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Wyszukujesz frazę "being" wg kryterium: Temat


Wyświetlanie 1-15 z 15
Tytuł:
Poznawalność bytu. Parmenides i św. Tomasz z Akwinu
Cognoscibility of Being. Case of Parmenides and St. Thomas Aquinas
Autorzy:
Pawlikowski, Tomasz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452395.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
Tematy:
byt
poznawalność bytu
metafizyka
św. Tomasz z Akwinu
Parmenides
being
cognoscibility of being
metaphysics
St. Thomas Aquinas
Opis:
According to Parmenides, the only acceptable way of philosophy as true cognition is research of being. The philosophical tradition had taken this track. St. Thomas Aquinas had very little information about Parmenidean ontology, but shared his focus on being as the object of knowledge. However, they had a different understanding of being. Philosopher of Elea claimed that everything is one monistic being. Therefore, every act of cognition has the same object – being. There is only being. Non-being is nothing. It doesn’t exist, so it isn’t cognizable. Moreover, the knowledge of being and being itself are the same. As a consequence, Parmenides described entity in identification to the mind and recognized the essence of being as truth. Therefore, his ontology is called “a veridical conception of being”. According to Aquinas, being is pluralistic. There are many types of entities, minds and truths. The core of every being is act of existence. The truth is property of singular beings or judgements. Thomas metaphysics is existential. The truth, that is here identified with adequation of thing and intellect, and cognoscibility of beings, is interpreted as the consequence of existence. Being, truth and cognoscibility are different things. In comparison with Parmenides, Thomas seems to be more faithful to the “way of being”. He characterizes being as existing and avoids a specific paradox that is inability to define the truth in a classical way, assuming her identity with the entity.
Źródło:
Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2013, 2; 31-54
2300-1976
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Tomistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Tadeusza Klimskiego realistyczna interpretacja problemu jedności
Tadeusz Klimski’s realistic interpretation of the problem of unity
Autorzy:
Andrzejuk, Artur
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452483.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
Tematy:
unity being
idealism
realism
monism
pluralism
thomism
metaphysics
Opis:
Tadeusz Klimski devoted to the problem of unity dissertation, entitled “One and being. Analysis of the realistic concepts (Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, modern Thomists)”, published in 1992. The paper characterises idealist philosophy in exposures and explanations of representatives of realism. It indicates the field of further considerations: Aristotle’s account which is determined by views of the pre–Socratics, and above all Plato, philosophical views of Thomas Aquinas, alluding to discussion with the Arabic philosophers, especially Avicenna, and often relating to the horizon designated by revelation and needs of interpreting it by theology, recognition of contemporary Thomists of various trends, the only realistic trend in contemporary philosophy. Even more interesting is placing the issues of unity in the problematic context. Tadeusz Klimski believed that the problematic field is twofold, and its starting point is epistemology: 1) platonic idealism, which leads (even if it is against Plato himself) to monism, where unity is seen as the first and fundamental philosophical problem — here unity is associated with the entire cosmos, today as well as in the in the materialistic or spiritualistic version. 2) Aristotelian realism leads to pluralism in the theory of being, in which philosophers–realists try to interpret the unity — unity here is associated with individual being. While formulating his standpoint, Tadeusz Klimski refers to Mieczyslaw Gogacz’s account, that unity is called the power of the act of existence to actualizing the real essence of being. Unity, therefore, is manifested in the whole being, but the act of existence is its source. This view is consistent Thomistic, specifying the relationship of unity with the existence of individual being. This view can be a good basis to consider the role of unity in cognition, the role of unity in action or various forms of social unity.
Źródło:
Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2013, 2; 19-27
2300-1976
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Tomistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Qu’est-ce que la réalité?
Czym jest rzeczywistość?
What is reality?
Autorzy:
Gogacz, Mieczysław
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452555.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
Tematy:
Réalité
monde
nature
être autonome
être non-autonome
réalité
existence
essence
accident
produit
rzeczywistość
świat
przyroda
byt
byt samodzielny
byt niesamodzielny
istnienie
istota
przypadłość
wytwór
reality
world
being
independent being
dependent being
product
Opis:
Rzeczywistość nie jest całością wszystkich rzeczy, nie jest kosmosem, ani światem, gdyż te określenia są tylko ogólnymi, abstrakcyjnymi pojęciami. Nie wskazują one na żaden realny, konkretny byt. Rzeczywistość ujęta filozoficznie w realistycznej filozofii tomizmu konsekwentnego to tyle, co „zespół realnie istniejących bytów samodzielnych i wiążących je relacji realnych”. Byt samodzielny, czyli to, co realnie istnieje, jest wtedy realny, gdy istnieje nie w czymś, lecz sam w sobie, jest niezależny, gdyż w sobie posiada samowystarczalne treści do istnienia i swego rozwoju. Relacje istniejące realnie są swoistymi bytami, gdyż nie są bytami samodzielnymi, a więc są wtedy realne, gdy zachodzą między realnymi bytami. Za Arystotelesem, realne, lecz niesamodzielne byty takie jak relacje, cechy i własności, nazywamy przypadłościami. Natomiast byty samodzielne określamy jako substancje. Tak rozumiana rzeczywistość uwalnia nas od popełnienia błędu uznania jakiejś cechy czy własności za pryncypium całej rzeczywistości, np. czas (miarę zmiany) i przestrzeń (rozciągłość) u Kanta, lub np. myślenie w koncepcji Heideggera. Byty samodzielne ze względu na to, że posiadają w sobie pryncypium samoorganizacji nazywamy także bytami naturalnymi. Natomiast te byty, które nie posiadają takiego pryncypium, określamy jako byty sztuczne lub wytwory, gdyż są wyprodukowane czy wymyślone ze względu na określoną funkcję. Te wytwory, w ścisłym sensie, nie powinniśmy nazywać bytami, gdyż są produktami kultury, a nie natury. Ich struktura bytowa jest skonstruowana zgodnie z wymyśloną przez nas funkcją, a nie z powodu jedności substancjalnej. Należą więc do „świata” kultury, a nie do „świata” rzeczywistości. Gdy utożsamimy ich funkcjonalną strukturę bytową ze strukturą bytów realnych, tak jak uczynili to Platon, Plotyn, Awicenna, Kant, Heidegger, Foucault, dla których pojęcia, czas, historia, rzeczywistość społeczna, walka klas nie różniły się strukturalnie od realnych bytów, wtedy zaniknie różnica między tym, co pomyślane, a tym, co istnieje realnie. Prawidłowe uwyraźnienie struktury wytworów i struktury bytów samodzielnych uwalnia nas od błędu utożsamienia tego, co pomyślane z tym, co istnieje realnie.
Reality is not the whole of all things, is not the cosmos or the world, as those terms are only general, abstract concepts. They do not indicate any real, concreto being. Philosophically speaking, the reality in realistic philosophy of consequent Thomism is „a bundle of really existing independent beings and real relations which bind them”. Independent being, which is that, what really exists, is real, when it is not in something, but in itself, as a independent, because it possesses self-sufficient content to existence and its development. Really existing relations are a kind of beings, because they are not independent entities, so they are real when they occur between real beings. Following Aristotle, the real, but reliant beings such as relations, features and properties, are called accidents. In contrast, independent beings are defined as substances. Thus understood reality frees us from making a mistake of recognizing a feature or property as a principle of all reality, eg. time (a measure of change) and space (extension) in Kant’s account, or thinking in the account of Heidegger. As they have a principle of self-organization in themselves, real beings because are also called natural beings. While those beings which do not have such a principle, are defined as artificial products, because they are made or invented because of their specific function. These products, in the strict sense, we should not call beings, because they are products of culture, not nature. Their ontological structure is constructed in accordance with the function invented by us, not because of the substantial unity. So, they belong to the „world of culture”, and not to the „world of reality”. When we identify the functional structure with the ontological structure of real beings, as did Plato, Plotinus, Avicenna, Kant, Heidegger, Foucault, for whom the concept of time, history, social reality or the class struggle did not differ structurally from the real beings, then the difference between what is intended, and what really exists, disappears. Proper identification of the functional structure of products and substantial structure of independent beings frees us from the incorrect identifying what is conceived of with what really exists.
Źródło:
Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2016, 5; 33-44
2300-1976
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Tomistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Antropologiczne aspekty doświadczenia mistycznego w ujęciu Mieczysława Gogacza
Anthropological aspects of mystical experience according to Mieczysław Gogacz
Autorzy:
Andrzejuk, Izabella
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2057897.pdf
Data publikacji:
2021-12-30
Wydawca:
Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
Tematy:
mistyka
doświadczenie mistyczne
człowiek
M. Gogacz
mystic
mystical experience
human being
Opis:
Mieczysław Gogacz, the founder of consequent Thomism, is also known for his original concept of mystical experience. In his opinion, mystical experience is a passive experience of the existence of God by the mean of potential intellect of a man. In this account, mystical experience is a relationship that connects two beings: God and man. This means that the nature of mystical experience will depend precisely on the people who are engaged in it. It further follows that our understanding of the mystical experience will depend on the anthropology and theodicy. In order to understand Gogacz’s concept of mystical experience, the following issues in his anthropology seem to be of key importance: a. the concept of man as a person; b. the problem of manifestations of existence that constitute the basis for establishing personal relationships; c. the subject of personal relations as connections between real rational beings; d. the problem of indistinct cognition as a passive experience by the potential intellect of the principles of the cognized being (the word of the heart). The groups of issues mentioned above are also one of the most significant elements of consequent Thomism.
Źródło:
Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2021, 10; 195-211
2300-1976
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Tomistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Mały błąd na początku wielkim jest na końcu. Tomaszowa reinterpretacja rozumienia bytu i istoty podstawą odkrycia Pierwszej Przyczyny jako Ipsum Esse
A little error at the beginning is great at the end. Thomas Aquinas’s reinterpretation of the understanding of being and essence as the basis for the discovery of the First Cause as Ipsum Esse
Autorzy:
Maryniarczyk, Andrzej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2057889.pdf
Data publikacji:
2021-12-30
Wydawca:
Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
Tematy:
byt
istota
Bóg
Ipsum Esse
dowód
metafizyka
being
essence
God
proof
metaphysics
Opis:
In this article, the author notes that Thomas Aquinas, in his brief work entitled De Ente et Essentia, proved that at the base of understanding the world, the human being, and God in particular, there is our understanding of being and its essence. When we make a small mistake at the beginning (parvus error in principio) in our understanding of being and its essence, it will turn to be a big one in the end (magnus in fine). And what is “at the end” of our knowledge is the discovery of the First and Ultimate Cause of all things, known as: Ipsum Esse, God, the Absolute, The Most Perfect Substance, on whom everything depends, and who depends not on anything else. These present inquiries about the proper understanding of being and its essence are aimed at formulating proof of the necessity of existence of a Being that is the First Cause, and which, existing as Ipsum Esse, is the source and reason of existence of all beings. Without these inquiries, the proof itself would be incomprehensible, and more importantly it would be a purely a priori one (i.e., ontological). Furthermore, without the existential conception of being, which Thomas first formulated, one could not discover the First Cause which, as Ipsum Esse, is the source of the existence of every being. This issue seems to have escaped the attention of the author of the book Aquinas’s Way to God. The Proof in “De Ente et Essentia”.
Źródło:
Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2021, 10; 57-77
2300-1976
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Tomistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Rola istnienia (bytu) w metafizycznym wyjaśnianiu rzeczywistości
The role of existence (of being) in the metaphysical explanation of reality
Autorzy:
Duma, Tomasz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2057887.pdf
Data publikacji:
2021-12-30
Wydawca:
Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
Tematy:
byt
filozofia
istnienie
metafizyka
poznanie
rzeczywistość
being
philosophy
existence
metaphysics
cognition
reality
Opis:
In the article, the author shows the le¬gitimacy of the maximalist approach in the philosophical explanation of reality. He refers to the existential aspect of be¬ing which, in his opinion, defines the right direction of searching for the ulti¬mate foundations of reality itself and hu¬man cognition. Of course, it is not about the ultimacy in the sense of unequivo¬cally pointing to the „substrate” of real¬ity, but more about the cognitive ap¬proach itself, which opens the philosopher to what reality is as fully as possible. He begins his considerations with an outline of a contemporary view of reality and then takes up the problem of the philosophical explanation of real¬ity, the philosophy of being, and the metaphysics of existence. In conclusion, he notes the main elements of a realistic interpretation of reality. The proposed elucidations are very general, but they point to those dimensions of reality, without which the understanding of the latter becomes a pure hypothesis.
Źródło:
Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2021, 10; 95-113
2300-1976
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Tomistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Problem subsystencji w "Logice" Marcina Śmigleckiego
The problem of Subsistence in "The Logic" of Marcin Śmiglecki
Autorzy:
Pawlikowski, Tomasz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452510.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
Tematy:
Marcin Śmiglecki
the second scholasticism
subsistence
substance
being
druga scholastyka
subsystencja
substancja
byt
Opis:
Marcin Śmiglecki (1564-1618) was one of the most famous Polish representatives of the second scholastics. His work Logica, originally published in Ingolstadt (1618), was followed by three times published at Oxford (1634, 1638 and 1658).This work includes a series of logical and metaphysical problems, issue of subsistence among them the. This issue belongs to the metaphysical problematics of the substance and is associated with the concept of being. An outline of the issues of subsistence, which we find in The Logic (1618), is very important, because in the earlier lectures in Vilnius (1586/1587), our thinker barely mentioned it. The problem was discussed in the Christian tradition. On the manner its consideration influenced mainly views of Boethius (c. 480-525), who understood the subsistence as a substance take on the aspect of independent existence. This idea developed St. Thomas Aquinas (1225- 1275) in accordance with its metaphysics of existence. The concept of subsistence meant for him independence in existence understood as the act of being. Generally, the second scholasticism, which was founded on the tradition of “pure” Aristotelianism, marginalized this question. We find this expressed in the views of Francisco Suárez (1548-1617), who claimed that “to subsist” means only one of many properties of the substance and that does not matter for the theory of being. However, for Śmiglecki, the concept of subsistence was essentially important. In the field of contingent beings it enabled him to positive statement the substance as being able to exist by itself. It was a generally valid definition of subsistence, especially referring to substances created. In this meaning “the subsistence” marked the independent existence, not inherent in the substrate. In the second and the crucial meaning, the subsistence is characterized by independence from any cause. This is the case of God’s Substance, Existence itself by itself. It seems that the great advantage of the concept of subsistence in Śmiglecki’s theory was that it allowed to accurately distinguish between substance created and the uncreated. The solution of this difficult problem was made possible by drawing attention to the existential aspect of being. Aquinas’ theory of being suggested this solution, but in the period of second scholasticism Aristotelian metaphysics was favorited. Thomistic accents were probable the cause that Śmiglecki’s Logic was initially negatively censured in Roma (1615). This is the fact, in his fundamental work our author walked away from some interpretations introduced by F. Suárez and masters of Jesuits school, but finally that gave great effects.
Źródło:
Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2016, 5; 305-328
2300-1976
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Tomistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The method for the discovery of the absolute transcendental properties of being in Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec’s metaphysics
Metoda odkrywania absolutnych własności transcendentalnych bytu w metafizyce Mieczysława Alberta Krąpca
Autorzy:
Chidiebere Ekeocha, Kingsley
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452399.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
Tematy:
transcendentals
being
one
thing
realism
Albert Krąpiec
transcendentalia
istnienie
jedność
byt
realizm
Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec
Opis:
The need to preserve a realistic cognition of the world is imperative for realistic philosophy in the face of idealism, subjectivism and relativism. This paper captures the effort of a philosopher who is “faithful to reality” through his works. The [absolute] transcendental properties of being are real properties of real beings; they are neither empty concepts nor constructions of the mind detached from the existing being. They form the foundation for the rationality of the world without which nothing is knowable. There is also a method proper to the discovery of these properties. This method which is known as metaphysical separation demonstrates that realistic cognition is not naïve cognition; it enables us to discover that whatever exists is a determinate content with proportional existence, undivided in itself and divided from others, as well as a vehicle of truth, good and beauty. It is precisely in this sense that something is being, thing, one, something, truth, good and beauty.
Potrzeba zachowania realistycznego poznania świata jest konieczna dla filozofii realistycznej w obliczu idealizmu, subiektywizmu i relatywizmu. Niniejszy artykuł ukazuje wysiłek filozofa, który jest „wierny rzeczywistości”. Transcendentalne właściwości bytu są prawdziwymi właściwościami rzeczywistych istot; nie są ani pustymi ideami, ani konstruktami umysłu oderwanymi od istoty. Stanowią one podstawę racjonalności świata, bez której nic nie jest możliwe do poznania. Istnieje również metoda odpowiednia do odkrycia tych właściwości. Ta metoda to separacja metafizyczna, która dowodzi, że poznanie realistyczne nie jest naiwnym poznaniem, albowiem separacja pozwala nam odkryć, że cokolwiek co istnieje, jest determinowaną treścią o konkretnym istnieniu, niepodzielną w sobie i różną od innych, jak również jest nośnikiem prawdy, dobra i piękna
Źródło:
Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2017, 6; 207-230
2300-1976
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Tomistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Struktura bytu w Summa contra Gentiles Tomasza z Akwinu
Structure of being in Summa contra Gentiles by Thomas Aquinas
Autorzy:
Andrzejuk, Artur
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452699.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
Tematy:
byt
istnienie
istota
metafizyka
Arystoteles
Tomasz z Akwinu
being
existence
essence
metaphysics
Aristotle
Thomas Aquinas
Opis:
The answer to the question what being means for Thomas Aquinas in his Summa contra Gentiles is: a composition of existence and essence. Such definition refers in a way (analogously) even to God because Thomas Aquinas says that in the case of God essence is existence, thus expressing the one-elementality and simplicity of His structure. All other beings are composed of existence as an act and essence as potency. Therefore, existence and essence are being’s principles and their relation is like that of act and potency. Existence makes being exist and essence determines what it is. The concept of being according to St. Thomas Aquinas is usually rightly associated with Aristotle’s metaphysics. Thomas Aquinas adopted from Aristotle the concept of act and potency but his view on the structure of being was different than that of the philosopher, who considered form and matter as being’s principles. Together they constituted being understood as what something is. In this structure, form was the act shaping it and matter was potency being shaped. Their effects were limited to determining the identity of being, that is, whether or not it is. Thomas Aquinas recognized that the first principle of being must be the factor that makes being real and only then can one speak of its identity. That is why he proclaimed that the basic structure of being is: existence as the cause of the reality of being and essence as the cause of its identity. Thomas’ proposal is thus different metaphysics than Aristotle’s “first philosophy.” Therefore, Thomism is not Aristotelianism. Composition of form and matter applies to the essence of material beings, determining what they are, i.e. their identity. Thus, one can say that form is an essential act, and matter is essential potency. Therefore, it can be further stated that Aristotle’s metaphysics is a theory of being as essence while Thomas Aquinas’ metaphysics would be the theory of existing being. Thus, it is right to call Stagirite’s approach essentialism in contrast to Thomas’ existential metaphysics
Źródło:
Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2017, 6; 99-119
2300-1976
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Tomistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Profesora Tadeusza Klimskiego badanie problematyki prawdy w filozofii starożytnej i średniowiecznej
Tadeusz Klimski studies on the issue of truth in ancient and medieval philosophy
Autorzy:
Zembrzuski, Michał
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452581.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
Tematy:
T. Klimski
Saint Augustine
Johannes Scotus Eriugena
Honorius of Autun
truth in ancient and medieaval philosophy
being
existence and essence
Opis:
Tadeusz Klimski studied three ancient and medieval authors: Saint Augustine, Johannes Scotus Eriugena and Honorius of Autun, and devoted them his publications in „Studia Philosophiae Christianae”. He studied in their texts the issues of truth, proceeded from Aristotle who defined philosophy as „the knowledge of the truth”. According to T. Klimski, knowability of truth was by St. Augustine radically dependent on God, and in the philosophy of Eriugena truth was equated directly with him. Honorius of Autun in his works connected the truth with the essence of things, however, he has not seen existential aspect resulting from the definition of God as semper esse. According to T. Klimski, these philosophers, because they were neoplatonists they haven’t come to the truth with existence, with esse, as something most fundamental for the understanding of being.
Źródło:
Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2013, 2; 11-17
2300-1976
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Tomistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Gott ist die Umwelt des Menschen. Über die Gotteserkenntnis nach Thomas von Aquin
Bóg jako środowisko dla człowieka. O poznaniu Boga w ujęciu św. Tomasza z Akwinu
God as the environment for man. The knowledge of God in account of St. Thomas Aquinas
Autorzy:
Zan, Richard
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452375.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
Tematy:
poznawalność Boga
teologia naturalna
filozofia bytu
św. Tomasz z Akwinu
knowability of God
natural theology
philosophy of being
St. Thomas Aquinas
Opis:
Każdy człowiek z natury pragnie poznać siebie i swoje otoczenie. Zdaje sobie przy tym sprawę z tego, że otaczający go świat nie został stworzony przez niego, człowieka, lecz przez Boga. W myśli średniowiecznej uznano, że wiara jest najlepszym sposobem na poznanie Boga. Wystarczy przypomnieć koncepcję Pseudo-Dionizego Areopagity o niepoznawalności Boga na naturalnej drodze poznania umysłowego. Kluczowym problemem artykułu jest pytanie, czy Bóg jest do tego stopnia nieadekwatny jako przedmiot naturalnego poznania, że konieczne jest poznanie nadprzyrodzone w celu osiągnięcia wiedzy o Bogu? Odpowiedź leży w filozofii św. Tomasza z Akwinu, a dokładniej w jego ujęciu relacji między wiarą a poznaniem. Dodatkowo, artykuł dowodzi, że historycznie wcześniejsze od ujęcia Akwinaty propozycje rozwiązania tego problemu (opracowane przede wszystkim w ramach średniowiecznej filozofii neoplatońskiej) okazały się nietrafne i niewystarczające. W filozofii Tomasza dopiero wypracowana przez niego (za filozofią Arystotelesa) oryginalna filozofia bytu (zwłaszcza tezy z De ente et essentia) zapewnia właściwe ujęcie zarazem relacji między wiarą a rozumem oraz naturalnego poznania Boga przez człowieka. Autor artykułu pokazuje - za Akwinatą - że naturalne poznanie Boga realizuje się przede wszystkim w poznaniu skutków Jego działań.
Every man naturally desires to cognize himself and his world. He realizes at the same time that the world around him was not created by him, man, but by God. In medieval thought it was the faith, that is the best way to cognize God. Let us remind the concept of Pseudo- Dionysius the Areopagite on the unknowability of God in the natural way. Thus, the key problem of the article is the question of whether God is so inadequate as a matter of natural knowledge, that it is necessary to cognize him supernaturally. The answer lies in the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, and more specifically in his view on the relationship between faith and cognition. In addition, the article argues that historically earlier shots of proposals of solution of this problem (developed primarily in the context of neo-medieval philosophy) proved to be inaccurate and inadequate. Thomas worked out (as a addition to the Aristotelian framework) the original philosophy of being (especially the thesis of De ente et essentia), which provided appropriate recognition the relationship between faith and reason and the natural knowledge of God by man. The author shows - following Aquinas - that the natural knowledge of God is realized above all in the knowledge of the results of his actions (causes). This proves the inalienability of metaphysics in natural theology.
Źródło:
Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2016, 5; 165-172
2300-1976
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Tomistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Specyfika metody separacji w koncepcji metafizyki realistycznej Andrzeja Maryniarczyka
Specifics of the method of separation in Andrzej Maryniarczyk’s conception of realistic metaphysics
Autorzy:
Gondek, Natalia
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2057888.pdf
Data publikacji:
2021-12-30
Wydawca:
Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
Tematy:
separacja
sąd egzystencjalny
struktura bytu
przedmiot metafizyki
A. Maryniarczyk
metafizyka realistyczna
separation
existential judgement
structure of being
object of metaphysics
realistic metaphysics
Opis:
The article presents the specificity of the method of metaphysical separation in philosophical thought of Andrzej Maryniarczyk. The method of separa¬tion is a fundamental way of investigat¬ing ontic foundations of the existence of reality, thanks to which at the same time the proper object of metaphysics is for-mulated. Therefore, the first part of the article presents the characteristics of the method of metaphysical separation, em¬phasising the essential role of the exis¬tential judgement, which is the basis for separative cognition. In the second part metaphysical separation has been char¬acterized as a fundamental method thanks to which one reaches the reading and intellectual separation of being as an object of metaphysical cognition. In the last part the application of the meth¬od of separation to metaphysical research of the structure of being was made. It allowed to show the specificity of the method of metaphysical separation as a cognitively adequate answer to the dis¬covery of the existence of complexity and diversity in reality.
Źródło:
Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2021, 10; 79-93
2300-1976
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Tomistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Koncepcja istnienia w ujęciu Mieczysława Gogacza. Przyczynek do dziejów formowania się tomizmu konsekwentnego
The Conception of Existence According to Mieczyslaw Gogacz. A Contribution to the History of Consequential Thomism’s Formation
Autorzy:
Andrzejuk, Artur
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452689.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
Tematy:
Tomasz z Akwinu
Mieczysław Gogacz
Mieczysław Krąpiec
tomizm egzystencjalny
tomizm konsekwentny
akt istnienia
Thomas Aquinas
Existential Thomism
Consequential Thomism
act of being
Opis:
The concept of existence (esse) as an act of making realistic and actual individual being describes the basic feature of Consequential Thomism which refers to all possible philosophical analysis from the topic of existence (esse), because existence (esse) is the first and initiating principle of being. Professor Gogacz claims that the beginning of the modification of depictions the issue of esse in the context of Existential Thomism is published in book Istnieć i poznawać in 1969. Theses of this book also are found in the script about philosophy of being (1973) entitled Ważniejsze zagadnienia metafizyki. The most mature formula of Consequential Thomism is in the Elementarz metafizyki (1987). Some topics were developed in details in the articles that also are in the following books: Historia filozofii w poszukiwaniu realizmu (2011) and W kierunku tomizmu konsekwentnego (2012). The analysis of these texts allows to separate ten topics connected with the problem of esse: 1) act of existence’s characteristic, 2) types of acts of existence, 3) making realistic and actual as an act of existence’s ‘action’, 4) the issue of Ipsum Esse Subsistens, 5) the problem of not independent being (accident) of act of being (ipsum esse), 6) the issue of transcendentals, 7) the knowledge of the existence (esse), 8) the issue of creatio esse and conservatio esse 9) the order of thesis in metaphysics, 10) the historical and philosophical aspects of the modification of Thomism which led to its consistent version. In Istnieć i poznawać M. Gogacz represents an Existential Thomism and he is influenced by thought of M. A. Krąpiec. Elementarz metafizyki is the most mature version of Consequential Thomism. According it Consequential Thomism is characterized by: 1) Recognition of statements of Avicenna’s philosophy and taking them out from Existential Thomism; 2) Understanding of existence (esse) as a created principle which initiate an individual being; 3) The experience essential principles in verbum cordis; 4) Application the essential order of causes and results with consistent notice of pluralism; 5) Distinguishing the relationship connected with esse and the relationship connected with essentia and joining the experience of ipsum esse with relationship connected with esse and joining experience of unity of esse-principles with essential relationship; 6) Using the depiction of essence (essentia) permeated by existence (esse), what should be understanding as a subsistentia, in the issue of person.
Źródło:
Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2016, 5; 45-72
2300-1976
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Tomistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Egzystencjalna metafizyka bytu w traktacie "De ente et essentia" Tomasza z Akwinu
Existential metaphysics of being in Thomas’ Aquinas treatise "De ente et essentia"
Autorzy:
Andrzejuk, Artur
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452381.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
Tematy:
Byt jednostkowy
akt
akt istnienia
możność
istota
quidditas
subsystencja
forma
materia
Ipsum esse subsistens
individual being
act
act of existence
potency
essence
subsistence
form
matter
Ipsum esse subsistence
Opis:
Text De ente et essentia was written together with "De principis naturae" in Thomas’ first years of teaching activities and accounted philosophical “exercises” for the brothers at the convent of St. James in Paris. There is commonly noted, that Aquinas had already established the most important theses of his philosophy, the existential metaphysics of being above all, in which the act was the existence of this being, and the form with the matter constituted its essence. In this situation, the source of all existence, God appeared as only existence. Analysis of existential themes in "De ente et essentia" confirms these opinions. In later texts, especially in the "Summa Contra Gentiles", "Summa theologiae" and "Quaestiones disputatae", Thomas deepens his concepts; he introduces extended topic of transcendentals - property of being which manifest its existence. However, the bulk of his existential metaphysics of existence has been outlined already in "De ente et essentia", and it was never corrected in the basic theses.
Źródło:
Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2013, 2; 95-111.
2300-1976
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Tomistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
O związku między istościami a świadomością i jaźnią
How Ities Relate to Concsciousness and the Self?
Autorzy:
Pociej, Jan
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2075564.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020-12-30
Wydawca:
Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
Tematy:
świadomość
jaźń
indywiduum
istość
Trójca Święta
teologia
Byt Pierwszy
metafizyka
materia
ruch
możność
akt
fizyka
biologia
psychologia
ujęcie
obraz świata
consciousness
self
individual
ity
Holy Trinity
theology
Prime Being
metaphysics
matter
motion
potency
act
physics
biology
psychology
conceptualization
world picture
Opis:
The third in a series of texts printed in “Rocznik Tomistyczny” (the former two are Albert Mitterer’s and Tadeusz Wojciechowski’s Concepts of the Interdependence of Matter and Motion, RT 6/2017 and The Metaphysical Consequences of the Concepts of Matter and Motion in Contemporary Physics, RT 7/2018) this article gives the crowning touch to the theory of dynamo-energetic duality of being. Applying the method of transcendental analogy, it reveals how human mind – cognizing matter-motion, as well as vegetative, sensitive and rational beings – comes to the conclusion that there are one consciousness and three selves in the Prime Being – the counterpart of triune God of the Catholic doctrine.
Źródło:
Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2020, 2, 9; 41-71
2300-1976
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Tomistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
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