Informacja

Drogi użytkowniku, aplikacja do prawidłowego działania wymaga obsługi JavaScript. Proszę włącz obsługę JavaScript w Twojej przeglądarce.

Wyszukujesz frazę "scepticism" wg kryterium: Wszystkie pola


Tytuł:
Elements of Greek Scepticism in Richard Feynman’s Views on Science
Autorzy:
Dembiński, Bogdan
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/665274.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego
Tematy:
philosophy of science
Richard Feynman
criticism
scepticism
ancient scepticism
epistemology
continuity of philosophical tradition
Opis:
The article considers some aspects of Richard Feynman’s philosophy of science. The basic assumptions of Feynman’s views on science refer back to the tradition of Greek scepticism. Interestingly, Feynman was probably unaware of this relation, still he became an outstanding modern continuator of this tradition. The analysis is based on Feynman’s lectures included in The Character of Physical Law.
Źródło:
Folia Philosophica; 2015, 34
1231-0913
2353-9445
Pojawia się w:
Folia Philosophica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Meaning Scepticism
Autorzy:
Szubka, Tadeusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1918907.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020-10-27
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 1994, 42, 1; 240-243
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
A Very Short Introduction to Scepticism (rec.: Duncan Pritchard. Scepticism: A Very Short Introduction)
Autorzy:
Socrates, Francisco Angel P.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1791164.pdf
Data publikacji:
2021-06-28
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2021, 69, 2; 352-358
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Trzy strategie dyskusji ze sceptycyzmem
Three strategies of debate with scepticism
Autorzy:
Ziemińska, Renata
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2015956.pdf
Data publikacji:
2002
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
epistemologia
sceptycyzm
filozofia współczesna
epistemology
scepticism
contemporary philosophy
Opis:
In debate with scepticism three general strategies may be differentiated: (1) pointing to self-refutation of scepticism; (2) looking for certainty; and (3) modification of the concept of knowledge. The latter strategy has at least three versions: (a) knowledge does not require certainty, (b) knowledge is not broadened by way of deduction, and (c) knowledge does not require the knowledge of knowledge. The first strategy refutes global scepticism, but does not give an example of knowledge and is not efficient in the case of scepticism based on the hypothesis of the malicious scientist. Also the second strategy is only able to refute the typical thesis of global scepticism (knowledge does not exist). Scepticism based on the hypothesis of the malicious scientist is more efficiently refuted in the third strategy. However, separation of knowledge and certainty is only avoiding the problem of scepticism. It is also doubtful if the principle of broadening knowledge by way of deduction may be refuted. Negation of the principle of transparency of knowledge is the most convincing one. After it is refuted, knowledge is possible in the situation when we do not know if we know and we cannot exclude sceptical hypotheses.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2002, 50, 1; 575-595
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Superroznosiciele wątpliwości. Sceptycyzm i teorie spiskowe w dobie koronawirusa
Super-spreaders of doubts. Scepticism and conspiracy theories in the times of coronavirus
Autorzy:
Wróblewski, Michał
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1849719.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020-12-30
Wydawca:
Instytut Dyskursu i Dialogu
Tematy:
pandemia
teorie spiskowe
sprzedawcy wątpliwości
sceptycyzm
pandemic
conspiracy theories
merchants of doubts
scepticism
Opis:
W artykule używając metafory superreroznosiciela zanalizowano zjawisko rozprzestrzeniania się sceptycyzmu wobec nauki i ekspertyzy medycznej. Autor chce pokazać, że w debacie na temat koronawirusa konkretni aktorzy przyczyniają się do utrwalania negatywnych przekonań na temat samego wirusa, jak i sposobów jego okiełznania. W pierwszej części tekstu przywołane zostały wcześniejsze przypadki teorii spiskowych i prób delegitymizowania wiedzy medycznej, pokazując, że są to dość częste reakcje na epidemie. W drugiej natomiast dokonano analizy wypowiedzi medialnych polityków Konfederacji związanych z pandemią Sars-Cov-2, by pokazać, dlaczego odgrywają oni rolę tytułowych superroznosicieli wątpliwości.
In the article, using the metaphor of a super-spreader, the phenomenon of spreading scepticism about science and medical expertise was analysed. The author wants to show that in the debate on the coronavirus, specific actors contribute to the dissemination of negative beliefs about the virus. In the first part of the text, earlier cases of conspiracy theories and attempts to delegitimize medical knowledge are mentioned, showing that these are quite frequent reactions to epidemics. The second part of the text analyzes the statements made by politicians related to the Sars-Cov-2 pandemic in order to show why they play the role of the super-spreaders of doubts.
Źródło:
Dyskurs & Dialog; 2020, II, 4 (6); 23-41
2658-2368
2658-2406
Pojawia się w:
Dyskurs & Dialog
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Próby de Montaigne’a, czyli apologia życia prywatnego
Autorzy:
Waśkiewicz, Andrzej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2188283.pdf
Data publikacji:
2022-10-24
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. Komisji Edukacji Narodowej w Krakowie. Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii
Tematy:
Renaissance scepticism
political disengagement
individualism
friendship
Opis:
De Montaigne’s Essays, or the apology of private life: The paper presents Michel de Montaigne’s Essays as an apology of his life on the margin of society. Montaigne lives at the time of a civil war in which he refuses to take sides; accordingly, the only thing that he absolutely expects from national government is for it to guarantee peace in the realm. His expectations of the institutional Church are similarly minimalist. Universally respected laws should safeguard public order; all those who invoke philosophical wisdom or religious revelation do is destroy that order. The truly wise ancient philosophers lived outside the polis, aware that it is not reason but common sense that forms its foundation. Having no competences to run a polity, the philosopher has no particular obligations toward it, either. And yet, even with his sceptical philosophy and egocentric personality, Montaigne does not shut himself in an ivory tower, but merely protects his privacy, the right to devote his time to himself. As any philosopher, he highly treasures friendship, which he regards as an intimate relationship, a communion of two souls merged into one. Nonetheless, he needs other people, too, even if it is only to share his thoughts with them: he needs their judgment on his own reflection. He presents this reflection in the Essays in a novel way, drawing the attention to himself, something for which he does not intend to explain himself. For he regards stupidity, including his own stupidity, as a natural human vice; his essays are designed to protect him against it, and him alone, as he will not embark on a crusade against stupidity of others. He does not make his life part of any great narrative: he lives for himself, but he does not argue that the readers of the Essays should imitate him in that. For Montaigne consistently avoids any kind of categorical moralising or viewing human life in terms of obligations.
Źródło:
ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal; 2022, 12, 1; 11-26
2083-6635
2084-1043
Pojawia się w:
ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The Metaphysics of Cartesian Science
Autorzy:
Esfeld, Michael
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2143650.pdf
Data publikacji:
2022
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Zielonogórski. Instytut Filozofii
Tematy:
Descartes
methodological scepticism
modern science
res cogitans
res extens
Opis:
The argument of this paper is that the rationale, potential and limits of modern science are evident in Descartes, and in respect of its basic Cartesian features are still valid today. Its rationale is objectivity, its potential is a great improvement in human living conditions, and its limit is that, due to its striving for objectivity, modern science cannot in principle encompass human thought and action. Cartesian dualism is therefore well grounded, and can be elaborated on without any commitment to two autonomous types of substances.
Źródło:
Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy; 2022, 19, 2; 1-25
2299-0356
Pojawia się w:
Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Zagadnienie sceptycyzmu w kontekście wpływu myśli Locke’a na filozofię Berkeleya
Scepticism and the Influence of the Lockean Thought on Berkeley’s Philosophy
Autorzy:
Szałek, Piotr K.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2012927.pdf
Data publikacji:
2010
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
J. Locke
G. Berkeley
istnienie
materia
korpuskularyzm
sceptycyzm
percepcja
existence
matter
corpuscularism
scepticism
perception
Opis:
The paper seeks to answer the question about the actual influence of the Lockean thought on Berkeley’s philosophy. It promotes the view that though scepticism that arises from the representational theory of perception is an important factor for motivating Berkeley to built his anti-sceptical strategy, it is the so-called corpuscular scepticism that was in fact an essential element of this influence. The latter was a consequence of assuming the notion of corpuscular, yet unknown material substance by Locke, and motivated Berkeley to consider an argument for rejection of the existence of such substance. The Berkeleian anti-sceptical argument here seems congenial to the Cartesian origins of his definition of existence, and enables us to combine the Lockean perspective with the Cartesian reading of sources of Berkeley’s philosophy.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2010, 58, 1; 229-246
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
O rozwoju realizmu naukowego jako selektywnego sceptycyzmu
On the Evolution of Scientific Realism as Selective Scepticism
Autorzy:
Kotowski, Mateusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/967236.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014-09-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:
The article discusses the evolution which scientific realism underwent within the last thirty years. It is argued that this evolution was to a large extent fuelled by at-tempts at arriving at a formulation of realism which would be immune to the pessi-mistic induction argument. The argument, whose most influential formulation is due to Laudan, is targeted at any version of realism about theories understood as unified wholes. The central claim defended in the article is that, although pessimistic induc-tion was presented as a confutation of scientific realism, it has had a very positive effect on the evolution of realistic positions. It is because it has forced realists to limit their claims and, at the same time, to make them more subtle and precise. As a con-sequence, some realists ceased to defend realism as an attitude towards whole theo-ries (or whole scientific knowledge) and tried to distinguish the parts of theories which realist should be committed to as approximate descriptions of the unobservable (and at the same time as the most stable aspects of scientific knowledge) from the parts they should be sceptical about. Any form of realism which makes use of such a strategy may be referred to as selective scepticism. Although the initial attempts at adopting selective scepticism (exemplified by the conceptions of Hacking and Worrall) proved to be problematic, the most recent proposal - Chakravartty’s semirealism, with its commitment to concrete structures - seems to have achieved the general goal and allowed realists to dismiss the problems connected with pessi-mistic induction.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2014, 22, 3; 105-123
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Zaproszenie do mitu. Filozofia wychowania z pism Leszka Kołakowskiego wywiedziona
Autorzy:
Stanisław, Gałkowski,
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/892226.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018-06-19
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
Tematy:
Leszek Kołakowski
education
myth
scepticism
autonomy
Opis:
This article is an attempt to reconstruct Leszek Kołakowski’s vision of education based on the study of his own notions and ideas. According to Kołakowski, any meaning which can be attributed to human life and activities is not a feature inherent in human beings but can only be granted by themselves. The process of sense creation is irremovable from culture. Kołakowski calls this process myth creation, which is one of the key concepts he employs. He considers education as an introduction to myth while the lack of an external frame of reference renders education “identical with indoctrination”. Therefore the only way to preserve the apprentice’s autonomy is to refer to another category of Kołakowski’s, which is inconsistency. Placing hope for the apprentice’s autonomy in the teacher’s inconsistency and, in consequence, in the ineffectiveness of education, is not very reassuring. Kołakowski’s vision of education demonstrates that scepticism is not capable (or even willing) of offering us anything more than that.
Źródło:
Kwartalnik Pedagogiczny; 2018, 63(2 (248)); 9-23
0023-5938
Pojawia się w:
Kwartalnik Pedagogiczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł

Ta witryna wykorzystuje pliki cookies do przechowywania informacji na Twoim komputerze. Pliki cookies stosujemy w celu świadczenia usług na najwyższym poziomie, w tym w sposób dostosowany do indywidualnych potrzeb. Korzystanie z witryny bez zmiany ustawień dotyczących cookies oznacza, że będą one zamieszczane w Twoim komputerze. W każdym momencie możesz dokonać zmiany ustawień dotyczących cookies