O semantyce Donalda Davidsona. Uwagi interpretacyjne i krytyczne

The article is concerned with D. Davidson’s semantic views. The aim of the article is to explain some misunderstandings that have arisen in the course of reception of these views. The author tries to prove that according to Davidson semantic properties and relations do not come under classical definitions, but under contextual ones, like in L. Wittgenstein’s semantics. Hence the interpretation presented by J. Kmita is incorrect, whereas that by R. Rorty is right. Causal explanation of semantics is out of the question; hence Rorty’s interpretation is false with respect to this point. Propositions talk about what they talk about, so Kmita is wrong. According to Davidson the concept of reference is permissible, so Putnam is wrong in his interpretation. Moreover, there is only one logic semantics and for all languages it is the same, hence Kmita is wrong when he says that Davidson’s interpreter arbitrarily pushes foreign semantics into his own. He is also wrong when he puts in Davidson’s mouth the conviction that non-determination of a translation does not consist in impossibility to cognize foreign semantics.