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Tytuł:
Meaning Scepticism
Autorzy:
Szubka, Tadeusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1918907.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020-10-27
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 1994, 42, 1; 240-243
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Trzy strategie dyskusji ze sceptycyzmem
Three strategies of debate with scepticism
Autorzy:
Ziemińska, Renata
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2015956.pdf
Data publikacji:
2002
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
epistemologia
sceptycyzm
filozofia współczesna
epistemology
scepticism
contemporary philosophy
Opis:
In debate with scepticism three general strategies may be differentiated: (1) pointing to self-refutation of scepticism; (2) looking for certainty; and (3) modification of the concept of knowledge. The latter strategy has at least three versions: (a) knowledge does not require certainty, (b) knowledge is not broadened by way of deduction, and (c) knowledge does not require the knowledge of knowledge. The first strategy refutes global scepticism, but does not give an example of knowledge and is not efficient in the case of scepticism based on the hypothesis of the malicious scientist. Also the second strategy is only able to refute the typical thesis of global scepticism (knowledge does not exist). Scepticism based on the hypothesis of the malicious scientist is more efficiently refuted in the third strategy. However, separation of knowledge and certainty is only avoiding the problem of scepticism. It is also doubtful if the principle of broadening knowledge by way of deduction may be refuted. Negation of the principle of transparency of knowledge is the most convincing one. After it is refuted, knowledge is possible in the situation when we do not know if we know and we cannot exclude sceptical hypotheses.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2002, 50, 1; 575-595
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Superroznosiciele wątpliwości. Sceptycyzm i teorie spiskowe w dobie koronawirusa
Super-spreaders of doubts. Scepticism and conspiracy theories in the times of coronavirus
Autorzy:
Wróblewski, Michał
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1849719.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020-12-30
Wydawca:
Instytut Dyskursu i Dialogu
Tematy:
pandemia
teorie spiskowe
sprzedawcy wątpliwości
sceptycyzm
pandemic
conspiracy theories
merchants of doubts
scepticism
Opis:
W artykule używając metafory superreroznosiciela zanalizowano zjawisko rozprzestrzeniania się sceptycyzmu wobec nauki i ekspertyzy medycznej. Autor chce pokazać, że w debacie na temat koronawirusa konkretni aktorzy przyczyniają się do utrwalania negatywnych przekonań na temat samego wirusa, jak i sposobów jego okiełznania. W pierwszej części tekstu przywołane zostały wcześniejsze przypadki teorii spiskowych i prób delegitymizowania wiedzy medycznej, pokazując, że są to dość częste reakcje na epidemie. W drugiej natomiast dokonano analizy wypowiedzi medialnych polityków Konfederacji związanych z pandemią Sars-Cov-2, by pokazać, dlaczego odgrywają oni rolę tytułowych superroznosicieli wątpliwości.
In the article, using the metaphor of a super-spreader, the phenomenon of spreading scepticism about science and medical expertise was analysed. The author wants to show that in the debate on the coronavirus, specific actors contribute to the dissemination of negative beliefs about the virus. In the first part of the text, earlier cases of conspiracy theories and attempts to delegitimize medical knowledge are mentioned, showing that these are quite frequent reactions to epidemics. The second part of the text analyzes the statements made by politicians related to the Sars-Cov-2 pandemic in order to show why they play the role of the super-spreaders of doubts.
Źródło:
Dyskurs & Dialog; 2020, II, 4 (6); 23-41
2658-2368
2658-2406
Pojawia się w:
Dyskurs & Dialog
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Próby de Montaigne’a, czyli apologia życia prywatnego
Autorzy:
Waśkiewicz, Andrzej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2188283.pdf
Data publikacji:
2022-10-24
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. Komisji Edukacji Narodowej w Krakowie. Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii
Tematy:
Renaissance scepticism
political disengagement
individualism
friendship
Opis:
De Montaigne’s Essays, or the apology of private life: The paper presents Michel de Montaigne’s Essays as an apology of his life on the margin of society. Montaigne lives at the time of a civil war in which he refuses to take sides; accordingly, the only thing that he absolutely expects from national government is for it to guarantee peace in the realm. His expectations of the institutional Church are similarly minimalist. Universally respected laws should safeguard public order; all those who invoke philosophical wisdom or religious revelation do is destroy that order. The truly wise ancient philosophers lived outside the polis, aware that it is not reason but common sense that forms its foundation. Having no competences to run a polity, the philosopher has no particular obligations toward it, either. And yet, even with his sceptical philosophy and egocentric personality, Montaigne does not shut himself in an ivory tower, but merely protects his privacy, the right to devote his time to himself. As any philosopher, he highly treasures friendship, which he regards as an intimate relationship, a communion of two souls merged into one. Nonetheless, he needs other people, too, even if it is only to share his thoughts with them: he needs their judgment on his own reflection. He presents this reflection in the Essays in a novel way, drawing the attention to himself, something for which he does not intend to explain himself. For he regards stupidity, including his own stupidity, as a natural human vice; his essays are designed to protect him against it, and him alone, as he will not embark on a crusade against stupidity of others. He does not make his life part of any great narrative: he lives for himself, but he does not argue that the readers of the Essays should imitate him in that. For Montaigne consistently avoids any kind of categorical moralising or viewing human life in terms of obligations.
Źródło:
ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal; 2022, 12, 1; 11-26
2083-6635
2084-1043
Pojawia się w:
ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Zagadnienie sceptycyzmu w kontekście wpływu myśli Locke’a na filozofię Berkeleya
Scepticism and the Influence of the Lockean Thought on Berkeley’s Philosophy
Autorzy:
Szałek, Piotr K.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2012927.pdf
Data publikacji:
2010
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
J. Locke
G. Berkeley
istnienie
materia
korpuskularyzm
sceptycyzm
percepcja
existence
matter
corpuscularism
scepticism
perception
Opis:
The paper seeks to answer the question about the actual influence of the Lockean thought on Berkeley’s philosophy. It promotes the view that though scepticism that arises from the representational theory of perception is an important factor for motivating Berkeley to built his anti-sceptical strategy, it is the so-called corpuscular scepticism that was in fact an essential element of this influence. The latter was a consequence of assuming the notion of corpuscular, yet unknown material substance by Locke, and motivated Berkeley to consider an argument for rejection of the existence of such substance. The Berkeleian anti-sceptical argument here seems congenial to the Cartesian origins of his definition of existence, and enables us to combine the Lockean perspective with the Cartesian reading of sources of Berkeley’s philosophy.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2010, 58, 1; 229-246
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
O rozwoju realizmu naukowego jako selektywnego sceptycyzmu
On the Evolution of Scientific Realism as Selective Scepticism
Autorzy:
Kotowski, Mateusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/967236.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014-09-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:
The article discusses the evolution which scientific realism underwent within the last thirty years. It is argued that this evolution was to a large extent fuelled by at-tempts at arriving at a formulation of realism which would be immune to the pessi-mistic induction argument. The argument, whose most influential formulation is due to Laudan, is targeted at any version of realism about theories understood as unified wholes. The central claim defended in the article is that, although pessimistic induc-tion was presented as a confutation of scientific realism, it has had a very positive effect on the evolution of realistic positions. It is because it has forced realists to limit their claims and, at the same time, to make them more subtle and precise. As a con-sequence, some realists ceased to defend realism as an attitude towards whole theo-ries (or whole scientific knowledge) and tried to distinguish the parts of theories which realist should be committed to as approximate descriptions of the unobservable (and at the same time as the most stable aspects of scientific knowledge) from the parts they should be sceptical about. Any form of realism which makes use of such a strategy may be referred to as selective scepticism. Although the initial attempts at adopting selective scepticism (exemplified by the conceptions of Hacking and Worrall) proved to be problematic, the most recent proposal - Chakravartty’s semirealism, with its commitment to concrete structures - seems to have achieved the general goal and allowed realists to dismiss the problems connected with pessi-mistic induction.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2014, 22, 3; 105-123
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Dlaczego Popper nie był kryptoindukcjonistą
Autorzy:
Sajdek, Zofia
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/429115.pdf
Data publikacji:
2012
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Papieski Jana Pawła II w Krakowie
Tematy:
Karl Popper
David Hume
Rudolf Carnap
John Watkins
induction
verisimilitude
truthlikeness
probability
corroboration
confirmation
scepticism
Opis:
The article is an attempt to answer the question whether the result of the connection between corroboration and verisimilitude is an inductive element in the Popperian methodology. For this purpose the essay collates Karl Popper’s view with David Hume’s scepticism and inductionism of Rudolf Carnap. Further on the paper analizes the compromising”(for inductionism and critical falsificationism) proposition of Evaldas Nekraˇsas. The article also contains a presentation of Imre Lakatos’ allegation of Popper’s scepticism and the accusation of inductionism as formulated by John Watkins. The study of the disputes between the philosophers leads to the conclusion that the critical views are baseless. The final hypothesis is that these are not the right ways of proving the allegations of crypto-inductionism.
Źródło:
Semina Scientiarum; 2012, 11
1644-3365
Pojawia się w:
Semina Scientiarum
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Praktyczny sceptycyzm
Practical Scepticism (the quotation of Gary Malinas paper)
Autorzy:
Malinas, Gary
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2015803.pdf
Data publikacji:
2003
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
wolne działanie
odpowiedzialność
usprawiedliwienie
presupozycja
free agency
responsibility
excuses
presupposition
Opis:
In Section 2 of his paper (which follows the introductory section) Gary Malinas „summarises three arguments that have been advanced in recent discussions of free agency and responsibility. The first concludes that free agency and responsibility are incompatible with determinism. The second concludes that free agency and responsibility are incompatible with indeterminism. The third concludes that the concept of a free and responsible agent is incoherent. Taken collectively, they entail the conclusion of the practical sceptic: No one acts freely and responsibly. If the summary case can be filled out so that it is sound, it undercuts a number of the commitments of the thick conception of persons the fulfilment of which, arguably, is required for free and responsible action. I believe that the summary case can be filled out so that it is sound. I will adopt this belief as an unargued assumption. It entails that no one acts freely and is truly responsible for their actions. I also believe that it is true that people act freely and responsibly. Once the case for practical scepticism has been put, I devote the remainder of this paper to the vindication of this latter belief. My claim is that practical scepticism is sound, yet nevertheless, it is also true that people act freely and responsibly. The onus of the vindication will be to disarm what appears to be an explicit contradiction. Section 3 proposes a definition of free and responsible action in terms of the concept of exculpation. It argues that judgements concerning agents' responsibility for their actions are often true under the presuppositions which are in place in the settings in which the judgements are made. Those presuppositions restrict the domains over which the judgements are semantically evaluated. The practical sceptic contests those presuppositions and thereby alters the domain of semantic evaluation. Under the influence of sceptical argumentation, possibilities of exculpation which had been properly ignored can no longer be ignored. Section 4 sketches an account of presupposing and when exculpatory possibilities are properly ignored. Section 5 considers the question of whether I have conceded too much to the practical sceptic”.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2003, 51, 2; 103-125
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Search for knowledge and professional scepticism of accounting students – an experimental study
Autorzy:
Ciołek, Maciej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/582953.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu
Tematy:
auditing
search for knowledge
accounting students
experimental study
HPSS
Opis:
The purpose of this study is to examine whether university accounting programs shape such ‘search for knowledge’ trait in significantly more effective comparing other university programs in the field of economy. For this purpose I conducted an experimental study using Hurtt Professional Skepticism Scale – HPSS which is one of the most recognized skepticism measures. I surveyed 432 students of Poznań University of Economics who follow either accounting program or management program (control group). The results showed that only programs in accounting increased the mean level of ‘search for knowledge’ trait significantly comparing to management program. The robustness analysis showed that gender, professional experience and length of service had no statistically significant impact on results.
Źródło:
Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu; 2018, 515; 243-256
1899-3192
Pojawia się w:
Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Profesjonalny osąd i sceptycyzm zawodowy - ocena dowodów w postępowaniu kontrolnym NIK
Professional Judgment and Professional Scepticism as Basis for Evaluating Evidence – NIK Audit Proceedings
Autorzy:
Dziwisz, Stanisław
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/31343644.pdf
Data publikacji:
2024-02
Wydawca:
Najwyższa Izba Kontroli
Tematy:
sceptycyzm zawodowy
profesjonalny osąd
ocena dowodów
cechy dowodów
professional scepticism
professional judgment
evidence assessment
features of evidence
Opis:
W artykule zaprezentowano rozważania dotyczące profesjonalnego osądu i sceptycyzmu zawodowego, które są niezbędne przy ocenie dowodów w postępowaniach kontrolnych NIK. Szerszemu spojrzeniu na zagadnienie służy przedstawienie odpowiednich standardów kontroli administracji rządowej i standardów rewizji finansowej oraz regulacji ustawowych poświęconych pracy biegłych rewidentów. Przybliżając rozumienie sceptycyzmu zawodowego i profesjonalnego osądu oraz możliwości ich zastosowania, zwrócono uwagę na konieczność zachowania obiektywizmu, podnoszenia wiedzy specjalistycznej i prawidłowej komunikacji pomiędzy kontrolerami.
Professional judgment and professional scepticism are applied at all stages of the audit process. Already at the audit planning phase, they allow for identifying and assessing audit risk, and – consequently – for planning appropriately directed activities. However, the article focuses on using them for evidence assessment, so at the diagnostic stage of an audit, which consists in analysing the material gathered, and subsequently leads to determining the actual state and irregularities in auditees’ activities. This stage is the key element of the audit function aimed at determining whether auditees perform their tasks in the way they are expected to. Without solid assessment of evidence, it is not possible to properly implement the audit proceedings set forth in Article 28 of the Act of 23rd December 1994 on the Supreme Audit Office, which comprises all the components of the audit function, understood as a process realised on the basis of a series of activities, starting from determining the actual state (what things are like), through documenting in (evidence collection), to concluding with an assessment (compare the findings with the expected state – a model for the audit).
Źródło:
Kontrola Państwowa; 2024, 69, 1 (414); 28-43
0452-5027
Pojawia się w:
Kontrola Państwowa
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
O klasycznym pojęciu prawdy
On the classical concept of truth
Autorzy:
Judycki, Stanisław
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2016132.pdf
Data publikacji:
2001
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
epistemologia
logika
prawda
sceptycyzm
antyrealizm
pragmatyzm
koherencjonizm
epistemology
logic
truth
scepticism
anti-realism
pragmatism
coherentionism
Opis:
The article presents the state of contemporary debate on the three fundamental theories of truth: classical (correspondence), coherentionist and pragmatist ones. Also A. Tarski’s conception o f truth, D. Davidson’s views on truth and the so-called deflationist conceptions are discussed. The author tries to show what relations occur between the pre-theoretical understanding o f the concept of truth and the classical concept of truth. Also the relation between the nature of truth and philosophical scepticism is discussed as well as the question: do sciences and technologies based on them need the classical concept of truth in order to account for the explanatory, prognostic and technological success they achieve. The article also discusses the position of the so-called anti-realism postulating replacing the concept of truth with e.g. the concept of ideal verification or the concept of objectivity. The opposition is considered between fundationalism and coherentionism and in this context the author tries to formulate an answer to the question of what the debate on the criterion of truth is concerned with. The conclusions drawn from all these considerations are the following. Despite the various attempts at discrediting or rejecting it the classical concept of truth is in a good theoretical condition. All sceptical positions have to assume this concept in one or another way; also no semantic programmes presented up to now (A. Tarski, D. Davidson) have been able to eliminate the classical concept of truth. Science and technology assume both the concept of truth in the classical sense and the characteristics that are connected with it. The classical understanding o f truth should be then recognised as one that cannot be eliminated from our conceptual paradigm we use to think about the world. The article is concluded with considerations on the metaphysical background of the classical concept of truth. The author formulates the thesis that there is a close relationship between the classical conception of truth and the position taken by metaphysical rationalism. In this context R. Descartes', G. W. Leibniz’s and I. Kant’s vies are discussed.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2001, 49, 1; 25-62
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Anti-scepticism for four hands (W. Lycan, On Evidence in Philosophy, Oxford 2019)
Recenzje: Antysceptycyzm na cztery ręce (W. Lycan, On Evidence in Philosophy, Oxford 2019)
Autorzy:
Gębura, Błażej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2029492.pdf
Data publikacji:
2021
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
Źródło:
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria; 2021, 3; 127-130
1230-1493
Pojawia się w:
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Pismo jako środek obiektywizacji języka i poznania
Writing as a Tool for Objectification Language and Cognition
Autorzy:
Trybulec, Marcin
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/577304.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
Tematy:
sceptycyzm Wittgensteina
relacja epistemiczna
wiedza metajęzykowa
język pisany
język mówiony
obiektywizacja
Wittgenstein’s scepticism
epistemic relation
metalinguistic knowledge
written language
spoken language
objectification
Opis:
Artykuł odpowiada na pytanie, w jaki sposób pismo, dzięki procesowi obiektywizacji języka, przyczynia się do obiektywizacji znaczeń. Proces ten opisany zostanie na przykładzie antropologii słowa E. Havelocka i psychologii piśmienności D. Olsona. Przedstawione funkcje pisma w wyłonieniu się świadomości metajęzykowej i ukonstytuowaniu relacji poznawczej wskazują, że nie każdy rodzaj zewnętrznych reprezentacji, jak sugeruje Wittgenstein, jest równie użyteczny w procesie obiektywizacji znaczeń.
The paper answers the question, how writing, in virtue of the process of language objectifi cation, contributes to objectifi cation of meaning. This processes are described by appealing to E. Havelock’s anthropology of the word and by D. Olson’s psychology of literacy. Writing contributes to metaliguistic awareness and constitute epistemic relation. This suggest that not every kind of external representations is equally suited to contribute to the process of objectifi cation of meaning.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa; 2015, 51, 2(204); 183-190
0044-1619
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
O typach kawy. Kontekstualizm DeRose’a jako strategia antysceptycka (On types of coffee. DeRoses contextualism as an anti-sceptical strategy)
On Types of Coffee. DeRoses contextualism as an anti-sceptical strategy
Autorzy:
Szubart, Tomasz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1621871.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Szczeciński. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego
Tematy:
scepticism
invariantism
contextualism
knowledge
sceptycyzm
inwariantyzm
kontekstualizm
wiedza
Opis:
Teoria kontekstualizmu semantycznego, chociaż pierwotnie jest to teoria z dziedziny filozofii języka, bywa często wykorzystywana jako element strategii rozwiązywania problemów w pozostałych dziedzinach filozofii, w tym epistemologii. Wedle kontekstualizmu epistemologicznego, znaczenie słowa „wiem” zmienia się wraz z kontekstem jego wypowiedzenia. Celem tego artykułu jest krytyczna analiza kontekstualizmu Keitha DeRose’a w celu sprawdzenia do jakiego stopnia dostarcza on dobrej strategii antysceptyckiej. Argumentuję, że pomimo, iż teoria ta jest dobrym rywalem dla sceptycyzmu globalnego i Ungerowskiego, przyjęcie jej nie prowadzi jednak do odrzucenia innych wariantów klasycznego sceptycyzmu.
Semantic contextualism is often used in order to offer solutions for problems in other branches of philosophy, including epistemology. One of such attempts is epistemic contextualism, according to which the semantic value of the word “knows” changes with the context of its utterance. The aim of this paper is to critically investigate Keith DeRose’s contextualism to see up to what extent does it provide a valid anti-sceptical strategy. I argue that while it can be seen as a good rival for global and Ungerian scepticism, it does not lead to the refutation of other variants of classical scepticism.
Źródło:
Analiza i Egzystencja; 2018, 44; 61-81
1734-9923
2300-7621
Pojawia się w:
Analiza i Egzystencja
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Charlesa S. Peirce’a krytyka epistemologii kartezjańskiej. U źródeł filozofii współczesnej
Charles S. Peirce’s Critique of Cartesian Epistemology. At the Origins of Contemporary Philosophy
Autorzy:
Gutowski, Piotr
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2015645.pdf
Data publikacji:
2004
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
Kartezjusz
Ch. S. Peirce
epistemologia
sceptycyzm
wiedza
nauka
fallibilizm
Descartes
epistemology
scepticism
knowledge
science
fallibilism
Opis:
The paper presents Ch. S. Peirce's attack on Cartesian epistemology as it was formulated in 1868 article Some Consequences of Four Incapacities. Peirce's arguments are analyzed in the context of possible Descartes' responses. One conclusion of the paper is that Peirce uses two different notions of knowledge and science, and that the distance of his ideas from that of Descartes depends, among others, on which notion we take into account. Another conclusion is that although Peirce's general project of combining falibilism and anti-scepticism looks very attractive (especially in the light of what we now know about the development of science) it generates many problems that Descartes could have pointed out if he had a chance to talk to his two and a half century younger debater. Despite, however, the problems Peircean project generates, it may be regarerd as a forerunner of typical tendencies of 20th century philosophy such as e.g. fallibilism or antifoundationalism.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2004, 52, 2; 171-188
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Wyświetlanie 1-15 z 18

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