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    Wyświetlanie 1-9 z 9
    Tytuł:
    Improving the Game Approach to Fuzzy Madm
    Autorzy:
    Larbani, Moussa
    Chen, Yuh-Wen
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/578604.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2014
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Katowicach
    Tematy:
    Zakres fuzzy
    Gra przeciwko naturze
    Równowaga Nash
    Fuzzy MADM
    Fuzzy interval
    Game against Nature
    Nash equilibrium
    Opis:
    In the FSS paper 157 (2005, p. 34-51) we presented a game approach for solving MADM problems with fuzzy decision matrix. The results of the paper essentially depend on the assumption that the entries of the fuzzy decision matrix are triangular fuzzy numbers and dependent via a real parameter \lambda. In this paper we present a more general game approach for solving fuzzy MADM problems free of these restrictions. The entries of the decision matrix are assumed to be not necessarily dependent fuzzy intervals with bounded support as defined by Dubois and Prade.
    Źródło:
    Multiple Criteria Decision Making; 2014, 9; 58-71
    2084-1531
    Pojawia się w:
    Multiple Criteria Decision Making
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Common-Knowledge and Bayesian Equilibrium in Network Game
    Mądrość zespołowa a równowaga bayesowska w grach sieciowych
    Autorzy:
    Matsuhisa, Takashi
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/953385.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2018
    Wydawca:
    Polskie Towarzystwo Matematyczne
    Tematy:
    bayesian routing game
    common-knowledge
    conjecture
    expected delay equilibrium
    expected price of anarchy
    information partition
    nash
    equilibrium
    rational expectations equilibrium
    social costs
    tworzenie partnerstwa
    gra dynamiczne
    równowaga nash
    problem
    stopowania
    Opis:
    In this paper we investigate equilibriums in the Bayesian routing problem of the network game introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999).We treat epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium of social costs function in the network game. It highlights the role of common-knowledge on the users' individual conjectures on the others' selections of channels in the network game. Especially two notions of equilibria are presented in the Bayesian extension of the network game; expected delay equilibrium and rational expectations equilibrium. The former equilibrium is given such as each user minimizes own expectations of delay, and the latter is given as he/she maximizes own expectations of a social costs. We show that the equilibria have the properties: If all users commonly know them, then the former equilibrium yields a Nash equilibrium in the based KP-model and the latter equilibrium yields a Nash equilibrium for social costs in the network game. Further we introduce the extended notions of price of anarchy in the Bayesian network game for rational expectations equilibriums for social costs, named the expected price of anarchy and the common-knowledge price of anarchy. We will examine the relationship among the two extended price of anarchy and the classical notion of price of anarchy introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou(1999).
    Źródło:
    Mathematica Applicanda; 2018, 46, 2
    1730-2668
    2299-4009
    Pojawia się w:
    Mathematica Applicanda
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    On nonzero-sum stopping game related to discrete risk processes
    Autorzy:
    Bobecka, K.
    Ferenstein, E.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/205836.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2001
    Wydawca:
    Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Badań Systemowych PAN
    Tematy:
    gra stopująca
    proces ryzyka
    równowaga Nasha
    Nash equilibrium
    risk process
    stopping game
    Opis:
    We consider two-person nonzero-sum stopping game. The players (insurers) observe discrete time risk processes until one of them decides to stop his process. Strategies of the players are stopping times. The aim of each player is to maximize his expected gain. We find Nash equilibrium point for this game under certain assumptions on reward sequences.
    Źródło:
    Control and Cybernetics; 2001, 30, 3; 339-354
    0324-8569
    Pojawia się w:
    Control and Cybernetics
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Nash equilibrium design and price-based coordination in hierarchical systems
    Autorzy:
    Karpowicz, M. P.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/331251.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2012
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Zielonogórski. Oficyna Wydawnicza
    Tematy:
    równowaga Nasha
    system hierarchiczny
    sterowanie rozproszone
    Nash equilibrium
    coordination in hierarchical systems
    decentralized control
    asymmetric information
    Opis:
    This paper deals with the problem of designing Nash equilibrium points in noncooperative games in which agents anticipate values of Lagrange multipliers coordinating their payoff functions. The addressed model of agents' interactions, referred to as the price-anticipation game, is studied within the framework of coordination and mechanism design theory for hierarchical systems. Sufficient conditions are formulated for Nash implementation of a regular and isolated solution to a coordination problem. An equilibrium design procedure is proposed and applied as an analytic tool in a study of mechanism design games. In the setting considered the well-known fact is demonstrated that gains from reaching a desired solution to a coordination problem in a Nash equilibrium point need not balance the overall costs of its implementation. However, it is also demonstrated how these costs can be distributed among the agents and related to the particular organization of interactions in the system. Finally, application of the developed framework in the field of Internet traffic engineering is presented.
    Źródło:
    International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science; 2012, 22, 4; 951-969
    1641-876X
    2083-8492
    Pojawia się w:
    International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    A Large Population Partnership Formation Game with Associative Preferences and Continuous Time
    Gra o typie wyboru partnera z kontinuum graczy, preferencjami homotypowymi oraz czasem ciągłym
    Autorzy:
    Ramsey, David Mark
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/953347.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2018
    Wydawca:
    Polskie Towarzystwo Matematyczne
    Tematy:
    dynamic game
    nash equilibrium
    stopping problem
    partnership formation
    tworzenie partnerstwa
    gra dynamiczne
    równowaga nasha
    problem
    stopowania
    Opis:
     A model of partnership formation is considered in which there are two classes of player (called male and female). There is a continuum of players and two types of both sexes. These two types can be interpreted, e.g. as two subspecies, and each searcher prefers to pair with an individual of the same type. Players begin searching at time zero and search until they find a mutually acceptable prospective partner or the mating season ends. When a pair is formed, both individuals leave the pool of searchers. Hence, the proportion of players still searching and the distribution of types changes over time. Prospective partners are found at a rate which is non- decreasing the proportion of players still searching. Nash equilibria are derived which satisfy the following optimality criterion: each searcher accepts a prospective partner if and only if the reward from such a partnership is greater or equal to the expected reward obtained from future search. So called ”completely symmetric” versions of this game are considered, where the two types of player are equally frequent. A unique Nash equilibrium exists regardless of the precise rule determining the rate at which prospective partners are found. Two examples are given. 
    Źródło:
    Mathematica Applicanda; 2018, 46, 2
    1730-2668
    2299-4009
    Pojawia się w:
    Mathematica Applicanda
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    A symbolic shortest path algorithm for computing subgame-perfect Nash equilibria
    Autorzy:
    Góngora, P. A
    Rosenblueth, D. A.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/329934.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2015
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Zielonogórski. Oficyna Wydawnicza
    Tematy:
    shortest path
    Bellman–Ford algorithm
    Nash equilibrium
    BDD
    model checking
    najkrótsza ścieżka
    równowaga Nasha
    sprawdzanie modelu
    Opis:
    Consider games where players wish to minimize the cost to reach some state. A subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium can be regarded as a collection of optimal paths on such games. Similarly, the well-known state-labeling algorithm used in model checking can be viewed as computing optimal paths on a Kripke structure, where each path has a minimum number of transitions. We exploit these similarities in a common generalization of extensive games and Kripke structures that we name “graph games”. By extending the Bellman–Ford algorithm for computing shortest paths, we obtain a model-checking algorithm for graph games with respect to formulas in an appropriate logic. Hence, when given a certain formula, our model-checking algorithm computes the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (as opposed to simply determining whether or not a given collection of paths is a Nash equilibrium). Next, we develop a symbolic version of our model checker allowing us to handle larger graph games. We illustrate our formalism on the critical-path method as well as games with perfect information. Finally, we report on the execution time of benchmarks of an implementation of our algorithms.
    Źródło:
    International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science; 2015, 25, 3; 577-596
    1641-876X
    2083-8492
    Pojawia się w:
    International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Digital Sovereignty Strategies for Every Nation
    Autorzy:
    Shoker, Ali
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/27294488.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2022
    Wydawca:
    NASK - National Research Institute
    Tematy:
    autonomy
    digital sovereignty
    digital strategy
    Nash equilibrium
    technology sovereign
    autonomia
    cyfrowa suwerenność
    strategia cyfrowa
    równowaga Nasha
    technologiczna suwerenność
    Opis:
    Digital Sovereignty must be on the agenda of every modern nation. Digital technology is becoming part of our life details, from the vital essentials, like food and water management, to transcendence in the Metaverse and Space. Protecting these digital assets will, therefore, be inevitable for a modern country to live, excel and lead. Digital Sovereignty is a strategic necessity to protect these digital assets from the monopoly of friendly rational states, and the threats of unfriendly Malicious states and behaviors. In this work, we revisit the definition and scope of digital sovereignty through extending it to cover the entire value chain of using, owning, and producing digital assets. We emphasize the importance of protecting the operational resources, both raw materials and human expertise, in addition to research and innovation necessary to achieve sustainable sovereignty. We also show that digital sovereignty by autonomy is often impossible, and by mutual cooperation is not always sustainable. To this end, we propose implementing digital sovereignty using Nash Equilibrium, often studied in Game Theory, to govern the relation with Rational states. Finally, we propose a digital sovereignty agenda for different country’s digital profiles, based on their status quo, priorities, and capabilities. We survey state-of-the-art digital technology that is useful to make the current digital assets sovereign. Additionally, we propose a roadmap that aims to develop a sovereign digital nation, as close as possible to autonomy. Finally, we draw attention to the need of more research to better understand and implement digital sovereignty from different perspectives: technological, economic, and geopolitical.
    Źródło:
    Applied Cybersecurity & Internet Governance; 2022, 1, 1; 1-17
    2956-3119
    2956-4395
    Pojawia się w:
    Applied Cybersecurity & Internet Governance
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Transformation of the Network Model with Complete Information of the Network Structure into a Network Model with Incomplete Information of the Network Structure : A Game Theory Approach
    Transformacja modelu z pełną informacją o sieci użytkowników do modelu z niekompletną informacją : podejście wykorzystujące narzędzia teorii gier
    Autorzy:
    Misztak, A.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/305929.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2011
    Wydawca:
    Wojskowa Akademia Techniczna im. Jarosława Dąbrowskiego
    Tematy:
    formowanie sieci
    równowaga Nasha
    struktura sieci
    informacja o strukturze sieci
    network formation
    Nash equilibrium
    information of network structure
    network structure
    Opis:
    In this paper we consider the formation of directed networks, i.e. networks represented by directed graphs. By information (a rather common use of this term) we mean good information that flows in the network. Each member of the network is endowed with some amount of resources and has also a payoff function, which depends positively on the amount of information he has access to. Knowing the network structure players can gain access to the information possessed by others by creating links. The problem is to specify which network structures can be a strategic equilibrium and whether they are optimal (effective) [3], [2]. Further on we introduced a model in which players do not have a complete knowledge of the network structure, but only a part of it. Decisions they make base on incomplete information. The problem is to define the equilibrium and to find out what strategies can lead to the equilibrium.
    W tym artykule zajmiemy się modelowaniem sieci skierowanych, to znaczy przedstawionych za pomocą grafów skierowanych. Przez "informację" (w raczej ogólnym użyciu tego słowa) będziemy rozumieć dobro, którego przepływ następuje w sieci. Każdy uczestnik jest obdarzony pewnym zasobem, ale posiada również funkcję wypłaty, która wprost zależy od ilości informacji, do których dany uczestnik ma dostęp. Znając strukturę sieci gracze przez ustanowienie połączeń do innych uczestników uzyskują dostęp do posiadanej przez nich informacji. Problem polega na określeniu, jakie konfiguracje połączeń mogą prowadzić do równowagi oraz czy takie konfiguracje są optymalne (efektywne) [3], [2]. W dalszej części wprowadzamy model, w którym gracze nie posiadają wiedzy na temat struktury całej sieci a jedynie pewnego fragmentu. Decyzje podejmowane są na podstawie cząstkowej (niekompletnej) informacji. Podstawowym problemem jest zdefiniowanie równowagi w takim modelu a następnie zbadanie, jakie postępowanie prowadzi do równowagi.
    Źródło:
    Biuletyn Instytutu Systemów Informatycznych; 2011, 7; 25-29
    1508-4183
    Pojawia się w:
    Biuletyn Instytutu Systemów Informatycznych
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    A communication network routing problem: Modeling and optimization using non-cooperative game theory
    Autorzy:
    Dubey, Sapana P.
    Kedar, Ganesh D.
    Ghate, Suresh H.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1838181.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2021
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Zielonogórski. Oficyna Wydawnicza
    Tematy:
    communication network
    routing problem
    game theory
    focal points
    Nash equilibrium
    Pareto optimal solution
    sieć komunikacyjna
    teoria gier
    punkt ogniskowy
    równowaga Nasha
    Opis:
    We consider a communication network routing problem wherein a number of users need to efficiently transmit their throughput demand in the form of data packets (incurring less cost and less delay) through one or more links. Using the game theoretic perspective, we propose a dynamic model which ensures unhindered transmission of data even in the case where the capacity of the link is exceeded. The model incorporates a mechanism in which users are appropriately punished (with additional cost) when the total data to be transmitted exceeds the capacity of the link. The model has multiple Nash equilibrium points. To arrive at rational strategies, we introduce the concept of focal points and get what is termed focal Nash equilibrium (FNE) points for the model. We further introduce the concept of preferred focal Nash equilibrium (PFNE) points and find their relation with the Pareto optimal solution for the model.
    Źródło:
    International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science; 2021, 31, 1; 155-164
    1641-876X
    2083-8492
    Pojawia się w:
    International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
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