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Wyświetlanie 1-15 z 70
Tytuł:
Intelekt bierny a intelekt możnościowy w ujęciu św. Tomasza z Akwinu
Passive intellect and potential intellect according to St. Thomas Aquinas
Autorzy:
Zembrzuski, Michał
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452457.pdf
Data publikacji:
2012
Wydawca:
Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
Tematy:
intelekt bierny
intelekt możnościowy
perypatetycka tradycja epistemologiczna
Tomasz z Akwinu
passive intellect
potential intellect
peripatetic epistemological tradition
Thomas Aquinas
Opis:
The article is an attempt to respond the following questions: is there a difference between operations of potential and passive intellect? Could one call the potential intellect passive intellect? Are there any questions, statements or opinions in the history of philosophy which separate potential from passive intellect? The passivity of potential intellect is not a problem here, because its nature and its act is to be in the state of potency towards ist object. The subject of analysis tends to define teechnical terms "intellectus passivus" and to reach philosophical implications resulting from it.
Źródło:
Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2012, 1; 65-84
2300-1976
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Tomistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Desire and Intellect: Individuation in Capitalism, or Simmel vs. Marx
Autorzy:
Ratajczak, Mikołaj
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1790689.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018-12-19
Wydawca:
Polskie Towarzystwo Socjologiczne
Tematy:
capital
desire
intellect
modernity
subject
individuation
Opis:
The aim of this text is to compare Simmel’s and Marx’s notions of two subjective faculties, desireand intellect, and the role each plays in modern capitalist societies. While Simmel understands the faculties asindividual, Marx’s critique of political economy presents their social, public, and trans-individual character. Thesetwo perspectives differ over the particular economic sphere in which we ought to locate the social production ofsubjectivity. Simmel locates such production in market exchange, the formal, symbolic expression of which ismoney, thereby leading to the notion of an intersubjective social reality as the effect of monetary relations betweendesiring and calculating individual subjects. Marx, for his part, treats both desire and intellect as trans-individualfaculties, and locates the social production of subjectivity in the sphere of production as subsumed under capital.
Źródło:
Polish Sociological Review; 2018, 204, 4; 499-515
1231-1413
2657-4276
Pojawia się w:
Polish Sociological Review
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Prawda o intelekcie. Mieczysława Gogacza rozumienie intelektu możnościowego i czynnego
Truth about intellect. Understanding of possible and agent intellect in the thought of Mieczysław Gogacz
Autorzy:
Zembrzuski, Michał
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452563.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
Tematy:
intelekt możnościowy
intelekt czynny
dusza i ciało
jednostkowienie
Tomasz z Akwinu
Mieczysław Gogacz
possible intellect
agent intellect
soul and body
individuation
Thomas Aquinas
Opis:
The aim of the article is presentation the problems of possible intellect and agent intellect in philosophy Mieczyslaw Gogacz, founder of consequent version of thomism (Warsaw School of Thomism). His understanding of the intellect was dictated by the successive publications. Difference between intellects, was first shown in the context of fundamental metaphysical positions - realism and idealism. According to M. Gogacz realistic proposition is depends on the distinction between two intellects, and idealistic related with the acceptance of a single intellect with passive and active function, and identification of the faculties of the soul with itself. M. Gogacz presented the metaphysical description of the nature of the intellect, emphasizing its being, as well as the very essence. He underlined that the possible intellect should be defined as the possibility of the soul, which is it imperfection (intellect is principle of individuation of the soul), located in the soul, but not identical with its essence. Agent intellect in his opinion should be defined as an accident of the possible intellect. Distinction between possible intellect and agent intellect allowed to remark the difference between knowing confused and clearly, and to build the theory of “speech of the heart”, which describes the most important way of knowing a principle of being – act of being.
Źródło:
Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2016, 5; 75-89
2300-1976
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Tomistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Henryk Rzewuski – on the way to Polish national philosophy
Autorzy:
Jastrzębski, Bartosz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/426915.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Papieski Jana Pawła II w Krakowie
Tematy:
the idea of the nation
national philosophy
individual intellect
collective intellect
intuition
inspiration
history
God’s revelation
genius‐philosopher
Opis:
The purpose of this article is to present original philosophical concept by Henryk Rzewuski. This nineteenth century Polish thinker was (and still is) extremely controversial person, accused of national “apostasy” for the Tsarist Russia and the spread of beliefs about the irrevocable end of the Polish state. In this text reveals the complexity and ambivalence Rzewuskiego attitude towards the Polish cause. This philosopher believed that indeed the Polish state will not be standing free himself from the Russian political sovereignty. At the same time, however, was an ardent supporter of building the Polish national philosophy, which would illustrate Polishness and develop in the sphere of the ideal and spiritual. Polish history has to be – within its concept – the material from which the philosopher sees that these thoughts and ideas around which crytallized Polish spirit, and that reflect the basic idea of moral. The spirit of the nation and its moral idea meet, according to this philosopher, the functions analogous to that of the soul to the body – is a condition of life and the unity of its geopolitical “body.”
Źródło:
Logos i Ethos; 2019, 51; 155-174
0867-8308
Pojawia się w:
Logos i Ethos
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Realna różnica między intelektem czynnym i możnościowym w ujęciu św. Tomasza z Akwinu
The Real Distinction Between Agent and Potential Intellect in Approach Thomas Aquinas
Autorzy:
Zembrzuski, Michał
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452459.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
Tematy:
Thomas Aquinas
potential intellect
agent intellect
real distinction
object oh intellectual cognition
Tomasz z Akwinu
intelekt możnościowy
intelekt czynny
różnica realna
przedmiot poznania intelektualnego
Opis:
The aim of article was to prove the existence of the real difference between active intellect and potential intellect, based on the epistemological thought of Thomas Aquinas. Although many authors suggested such a character distinction, yet no one does not try to justifying it. In this article are comments on intellects in Aristotle account, very short history – following the Aquinas - of distinguishing and separating intellects. Presented is the same understanding of the real difference between existence and essence of beings created and in this light given difference between intellects, because Aquinas, actually never spoke about it in this way. A basic element of the article is to distinguish intellects on the basis of a formal rules of their objects and distinguish them on the basis of acts, which allows to build a proper argumentation. It has been shown that between what is recognized in the potential intellect is a disproportion, which may be removed by the allocation of truly different between potential and active intellect. Between intellects there is a real difference only in the case of the human intellect, since both in God and in the angelic beings, this differentiation is not needed. The real difference between intellects is based on the difference between the act and potency or being in act and being in potency, however, are not they act and potency relative to each other, but to the cognized object. Moreover, the active intellect as being in the act, is not determined nor determining the object of cognition potential intellect, it is not the object recognized by him. Finally, if the way of cognition depends on the mode of existence, the intellectual knowledge infinity of human remains in potency, by what must be in man two intellects.
Źródło:
Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2015, 4; 63-95
2300-1976
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Tomistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
"Homo non est intellectus". Aquinas about relation between soul and intellect
Autorzy:
Zembrzuski, Michał
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/431257.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie
Tematy:
Aquinas
intellect
soul–body problem
impediment argument
hylomorphism
whole–part relation
Tomasz z Akwinu
intelekt
problem psychofizyczny
hylemorfizm
relacja część–całość
Opis:
This paper discusses Thomas Aquinas’ stance on the relation between intellect and human soul, where the former is a power and the latter its principle. Due to the fact that Aquinas understands soul as the form of a body, rather than its mover, the problem of how to separate and characterize intellective powers arises. For it is accidental intellectuality that enables cognitive and volitional acts, which are independent of body in their essence. To explain his own position, Aquinas employs the so-called “impediment argument” for the spirituality of the human intellect. He also employs the whole/part distinction when discussing the relation between intellect and soul as whole/part categories. As a result, his account can avoid Averroistic flaws without having to identify intellect with the soul or the whole human being (as argued by Albert the Great). M. Gogacz’s thesis that the intellectual accident of the soul is identical with the possible intellect seems to solve the problem of the accidental and potential character of this particular human power.
Źródło:
Studia Philosophiae Christianae; 2017, 53, 4; 75-101
0585-5470
Pojawia się w:
Studia Philosophiae Christianae
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Poznanie Adama i wiedza Chrystusa a intelekt możnościowy i czynny. Ujęcie Tomasza z Akwinu
The Cognition of Adam and Knowldege of Christ in the Context of Potential and Agent Intellect
Autorzy:
Zembrzuski, Michał
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2078915.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019-12-30
Wydawca:
Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
Tematy:
Tomasz z Akwinu
intelekt możnościowy i czynny
wiedza Chrystusa
wiedza Adama
Thomas Aquinas
potential intellect
agent intellect
knowledge of Christ
knowledge of Adam
Opis:
Thomas Aquinas anthropology is related to the description of human nature, which was established at the beginning, before original sin, as well as taking into account all its effects, and the nature that was united with God. The distinction of two intellects adopted by Aristotle - a potential and active intellect - for Aquinas was helpful in showing the unique character of the knowledge that Adam and Christ had. Adam as the one who was appointed as teacher of people, had perfect knowledge and did not have a potential intellect that would be an unwritten tablet. His potential intellect had the habits of knowledge, by which he had a perfect knowledge of everything that can be embraced in any field of cognition by the power of the first principles of knowledge. The perfection of Christ's knowledge was incomparably greater than knowledge of Adam and every other human being – it was result of unification with the Word, but not the mixing of two natures. Christ had knowledge which have blessed (saved), infused knowledge (resulting from union with the Word) and had experiential knowledge appropriate to age and time. Christ developed in knowledge and wisdom because he grew in human experience.
Źródło:
Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2019, 8; 123-138
2300-1976
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Tomistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Arystoteles czy św. Tomasz z Akwinu? Głębsze rozumienie intelektu
Aristotle or St. Thomas Aquinas? Deeper the understanding of intellect
Autorzy:
Zaorski, Mariusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1008974.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018-10-03
Wydawca:
Akademia Katolicka w Warszawie
Tematy:
intelekt
dusza
nieśmiertelność
św. Tomasz z Akwinu
Arystoteles
St. Thomas Aquinas
Aristotle
intellect
soul
immortality
Opis:
The presented concept of intellect shows the size and innovation of St. Thomas Aquinas. As opposed to Aristotle, St. Thomas explains the nature of intellect more precisely. Aristotle used only one concept in describing form and matter. However, this was not enough to show the existence of intellect a
Źródło:
Warszawskie Studia Teologiczne; 2018, 31, 3; 80-90
0209-3782
2719-7530
Pojawia się w:
Warszawskie Studia Teologiczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Intelletto e spirito. La via segreta di Dio
Intellect and Spirit. Hidden Path of God
Intelekt i duch. Ukryta ścieżka Boga
Autorzy:
Nanni, Gabriele
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2036763.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
intelekt
rozum
opętanie
mistyka
zjednoczenie
Duch
dusza
intellect
reason
possession
mysticism
unification
Spirit
soul
Opis:
Artykuł opisuje działanie Ducha Świętego wewnątrz człowieka – poprzez intelekt oraz poza intelektem. Opisuje trzy doświadczenia świętych karmelitanek: M. Magdaleny de Pazzi (XVI w.), Marii Baouardy (XIX w.) oraz Edyty Stein (XX w.). Dwie pierwsze cierpiały z powodu czasowych opętań diabolicznych. Autor tekstu wyjaśnia, że w niektórych momentach Bóg może zawiesić ludzki rozum, by ochronić osobę na płaszczyźnie duchowej. Najcięższe doświadczenia – jeśli są przeżyte z Bogiem – pozwalają dojść do głębokiej z Nim jedności, do zjednoczenia przeobrażającego.
The article describes the action of the Holy Spirit within a human being − through the intellect and beyond the intellect. Describes the three experiences of the Carmelite saints: M. Magdalena de Pazzi (16th c.), Maria Baouardy (19th c.) and Edyta Stein (20th c.). The first two suffered from temporal diabolical oppressions. The author of the text explains that at some moments God may suspend human reason to protect a person on the spiritual plane. The hardest experiences − if they are lived with God − allow us to come to a deep unity with Him, to the transforming unification.
Źródło:
Roczniki Teologiczne; 2018, 65, 5; 137-155
2353-7272
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Teologiczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The alleged activity of active intellect: A wild goose chase or a puzzle to be solved?
Autorzy:
Kamińska, Sonia
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/690658.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
nous
nous poietikos
nous pathetikos
soul
intellect
God
Deity
actuality
potentiality
philosophy of mind
Aristotle
Thomas Aquinas
Franz Brentano
Victor Caston
Opis:
Trying to describe the activity of Aristotle’s active intellect, we will sooner or later realize that we cannot find its right description, because Aristotle did not provide for one. He left us with many irreconcilable statements and questions with no answers. In the famous text Aristotle’s Two Intellects: a Modest Proposal Victor Caston claims that Aristotle did not describe the activity, because there simply is no such activity and we should therefore identify nous poietikos with God, because God too does nothing. Trying to find this lacking description is like going on a wild goose chase – Caston argues. In my text I will show that his solution, albeit tempting, is in fact a kind of “dissolution” and that a wild goose chase, although for many doomed to failure, can be fruitful. I will do so by presenting three groups or clusters of views on active intellect which – I believe – are philosophically significant. Caston’s proposal will be one of them, but not the privileged one. These three types of interpretations will hopefully provide us with an imagery that will help us somewhat come to terms with Aristotle’s succinctness.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2014, 54; 79-126
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Tomaszowy argument „z blokowania” za niematerialnością działań intelektu.
Aquinas’s impediment argument for the immateriality of the intellect
Autorzy:
Zembrzuski, Michał
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452485.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
Tematy:
Tomasz z Akwinu
intelekt możnościowy
niematerialność intelektu
poznanie intelektualne
dusza i ciało
Thomas Aquinas
possible intellect
immateriality
intellectual cognition
soul and body
Opis:
Argument for spirituality of soul appears in a few places of Aquinas’ text and is sometimes called “the impediment argument”, “the argument for plasticity of intellect”, “the argument from common dimension”. The names differ as far as Thomas did not establish himself any name for his reasoning in this matter. There is no doubt that the argument derives from the Aristotelian On the soul, however, Aquinas does not develop it. The argument is present in four places and its most important presumptions would be summarized as follows: (1) man can cognize the nature of all bodies by his own intellect; (2) that what is able to cognize everything can not in itself have a nature of the cognized object – the nature of body would block a process of cognition; (3) it is impossible for the intellectual principle to be a body – it would not be possible for the principle of intellectual action to act through a bodily part; (4) the intellectual principle which is called the intellect or the mind acts per se does not contain any bodily involvement in its action. Hence, according to Aquinas, soul is something subsisting with regard to actions which are not the acts of body. However, this statement is disturbingly mistaken. In Summa, nevertheless, Thomas develops this issue further. In response to some objections he would emphasize that none of parts (as far as part is understood as a part of a whole) could not exist separately and act separately – neither soul nor body (as well as an eye or a hand). This is for the fact that soul is something subsisting (quod est) and inherited in matter (quo aliquid aliud est). Aquinas tries to explain the status of soul significantly, nevertheless left some questions open to make analysis on a whole human being possible, including body for which soul serves as a form. Thus, through the intellect we would observe a unique characteristic of human soul as a rational being.
Źródło:
Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2017, 6; 77-98
2300-1976
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Tomistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The Human Being as Body and Soul
Autorzy:
Long, Jeremy M.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1419271.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020-09-30
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Diecezjalne Adalbertinum
Tematy:
Being
Human
Hylemorphism
Immaterial
Intellect
Person
Personalism
Rational
Soul
Opis:
Under Hylemorphism, all composed beings are composed of form and matter. Accordingly, the human being is a unified substance of soul and body. Through the operations of a human being an immaterial power is manifested which demonstrates that the rational soul is immaterial and immortal. Through these elements of Thomistic metaphysics, a clear understanding of the person emerges as both in-itself and toward-others. After key metaphysical principles such as the principle of sufficient reason are defended, arguments against the thesis which claim the person is reducible to body or soul are rebuked and the Hylemorphic account is shown to stand. Leaning on the work of W. Norris Clarke, the person as body and soul is thus shown to be the frontier of being.
Źródło:
Studia Ełckie; 2020, 22, 3; 313-324
1896-6896
2353-1274
Pojawia się w:
Studia Ełckie
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Bыбранные pусские и польские фразеологизмы, связанные с безумием и недостатком интеллекта (мотивационно-семантический аспект)
Selected Russian and Polish phraseologisms connected with madness and the lack of intellect (the motivation and semantic aspect)
Autorzy:
Walczak, Maciej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2050895.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
Tematy:
phraseologism
proverb
madness
lack of intellect
semantics
motivation
Opis:
The article deals with the Russian and Polish phraseologisms including some proverbs and sayings describing madness and the lack of mind. The material has been presented with regard to dominating imaginations of madness and stupidity being displayed in the semantics of examined units. These units include – hitting, aside movement, the lack of sensitivity to outer stimuli, the fragmentation of entirety, lack of components, etc.
Źródło:
Linguistica Silesiana; 2018, 39; 315-326
0208-4228
Pojawia się w:
Linguistica Silesiana
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Religious Faith And The Types Of Rationality
Autorzy:
Jasiński, Karol
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/512133.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie
Tematy:
religious faith
instrumental reason
pluralism of rationality
substantial reason
intellect
Opis:
The purpose of this article is to determine the nature of religious faith and various types of rationality, with special emphasis on instrumental rationality, to characterise the link between faith and reason, and to reveal the insufficiency of instrumental reason in the sphere of faith. Instrumental reason is limited to the practical pursuits, which forces man to rely on a different type of mental activity in other spheres of life, such as religiousness. The paper is divided into three parts. The first section presents the nature of religious faith (religious faith as a psychological attitude of the followers and as a set of theses accepted in a given religion; existential and cognitive dimension of faith; the relationship between faith and revelation; assertion of religious truth). The second section outlines the nature of modern rationality (pluralism of rationality, its types, instrumental reason). The third section focuses on the relationship between religious faith and human reason (ratio, substantial reason, intellect).
Źródło:
Studia Theologica Varsaviensia; 2019, 57, 1; 9-32
0585-5594
Pojawia się w:
Studia Theologica Varsaviensia
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
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