską podczas ofensywy nad Piave na froncie włoskim (czerwiec 1918); powrót jeńców z niewoli rosyjskiej (marzec-październik 1918) w znacznej mierze zrewoltowanych i zanarchizowanych i wreszcie wzrost nastrojów partykularnych wśród różnych grup etnicznych. Przejawami rozkładu wojska były: masowe dezercje i samowolne przedłużanie urlopów, symulowanie chorób, odmowa wykonywania rozkazów, a w szczególności pełnienia służby frontowej, próby wszczęcia buntu o podłożu politycznym i socjalnym. Władze austro-węgierskie nie potrafiły przeciwstawić się tym tendencjom, licząc na dotrwanie państwa do chwili zawieszenia broni. Włoska ofensywa pod Vittoria Veneto (od 24.10.1918.) w połączeniu z równoczesnym załamaniem się cywilnych struktur władzy państwowej, doprowadziły do błyskawicznego rozkładu armii.
Źródło:: Folia Historica Cracoviensia; 2019, 25, 2; 123-143
0867-8294
Pojawia się w:: Folia Historica Cracoviensia
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 9.

Tytuł:: Żołnierze żydowscy w armii austro-węgierskiej podczas I wojny światowej
Autorzy:: Baczkowski, Michał
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2083441.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2022-01-07
Wydawca:: Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. Komisji Edukacji Narodowej w Krakowie
Tematy:: Austro-Hungarian Army
Jews
World War I
Armia austro-węgierska
Żydzi
I wojna światowa
Opis:: The military service of Jewish soldiers during World War I caused controversies, with the term “Jew” itself being problematic. In Austria-Hungary, a Jewish nationality was not recognized, and the only criterium of identification was a declaration of practicing religion (Judaism). This is not a problem for establishing the number of Jewish privates, but it disrupts the statistics of the officer corps, where it was common to abandon Judaism. In the Austro-Hungarian Army, Jews had the ability to acquire higher officer ranks (general), but in practice, this was only applicable to Jews assimilated to German culture. The percentage of Jews among reserve officers was higher than average due to their high level of education. According to data from 1910, Jews constituted 3.1% of all privates in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. World War I took the lives of about 25,000 Austro-Hungarian Jews, i.e. about 8.3% of all followers of Judaism mobilized to the army. This was a percentage slightly lower than for Christians, which became fodder to anti-Semitism. Jewish soldiers showed loyalty to the state and did not engage in military rebellions in 1918. After the war, the memory of Jewish soldiers was not cultivated in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy’s successor states. In contrast to Germany, however, they were not accused of acting to undermine the empire’s military potential during World War I.
The military service of Jewish soldiers during World War I caused controversies, with the term “Jew” itself being problematic. In Austria-Hungary, a Jewish nationality was not recognized, and the only criterium of identification was a declaration of practicing religion (Judaism). This is not a problem for establishing the number of Jewish privates, but it disrupts the statistics of the officer corps, where it was common to abandon Judaism. In the Austro-Hungarian Army, Jews had the ability to acquire higher officer ranks (general), but in practice, this was only applicable to Jews assimilated to German culture. The percentage of Jews among reserve officers was higher than average due to their high level of education. According to data from 1910, Jews constituted 3.1% of all privates in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. World War I took the lives of about 25,000 Austro-Hungarian Jews, i.e. about 8.3% of all followers of Judaism mobilized to the army. This was a percentage slightly lower than for Christians, which became fodder to anti-Semitism. Jewish soldiers showed loyalty to the state and did not engage in military rebellions in 1918. After the war, the memory of Jewish soldiers was not cultivated in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy’s successor states. In contrast to Germany, however, they were not accused of acting to undermine the empire’s military potential during World War I.
Źródło:: Res Gestae. Czasopismo Historyczne; 2022, 13; 96-110
2450-4475
Pojawia się w:: Res Gestae. Czasopismo Historyczne
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki