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Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2
Tytuł:
bKash vs. Bank-led Option: Factors Influencing Customer’s Preferences – Does it Warrant Voluntary-Insurance-Policy for Rapid-growth Digital-banking in Bangladesh-economy?
Autorzy:
Rahman, Akim M.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2046424.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020-11-09
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Zarządzania
Tematy:
Bank-led digital
digital-transaction
bKash
Voluntary Insurance
digital-banking
percived risk-factor
Opis:
In today’s technology-driven world-economy, banking-services have been modernized where customers compete for comparative time-saving-options. Bangladesh, a developing country, is no exception. Besides traditional banking, Agent-banking, bKash, Western-Union etc. serve new-way financial-services. But, in 21st-Century business-mentality era, many factors are unpredictable. Strict laws & application can marginalize the magnitudes of Perceived-risk where developed countries are ahead of developing countries. But it does not guarantee risk-free digital-transaction where developing countries are vulnerable. It might have led a slower growth of digital-banking in countries like Bangladesh. Dealing with determinant Perceived-risk, current author proposed Voluntary-Insurance policy (Rahman, 2018) that deserves to be scrutinized. Using Factor Analysis and Hypothesis Testing on customers’ opinions helps identifying factors that have undermined the growth-trend of bank-led digital. Attributes “Phone call confirmation” has influenced customer’s preference using bKash. “No transaction fee” has influenced using bank-led digital. Addressing risk-factors, Voluntary-Insurance in place can ensure secured digital-banking that can enhance growth of usages digital-banking.
Źródło:
Journal of Banking and Financial Economics; 2020, 1(13); 51-69
2353-6845
Pojawia się w:
Journal of Banking and Financial Economics
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Conventionalists, Pioneers and Criminals Choosing Between a National Currency and a Global Currency
Autorzy:
Wang, Guizhou
Hausken, Kjell
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2053930.pdf
Data publikacji:
2021-12-30
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Zarządzania
Tematy:
Bitcoin
digital currencies
currency competition
money
evolution
replicator
dynamics
cryptocurrencies
central bank digital currencies
Opis:
The article analyzes how conventionalists, pioneers and criminals choose between a national currency (e.g. a central bank digital currency) and a global currency (e.g. a cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin) that both have specific characteristics in an economy. Conventionalists favor what is traditional and historically common. They tend to prefer the national currency. Pioneers (early adopters) tend to break away from tradition, and criminals prefer not to get caught. They both tend to prefer the global currency. Each player has a Cobb-Douglas utility with one output elasticity for each of the two currencies, comprised of backing, convenience, confidentiality, transaction efficiency, financial stability, and security. The replicator equation is used to illustrate the evolution of the fractions of the three kinds of players through time, and how they choose among the two currencies. Each player’s expected utility is inverse U-shaped in the volume fraction of transactions in each currency, skewed towards the national currency for conventionalists, and towards the global currency for pioneers and criminals. Conventionalists on the one hand typically compete against pioneers and criminals on the other hand. Fifteen parameter values are altered to illustrate sensitivity. For parameter values where conventionalists go extinct, pioneers and criminals compete directly with each other. Players choose volume fractions of each currency and which kind of player to be. Conventionalists go extinct when criminals gain more from criminal behavior, and when the parameter values in the conventionalists’ expected utility are unfavorable, causing competition between pioneers and criminals.
Źródło:
Journal of Banking and Financial Economics; 2021, 2(16); 104-133
2353-6845
Pojawia się w:
Journal of Banking and Financial Economics
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2

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