Informacja

Drogi użytkowniku, aplikacja do prawidłowego działania wymaga obsługi JavaScript. Proszę włącz obsługę JavaScript w Twojej przeglądarce.

English (EN)·Polski (PL)·Yкраїнський (UK)
Przejdź do strony domowej biblioteki Centralna Biblioteka Wojskowa Link otwiera się w nowym oknie Logo biblioteki Prolib Integro - strona głównaCentralna Biblioteka Wojskowa

Wyszukujesz frazę "political consensus" wg kryterium: Temat

  Lista filtrów
Wyrównaj
    Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3
    Tytuł:
    Political Consensus: A crucial and key element of political organization
    Autorzy:
    Shehu, Sali
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1036781.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2017
    Wydawca:
    Academicus. International Scientific Journal publishing house
    Tematy:
    political consensus
    decision making
    political framework
    international organizations
    Opis:
    The following material will focus initially on determining the concept of consensus, as defined by different scholars and different philosophical beliefs, role played by consensus in the establishment and functioning of the rule of law, in operation of international organizations, such as the UN, NATO and the EU. Also, we will discuss briefly the role of consensus in the process of running and organization of these organizations and functioning of the structures of national security in the process of making important decisions, in achieving the standards for Euro-Atlantic integration, and in the closing of this paper we will provide some conclusions which might be of some help in contributing, even theoretically, in the establishment, consolidation and strengthening of the national security structure. Finally, the conclusion part of this paper is thought to offer some recommendations, as well. Of course, due to the scope of this paper, the recommendations are being addressed to the political class, as an attempt to encourage it to use consensus in all areas of its activity.
    Źródło:
    Academicus International Scientific Journal; 2017, 15; 80-90
    2079-3715
    2309-1088
    Pojawia się w:
    Academicus International Scientific Journal
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Demokracja nieliberalna jako projekt polityczny
    Autorzy:
    Andrzej, Antoszewski,
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/894933.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2019-03-04
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
    Tematy:
    system polityczny
    demokracja
    liberalizm
    populizm
    konsensus polityczny
    political system
    democracy
    liberalism
    populism
    political consensus
    Opis:
    Illiberal democracy seems to be one of the most important topics for political scientists studying the process of postcommunist democratisation. It may be – and often has been – considered as a real alternative for models of democracy developing in the Western political hemisphere. This article focuses on the sources of crisis of liberal democracy and possible political consequences of its replacing by an illiberal vision of political system. Author hypothesises that making illiberal democracy real requires the reinterpretation of main democratic principles, such as representation or separation of powers, as well as abandoning of political consensus, present in consolidated West European democracies after the Second World War, and, in effect, fundamental change of patterns of political behaviour. The question of the future of illiberal democracy is also posed and three possible scenarios are considered. Problematyka demokracji nieliberalnej wydaje się jednym z najważniejszych zagadnień, jakimi zajmują się badacze studiujący proces postkomunistycznej demokratyzacji. Może być – i często jest – uważana za realną alternatywę dla modeli demokracji rozwiniętych w zachodniej hemisferze politycznej. Artykuł koncentruje się na źródłach kryzysu demokracji liberalnej i możliwych konsekwencjach zastąpienia jej nieliberalną wizją systemu politycznego. Autor przyjmuje hipotezę, że urzeczywistnienie koncepcji demokracji nieliberalnej oznacza konieczność reinterpretacji głównych zasad demokracji, takich jak: suwerenność narodu, reprezentacja czy podział władzy, oraz odrzucenia liberalno-demokratycznego konsensusu obowiązującego po II wojnie światowej w Europie Zachodniej, a w rezultacie znaczącą zmianę dotychczasowych wzorców zachowania politycznego. Stawia też pytanie o przyszłość demokracji nieliberalnej, kreśląc trzy możliwe scenariusze dalszego rozwoju politycznego państw, które na tę drogę wkroczyły
    Źródło:
    Przegląd Europejski; 2018, 2; 11-31
    1641-2478
    Pojawia się w:
    Przegląd Europejski
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Pragmatism and Political Pluralism - Consensus and Pluralism
    Autorzy:
    Marsonet, Michele
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1036574.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2015
    Wydawca:
    Academicus. International Scientific Journal publishing house
    Tematy:
    pragmatism
    science
    cultural evolution
    political philosophy
    consensus
    social contract
    Opis:
    A pragmatist thinker like Nicholas Rescher deems the idea that social harmony must be predicated in consensus to be both dangerous and misleading. An essential problem of our time is the creation of political and social institutions that enable people to live together in peaceful and productive ways, despite the presence of not eliminable disagreements about theoretical and practical issues. Such remarks, in turn, strictly recall the “practical” impossibility of settling philosophical disputes by having recourse to abstract and aprioristic principles. In the circumstances, the social model of team members cooperating for a common purpose is unrealistic. A more adequate model is, instead, that of a classical capitalism where - in a sufficiently well developed system - both competition and rivalry manage somehow to foster the benefit of the entire community (theory of the “hidden hand”). Certainly the scientific community is one of the best examples of this that we have, although even in this case we must be careful not to give too idealized a picture of scientific research. Consensus, however, in the Western tradition is an ideal worth being pursued. At this point we are faced with two basic positions. On the one side (a) “consensualists” maintain that disagreement should be averted no matter what, while, on the other, (b) “pluralists” accept disagreement because they take dissensus to be an inevitable feature of the imperfect world in which we live. A pluralistic vision, therefore, tries to make dissensus tolerable, and not to eliminate it. All theories of idealized consensus present us with serious setbacks. This is the case, for instance, with Charles S. Peirce. As is well known, Peirce takes truth to be “the limit of inquiry,” i.e. either what science will discover in the (idealized) long run, or what it would discover if the human efforts were so extended. By taking this path, thus, truth is nothing but the ultimate consensus reached within the scientific community. We can be sure that, once a “final” answer to a question has been found which is thereafter maintained without change, that one is the truth we were looking for. This fascinating theory, however, has various unfortunate consequences. In our day the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has in a way revived these Peircean insights, putting forward an influential theory to the effect that consensus indeed plays a key role in human praxis, so that the primary task of philosophy is to foster it by eliminating the disagreement which we constantly have to face in the course of our daily life. In his “communicative theory of consensus,” furthermore, he claims that human communication rests on an implicit commitment to a sort of “ideal speech situation” which is the normative foundation of agreement in linguistic matters. Consequently, the quest for consensus is a constitutive feature of our nature of (rational) human beings: rationality and consensus are tied together. A very strong consequence derives from Habermas’ premises: were we to abandon the search for consensus we would lose rationality, too, and this makes us understand that he views the pursuit of consensus as a regulative principle (rather than as a merely practical objective). Rescher opposes both Peirce’s eschatological view and Habermas’ regulative and idealized one.
    Źródło:
    Academicus International Scientific Journal; 2015, 12; 47-58
    2079-3715
    2309-1088
    Pojawia się w:
    Academicus International Scientific Journal
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3

      Ta witryna wykorzystuje pliki cookies do przechowywania informacji na Twoim komputerze. Pliki cookies stosujemy w celu świadczenia usług na najwyższym poziomie, w tym w sposób dostosowany do indywidualnych potrzeb. Korzystanie z witryny bez zmiany ustawień dotyczących cookies oznacza, że będą one zamieszczane w Twoim komputerze. W każdym momencie możesz dokonać zmiany ustawień dotyczących cookies