Informacja

Drogi użytkowniku, aplikacja do prawidłowego działania wymaga obsługi JavaScript. Proszę włącz obsługę JavaScript w Twojej przeglądarce.

Wyszukujesz frazę "odniesienie" wg kryterium: Temat


Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2
Tytuł:
O semantyce Donalda Davidsona. Uwagi interpretacyjne i krytyczne
On Donald Davidson’s Semantics. Interpretative and Critical Remarks
Autorzy:
Godlewski, Roman P.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2013882.pdf
Data publikacji:
2005
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
semantyka
interpretacja
odniesienie
prawda
język
semantics
interpretation
reference
truth
language
Opis:
The article is concerned with D. Davidson’s semantic views. The aim of the article is to explain some misunderstandings that have arisen in the course of reception of these views. The author tries to prove that according to Davidson semantic properties and relations do not come under classical definitions, but under contextual ones, like in L. Wittgenstein’s semantics. Hence the interpretation presented by J. Kmita is incorrect, whereas that by R. Rorty is right. Causal explanation of semantics is out of the question; hence Rorty’s interpretation is false with respect to this point. Propositions talk about what they talk about, so Kmita is wrong. According to Davidson the concept of reference is permissible, so Putnam is wrong in his interpretation. Moreover, there is only one logic semantics and for all languages it is the same, hence Kmita is wrong when he says that Davidson’s interpreter arbitrarily pushes foreign semantics into his own. He is also wrong when he puts in Davidson’s mouth the conviction that non-determination of a translation does not consist in impossibility to cognize foreign semantics.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2005, 53, 2; 25-46
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Czy filozofia analityczna sama sobie wykopała grób?
Has Analytical Philosophy Dug Out a Grave for Itself?
Autorzy:
Nowaczyk, Adam
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2015668.pdf
Data publikacji:
2004
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
R. Rorty
W. V. O. Quine
odniesienie przedmiotowe
korespondencyjna teoria prawdy
realizm poznawczy
objective reference
correspondential theory of truth
cognitive realism
Opis:
Many contemporary philosophers, especially the “post-modern ones,” claim that analytical philosophy has committed self-destruction by undermining the position of cognitive realism and questioning its main pillars: theory of objective reference of expressions and correspondential theory of truth. One of such philosophers is Rorty, an indefatigable critic of the conception of “right representations,” a concept that – according to him – is “an empty compliment which we pay to helpful beliefs while realising our intentions.” In order to support his nihilistic position, Rorty many times refers to Quine. In my paper I seek to answer the question whether Rorty’s and the views of other post-modern philosophers can be supported by Quine’s philosophical conceptions. Analysing some selected trends of his philosophy, in particular the thesis about indeterminacy of reference (ontological relativity), I seek to prove that – contrary to Rorty’s claim – Quine did not devalue the idea of objective reference. I also prove that the semantic concept of truth as relativised to the model of language plays in Quine’s epistemology an equally essential role to the role of the immanent concept of truth as “disquotational.” The former is closer to the correspondential conception of truth. The conclusions which Rorty draws from the conception of Quine are rash, and sometimes they are an outcome of biased interpretation.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2004, 52, 1; 227-242
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2

    Ta witryna wykorzystuje pliki cookies do przechowywania informacji na Twoim komputerze. Pliki cookies stosujemy w celu świadczenia usług na najwyższym poziomie, w tym w sposób dostosowany do indywidualnych potrzeb. Korzystanie z witryny bez zmiany ustawień dotyczących cookies oznacza, że będą one zamieszczane w Twoim komputerze. W każdym momencie możesz dokonać zmiany ustawień dotyczących cookies