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Wyszukujesz frazę "introspection" wg kryterium: Wszystkie pola


Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3
Tytuł:
Introspection - One or More? Pluralism about Self-Knowledge
Autorzy:
Komorowska-Mach, Joanna
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/968702.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019-03-31
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:
The aim of this paper is to provide a metaphilosophical analysis of the debate between monistic and pluralistic approaches to self-knowledge. I start by presenting the background for the discussion, clarifying the terminology, and drawing a distinction between moderate and radical pluralism. I then discuss and evaluate arguments for monism that appeal to general methodological guidelines as well as those relying on specific assumptions about the objects and character of self-knowledge. I offer a separate analysis of Eric Schwitzgebel’s radical pluralism, which threatens to undermine both monism and moderate pluralism. I close by describing a way of looking at the problem of the homogeneity of self-knowledge that goes beyond the monism–pluralism dichotomy and arguing that the heterogeneity and multidimensionality of the problem of self-knowledge are more important than the plurality of the solutions.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2019, 27, 1; 5-25
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The Cognitive Value of Introspection according to Kazimierz Twardowski
Autorzy:
Rechlewicz, Wojciech
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/38428212.pdf
Data publikacji:
2022
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Tematy:
introspection
Kazimierz Twardowski
Lvov-Warsaw School
mental phenomena
psychology
Opis:
Kazimierz Twardowski attributed high cognitive value to introspection because he believed it plays a fundamental role in psychology, the primary philosophical discipline. He believed that basing philosophy on inner experience would allow it to obtain universal and justified results. Internal experience consists of perceiving one’s own mental facts; it is non-sensual and selfevident. Twardowski referred to introspection in his investigations in various ways, which is presented in the article.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2022, 30, 2; 47-64
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Pojęcie introspekcji w anglosaskiej filozofii analitycznej
The Concept of Introspection in Anglo-Saxon Analytical Philosophy
Autorzy:
Ziemińska, Renata
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/965286.pdf
Data publikacji:
2004-03-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:
"Introspection" in its broad sense (Shoemaker, Armstrong) is each non-inferential access a person has to his/her own current mental states and events. It includes both introspection as a conscious act and introspection as pre-introspective awareness. "Introspection" in its narrow sense (Ryle, Dretske, Dennett) excludes pre-intro-spective awareness as not self-sufficient kind of access and part of some other conscious act. Introspection as a self-sufficient conscious act can be explained as second-order thought or reduced to third person knowledge but pre-introspective awareness can not (it is left as a mystery). Author claims that either pre-introspective awareness deserves the name "experience" and in source of special first-person knowledge (even if it is part of other sources of knowing and can be brought to consciousness only by proper introspection), either introspection as an act is a kind of experience and source of knowledge (sense experience is also some very fast interpretation of stimuli). Both pre-introspective awareness and proper introspection are kinds of experience if experience equals direct acquaintance, without any inference and stages. "Perception" can be left for sense perception of external objects. The result of introspection are not incorrigible but persons have "privileged access" to their own thoughts.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2004, 12, 1; 83-97
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3

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