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    Tytuł:
    The Liar, Contextualism, and the Stalnakerian View of Context
    Autorzy:
    Rudnicki, Jakub
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/973299.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2019
    Wydawca:
    Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne
    Tematy:
    contextualism
    Stalnaker
    liar paradox
    context
    semantics
    Glanzberg
    Opis:
    My aim in this paper is to amend the Stalnakerian view of context in such a way that it can allow for an adequate treatment of a contextualist position regarding the Liar Paradox. I discuss Glanzberg’s contextualism and the reason why his position cannot be encompassed by the Stalnakerian view, as it is normally construed. Finally, I introduce the phenomenon I call “semantic dissonance”, followed by a mechanism accommodating the Stalnakerian view to the demands of Glanzberg’s contextualism.
    Źródło:
    Studia Semiotyczne; 2019, 33, 1
    0137-6608
    Pojawia się w:
    Studia Semiotyczne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    The Liar Paradox from the Wittgensteinian Perspective
    Autorzy:
    Gomułka, Jakub
    Wawrzyniak, Jan
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/561372.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2017
    Wydawca:
    Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne
    Tematy:
    compositionality principle
    context principle
    intelligibility
    liar paradox
    nonsense
    Wittgenstein
    Opis:
    Our approach to the liar paradox is based on the Wittgensteinian approach to semantic and logical paradoxes. The main aim of this article is to point out that the liar sentence is only seemingly intelligible, and that it has not been given any sense. First, we will present the traditional solutions of the paradox, especially those which we call modificational. Then we will determine what the defects of these solutions are. Our main objection is that the modificational approaches assume that we can express in languages certain senses which are improper. Next, we will explain why we think that the liar sentence is a mere nonsense. This sentence does not have any role in any language game – it is completely useless. We will also respond to several objections to our approach. 1. That it is not consistent with the principle of compositionality of sense. 2. According to the Quineian philosophy of logic, paradoxical sentences can be conceived as false assumptions leading to crises of logical paradigms. 3. The liar sentence seems to be, contrary to our approach, intelligible.
    Źródło:
    Studia Semiotyczne; 2017, 31, 2; 179-199
    0137-6608
    Pojawia się w:
    Studia Semiotyczne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Antynomia kłamcy a teoria hiperzbiorów
    Liar Paradox and the Hyperset Theory
    Autorzy:
    Jaworski, Krzysztof
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/516517.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2017
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Szczeciński. Wydział Teologiczny
    Tematy:
    hiperzbiór
    antynomia kłamcy
    aksjomat antyufundowania
    model
    sąd
    prawda
    hyperset
    Liar paradox
    anti-foundation axiom
    proposition
    truth
    Opis:
    Celem artykułu jest prezentacja jednego z filozoficznych zastosowań teorii hiperzbiorów ZFA. Autorami tego pomysłu są Barwise i Etchemendy, którzy proponują nowe rozwiązanie antynomii kłamcy. Artykuł przedstawia tzw. koncepcję sądu (i prawdziwości) w ujęciu Russella. Zgodnie z tą koncepcją sąd Kłamcy posiada teoriomnogościową reprezentację w postaci obiektu . Zapis ten należy odczytywać: „sąd to sąd, który głosi, że jest fałszywy”. Kluczem do omawianego rozwiązania jest zdefiniowanie dwóch typów paradoksalności: paradoksalności względnej i paradoksalności bezwzględnej. Sąd jest paradoksalny bezwzględnie, jeżeli jest paradoksalny w każdym świecie, natomiast jest paradoksalny względnie, jeżeli jest paradoksalny w pewnych światach, ale nie we wszystkich.
    The objective of the paper is to discuss one of the philosophical applications of the hyperset theory ZFA. The idea is due to Barwise and Etchemendy, who proposed a new solution to the Liar paradox. The solution involves Russellian account of proposition (and truth). According to Russellian account, Liar proposition may be represented in set theory as: , to be read: „proposition is a proposition stating that is false”. The solution is based on the distinction between two kinds of paradoxicality: contingent paradoxicality and intrinsical paradoxicality. A proposition is intrinsically paradoxical, if it is paradoxical in every world, and is contingently paradoxical if it is paradoxical in some worlds but not in others.
    Źródło:
    Studia Paradyskie; 2017, 27; 187-206
    0860-8539
    Pojawia się w:
    Studia Paradyskie
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    The ‘Verdict Paradox’ and the Liar Paradox: How Logic Can Defend the Rule of Law. A Study of the Polish Constitutional Crisis
    Autorzy:
    Mazurkiewicz, Szymon
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2200450.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2019
    Wydawca:
    Projekt Avant
    Tematy:
    Polish constitutional crisis
    Constitutional Tribunal verdict of 9th March 2016
    amendment to the Statute on the Constitutional Tribunal from 22nd December 2015
    verdict paradox
    Liar paradox
    logical contradiction
    constitutional contradiction
    political
    freedom guarantees
    Opis:
    This paper aims to present how logic may undermine a parliamentary assault on democratic institutions (representing legal guarantees of the rule of law and political freedom) based on the analysis conducted with reference to the so-called Polish constitutional crisis. I analyse whether a law can be reviewed on the basis of this law itself. The Polish Constitutional Tribunal faced such a problem while passing the verdict of 9th March, 2016, regarding the constitutionality of the amendment to the Statute on the Constitutional Tribunal from 22nd December, 2015. This problem, called a ‘verdict paradox’, was claimed to be a type of the Liar paradox. I argue that, contrary to the common view, the problem of the verdict paradox is not based on the Liar paradox; for this purpose, a logical analysis is applied to four variants of a reasoning with regard to the constitutionality of the said amendment. The distinction between two levels of analysis concerning emerging reasonings, namely an abstract (logical) level and a concrete level placed in the context of the legal system, is also introduced. This paper demonstrates that although only two variants of the reasoning concerning a law’s judicial review based on the law itself involve logical contradiction, the possibility of employing reasonings from other variants must be excluded, albeit due to alternative reasons. Therefore, the Constitutional Tribunal’s decision to avoid the verdict paradox by passing over the reviewed provisions in the review process was correct and might be perceived as an example of how logic and reason can defend the institutional guarantees of political freedom.
    Źródło:
    Avant; 2019, 10, 1; 173-187
    2082-6710
    Pojawia się w:
    Avant
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Raz jeszcze o grobie Dzeusa na Krecie
    On Zeus Grave in Crete Once More
    Autorzy:
    Kaczyńska, Elwira
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1954799.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2001
    Wydawca:
    Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
    Tematy:
    Religia grecka
    kult grobów
    paradoks kłamcy
    komentarze do Nowego Testamentu
    Epimenides z Krety
    Kallimach z Cyreny
    święty Paweł Apostoł
    Greek religion
    the tomb cult
    the liar paradox
    Commentaries to the New Testament
    Epimenides of Crete
    Callimachus of Cyrene
    St. Paul Apostle
    Opis:
    According to the author, the legend about Zeus' grave was probably created as early as VIII or VII centuries BC, being a part of the common tomb cult in Early Greece. In this time the Mycenaean tholos graves began to be considered as tombs of the Greek heroes and gods. However, some Greeks raised an objection to the new form of the tomb cult. The belief in Zeus' grave was regarded as downright blasphemy by Epimenides (VII/VI century BC) and brought censure upon the Cretans for being liars. This is reflected not only in Callimachean Hymnus to Zeus (vv. 8-9), but also in a lost poem of Epimenides (probably in his Theogony). A fragment of this poem has been preserved in two Syriac commentaries to the Apostle Acts (17, 28). The English translation of these Syriac sources runs as follows: “The Cretans carved a tomb for thee, O Holy and High, / Liars, noxious beasts, evil bellies, / For thou didst not die, ever thou livest and standest firm / For in thee we live and move and have our being”. This fragment may been restored in the following shape: Τύμβον ἐτεκτΥναντο σέϑεν, Κύδιστε, Μέγιστε,Κρῆτες ἀεὶ ψεῦσται, κακὰ ϑηρία, γαστέρες ἀργαί.᾽Αλλὰ γὰρ οὐ σὺ ᾽ϑάνες, ζώεις δὲ καὶ ἵστασαι αἰεί,῎Εν σοι καὶ ζῶμεν καὶ κινύμεϑ᾽ ἠδὲ καὶ ἐσμέν. Both the second and the fourth verses were quoted by St. Paul, the former as an excerption from a poem of the Cretan seer, the latter as an anonymous quotation. Two remaining lines are convincingly restored on the basis of both Syriac translations. The attribution of this tetrameter to Epimenides, the well known Cretan prophet, poet and politician, seems certain. Thus some verses of the Callimachean Hymnus to Zeus had to be modelled on Epimenides' version of the birth-story of the Greek principal god. They contain an exact imitation of the prophet's words: “The Cretans always Liars” (Κρῆτες ἀεὶ ψεῦσται) and the same arguments: (1)both poets (i.e. Epimenides and Callimachus) reproached the Cretans for the lie; (2) both think congruently that the alleged Zeus' grave in Crete was a basic reason for arising the popular opinion on the lying character of the Cretans; (3) both deny the supposed death of Zeus; (4) both believe in the immortality of the god;(5) both criticize the different traditions, referring to the authority of a god (Zeus in the Callimachean hymn) or a hero (Minos in Epimenides' poem). Callimachus of Cyrene follows silently Epimenides, summarizing the same arguments, which permit him to reject the common version of the Zeus' birth-story in Crete. He also records some of Epimenides' aetiological tales, e.g. on the Omphalian Plain and the Mountain Panacra.
    Źródło:
    Roczniki Humanistyczne; 2001, 49, 3; 95-124
    0035-7707
    Pojawia się w:
    Roczniki Humanistyczne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-5 z 5

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