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Wyszukujesz frazę "stewardship theory" wg kryterium: Temat


Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4
Tytuł:
Best practice in bank corporate governance: The case of Islamic banks
Autorzy:
Alatassi, Bchr
Letza, Steve
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/943177.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018-11-14
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Poznaniu
Tematy:
corporate governance
Islamic banking
stewardship theory
Opis:
Islamic banks are growing rapidly with annual growth rates of 17.6% between 2009 to 2013 and 19.7% from 2014 to date. This level of growth is projected to continue into the future. Islamic banks now operate in more than 75 countries with a value of approximately $920 trillion of bank assets. Islamic banks are increasingly being seen as good long-term value propositions and are serving both Muslim and non-Muslim customers across international markets. Despite the rapid growth in Islamic finance, the underpinning corporate governance rules and regulations are at an embryonic stage of development with little attention having been paid to them. The purpose of this paper is to help fill that gap by exploring a conceptual model of corporate governance for Islamic banks based on both Islamic finance principles while fused with elements of corporate governance standards from Western theories and codes, primarily the UK, and thereby ensure that good governance is in place in Islamic banks. The paper links the predominant corporate governance theories of Principal/Agent, Stakeholder and Stewardship with practice based corporate governance codes and explores the potential of applying stewardship theory to Islamic banks. Islamic principles emphasis is on real assets rather than debt as is the case in Western Banks and as a consequence this paper offers the conclusion that the more prudent approach to banking used by Islamic banks could be used as a model for Western banks and thereby deliver a more sustainable future and maintain confidence in banks and substitute for the need for taxpayer support, such as the guaranteed deposit scheme, which acts as a backstop under the Western approach.
Źródło:
Economics and Business Review; 2018, 4(18), 4; 115-133
2392-1641
Pojawia się w:
Economics and Business Review
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
CONTROVERSIES ABOUT AGENCY THEORY AS THEORETICAL BASIS FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Autorzy:
Kultys, Jan
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/489081.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Instytut Badań Gospodarczych
Tematy:
corporate governance
agency theory
stewardship theory
team production theory
shareholder primacy model
director primacy model
Opis:
The issue of corporate governance is being taken up by different branches of science. Particular views on the nature and goals of a firm, as well as on corporate law, determine various approaches to the issue. The ongoing debate on corporate governance is being stimulated by notorious scandals and economic crises. The agency theory (prevailing today), which assumes egoism and pursuit of one’s own interests, forms the basis for shareholder primacy model, while team production theory forms the basis for director primacy model. Stewardship theory, which assumes convergence of management’s and stakeholders’ interests, may be competing or complementary towards the agency theory, depending on situation. According to management theory, efficient management requires law regulation of managers’ status. This paper is aimed at presenting controversies about traditional agency theory as theoretical basis for corporate governance, as well as at discussing other perspectives on the issue, which are extensions of the traditional theory or are based on substantially different premises. The analysis shows that going beyond agency theory allows for better understanding of the whole range of models of corporate governance as well as of the changes that are being proposed in the area. The method utilized in this paper is descriptive and comparative in character.
Źródło:
Oeconomia Copernicana; 2016, 7, 4; 613-634
2083-1277
Pojawia się w:
Oeconomia Copernicana
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Boardroom leadership: The board of directors as a source of strategic leadership
Autorzy:
Castellanos, Julio David
George, Babu
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/557773.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Poznaniu
Tematy:
board of directors
corporate governance
strategic leadership
agency theory
principal agent problem
stewardship theory
board typologies
Opis:
The aim of this paper is to bring together some of the foundational and recent literature interlinking corporate governance and the leadership role of the board of directors. Strategic leadership is widely assumed to be a responsibility that defaults to the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). However, in practice, what most CEOs do is strategic management rather than strategic leadership. While strategic management does share key aspects of strategic leadership CEOs are expected to prioritize the managerial side over the leadership side. This is just one of the situations in which the boardroom assumes the leadership role. This paper discusses how boards of directors conduct the process of strategic leadership in their organizations. In recent years there has been an increasing interest among scholars to understand how boards strategize from a behavioral point of view. This growing interest has resulted in the development of various typologies regarding boards’ involvement in the strategic leadership processes.
Źródło:
Economics and Business Review; 2020, 6(20), 1; 103-119
2392-1641
Pojawia się w:
Economics and Business Review
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Atrybuty użytkowników wewnętrznych i zewnętrznych systemu informacyjnego rachunkowości – perspektywa asymetrii informacji
The attributes of internal and external users of accounting information system – the perspective of information asymmetry
Autorzy:
Gad, Jacek
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/525358.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014-04-30
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Zarządzania
Tematy:
system informacyjny
użytkownicy systemu rachunkowości teoria agencji
teoria służebności
asymetria informacji
information system
users of accounting system
agency theory
stewardship theory
information asymmetry
Opis:
Celem niniejszego artykułu było zidentyfikowanie atrybutów użytkowników systemu informacyjnego rachunkowości. Wyodrębniono w nim trzy atrybuty użytkowników wewnętrznych systemu rachunkowości oraz dwa atrybuty użytkowników zewnętrznych. W artykule dokonano również charakterystyki relacji między użytkownikami systemu rachunkowości w świetle założeń teorii agencji oraz teorii służebności. Treści prezentowane w niniejszym artykule opracowano na podstawie studiów literaturowych – polskiej i zagranicznej literatury przedmiotu z zakresu rachunkowości, finansów i zarządzania.
The purpose of this article was to identify the attributes of the users of accounting information system. In the article three attributes of external users of accounting system and two attributes of internal users of accounting system were identified. In the paper the characteristics of the relationship between users of accounting system under the assumptions of the agency theory and the stewardship theory were presented. The content presented in this article was based on literature studies – Polish and foreign literature in the field of finance, accounting and management.
Źródło:
Problemy Zarządzania; 2014, 2/2014 (46); 114-128
1644-9584
Pojawia się w:
Problemy Zarządzania
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4

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