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    Tytuł:
    Shale gas in Poland: An analysis of tax mechanisms and dynamic interactions
    Autorzy:
    Walentek, Dawid
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/522094.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2016
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Katowicach
    Tematy:
    Dynamic game
    Polska
    Regulation
    Shale gas
    Tax mechanism
    Opis:
    This is a preliminary research into possible taxation mechanisms for firms that will be operating in the shale gas industry in Poland and potential market interactions between the incumbents and the entrants. The study places focus on the level of welfare and it includes a static and a dynamic analysis. The result of the former is that the lump sum tax is the first best of all considered tax mechanisms for the Polish shale gas from the welfare perspective. The second best option for taxation is a combination of the current CIT rate and a windfall profit tax. In respect to the dynamic analysis, the results suggest that Gazprom can remain the market leader in Poland even if the shale gas producers start to operate, due to the sequential character of the competition in the Polish natural gas market. Counterintuitively, it will not come at the expenses of the consumers in Poland and it can bring potential welfare gains.
    Źródło:
    Journal of Economics and Management; 2016, 26; 128-149
    1732-1948
    Pojawia się w:
    Journal of Economics and Management
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    The operation of ecosystems and game theory. II. Cooperation.
    Autorzy:
    Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel, A.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/747906.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2003
    Wydawca:
    Polskie Towarzystwo Matematyczne
    Tematy:
    dynamic game, cooperative models, fish wars, ecological systems, fishery management game
    Opis:
    Artykuł nie zawiera streszczenia
    The article contains no abstract
    Źródło:
    Mathematica Applicanda; 2003, 31, 45/04
    1730-2668
    2299-4009
    Pojawia się w:
    Mathematica Applicanda
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    On ”Games and Dynamic Games” by A. Haurie, J.B. Krawczyk and G. Zaccour
    Autorzy:
    Więcek, Piotr
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/748451.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2013
    Wydawca:
    Polskie Towarzystwo Matematyczne
    Tematy:
    game theory, dynamic games, equilibrium
    Opis:
    Although the title, ''Games and Dynamic Games"  of the new book by Alain Haurie, Jacek B. Krawczyk and Georges Zaccour suggests just another textbook on general game theory, with a little more stress made on dynamic aspect of games, the book appears to be something of novelty both in the scope and the treatment of the material. From the very first chapters of the book, it is clear that we will not be given another standard course of game theory, and that the dynamics of games will be the main issue. It starts with the simplest treatment of game dynamics, which is the extensive form of the game, and, having defined and explained the basic notions of static game theory, progresses to more complex dynamic models. Those start with deterministic repeated games, continue with variable state discrete time (or multistage) dynamic games and deterministic differential (that is, continuous time) games, and finish with stochastic models extending the ones presented before. Each part presents in a self-contained and comprehensive way, the main notions and solution concepts (such as open- and closed-loop strategies, Nash and correlated equilibria, subgame-perfectness, using threats to improve the performance of the equilibrium strategies) and theoretical results. It complements them with a number of economic applications, presented in detail. These applications relate to many fields of interest of economists, such as exploitation of renewable resources, environmental and energy issues, macroeconomics and finance. Each chapter ends with a set of excercices and a {\it game engineering} part, where a detailed presentation of a real-life application of some relevant game model is presented. Just this part is a novelty in the game-theoretic literature, as it shows to what extent the game-theoretic models can be applicable. Although the book presents the mathematical tools to model the situations of conflict in a rather rigorous way, it is clear that its target reader is someone with a background in economics or managemant science rather than mathematics. All the basic mathematical concepts used in the book are carefully explained, with those more complex ones (which appear in the latter chapters of the book) approached mainly through examples and intuitions. I believe this is a good decision of the authors, as in that way it makes the book really accessible to its potential readers. In fact, even though the tools (even those most advanced) of dynamic game theory have now been for many years used to model the economic interactions, surprisingly there has not been a single textbook addressed to more advanced students and researchers in economics and management science, presenting the state-of-art in the theory and applications of dynamic games in a comprehensive way. Those already existing required mathematical expertise well beyond what one could expect from typical economics/management students, and could not serve as textbooks for this type of readers. Moreover, those existing books concentrated without exception on some particular classes of dynamic games (such as differential games and their subclasses, stochastic games, repeated games). The book of Haurie, Krawczyk and Zaccour fills well the existing gap.Another important advantage of the book is its stress made not only on theoretical concepts and their adoption in real-life models, but on computation issues. The authors present a host of techniques to compute the solutions to the considered games either symbolically or numerically. They also provide information about software that can be used to solve similar games. Also the examples presented in game engineering sections are not abstract. They are based on real data, and issues of the credibility of the solutions obtained is discussed.The clarity of the exposition of often complicated topics is in general a big advantage of the book, although in latter chapters this clarity is sometimes unfortunatelly lost. The best example is the part about games over event trees with a confusing introduction concerning game with finite action sets and then the whole chapter concerning games with continuous ones. Also the last chapter, about stochastic-diffusion games, seems not very well conceived, as it jumps forth and back between an example and some more general considerations, leaving the reader confused about the generality of what is presented. These are certainly minor problems, but unfortunatelly there are other, more upseting issues. In general, it seems that the manuscript was not proofread carefully enough. The number of typos is enormous (the errata added to the book enumerates just a small fraction). Also some other faults, such as references to the colors on one of the figures, which is in black and white (p. 187), self-contradicting sentences like ''We use $\beta$ for a discount factor because we use $\beta$ to denote a strategy'' (p. 233), faults in references between chapters of the book (p. 372, footnote on p. 419) could have been easily eliminated if the book was properly proofread. What is worse though, is that there are also some more serious mistakes: one of the assumptions of the Kakutani fixed point theorem is missing, $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium in Lemma 10.1 should be $A\epsilon$-equilibrium. And finally---it seems that most of the section 11.6.1 is missing from the manuscript. This significantly reduces the value of the book. Nevertheless, although I believe that all these errors should make the reader more cautious when reading the book, they do not unmake its main quality, which is acquainting all those interested in describing some real-life multi-agent economic situations in a rigorous way with the theory which provides the tools for doing it.
    Źródło:
    Mathematica Applicanda; 2013, 41, 1
    1730-2668
    2299-4009
    Pojawia się w:
    Mathematica Applicanda
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    A Large Population Partnership Formation Game with Associative Preferences and Continuous Time
    Gra o typie wyboru partnera z kontinuum graczy, preferencjami homotypowymi oraz czasem ciągłym
    Autorzy:
    Ramsey, David Mark
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/953347.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2018
    Wydawca:
    Polskie Towarzystwo Matematyczne
    Tematy:
    dynamic game
    nash equilibrium
    stopping problem
    partnership formation
    tworzenie partnerstwa
    gra dynamiczne
    równowaga nasha
    problem
    stopowania
    Opis:
     A model of partnership formation is considered in which there are two classes of player (called male and female). There is a continuum of players and two types of both sexes. These two types can be interpreted, e.g. as two subspecies, and each searcher prefers to pair with an individual of the same type. Players begin searching at time zero and search until they find a mutually acceptable prospective partner or the mating season ends. When a pair is formed, both individuals leave the pool of searchers. Hence, the proportion of players still searching and the distribution of types changes over time. Prospective partners are found at a rate which is non- decreasing the proportion of players still searching. Nash equilibria are derived which satisfy the following optimality criterion: each searcher accepts a prospective partner if and only if the reward from such a partnership is greater or equal to the expected reward obtained from future search. So called ”completely symmetric” versions of this game are considered, where the two types of player are equally frequent. A unique Nash equilibrium exists regardless of the precise rule determining the rate at which prospective partners are found. Two examples are given. 
    Źródło:
    Mathematica Applicanda; 2018, 46, 2
    1730-2668
    2299-4009
    Pojawia się w:
    Mathematica Applicanda
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Comparison of dynamic games in application to safe ship control
    Autorzy:
    Lisowski, J.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/259470.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2014
    Wydawca:
    Politechnika Gdańska. Wydział Inżynierii Mechanicznej i Okrętownictwa
    Tematy:
    marine transport
    safety at sea
    safe ship control
    optimum control
    dynamic games positional game
    matrix game
    computer simulation
    Opis:
    The paper introduces methods of dynamic games for automation of ship control in the collision situation, the game control processes in marine navigation and the fundamental mathematical model of the game ship control. First, state equations, control and state constraints and then control goal function in the form of payments : the integral payment and the final one, have been defined. Multi-stage positional , and multi-step matrix, non-cooperative and cooperative, game and optimum control algorithms for a collision situation, have been presented. The considerations have been illustrated with an exemplary computer simulation of algorithms to determine a safe own ship’s trajectory in the process of passing the ships encountered in Kattegat Strait.
    Źródło:
    Polish Maritime Research; 2014, 3; 3-12
    1233-2585
    Pojawia się w:
    Polish Maritime Research
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Viscosity solutions of the Isaacs equation οn an attainable set
    Autorzy:
    Zaremba, Leszek
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1340598.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    1994
    Wydawca:
    Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Matematyczny PAN
    Tematy:
    Isaacs equation
    dynamic programming
    differential game
    viscosity solution
    Opis:
    We apply a modification of the viscosity solution concept introduced in [8] to the Isaacs equation defined on the set attainable from a given set of initial conditions. We extend the notion of a lower strategy introduced by us in [17] to a more general setting to prove that the lower and upper values of a differential game are subsolutions (resp. supersolutions) in our sense to the upper (resp. lower) Isaacs equation of the differential game. Our basic restriction is that the variable duration time of the game is bounded above by a certain number T>0. In order to obtain our results, we prove the Bellman optimality principle of dynamic programming for differential games.
    Źródło:
    Applicationes Mathematicae; 1993-1995, 22, 2; 181-192
    1233-7234
    Pojawia się w:
    Applicationes Mathematicae
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Dynamic consistency under private information
    Autorzy:
    Correa, R.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/205556.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    1999
    Wydawca:
    Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Badań Systemowych PAN
    Tematy:
    teoria gier
    topologia
    dynamic consistency
    imperfect information
    loop model
    Nash game
    Stackelberg game
    time consistemcy
    Opis:
    Time inconsistency is often demonstrated in the context of the global Sta.ckelberg solution of a two-person, two-stage dynamic game. The loop model of dynamic games is used. The recommended solution to the problem is for both players to adopt open-loop strategies. VVe recast the problem in an imperfect informa-tion framework. In contrast to the standard result, (i) a consistency in the outcomes of the lash game and the associated Stackelberg game is shown and (ii) it is proved that under feedback information patterns, both players prefer to play the Stackelberg game rather than the associated Nash game.
    Źródło:
    Control and Cybernetics; 1999, 28, 2; 225-232
    0324-8569
    Pojawia się w:
    Control and Cybernetics
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Performance-Based Dynamic Difficulty Adjustment and Player Experience in a 2D Digital Game: A Controlled Experiment
    Autorzy:
    Robb, Nigel
    Zhang, Bo
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2150903.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2022
    Wydawca:
    Univerzita sv. Cyrila a Metoda. Fakulta masmediálnej komunikácie
    Tematy:
    adaptive software
    digital games
    dynamic difficulty adjustment
    flow
    game balancing
    performance
    Opis:
    Dynamic difficulty adjustment (DDA) in digital games involves altering the difficulty of a game based on real-time feedback from the player. Some approaches to DDA use measurements of player performance, such as success rate or score. Such performance-based DDA systems aim to provide a bespoke level of challenge to each player, so that the game is neither too hard nor too easy. Previous research on performance-based DDA shows that it is linked to better player performance but finds mixed results in terms of player experience (e.g., enjoyment). Also, while the concept of flow is regarded as an important aspect of digital game experience, little research has considered the effects of performance-based DDA on flow. We conducted an experiment on the effects of performancebased DDA on player performance, enjoyment, and experience of flow in a digital game. 221 participants played either the DDA version of the game, a control version (difficulty remained constant), or an incremental version (difficulty increased regardless of performance). Results show that the DDA group performed significantly better. However, there were no significant differences in terms of enjoyment or experience of flow.
    Źródło:
    Acta Ludologica; 2022, 5, 1; 4-22
    2585-8599
    Pojawia się w:
    Acta Ludologica
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Computing power indices for weighted voting games via dynamic programming
    Autorzy:
    Staudacher, Jochen
    Kóczy, László Á.
    Stach, Izabella
    Filipp, Jan
    Kramer, Marcus
    Noffke, Till
    Olsson, Linuss
    Pichler, Jonas
    Singer, Tobias
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2099634.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2021
    Wydawca:
    Politechnika Wrocławska. Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej
    Tematy:
    cooperative game theory
    power indices
    weighted voting games
    dynamic programming
    minimal winning coalitions
    Opis:
    We study the efficient computation of power indices for weighted voting games using the paradigm of dynamic programming. We survey the state-of-the-art algorithms for computing the Banzhaf and Shapley–Shubik indices and point out how these approaches carry over to related power indices. Within a unified framework, we present new efficient algorithms for the Public Good index and a recently proposed power index based on minimal winning coalitions of the smallest size, as well as a very first method for computing the Johnston indices for weighted voting games efficiently. We introduce a software package providing fast C++ implementations of all the power indices mentioned in this article, discuss computing times, as well as storage requirements.
    Źródło:
    Operations Research and Decisions; 2021, 31, 2; 123--145
    2081-8858
    2391-6060
    Pojawia się w:
    Operations Research and Decisions
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Analysis of pandemic with game methodology and numerical approximation
    Autorzy:
    Matusik, Radosław
    Nowakowski, Andrzej
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/29432416.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2023
    Wydawca:
    Polska Akademia Nauk. Czasopisma i Monografie PAN
    Tematy:
    COVID-19
    game model of pandemic
    approximate dual dynamic programming
    sufficient approximate optimality conditions for Nash equilibrium
    numerical algorithm
    Opis:
    We build a mathematical game model of pandemic transmission, including vaccinations of population and budget costs of different acting to eliminate pandemic. We assume the interactions among different groups: vaccinated, susceptible, exposed, infectious, super-spreaders, hospitalized and fatality, defining a system of ordinary differential equations, which describes compartment model of disease and costs of the treatment. The goal of the game is to describe the development disease under different types of treatment, but including costs of them and social restrictions, during the shortest time period. To this effect we construct a dual dynamic programming method to describe open-loop Nash equilibrium for treatment, a group of people having antibodies and budget costs. Next, we calculate numerically an approximate open-loop Nash equilibrium.
    Źródło:
    Archives of Control Sciences; 2023, 33, 3; 651--680
    1230-2384
    Pojawia się w:
    Archives of Control Sciences
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
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