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Tytuł:
Assesment of the International Court of Justice judgment to 2012 and the Supreme Court judgment in Poland to 2010
Autorzy:
Gruszczyński, Krzysztof Jerzy
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1832521.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Wyższa Szkoła Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego i Indywidualnego Apeiron w Krakowie
Tematy:
Court of Justice
supreme Court
immunity
de iure imperii
de iure gestionis
Opis:
The article concernes the issue of foreign courts’ jurisdiction and their relations with the particular states’ legal systems in the context of sovereign state’s immunity and its temporary limited interpretation. several cases are analyzed, from midwar period, through the Cold War era, up to the end of the first decade od XXi century, including assesement of not only international Court of Justice and Polish supreme Court but also sereral examples of assesement of European and American courts.
Źródło:
Security Dimensions; 2015, 14(14); 54-66
2353-7000
Pojawia się w:
Security Dimensions
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Legal and political implications The Republic of Philippines. The Republic of Philippines v. The Peoples Republic of China. 2016 case
Autorzy:
Gruszczyński, Krzysztof Jerzy
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2157847.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Instytut Studiów Międzynarodowych i Edukacji Humanum
Tematy:
Permanent Court of Arbitration
arbitration
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
China
US
Opis:
The article analyzes The Philippines v. China arbitration case and its geopolitical implications for further bilateral relations between USA and China. Additionally, it examines the viewpoints of Chinese leaders. Term arbitration refers to a process in which a party submits a “dispute” to an unbiased, independent third party. Its main goal is to settle and conclude the disputes presented. The Permanent Court of Arbitration is an intergovernmental organization established in 1899 that designates arbitral tribunals to resolve disputes between and among nations. It is based in The Hague, Netherlands, and currently presides over the arbitration case. Philippines brought the case before the tribunal to dispute China’s claim of “indisputable sovereignty” over almost the entire South China sea through its “nine-dash line” claim. The five arbitrators were assigned to the Judge Thomas A. Mensah (President), Judge Jean-Pierre Cot, Judge Stanislaw Pawlak, Professor Alfred H. Soons, and Judge Rüdiger Wolfrum. It will be argued that China has had a bad relationship with all neighbors since 1974, when China used force against South Vietnam in the South China Sea in order to recapture the Paracel Islands and against a unified Vietnam in 1988 to seize Johnson Reef and five more features, massacring a party of Vietnamese flag-bearers. In 1994, China seized Mischief Reef unobserved and it took months before the world noticed. Until then, China was the only claimant to have no permanent presence in the area. There are already clear signs that China is using its military power to rebuke the arbitration. Admiral Wu Shengli, the Commander of the Chinese navy, just hosted the US Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral John Richardson, at the Chinese Navy Headquarters on July 18 2016, following the successful participation of Chinese warships in the major US RIMPAC exercise in the Pacific. He made clear that the militarization of China’s artificial islands will continue so that their defense corresponds to the “level of threats”. After a PLA Air Force patrol close to Scarborough Shoal made the headlines of most Chinese newspapers yesterday, a military spokesman announced that air patrols would become a regular occurrence now. The Tribunal issued its Award on July 16 2016 after several months of hearings and submission of documents. China was absent throughout the proceedings, refusing to recognize the case. The Tribunal concluded that there was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the sea areas falling within the ‘nine-dash line The Spratly Islands and its many reefs are being claimed by China under its “nine-dash line” claim that covers nearly the entire South China Sea including parts of the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (hereafter referred to as EEZ). China insisted it has historic rights in asserting its ownership of the region believed to be rich in natural gas resources and also a vital trade route for international cargo ships The 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff was one of the factors that prompted the Philippines to file a case against China. Tensions between the two countries escalated when Chinese surveillance ships prevented Philippine authorities from apprehending Chinese vessels found poaching endangered Philippine marine species at the shoal. The dispute over maritime features in the South China Sea has been ongoing for decades prior and involved other Southeast Asian countries such as Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia. On January 23, 2013, the Philippine government (hereafter referred to as Manila) announced that it had initiated an arbitration case against the People’s Republic of China in accordance with the dispute settlement provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea concerning a range of issues relevant to the ongoing sovereignty dispute in the South China Sea between the two nations.Manila’s case was submitted for arbitration to a five-judge panel formed under the “Settlement of Disputes” process contained in Part XV of UNCLOS and hosted by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is an international treaty that defines the limits of a nation’s maritime sovereignty claims. This convention was ratified by both the Philippines and China. Under its provisions, areas within 200 nm from the country’s baselines would be part of the EEZ. UNCLOS states three basic maritime features: Islands under the sovereignty of a country are entitled to a 12 nm (approximately 22 kilometers) territorial sea and a 200 nm (approximately 370 km) exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The state may exclude foreign entities within its territorial sea and has the sole right to exploit resources found within the EEZ Since the initiation of the arbitration case, China has conducted several massive reclamation projects to turn submerged reefs into artificial islands capable of hosting military structures and equipment. The conclusion offers general thoughts on the larger implications of the findings for the management of maritime disputes involving China and especially U. S.-China security relations.
Źródło:
Społeczeństwo i Edukacja. Międzynarodowe Studia Humanistyczne; 2016, 4(23); 45-65
1898-0171
Pojawia się w:
Społeczeństwo i Edukacja. Międzynarodowe Studia Humanistyczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Grexit as a Challenge to the European Integrity
Autorzy:
Gruszczyński, Krzysztof Jerzy
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1861635.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Wyższa Szkoła Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego i Indywidualnego Apeiron w Krakowie
Tematy:
Withdrawal from the European Union
accession negotiation
Opis:
The paper analyzes the prospect of Greece exit know as “Grexit” from EU, whereas the Treaties have a specific legal regime on withdrawing – Article 50 TEU which was added to the Treaties by the Treaty of Lisbon. It confirms the possibility to leave the EU that many (but not all) legal observers believed existed beforehand. No fully-fledged Member State has in fact left the EU before or after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, although some parts of Member States have done so. Before the Treaty of Lisbon, this was accomplished by means of Treaty amendment. One of the important question is whether would it be possible for Greece to withdraw a notification to leave the EU? In the article an argument will be raised that other Member States and the EU institutions are arguably legally obliged to refuse debt relief for Greece, in accordance with the Treaties’ no bail-out rule.
Źródło:
Security Dimensions; 2016, 18(18); 164-189
2353-7000
Pojawia się w:
Security Dimensions
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Short introduction to shale gas extraction and production in Poland
Autorzy:
Gruszczyński, Krzysztof Jerzy
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1872798.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
Wyższa Szkoła Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego i Indywidualnego Apeiron w Krakowie
Tematy:
shale gas extractions and regulation
European Commission
gas prices
federal regulation in the USA
environmental
risk
hydraulic fracking litigation in the USA & UK
Opis:
The economic significance of shale gas in Poland cannot be underestimated. In 2010 Poland was considered among the most promising of European countries for replicating the American shale gas boom. A study undertaken in 2011 by the United States Energy Information Administration placed Poland first among European countries in terms of technically recoverable reserves. Later reports downgraded the estimate of recoverable gas. In the EU member states were increasing reliance on imports from outside the EU, especially from Federation of Russia. For instance France currently imports gas from Algeria, the Netherlands, Russia and Norway, the UK from Norway and the Netherlands and LNG from Qatar. In addition, geopolitical factors may make shale gas in the EU more expensive to produce, and there are also infrastructure challenges. Other challenges include fracking litigation both in the United States and UK with the potential aftermath for European courts. In the United States, landowners often stand to benefit financially from drilling on their property—if they own the underground resources, they may receive a bonus or royalties upon leasing to an oil company in order to develop the resources. On the other hand, among the many obstacles in further development of shale gas might be the possible impacts of hydraulic fracturing on the environment and on human health.
Źródło:
Security Dimensions; 2014, 12(12); 47-68
2353-7000
Pojawia się w:
Security Dimensions
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Odpowiedzialność odszkodowawcza NRF w XXI wieku – Próba opisu
The compensation responsibility of the Federal Republic of Germany in the 21st century - An attempt to describe
Autorzy:
Gruszczyński, Krzysztof Jerzy
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/485749.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Instytut Studiów Międzynarodowych i Edukacji Humanum
Tematy:
War reparation,
Germany,
WWII,
Poland damages,
Law and Justice Party
Opis:
Poland’s Law and Justice Party (PiS) is considering whether to seek further reparations from German Federal Republic for the massive losses inflicted during WWII. PiS head Kaczynski described the move as a “historical counteroffensive.” World War II (WW II), which began with the German invasion of Poland in 1939, killed nearly 6 million Polish citizens and inflicted huge material losses, including the destruction of cultural treasures, industry and entire cities. Those crimes carry not only a moral price, but a material one as well: In 2004, Warsaw’s then-mayor, Lech Kaczynski, calculated that the Deutsche Bundesrepublik was liable for reparation payments of some $45 billion dollars (38 billion dollars) for the destruction of Warsaw alone. If one were to extrapolate the amount to include the whole of Poland, one would certainly arrive at a figure 10 to 20 times higher. That would be a sum that could only be paid out over decades and across generations. When one considers that German Federal Republic’s (GFR) final reparation payments to France and Belgium for the First World War were not made until 2010, one gets an idea of the dimensions of such a demand. Shortly after the PiS regained power in 2916 its leader, Jarosław Kaczyński, announced that Poland and the GFR had outstanding accounts to settle from the WW II. He went on to say that the issue of war reparations between the neighboring countries had never been resolved. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, GFR’s foreign minister at the time, answered Kaczynski’s claims with a letter stating that Poland had no legal basis for demanding such damages. He reminded Kaczynski of Poland’s relinquishment of reparations in 1953. Poland’s government did indeed waive its right to war reparations from its western neighbor at the time – yet that neighbor was the German Democratic Republic (GDR). A few other interesting points. The GFR has paid billions of dollars over the years in compensation for III Reich crimes, primarily to polish survivors, and acknowledges the country’s responsibility for keeping alive the memory of III Reich atrocities. After WW II, both GFR and GDR were obliged to pay war reparations to the Allied governments, according to the Potsdam Conference. Other Axis nations were obliged to pay war reparations according to the Paris Peace Treaties, 1947 an early plan for a post-war GFR was the Morgenthau plan with terms that would have essentially transformed the GFR to an agrarian society... This position was completely changed by the London Agreement on German External Debts, so called the London Debt Agreement. As a consequence of aggression by the III Reich much of Poland was subjected to enormous destruction of its industry (62% of which was destroyed), its infrastructure (84%) and loss of civilian life (16.7% of its citizens during the war- 10% of them Jews). It is estimated that damages incurred by Poland during WWII total $640 billion in 2004 exchange values. As of 2012, the GFR had paid a total of $89 billion in compensation to victims of the war, in Poland and beyond, and GFR officials continue to meet regularly to revise and expand the guidelines for compensation. All in all, after WW II 17 % of Polish citizens perished, 62 % of industry & 84 % of infrastructure was destroyed. The capital Warsaw was raised to the ground as a result of Warsaw Uprising of 1944. Poland could not benefit from US Marshall Plan as other countries (incl. the GFR) as the Soviets decided for Poland to renounce it. The GFR paying WWI reparations to France in 2010 (92 years after WWI). Polish estimates of the damage the country suffered are in the hundreds of billions of dollars, with a government figure from 1945-47 putting material losses at $850 billion, not including human losses. In 2004, Kaczynski’s late twin brother Lech, as mayor of Warsaw, put the damages to the capital city alone at $45.3 billion. Poland is the biggest net beneficiary of the bloc’s 140 billion-euro ($164 billion) annual budget, having been granted more than 250 billion dollars since entry. The monstrosity of III Reich crimes, not only against Polish Jews but also others, including the 150,000 civilians butchered during the Warsaw Uprising in 1944, will forever remain a disgrace and an unforgettable injustice. It is all the more so given that hardly any of those Germans responsible for the deeds were ever brought to account. In 2004 a special commission estimated that damages incurred by the Polish capital alone during WW II amounted to more than $45 billion (38 billion dollars). The commission was convened by Lech Kaczynski, then Warsaw’s mayor. The topic has routinely strained German-Polish relations since the national-conservative party PiS returned to power in 2016. On 23 August 1953, the Communist People’s Republic of Poland under pressure from the Soviet Union announced it would unilaterally waive its right to war reparations from the German Democratic Republic on 1 January 1954, with the exception of reparations for III Reich oppression and atrocities. The GDR in turn had to accept the Oder-Neisse border, which gave around 1/4 of GDR’s historic territory to Poland and the USSR. Poland’s former communist government, agreed in 1953 to not to make any further claims on GDR. Poland’s former Communist government waived its right to German post-war compensation back in 1953, as part of its commitment to “contribute to solving the GDR question in the spirit of democracy and peace.” However, many argue that the agreement was unlawful since the government at the time was under pressure from the Soviet Union, and following the reunification of the GFR in the 1990s the matter has faced new scrutiny. As to the GFR the federal government has claimed that its duty to compensate Poland was denounced in the 1950s but insists that it continues to stand by its moral and financial duties to the victims of the war. The GFR hadn’t paid reparations to non-Jewish recipients for the damage inflicted in Poland. The agreement signed by Mr. Gierek and Mr. Schmidt in 1975 in Warsaw, stipulated that 1.3 billion DM will be paid to Poles who, during Nazi occupation, had paid into GFR’s social security system without receiving pension. After German reunification, Poland demanded reparations again, as a reaction to claims made by German refugee organizations demanding compensation for property and land repossessed by the new Polish state that they were forcibly deported from as a stipulation of the Potsdam Agreement and the mentioned Oder-Neisse border. In 1992, the Foundation for Polish-German Reconciliation was founded by the Polish and GFR governments, and as a result GFR paid Polish sufferers ca. 4.7 billion PLN. There is still an ongoing debate among international law experts if Poland still has the right to demand war reparations, with some arguing that the 1954 declaration wasn’t legal. According to a statement made by the German government in 2017, the reparations issue was resolved in 1953 as Poland declined receiving any payments from the GFR. However, it’s worth remembering that in 2004, the Polish government reaffirmed that decision when, in return, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder promised that the GFR’s government would not support demands for damages lodged by expellees against the Polish government. The decision came about dueto the fact that the GFR had relinquished former eastern territories to Poland as compensation for III Reich war crimes. Poland’s ruling officials are stepping up calls to demand compensation from the GFR for damages caused in WW II, potentially deepening a divide between the European Union’s largest eastern member and the bloc’s biggest economy. Between the collapse of communism in 1989 and 2004 when Poland joined the EU, subsequent governments declared the issue of war reparations from the GFR closed, based on a declaration of the 1953 communist administration in Warsaw and treaties from 1970 and 1990 with the GFR. Presently the Polish parliament’s research office is preparing an analysis of whether Poland can legally make the claim and will have it ready by Aug. 11, 2017 according to Deputy Arkadiusz Mularczyk, a lawmaker with the ruling Law and Justice party who requested the report. One of the reasons that the government is reopening the question may be to demonstrate it isn’t intimidated by the EU’s criticism for democratic backsliding. The bloc has opened an unprecedented probe into Poland over the rule-of-law that’s centered on a government push to strip the judiciary of its independence by giving politicians greater control over the courts. In response to the Poland’s new demand Ulrike Demmer, deputy spokeswoman for the GFR government, said that, while the GFR assumed political, moral and financial responsibility for the WW, the question of restitution was closed. The deputy spokeswoman added, that the GFR has made significant reparations for general war damage, including to Poland, and is still paying significant compensation for III Reich wrongdoing. Further it is stated that the federal government has paid billions over the years in compensation, namely to Polish survivors, for war crimes committed during WW II. The country has also acknowledged its responsibility for keeping alive the memory of atrocities committed by the III Reich. As far as German lawyers and scholars are concerned, the issue was resolved years ago and are not afraid of any possible lawsuit in the International Court of Justice. In 2004, Jochen Frowein, an expert on international law and the former director of the Max Planck Institute in Heidelberg, along with a Polish historian, came to the conclusion that no such demand by Poland had any chance of being upheld in a court of law – and that remains the case today. In his opinion the question has been “legally resolved and definitively settled.” He also points to the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to the GFR, known also as the Two plus Four Agreement. The agreement, signed in 1990, paved the way for German reunification and also made clear that the GFR would not be responsible to pay any further reparations stemming from WW II. Frowein refutes Polish Defense Minister Senor Antoni Macierewicz’s claim that Poland’s 1953 waiver is invalid because communist Poland was not a sovereign state. “Poland’s 1953 renunciation of reparations claims against the GFR remains valid even today. The fact that the constitutional situation in Poland has changed and that it is no longer a communist state does nothing to change the validity of that declaration. Many other treaties that Poland signed at the time have also remained in effect.
Źródło:
Humanum. Międzynarodowe Studia Społeczno-Humanistyczne; 2017, 4(27); 81-115
1898-8431
Pojawia się w:
Humanum. Międzynarodowe Studia Społeczno-Humanistyczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Immunitet jurysdykcyjny państwa w prawie międzynarodowym publicznym : aktualne zagadnienia teoretyczno-praktyczne. T. 2, Wyzwania, wątki i tendencje przyznania w XXI w.
Autorzy:
Gruszczyński, Krzysztof Jerzy.
Szyjko, Cezary Tomasz.
Współwytwórcy:
Akademia Obrony Narodowej.
Akademia Obrony Narodowej. Wydawnictwo. pbl
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
Warszawa : Wydawnictwo Akademii Obrony Narodowej
Tematy:
Immunitety państw obcych
Opis:
Tyt. grzb.: Immunitet jurysdykcyjny państwa...
Bibliogr. s. 207-214, wykaz orzecznictwa s. 191-205.
Dostawca treści:
Bibliografia CBW
Książka
Tytuł:
Immunitet jurysdykcyjny państwa w prawie międzynarodowym publicznym : aktualne zagadnienia teoretyczno-praktyczne. T. 1, Analiza kazusów krajowych i międzynarodowych
Autorzy:
Gruszczyński, Krzysztof Jerzy.
Szyjko, Cezary Tomasz.
Współwytwórcy:
Akademia Obrony Narodowej.
Akademia Obrony Narodowej. Wydawnictwo. pbl
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
Warszawa : Wydawnictwo Akademii Obrony Narodowej
Tematy:
Immunitety państw obcych
Opis:
Tyt. grzb.: Immunitet jurysdykcyjny państwa...
Dostawca treści:
Bibliografia CBW
Książka
Tytuł:
Prawo międzynarodowe publiczne : skrypt akademicki : how to beat the exam stress? : ubi societas ibi ius
Autorzy:
Gruszczyński, Krzysztof Jerzy.
Szyjko, Cezary Tomasz.
Współwytwórcy:
Akademia Obrony Narodowej.
Akademia Obrony Narodowej. Wydział Wydawniczy. pbl
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Warszawa : Wydawnictwo Akademii Obrony Narodowej
Tematy:
Prawo międzynarodowe
Prawo publiczne
Podręcznik
Opis:
Na s. tyt. i okł.: Vademecum studenta.
Bibliogr., netogr., orzecznictwo, wykaz aktów prawnych s. 225-239.
Dostawca treści:
Bibliografia CBW
Książka
Tytuł:
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS SELECTED ISSUES
Autorzy:
Jerzy, Gruszczyński, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/891790.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018-08-21
Wydawca:
Wyższa Szkoła Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego i Indywidualnego Apeiron w Krakowie
Tematy:
emerging markets
equity markets
foreign direct investment
government financial assets
petrodollars
sovereign wealth funds
Opis:
Sovereign wealth funds (called later SWF) have attracted a lot of attention in the beginning of the new century as many countries from Arab world open funds and invest in the European Union (EU), including new state members such as Poland. This has given way to a rising concern over SWF investments’s influence have on the european economy. Taking into consideration that all sovereign wealth funds combined to hold more than $5 trillion in assets in 2012 and they will exceed the annual economic output of the U.S. by 2015 and that of the EU by 2016, it is important to understand exactly what sovereign wealth funds are and what are the potential benefits and risk involved. Due to their long-term strategic outlook, SWF might contribute to the stability of the international financial markets in the US and EU. It should build more precise and effective institutional framework of sovereign wealth funds’ policy rules, and accountability and transparency mechanisms. SWF can be managed and regulated in order to avoid protectionist measures on the part of the recipients of inward foreign direct investment (FDI), in turn it could greatly benefit bilateral economic relations between EU and the Gulf Cooperation Council GCC.
Źródło:
Kultura Bezpieczeństwa. Nauka – Praktyka – Refleksje; 2014, 16; 154-165
2299-4033
Pojawia się w:
Kultura Bezpieczeństwa. Nauka – Praktyka – Refleksje
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł

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