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Tytuł:
Metamatematyczna interpretacja epistemologii (Jan Woleński, „Matematyka a epistemologia”)
Metamathematical Interpretation of Epistemology
Autorzy:
Tałasiewicz, Mieszko
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/963514.pdf
Data publikacji:
1994-03-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 1994, 2, 1; 103-110
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Epistemologia XX wieku: Przegląd stanowisk
Twentieth-century Epistemology: A Review of Standpoints
Autorzy:
Judycki, Stanisław
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2106963.pdf
Data publikacji:
1999
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Opis:
The paper seeks to make a review of the main standpoints and trends in the epistemology of the twentieth century. First, the problems of philosophical epistemology are discussed in the way as it is presented in the handbooks and monographs published in the 1980s and 1990s on philosophical epistemology. Then the three main currents of 20th-century epistemology have been distinguished: 1) the scientistic current in which the tasks of philosophical epistemology is to examine the grounds of scientific knowledge: here we find neo-Kantism and neopositivism; 2) the antiscientistic trend represented by phenomenology and neoscholasticism; 3) the philosophical trends which undermine a possibility for a purely rational relationship subject object by highlighting the non-rational factors which determine that relationship, e.g. social, historical, vital-psychological and other factors. Here we find the epistemology of Marxism and neo-Marxism, views on knowledge as regards hermeneutics, existentialists, personalists, the socalled philosophy of life. The analytic philosophy of knowledge after the Second World War and so-called naturalized theory of knowledge have been analyzed separately. The discussion takes into consideration, among other things, the following standpoints of: H. Cohen, E. Cassirer, E. Husserl, W. V. O. Quine, J. Habermas, J. Derrida, R. Rorty, L. Wittgenstein, and some main problems of contemporary epistemology: fundationalism, coherentionism, skepticism, internalism-externalism, issues concerning truth, realism and antirealism. Some broader epistemological consequences of the influential standpoints as regards the philosophy of science have been discussed here: K. Popper, T. S. Kuhn and P. K. Feyerabend. Finally, the author seeks to make a diagnosis concerning some possible directions of the development of epistemology in the twenty-first century.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 1999, 46-47, 1; 5-67
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Alvina I. Goldmana teoria wiedzy i uzasadnienia
Alvin I. Goldman’s theory of knowledge and justification
Autorzy:
Ziemińska, Renata
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2016134.pdf
Data publikacji:
2001
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
epistemologia
wiedza
uzasadnianie
naturalizm
reliabilizm
epistemology
knowledge
justification
naturalism
reliabilism
Opis:
A. Goldman proposes a softened version of the naturalistic epistemology connected with cognitive sciences. His theory of knowledge and justification belongs to the trend of extemalism and reliabilism. With reference to the Gettier problem Goldman (1967) suggests adding the condition of causal relation between belief and the fact concerned with the belief to the standard definition of knowledge. In (1976) he replaces the casual definition with the causalreliabilistic one: a true belief is knowledge if it is produced by reliable processes, that is by processes that generate true beliefs in the actual world and would generate them in relevant counter-factual situations (the concepts of relevant alternatives and knowledge as the ability to discriminate are involved here). In his recent works written on the basis of data from cognitive psychology Goldman goes beyond the Gettier problem: if knowledge is a prototype concept analysing it by means of necessary and sufficient conditions loses sense. Contrary to numerous externalists Goldman includes the traditional concept of justification in externalist epistemology. Justification of belief is a function of global reliability of the process that generated it, as reliability is in at least 50% the tendency of the process to generate true beliefs. Goldman's reliabilism struggles against (1) the problem of generality (how broad the definition of the types of processes that are supposed to be reliable may be); (2) the problem of the demon's world (the malicious demon's victims have the same foundations for their beliefs as we have, but still their beliefs are unjustified in the light of reliabilism as they are generated by unreliable processes); (3) the problem of clairvoyance (a reliable clairvoyant meets all the conditions of the reliabilistic theory of justification, and yet his beliefs are irrational): (4} the problem of the range of reliability (which possible worlds are relevant for justification). Responding to these problems Goldman first (1988) differentiates strong and weak justifications and then, changing his position to one of virtue reliabilism, he replaces reliability with what is considered reliable (1992b). By this very fact he agrees to the internalists' thesis saying that reliability is important for justification if it is accessible for the subject. However, Goldman means the collective subject (the community's opinions) and this is the basis for his externalism. He does not agree to subjectivism of the individual subject and he does not change the basic idea that epistemology should be close
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2001, 49, 1; 77-107
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
O klasycznym pojęciu prawdy
On the classical concept of truth
Autorzy:
Judycki, Stanisław
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2016132.pdf
Data publikacji:
2001
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
epistemologia
logika
prawda
sceptycyzm
antyrealizm
pragmatyzm
koherencjonizm
epistemology
logic
truth
scepticism
anti-realism
pragmatism
coherentionism
Opis:
The article presents the state of contemporary debate on the three fundamental theories of truth: classical (correspondence), coherentionist and pragmatist ones. Also A. Tarski’s conception o f truth, D. Davidson’s views on truth and the so-called deflationist conceptions are discussed. The author tries to show what relations occur between the pre-theoretical understanding o f the concept of truth and the classical concept of truth. Also the relation between the nature of truth and philosophical scepticism is discussed as well as the question: do sciences and technologies based on them need the classical concept of truth in order to account for the explanatory, prognostic and technological success they achieve. The article also discusses the position of the so-called anti-realism postulating replacing the concept of truth with e.g. the concept of ideal verification or the concept of objectivity. The opposition is considered between fundationalism and coherentionism and in this context the author tries to formulate an answer to the question of what the debate on the criterion of truth is concerned with. The conclusions drawn from all these considerations are the following. Despite the various attempts at discrediting or rejecting it the classical concept of truth is in a good theoretical condition. All sceptical positions have to assume this concept in one or another way; also no semantic programmes presented up to now (A. Tarski, D. Davidson) have been able to eliminate the classical concept of truth. Science and technology assume both the concept of truth in the classical sense and the characteristics that are connected with it. The classical understanding o f truth should be then recognised as one that cannot be eliminated from our conceptual paradigm we use to think about the world. The article is concluded with considerations on the metaphysical background of the classical concept of truth. The author formulates the thesis that there is a close relationship between the classical conception of truth and the position taken by metaphysical rationalism. In this context R. Descartes', G. W. Leibniz’s and I. Kant’s vies are discussed.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2001, 49, 1; 25-62
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Obiektywność percepcji zmysłowej
The objectivity of sense perception
Autorzy:
Smith, Barry
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2016133.pdf
Data publikacji:
2001
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
epistemologia
percepcja
obiektywność
środowisko
nisza ekologiczna
epistemology
perception
objectivity
environment
ecological niche
Opis:
There is an old problem in philosophy: the problem of how we pass from the mental theater of our representations to the external realm of concrete physical objects - from the "inner” to the "outer” . This problem arises against the background of representationalist theories of the relation between mind and its objects, theories that have taken different forms since Descartes, Kant, Helmholtz or Brentano. Representationalist theories of perception are marked by the following three features: 1. The perceiving subject is idealized. It is conceived as lying outside any context or environment and in abstraction from any goal-directed behavior. 2. Perception is seen as beginning with raw or bare sensations; then, by a process of inference or deliberation, there arise beliefs about external, physical objects. 3. Physical objects are assumed to be out there in the world, but to be inaccessible to direct experience. Our knowledge of them is indirect; it is the product of hypothesis and inference. This representationalist theory lives on in the computational theories of the mind and in doctrines of "methodological solipsism” embraced by much contemporary cognitive science. But the theory rests on a mistake. By making perception dependent on sensation, and by making sensations the direct objects of experience, it has matters exactly upside down. The paper draws on the ecological psychology of J. J. Gibson and Roger Barker in order to provide the metaphysical principles of a more adequate theory.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2001, 49, 1; 63-75
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Założenia i konsekwencje epistemologiczne eksplikacji formalnej pojęcia uzasadniania w szkole fińskiej
Assumptions and epistemological consequences of the formal explication of the concept of justification in the Finnish School
Autorzy:
Kawalec, Paweł
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2016136.pdf
Data publikacji:
2001
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
epistemologia
wiedza
indukcja
uzasadnienie
Carnap
epistemology
knowledge
induction
justification
Opis:
The common view on the program of the formal explication of the concept of confirmation, undertaken primarily by Carnap and the members of the Finnish School, is that it is irrelevant to epistemological debates on justification. In order to oppose this view I draw upon the features of Carnap’s early epistemological project expressed in Der logische Aufbau der Welt (1928). The key issue concerns the role of logic in epistemology, which in Carnap's own terms deviates from the one ascribed to it in the traditional program of logical empiricism, i.e. for Carnap logical structure is a precondition of objective epistemic relations between sentences. This view is inherited by the Finnish School, and the differences between theirs and Carnap's systems of inductive logic concern the type of theory of knowledge rather than theory of justification which in both cases is essentially identical.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2001, 49, 1; 109-126
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Epistemologia w dydaktyce fizyki Komisji Edukacji Narodowej
Epistemology in the teaching of physics by the Commission for National Education
Autorzy:
Janeczek, Stanisław
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2015979.pdf
Data publikacji:
2002
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
historia filozofii
nauki i oświaty
historia przyrodoznawstwa
historia fizyki
history of philosophy
science and education
natural history
history of physics
Opis:
The subject of the article is defining the specificity of broadly understood epistemology (theory of cognition, methodology of science) that could be seen in the teaching of physics at secondary schools (and partly also at universities) run by the Commission for National Education. It was the first European „ministry” of education, which worked in Poland in the years 1773-1795. Its specificity was defined by a new model of school directed to scientific rather than linguistic-humanist, and on a higher level − also than philosophical education. On the level of syllabuses it meant replacing lecturing Aristotelian philosophy of nature with phenomenalistic-mathematical natural science (mechanists), oriented to technical-economic practice (utilitarianism). The syllabuses declared so radical a break up − in the spirit of pre-positivism of The French Encyclopaedia − with traditional education that at secondary schools practically all the philosophical subjects were removed, apart from logic and ethics, and at universities logic was cancelled too. However, the teaching practice differed from the syllabus and organisational radicalism that was incomparable with any other education system functioning in Europe. In it numerous handbooks written in the circle of the so-called philosophia recentiorum were used. It joined the Aristotelian philosophy of nature with elements of modern natural history. Introduced into the secondary and university education in the whole of Europe in the first half of the 18th century, it broke the framework of the traditional philosophy syllabus. Also the handbooks of the Commission for National Education − like all of the eclectic school physics of the Enlightenment era − still contained philosophical elements, with the idea of justifying them inductively. However, at the same time numerous troubles appeared resulting from putting into effect the empirical-mathematical ideal of natural history. This was the result of shortage of instruments necessary for performing experiments, even on the didactic level that dominated over research work in the Polish science of that time. Also doubts were expressed as to the possibilities and range of applying the language of mathematics for defining the data obtained in experiments. This resulted from a low methodological level of natural science of that time that still had a describing-systematising character (natural history, partly also physics). Hence doubts appeared in defining the mathematical status of natural science, still treated as applied mathematics, or as an integral − sometimes even first-rate − element of physics. Especially development of mathematically defined mechanics and the possibilities of applying it in technology gave a higher prestige to reflection over technical--economic activity, which led to general acceptance of the ideal of applied science preferred at those times.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2002, 50, 1; 203-263
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Kłopoty z prawdą
Troubles with the truth
Autorzy:
Jadacki, Jacek Juliusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2015950.pdf
Data publikacji:
2002
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
epistemologia
logika
prawda
epistemology
logic
truth
Opis:
The article consists of two parts. In the first one the author, referring to Alfred Tarski's and Antoni B. Stępień's views and contesting them, presents his own definition of 'truth', changing his former views in this respect. The definition is constituted by the formula:(ε 0) /\x [x is true ≡ \/y∈R (x states y)],which may be read in the following way:a sentence is true if it states a certain real (occurring) state of things. The above definition is consistent with the so called (J)[adacki's] convention that, contrary to the so called (T)[arski's] convention avoids certain difficulties, e.g. possible entailing, through occurrence of an extra-linguistic state of things, existence of a respective true sentence. This definition also does not get entangled either in accepting purely intentional or negative state of things. Using the opportunity to do so the author proclaims himself in favour of the evidential criterion of truth, contradictory criterion of falsehood, and pragmatic criterion of faith. In the second part of the article the author replies to the questions concerning his theses that were put during the discussion 'in the company of Professor Stępień's pupils and his pupils' pupils. Especially he answers the charges and questions brought by Dr. Paweł Garbacz. They mainly focused on the problems of falsehood. The author admits two conceptions of falsehood: a false sentence does not state anything, or, a false sentence states a presented (fictitious) state of things.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2002, 50, 1; 193-201
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Metaphysical and Epistemplogical Presuppositions in Stephen Hawkings Interpretation of the Creation of the Universe
Metafizyczne i epistemologiczne założenia w Stephena Hawkinga ujęciu kreacji wszechświata
Autorzy:
Życiński, Józef M.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2015894.pdf
Data publikacji:
2002
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
czas
epistemologia
kosmologia kwantowa
kreacja
metafizyka
nicość
osobliwość
stworzenie
wszechświat
time
epistemology
quantum cosmology
creation
metaphysics
nothingness
peculiarity
creature
universe
Opis:
Artykuł przedstawia ewolucję poglądów Stephena Hawkinga dotyczącą kreacji wszechświata z nicości. Po przedstawieniu kosmologicznego kontekstu współczesnych koncepcji kreacji autor ukazuje kontrowersyjne tezy epistemologiczne i metafizyczne przyjęte w sposób ukryty przez Hawkinga. Ich status jest całkowicie niezależny od przyjmowanych interpretacji fizykalnych. W konsekwencji można przyjąć fizykę Hawkinga, odrzucając jego epistemologię i metafizykę. Podczas gdy na poziomie fizykalnym prace Hawkinga zawierają wiele interesujących idei, jego filozofia pozostaje arbitralna i naiwna. Można ją zastąpić znacznie bardziej krytycznym opracowaniem z zakresu filozofii, dlatego też propozycje Hawkinga dotyczące kreacji trzeba uznać za neutralne metafizycznie. W pracach późnego Hawkinga znajdujemy znacznie bardziej dojrzałe opracowania epistemologiczne. Jego słynne propozycje dotyczące stworzenia świata okazują się ostatecznie zgodne z teistyczną interpretacją kwantowej kreacji ex nihilo.
The article presents the evolution of Stephen Hawking's views on the creation of the universe from nothingness. After presenting the cosmological context of contemporary concepts of creation, the author presents controversial epistemological and metaphysical theses tacitly assumed byHawking. Their status is completely independent of the accepted physical interpretations. Consequently, one can accept Hawking's physics, while rejecting his epistemology and metaphysics. While Hawking's work contains many interesting ideas on a physical level, his philosophy remains arbitrary and naive. It can be replaced by a much more critical study of philosophy, and therefore Hawking's proposals for creation must be considered metaphysically neutral. In the work of the late Hawking we find much more mature epistemological studies. His famous proposals for the creation of the world prove ultimately to be in line with the theistic interpretation of the quantum creation ex nihilo.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2002, 50, 3; 109-133
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Poznanie i byt. Z epistemologii Wilfrida Sellarsa
Knowledge and being in the epistemology of Wilfrid Sellars
Autorzy:
Szubka, Tadeusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2015962.pdf
Data publikacji:
2002
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
epistemologia
poznanie
tomizm
W. Sellars
epistemology
cognition
Thomism
Opis:
Wilfrid Sellars very often expounds his philosophical views in an historical context. In his paper „Being and Being Known” Sellars gives a succinct account of his epistemology while at the same time discussing the Thomistic conception of sensory and intellectual knowledge. His aim in that paper is to provide a plausible interpretation of the doctrine that both the senses and the intellect are informed by the nature of external objects, and thus our cognitive acts are isomorphic with their objects. Sellars claims that there are two dimensions to that isomorphism, and that those separate dimensions are conflated by the Thomists, as well as by other philosophers. That is to say, there is isomorphism in the real or the natural order, and there is isomorphism in the intentional or the logical order. Sellars insists that in sensory cognition isomorphism holds merely in the real order. By contrast, intellectual knowledge is based upon the isomorphism of the intentional order. However, that isomorphism obtains in virtue of specific relations holding in the real order. Thus those two orders are intimately connected. Unfortunately, Sellars does not fully elaborate the nature of the connections between those two orders. I argue that in light of his commitment to ontological naturalism, Sellars should claim that ultimately there is only one isomorphism, namely the isomorphism in the real order. I suggest that his insistence that there are no genuine semantical relations holding between the elements of the intentional and the real supports such an interpretation.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2002, 50, 1; 439-457
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Problem prawdy w dziele sztuki
The problem of truth in the work of art
Autorzy:
Chudy, Wojciech
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2015953.pdf
Data publikacji:
2002
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
estetyka
epistemologia
wartość
prawda
aesthetics
epistemology
value
truth
Opis:
The text aims at considering from various points of view the presence of the value of truth in the work of art. The first step is a phenomenological analysis of epistemological, ontological and aesthetic phenomena connected with perception of the work of art. Its conclusion is the statement that truth belongs to the characteristics of both creation (contents, structure) and reception (cognition of various aspects) of the work. The very fact that the aesthetic value of the object claiming to be beautiful can be discussed proves the presence of the object on the rational-veritable plane. The next aspect undertaken in the article is concerned with the epistemological and methodological criticism of the view (represented here by R. Ingarden) that there is a radical difference between the objective domains of science and art. An attempt is made to show that the view is rooted rather in ideologically understood scientism and neo-positivism than in a realistic conception of cognition through art. In a completely realistic attitude the borderline between 'what is rationally cognised' and 'what is beautiful' (the sphere of quasi in Ingarden's meaning) is not an absolute borderline. The domain of the work of art also contains cognitive elements, often existentially and morally essential for man's life. As it appears, a similar position can be found in G. B. Vico's texts that proclaim the unity of poetic and metaphysical perspective in ancient beginnings of anthropological thought about the human world. Nowadays a methodological tendency is observed on the philosophical plane that allows joining the veritable and aesthetic aspects, and hence exploring the objective domain of art in the cognitive aspect. This is expressed today, among others, in the increase of the significance of art in social, cultural and scientific life.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2002, 50, 1; 45-71
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Trzy strategie dyskusji ze sceptycyzmem
Three strategies of debate with scepticism
Autorzy:
Ziemińska, Renata
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2015956.pdf
Data publikacji:
2002
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
epistemologia
sceptycyzm
filozofia współczesna
epistemology
scepticism
contemporary philosophy
Opis:
In debate with scepticism three general strategies may be differentiated: (1) pointing to self-refutation of scepticism; (2) looking for certainty; and (3) modification of the concept of knowledge. The latter strategy has at least three versions: (a) knowledge does not require certainty, (b) knowledge is not broadened by way of deduction, and (c) knowledge does not require the knowledge of knowledge. The first strategy refutes global scepticism, but does not give an example of knowledge and is not efficient in the case of scepticism based on the hypothesis of the malicious scientist. Also the second strategy is only able to refute the typical thesis of global scepticism (knowledge does not exist). Scepticism based on the hypothesis of the malicious scientist is more efficiently refuted in the third strategy. However, separation of knowledge and certainty is only avoiding the problem of scepticism. It is also doubtful if the principle of broadening knowledge by way of deduction may be refuted. Negation of the principle of transparency of knowledge is the most convincing one. After it is refuted, knowledge is possible in the situation when we do not know if we know and we cannot exclude sceptical hypotheses.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2002, 50, 1; 575-595
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
O cenności racjonalności w wierze religijnej
On how Precious Rationality is in Religious Cognition
Autorzy:
Pepliński, Marek
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2015839.pdf
Data publikacji:
2003
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
epistemologia
racjonalność
przekonania religijne
epistemology
rationality
religious belief
Opis:
The issue of rationality of religious beliefs belongs to the main problems of 20th century philosophy of religion. When posing this problem the term `rationality' is often used in a way that is not precise, and sometimes it seems to be ambiguous. In order to avoid this error I define rationality of acceptance regulatively as a property consisting in being in accordance with defined epistemic rules of the ethics of beliefs. The main rule that is taken into consideration here is the following requirement: `Each theorem p accepted by person S should be justifiable by her in a degree proportional to the degree of assertion with which he accepts p'. Acceptances having the property of so defined rationality belong to a broader class of reasonable acts, where rationality is understood as a property consisting in being a reliable use of human cognitive abilities. I claim that although the religious faith of a `common' Christian is not rational in this sense, as mysteries of faith are not justifiable by natural reason, it has a reasonable character and is precious from the epistemic point of view. I defend the proposition that the fact of not being rational in this particular sense does not involve irrationality that consists in breaking the rule that orders a change in the way of accepting a certain theorem p so as to adjust the degree of assertion to the justification one has, the borderline case being one of rejecting the theorem for which one does not have any epistemically valid justification. The proposition that one of these rules is obligatory for the believer with respect to his acceptance of the propositions of faith cannot be justified without stating that Christianity is false. This latter proposition cannot be proved philosophically.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2003, 51, 1; 219-244
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Zagadka naturalizmu
The Puzzle of Naturalism
Autorzy:
Judycki, Stanisław
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2015793.pdf
Data publikacji:
2003
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
naturalizm
epistemologia
filozofia umysłu
teizm
naturalism
epistemology
philosophy of the mind
theism
Opis:
Naturalism is a philosophical doctrine assuming that all that exists is natural, that is, that there are no spiritual realities, no purely spiritual substances, no supernatural beings, transcendent in relation to the world. In epistemology it is said that no correct and convincing arguments can be formulated for existence of this kind of objects. The general thesis of naturalism is concerned with a discussion on theism and atheism, a discussion on the ontological status of the human mind, a discussion coming from the area of philosophy of biology, from the area of ethics and axiology, and even a discussion of the issue of how the objects of formal sciences exist. Naturalism is rather a conclusion from accumulation of arguments from various branches of knowledge than a self-dependent philosophical conviction. In the course of the considerations the following issues will be dealt with: historical background of naturalism, ontological and methodological naturalism, naturalism in axiology, epistemology, in social sciences and philosophy of the mind, relations between naturalism and physicalism, materialism, emergentism and functionalism. Opponents of naturalism usually try to show that within one or another branch of knowledge naturalism cannot be maintained, and on this basis they assume that naturalism as awhole is false. In the present considerations a different method of anti-naturalist argumentation has been used, namely, a fictitious thesis has been accepted, that as result of future development of scientific knowledge naturalism in all the branches will be considered as a convincing point of view and will be generally accepted. The phrase „puzzle of naturalism” used in the title is supposed to suggest that even in such a situation the general thesis of naturalism will not result from acceptance of particular naturalisms in all branches of knowledge. In other words, conceivable complete explanative successes achieved in particular branches of knowledge will not give the right to draw a general naturalistic conclusion. Hence the thesis of auniversal naturalism will remain puzzling.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2003, 51, 3; 19-39
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Charlesa S. Peirce’a krytyka epistemologii kartezjańskiej. U źródeł filozofii współczesnej
Charles S. Peirce’s Critique of Cartesian Epistemology. At the Origins of Contemporary Philosophy
Autorzy:
Gutowski, Piotr
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2015645.pdf
Data publikacji:
2004
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
Kartezjusz
Ch. S. Peirce
epistemologia
sceptycyzm
wiedza
nauka
fallibilizm
Descartes
epistemology
scepticism
knowledge
science
fallibilism
Opis:
The paper presents Ch. S. Peirce's attack on Cartesian epistemology as it was formulated in 1868 article Some Consequences of Four Incapacities. Peirce's arguments are analyzed in the context of possible Descartes' responses. One conclusion of the paper is that Peirce uses two different notions of knowledge and science, and that the distance of his ideas from that of Descartes depends, among others, on which notion we take into account. Another conclusion is that although Peirce's general project of combining falibilism and anti-scepticism looks very attractive (especially in the light of what we now know about the development of science) it generates many problems that Descartes could have pointed out if he had a chance to talk to his two and a half century younger debater. Despite, however, the problems Peircean project generates, it may be regarerd as a forerunner of typical tendencies of 20th century philosophy such as e.g. fallibilism or antifoundationalism.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2004, 52, 2; 171-188
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Wyświetlanie 1-15 z 171

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