Informacja

Drogi użytkowniku, aplikacja do prawidłowego działania wymaga obsługi JavaScript. Proszę włącz obsługę JavaScript w Twojej przeglądarce.

English (EN)·Polski (PL)·Yкраїнський (UK)
Przejdź do strony domowej biblioteki Centralna Biblioteka Wojskowa Link otwiera się w nowym oknie Logo biblioteki Prolib Integro - strona głównaCentralna Biblioteka Wojskowa

Wyszukujesz frazę "ontological argument" wg kryterium: Wszystkie pola

  Lista filtrów
Wyrównaj
    Wyświetlanie 1-5 z 5
    Tytuł:
    Logika modalna a dowód ontologiczny
    Modal Logic vs. Ontological Argument
    Autorzy:
    Biłat, Andrzej
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/967109.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2012-03-01
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
    Opis:
    The contemporary versions of the ontological argument originated from Charles Hartshorne are formalized proofs (in the metalogical sense of the word) based on unique modal theories. The simplest well-known theory of this kind arises from the system B of modal logic by adding two extra-logical axioms: (AA) “If the perfect being exists, then it necessarily exists” (Anselm’s Axiom) and (AL) “It is possible that the perfect being exists” (Leibniz’s Axiom). In the paper a similar argument is presented, however none of the systems of modal logic is relevant to it. Its only premises are the axiom (AA) and, instead of (AL), the new axiom (AN): “If the perfect being doesn’t exist, it necessarily doesn’t”. The main goal of the work is to prove that (AN) is no more controversial than (AA) and - in consequence - the whole strength of the modal ontological argument lays in the set of its extra-logical premises. In order to do that, three arguments are formulated: ontological, “cosmological” and metalogical.
    Źródło:
    Filozofia Nauki; 2012, 20, 1; 103-108
    1230-6894
    2657-5868
    Pojawia się w:
    Filozofia Nauki
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Computer-supported Analysis of Positive Properties, Ultrafilters and Modal Collapse in Variants of Gödels Ontological Argument
    Autorzy:
    Benzmüller, Christoph
    Fuenmayor, David
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/750054.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2020
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
    Tematy:
    computational metaphysics
    ontological argument
    higher-order modal logic
    higher-order logic
    automated reasoning
    modal ultrafilters
    Opis:
    Three variants of Kurt Gödel's ontological argument, proposed by Dana Scott, C. Anthony Anderson and Melvin Fitting, are encoded and rigorously assessed on the computer. In contrast to Scott's version of Gödel's argument the two variants contributed by Anderson and Fitting avoid modal collapse. Although they appear quite different on a cursory reading they are in fact closely related. This has been revealed in the computer-supported formal analysis presented in this article. Key to our formal analysis is the utilization of suitably adapted notions of (modal) ultrafilters, and a careful distinction between extensions and intensions of positive properties.
    Źródło:
    Bulletin of the Section of Logic; 2020, 49, 2
    0138-0680
    2449-836X
    Pojawia się w:
    Bulletin of the Section of Logic
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    TEIZM UMIARKOWANY JAKO INTEGRACJA TEIZMU CHRZEŚCIJAŃSKIEGO I ATEIZMU. PRÓBA PORÓWNANIA TRZECH STANOWISK W KWESTII ISTNIENIA BOGA
    MODERATE THEISM AS AN INTEGRATION OF CHRISTIAN THEISM AND ATHEISM. AN ATTEMPT AT A COMPARISON OF THREE APPROACHES TO THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
    Autorzy:
    Ciesielski, Mieszko
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/418675.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2015
    Wydawca:
    Akademia Marynarki Wojennej. Wydział Nauk Humanistycznych i Społecznych
    Tematy:
    comparison of religions
    Christian theism
    atheism
    moderate theism
    death of God
    God’s mercy
    ontological argument
    Opis:
    The article compares three religious a comparison of three approaches to religion: Christian theism, atheism, and moderate theism – a concept built by the author of the article and presented in its first part. Moderate theism is one possible approach to the Supreme Being, within the framework of the classification formed by the intersection of two criteria: the beginning or a lack of the beginning of the existence of the Absolute and the end or a lack of the end of the existence of the Absolute. The author proposes the thesis that moderate theism, i.e. an approach which presupposes that the absolute does not have a beginning of its existence but that there is an end to it (it is eternal regressively but not eternal progressively) may be a concept which in a specific manner generalizes theism and atheism. What is more, a comparison of moderate theism with Christian theism and with atheism allows us to suppose that the concept of moderate theism avoids the weak points of both theism (i.a. the problem of reconciling human freedom and responsibility with the existence of a caring Good-shepherd, the problem of religious violence) and atheism (i.a. the problem of satisfying the existential need to exist after death, the problem of the ultimate justification of moral norms). The author also presents in his article a mercy-based argument for the current non-existence of God, which constitutes a philosophical justification of moderate theism.
    Źródło:
    Colloquium; 2015, 7, 3; 19-37
    2081-3813
    2658-0365
    Pojawia się w:
    Colloquium
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    O modalnej naturze argumentu w. Anzelma. Uwagi do artykułu „Logika modalna a dowód ontologiczny” Andrzeja Biłata
    On the Modal Nature of St. Anselm's Argument. Remarks on Andrzej Biłat's Paper Modal Logic vs Ontological Argument
    Autorzy:
    Świętorzecka, Kordula
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/968577.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2014-03-01
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
    Opis:
    The paper examines the justification of two theses put forward in the article Modal Logic vs Ontological Argument by Andrzej Biłat: (1) the Anselmian ontological argument does not essentially engage modalities, and its force is not dependent on any specific logical modal laws (but only on classical logic); (2) the only source of modal force of the ontological proof is the Leibnizian theory of perfections. Biłat considers Hartshorne's version of the ontological proof and proposes his own formalization based on classical logic alone. We compare the presented theories and their formal background. We follow the proposed justification of Biłat's main opinion, point out its problematic (and not valid) fragments, and discuss its formal and material correctness. In conclusion, we consider the known possibilities of nontrivial application of modal logics to the analysis of St. Anselm's argument and some of its modern versions.
    Źródło:
    Filozofia Nauki; 2014, 22, 1; 131-137
    1230-6894
    2657-5868
    Pojawia się w:
    Filozofia Nauki
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Odpowiedź Lowe’a na argument Ramseya przeciwko rozróżnieniu uniwersalia–indywidua
    The answer of Lowe to Ramsey’s argument against the distinction universal vs. indivi- dual
    Autorzy:
    Luc, Joanna
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/437135.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2016
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. Komisji Edukacji Narodowej w Krakowie. Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii
    Tematy:
    ontology; metaphysics; ontological dependence; problem of universals; categories
    Opis:
    At the beginning of this article Ramsey’s argumentation against universal‐particular distinction is presented. It is based on the assumption that this division requires another one: namely, subject‐predicate distinction. This argumentation was a starting point for Lowe, who does not respect the aforementioned assumption. In his theory, there are not two but four categories, namely: substantial universals, non‐substantial universals, substantial particulars, and non‐substantial particulars. Two of these categories are categories of universals; the other two are categories of particulars. Lowe tries to de ne categories in an ontological way, that is, with essential use of ontological notions. These notions are rigid and non‐rigid existential de‐ pendence, which are themselves de ned in terms of necessity and existence. The contribution of this paper is an analysis of Lowe’s solution. In the rst place, it is con onted with Ramsey remarks. Then other objections are considered. Some of them do not respect the very idea of autonomous ‘ontological way’ in philosophy. Others concern Lowe’s particular version of it. Possible answers to all of these objections are presented, such that Lowe’s theory is defended. However, there is no ultimate conclusion here. In the author’s opinion autonomy and the value of ontology cannot be shown om a purely external position. We should rst assume that this discipline does make sense and then explore its virtues by using its notions.
    Źródło:
    ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal; 2016, 6, 1; 223-237
    2083-6635
    2084-1043
    Pojawia się w:
    ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-5 z 5

      Ta witryna wykorzystuje pliki cookies do przechowywania informacji na Twoim komputerze. Pliki cookies stosujemy w celu świadczenia usług na najwyższym poziomie, w tym w sposób dostosowany do indywidualnych potrzeb. Korzystanie z witryny bez zmiany ustawień dotyczących cookies oznacza, że będą one zamieszczane w Twoim komputerze. W każdym momencie możesz dokonać zmiany ustawień dotyczących cookies