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Wyszukujesz frazę "interchange fees" wg kryterium: Wszystkie pola


Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3
Tytuł:
Payment Card Systems as an Example of Two-sided Markets – a Challenge for Antitrust Authorities
Autorzy:
Tosza, Katarzyna
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/530021.pdf
Data publikacji:
2009-12-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Zarządzania
Tematy:
two-sided markets
antitrust v. regulation
interchange fees
payment card systems
Opis:
This article aims to present the concept of two-sided markets on the example of payment card systems, which have attracted the attention of regulatory and antitrust authorities in recent years. First, the paper offers a few insights into the basic economic theory behind two-sided markets. Second, it presents a brief description of payment card systems and their features. The following analysis focuses on arguments that speak in favour of a regulatory or antitrust intervention into payment card systems. Finally, some of the potential problems that antitrust authorities must face when assessing two-sided markets are presented on the basis of an assessment of the decisional practice of the UOKiK President and the European Commission.
Źródło:
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies; 2009, 2(2); 125-140
1689-9024
2545-0115
Pojawia się w:
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The Condition of Fault in Private Enforcement of Competition Law – a Comparative Analysis of U.S. v. Polish and European Approach
Autorzy:
Mackiewicz, Marta
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2158943.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Zarządzania
Tematy:
anonymous fault
compensatory liability
corporate fault
infringement
of competition law
intent
interchange fees
negligence
private enforcement
Opis:
The purpose of the Polish Act on Claims for Damages for Remedying the Damage Caused by Infringements of Competition Law, based on and implementing EU law – the Damages Directive, was to enable undertakings to effectively use private enforcement of their damages claims from competition law offenders. Infringement of competition law is classified as a tort according to the said Act on Claims. Therefore, the Act on Claims refers to tort liability rules. The conditions of classic tort liability in domestic law do not have exactly the same dogmatic meaning and scope as the conditions of public or private liability for the infringements of domestic and EU competition law. In practice, their application by national courts may rise many questions regarding conformity between domestic and EU law. This paper aims to analyse one of the key conditions of tort liability, that is, the fault of both the undertaking – the offenders, as well as the fault of their governing bodies and officers. If one were to understand the notion of fault within the limits laid down by civil law, and follow the literal wording of the Polish Civil Code’s provisions referring to the fault condition, the efficiency of private enforcement of damage claims arising from infringements of competition law would be doubtful. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to provide the readers with such an interpretation of the notion of fault, as a condition of liability of undertakings, that the legislative purpose of the Act on Claims is achieved and that the principles of efficiency and equivalence of the EU law are observed. In order to present a comprehensive picture, this paper will also discuss the case law of the CJEU concerning ‘anti-trust fault’, accompanied by a comparative analysis of the German and French approach to the fault condition as well as United States antitrust laws in the same area.
L’objectif de la loi polonaise sur les actions en dommages et intérêts pour les infractions au droit de la concurrence, qui se base sur le droit de l’UE et le transpose était de permettre aux entreprises d’utiliser efficacement l’exécution privée de leurs demandes de dommages et intérêts auprès des auteurs d’infractions au droit de la concurrence. La violation du droit de la concurrence est qualifiée comme un délit civil selon la loi sur les demandes d’indemnisation. Par conséquent, la loi sur les demandes d’indemnisation renvoie aux règles de responsabilité délictuelle. Les conditions de la responsabilité délictuelle classique en droit national n’ont pas exactement la même signification et portée dogmatique que les conditions de la responsabilité publique ou privée pour les infractions au droit national et européen de la concurrence. Dans la pratique, leur application par les tribunaux nationaux peut soulever de nombreuses questions concernant la conformité entre le droit national et le droit de l’UE. Le présent document vise à analyser l’une des principales conditions de la responsabilité délictuelle, à savoir la faute de l’entreprise ainsi que la faute de ses organes et dirigeants. Si on voulait comprendre la notion de faute dans les limites fixées par le droit civil, et suivre la formulation littérale des dispositions du code civil polonais relatives à la condition de faute, l’efficacité de l’exécution privée des demandes de dommages et intérêts résultant d’infractions au droit de la concurrence serait incertaine. Par conséquent, le présent article vise à fournir aux lecteurs une interprétation de la notion de faute, en tant que condition de la responsabilité des entreprises, qui permette d’atteindre l’objectif législatif de la loi sur les demandes d’indemnisation et de respecter les principes d’efficacité et d’équivalence du droit de l’UE. Afin de présenter un cadre complet, cet article examine également la jurisprudence de la CJUE concernant la “faute antitrust”, accompagnée d’une analyse comparative des approches allemande et française de la condition de faute ainsi que des lois antitrust américaines dans le même domaine.
Źródło:
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies; 2020, 13, 21; 71-98
1689-9024
2545-0115
Pojawia się w:
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Rozwój sieci bankomatów w Polsce a opłaty interchange i surchange
ATM Network Development in Poland and ATM Interchange and Surcharge Fees
Autorzy:
Górka, Jakub
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/574690.pdf
Data publikacji:
2011-08-31
Wydawca:
Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie. Kolegium Analiz Ekonomicznych
Tematy:
automated teller machines
ATM
cash
payment card
interchange fee
surcharge fee
Opis:
The article sets out to assess the development of Poland’s network of automated teller machines (ATMs) after a series of reductions in ATM interchange fees in the Visa and MasterCard systems in 2010. The author aims to determine how these reductions have influenced the development of the country’s cash dispenser network and analyzes whether or not ATM owners should be allowed to impose special surcharges on cash withdrawals under law. Moreover, based on empirical research conducted in 2010 and 2009, the author estimates the savings for consumers and banks resulting from the use of ATMs. Thanks to cash dispensers, consumers save time, while banks and the economy as a whole save money, Górka notes. The research makes use of foreign market experience, especially that gained in the United States, and of theoretical models developed in various research reports. The specific features of the Polish market are also taken into account. The author outlines the advantages and disadvantages of ATM surcharges, pointing out that, under the current economic conditions in Poland, following the interchange fee reductions, passing laws regulating the permissibility of surcharges would be beneficial to the development of the country’s ATM network, especially in rural areas and small towns. The development of the ATM network benefits both consumers and banks, the author says. Poland is a country in which cash payments continue to dominate and consumers need to have access to banknotes and coins, while cash dispensers are a relatively cheap channel of distributing cash, Górka says. Based on macroeconomic data for 2009, the author estimates that Polish consumers saved 22.4 million hours that year by withdrawing cash in ATMs instead of at bank branches, which means that the average consumer and bank product user saved 1 hour. The total cost savings of the Polish economy from the use of ATMs stood at 1.63 billion zlotys (about 400 million euros). The estimated cost savings for banks were 1.34 billion zlotys (around 340 million euros), according to Górka. An analysis of the Polish market data shows that the reductions in the interchange fees collected from ATM cash withdrawal transactions have directly led to a sharp decline in the profitability of the ATM business for banks and independent ATM deployers, who have recently been the main driving force behind the development of the ATM network in Poland. In the case of Poland, the possibility of charging special ATM transaction convenience fees does not necessarily mean that such fees will be charged to consumers, while they would help stimulate the market, according to the author. At the moment, interchange fees are low, Górka says, which discourages both banks and independent ATM deployers from investing in the development of the ATM network despite consumer expectations.
Źródło:
Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics; 2011, 249, 7-8; 89-112
2300-5238
Pojawia się w:
Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3

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