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Wyszukujesz frazę "Intuition" wg kryterium: Temat


Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2
Tytuł:
The concept of intuition in experimental philosophy
Autorzy:
Sękowski, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2188294.pdf
Data publikacji:
2022-10-24
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. Komisji Edukacji Narodowej w Krakowie. Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii
Tematy:
experimental philosophy
intuition
methodology
pragmatics
Opis:
Although the concept of intuition has a central place in experimental philosophy, it is still far from being clear. Moreover, critics of that movement often argue that the concept of intuition in experimental philosophy does not correspond to the concept of intuition used in traditional, armchair philosophy. However, such a claim is problematic, because most attempts to define this concept are made with regard to the armchair philosophy’s point of view and not that of experimental philosophy. In the article I analyse the concept of intuition in experimental philosophy by taking into account its theoretical assumptions, and the research practice of its representatives. By analysing the most influential experimental philosophers’ views, I formulate its core characteristics. According to them, intuition is a mental state that is a reaction to the described case, which is revealed in the readiness to express a judgment about this case. Then, I investigate step by step the frequently postulated methodological, phenomenological, and etiological conditions that could narrow down the initial definition. I show that the only condition coherent with experimental philosophy’s assumptions and its practice is an etiological one, as the mental state that could be classified as intuition has to be shaped by pragmatic, and not only semantic factors. In the last parts of the text, I draw out some of the consequences of the position that I have presented, regarding the methodology of experimental philosophy and philosophy in general.
Źródło:
ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal; 2022, 12, 1; 111-128
2083-6635
2084-1043
Pojawia się w:
ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Od Fichtego do Kanta i z powrotem. Kilka uwag o Marka J. Siemka idei transcendentalizmu
Autorzy:
Hanuszkiewicz, Wojciech
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/944913.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. Komisji Edukacji Narodowej w Krakowie. Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii
Tematy:
marek j. siemek
immanuel kant
johann gottlieb fichte
transcendentalism
transcendental
genesis
intellectual intuition
apperception
Opis:
From Fichte to Kant and back. Several considerations on Marek J. Siemek’s concept of transcendentalism: The basic interpretation claim presented in Marek J. Siemek’s book is that Kant created a completely new level of philosophical reflection, for which the epistemo‑ logical question remains characteristic. This question — in contrast to the epistemic questions posed before Kant — neither solely focuses on the problem of the ontic structure of the reality nor it does on the cognitive conditions which enable a subject to get to know the latter. The epistemological question deals with the very relationship that occurs between the cognition (subject) and the reality (object) and constitutes both the ontological and cognitive conditions of knowledge. According to Siemek, Kant developed a transcendental perspective, but only Fichte was able to fully develop it, while Kant dealt with interweaving epistemic and epistemo‑ logical threads. However, one can defend the thesis that Kantian solutions, on the one hand, are much more strongly situated on the epistemological level of reflection than Siemek was ready to admit, and on the other hand, they offer a weaker (static) model of transcendentalism which — in contrast to the stronger (genetic) Fichte’s model — explores only the impassable limits of transcendental reflection
Źródło:
ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal; 2018, 8, 2
2083-6635
2084-1043
Pojawia się w:
ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2

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