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    Wyświetlanie 1-6 z 6
    Tytuł:
    Alternative investments during turbulent times - a comparison of dynamic relationships
    Autorzy:
    Siemaszkiewicz, Karolina
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2176611.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2023-02-28
    Wydawca:
    Główny Urząd Statystyczny
    Tematy:
    safe haven instruments
    gold
    silver
    Bitcoin
    dynamic correlation
    global financial crisis
    eurozone debt crisis
    COVID-19 pandemic
    Opis:
    The COVID-19 pandemic, like the Russian aggression against Ukraine, had a significant impact on many financial markets and asset prices. The latter additionally led to large fluctuations on financial markets. In our paper, we try to compare the performance of 'safe haven' assets during turbulent times, such as the recent global financial crisis, the eurozone debt crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian aggression against Ukraine. We investigate the dynamic relationship between indices from several European countries (Czech Republic, France, Germany, Great Britain, Poland, Slovakia and Spain), and popular financial instruments (gold, silver, Brent and WTI crude oil, US dollar, Swiss franc and Bitcoin). The study further estimates the parameters of DCC or CCC models to compare dynamic relationships between the above-mentioned stock markets and financial instruments. The results demonstrate that in most cases, the US dollar and Swiss franc were able to protect investors from stock market losses during turbulent times. In addition, investors from France, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia saw gold as a 'safe haven' asset throughout all the abovementioned crises. Our findings are in line with other literature which points out that 'safe haven' instruments can change over time and across countries. In the literature, we can find research performed for the USA, China, Canada, and Great Britain, but there is no such research for Poland, France, the Czech Republic or Slovakia. The purpose of this paper is to try to fill this research gap.
    Źródło:
    Przegląd Statystyczny; 2022, 69, 3; 23-43
    0033-2372
    Pojawia się w:
    Przegląd Statystyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Programy skupu aktywów Europejskiego Banku Centralnego w dobie kryzysu zadłużeniowego w strefie euro
    European Central Bank’s asset purchase programs in the age of the debt crisis in the Eurozone
    Autorzy:
    Grabowski, Wojciech
    Stawasz, Ewa
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/970384.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2013
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
    Tematy:
    euro area sovereign debt crisis
    asset purchase programs
    eurozone sovereign debt crisis
    AIC
    kryzys w strefie euro
    programy pomocowe EBC
    kryterium informacyjne Akaike
    Opis:
    The aim of the article is to analyse the effectiveness of the asset purchase programs implemented by the European Central Bank during the sovereign debt crisis of some euro area countries (i.e. Securities Markets Programme i Outright Monetary Transactions). We examine how those programs translate into changes in sovereign bond yields. With the aid of the Akaike information criterion we conclude that the impact of the Outright Monetary Transactions was more durable.
    Przedmiotem artykułu jest analiza skuteczności programów skupu aktywów, które Europejski Bank Centralny wprowadził w odpowiedzi na kryzys zadłużeniowy części gospodarek strefy euro – tj. programów Securities Markets Programme i Outright Monetary Transactions. W artykule badana jest trwałość efektów wprowadzenia tych dwóch programów, mierzonych zmianą rentowności obligacji skarbowych. Wykorzystując kryterium informacyjne Akaike, dochodzimy do wniosku, że oddziaływanie programu Out-right Monetary Transactions było dłuższe niż programu Securities Markets Programme.
    Źródło:
    Ekonomia Międzynarodowa; 2013, 004; 5-21
    2082-4440
    2300-6005
    Pojawia się w:
    Ekonomia Międzynarodowa
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    The Eurozone Crisis: Short-Run versus Long-Run Solutions
    Autorzy:
    Pickert, Jens
    Narayanan, Vijay
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/420784.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2017
    Wydawca:
    Akademia Ignatianum w Krakowie
    Tematy:
    Eurozone
    debt crisis
    EFSF
    ESM
    Opis:
    RESEARCH OBJECTIVE: The main objective of this article is to present the result of the comparison of the short‑run and the long‑run solutions available for the Eurozone crisis. The main focus lies in examining if the provisions provided for the short‑term are sufficient compared to the long‑term solutions. THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND METHODS: The existing monetary policy in the European Monetary Union at the beginning of the crisis will be examined together with the measures pursued immediately following the crisis as well as future prospects. The study is based on a literature review. THE PROCESS OF ARGUMENTATION: The monetary policy showed structural problems clearly emphasizing that the Eurozone was not prepared to address this crisis. The first reactive measures were taken several months after the start of the crisis. The implemented solutions on the short‑run did not meet the requirements to garner lost trust and determination. In summary, the decided provisions on the short‑run solutions were not sufficient. RESEARCH RESULTS: On the one hand, some efforts were made to find short run solutions. But these short‑run solutions could not solve the financial difficulties of the affected Eurozone countries. On the other hand, long‑run solutions are highly discussed in the literature but are not set in place. Therefore, only a political and monetary union can solve the structural problems of the Eurozone. However, in the foreseeable future, politicians need to spend more efforts into this aim. CONCLUSION, INNOVATION AND RECOMMENDATION: The paper underlines the need for a political and monetary union. A first step in the long‑term would be the introduction of the European Monetary Fund and later on the Eurobonds.
    Źródło:
    Horyzonty Polityki; 2017, 8, 24; 215-235
    2082-5897
    Pojawia się w:
    Horyzonty Polityki
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Debt Reduction in the Eurozone
    Autorzy:
    Sawicki, Janusz
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/953225.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2011-08-31
    Wydawca:
    Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie. Kolegium Analiz Ekonomicznych
    Tematy:
    sovereign debt crisis
    bailout
    debt reduction
    eurozone
    peripheral countries
    Opis:
    When the Greek crisis exploded in the spring of 2010 the eurozone countries collected funds to refinance Greece’s debt in order to stave off a banking crisis. Later Ireland and Portugal asked for similar eurozone assistance. Because refinancing (bailout) was not sufficient to enable these peripheral countries to solve their debt problems, they agreed to implement austerity programs so that they could use eurozone countries’ public funds. But these austerity measures, even if politically affordable, will not suffice. It is exceedingly possible that the peripheral countries will not outgrow their problems and will be unable to return to capital markets at their pre-crisis levels. Their debt-to-GDP as well as debt services-to-income ratios are likely to grow and additional debt reorganization programs including debt reduction (haircut) will be required. At the heart of the issue is the potential impact of a reduction of the peripheral economies’ debt on the monetary financial institutions of all European Union countries. As a result of the restructuring and partial debt reduction, banks may need to receive public support. To address these problems a new solution in the form of the European Stability Mechanism (EMS) has been proposed. It is expected to change the way in which the eurozone functions. However, the EMS idea is based on the same philosophy as the existing bailout instruments. It does not address the equal treatment and moral hazard issues, while the conditionality programs proposed so far have not softened the adverse impact of the growing debt burden on the economic performance of the debt-laden countries. The entire European Union financial system is at risk and remains vulnerable as long as the refinancing mechanisms are not supported by debt restructuring and reduction. Debt managers do not seem to know how to draw on past experience and so ad hoc measures prevail. To effectively manage that kind of debt reorganization, the European Union should create the necessary procedures to efficiently address the economic future of all heavily indebted economies. The EU should also be prepared politically to accept the costs of debt reduction or of a fundamental reorganization of the eurozone.
    Źródło:
    Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics; 2011, 249, 7-8; 1-20
    2300-5238
    Pojawia się w:
    Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Dispute over European Union and Eurozone Crisis in the Light of Selected Theories of European Integration
    Autorzy:
    Staszczyk, Artur
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2031831.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2014-12-31
    Wydawca:
    Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek
    Tematy:
    European Union
    eurozone
    theories of European integration
    debt crisis
    Opis:
    The study tackles the issue of applying respective theories of European integration to explain the processes occurring in the EU, and in particular, in the debt-wrecked eurozone. In the author’s view, the eurozone crisis revived the dispute over the shape of EU. On one hand, it is the supranational neofunctionalism and on the other, state-centric intergovernmentalism views clashing with one another. The author believes that the key theory that successfully explains the member states’ behavior in face of eurozone crisis is the intergovernmentalism theory. It assumes the primacy of nation-state and its interests in the process of European integration. This is particularly apparent in the time of crisis when supranational mechanisms typical of neofunctionalist theory serve solely the purpose of legitimizing national interests of the economically strongest EU members.
    Źródło:
    Reality of Politics; 2014, 5; 81-94
    2082-3959
    Pojawia się w:
    Reality of Politics
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Competition Law and State Aid for Failing Banks in the EU and its Specific Implications for CEE Member States
    Autorzy:
    Blazsek, Virag
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/530389.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2016-12-31
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Zarządzania
    Tematy:
    EU Competition Law
    Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)
    financial crisis
    State aid
    bank bailouts
    Eurozone
    sovereign debt
    European Stability Mechanism (ESM)
    Opis:
    The bank bailouts following the global financial crisis of 2008 have been subject to prior approval of the European Commission (EC), the competition authority of the European Union. The EC was reluctant to reject rescue efforts directed at failing banks and so it consistently approved all such requests submitted by Member States. Out of the top twenty European banks, the EC authorized State aid to at least twelve entities. In this context, the paper outlines the gradually changing interpretation of EU State aid rules, the “temporary and extraordinary rules” introduced starting from late 2008, and the extension of the “no-State aid” category. The above shifts show that the EC itself deflected from relevant EU laws in order to systemically rescue important banks in Europe and restore their financial stability. The paper argues that bank bailouts and bank rescue packages by the State have led to different effects on market structures and consumer welfare in the Eurozone and non-Eurozone areas, mostly the Eastern segments of the European Union. As such, it is argued that they are inconsistent with the European common market. Although the EC tried to minimize the distortion of competition created as a result of the aforementioned case law primarily through the application of the principle of exceptionality and different compensation measures, these efforts have been at least partially unsuccessful. Massive State aid packages, the preferential treatment of the largest, or systemically important, banks through EU State aid mechanisms – almost none of which are Central and Eastern European (CEE) – may have led to the distortion of competition on the common market. That is so mainly because of the prioritization of the stability of the financial sector and the Euro. The paper argues that State aid for failing banks may have had important positive effects in the short run, such as the promotion of the stability of the banking system and the Euro. In the long-run however, it has contributed to the unprecedented sovereign indebtedness in Europe, and contributed to an increased economic and political instability of the EU, particularly in its most vulnerable CEE segment.
    Les sauvetages bancaires consécutifs à la crise financière mondiale de 2008 ont été soumis à l'approbation préalable de la Commission européenne (CE), l'autorité de la concurrence de l'Union européenne. Les CE étaient réticentes à rejeter les efforts de sauvetage dirigés contre les banques défaillantes et ont donc approuvé de manière cohérente toutes les demandes présentées par les États membres. Sur les vingt premières banques européennes, la CE a autorisé des aides d'État au moins douze entités. Dans ce contexte le document souligne l'évolution progressive de l'interprétation des règles de l'UE en matière d'aides d'État, les « règles temporaires et extraordinaires » introduites à partir de la fin de 2008 et l'extension de la catégorie « sans aides d’État ». Les changements susmentionnés montrent que la CE elle-même a dévié des lois pertinentes de l'UE afin de sauver systématiquement d'importantes banques en Europe et de rétablir leur stabilité financière. L'article soutient que les plans de sauvetage bancaire et les plans de sauvetage bancaire de l'État ont eu des effets différents sur les structures du marché et sur le bien-être des consommateurs dans les zones de la zone euro et hors zone euro, principalement dans les segments orientaux de l'Union européenne. En tant que tel, il est soutenu qu'ils sont incompatibles avec le marché commun européen. Bien que les CE aient essayé de minimiser les distorsions de concurrence créées par la jurisprudence susmentionnée, principalement par l'application du principe d'exception et des mesures de compensation différentes, ces efforts ont été au moins partiellement infructueux. Les paquets massifs d'aides d'État, le traitement préférentiel des banques les plus importantes ou systématiquement importantes par le biais des mécanismes d'aide de l'UE - presque aucun d'Europe centrale et orientale (CEE) - ont entraîné une distorsion de concurrence sur le marché commun. Cela est dû principalement à la priorité accordée à la stabilité du secteur financier et de l'euro. Le document fait valoir que les aides d'État pour les banques en faillite peuvent avoir eu des effets positifs importants à court terme, comme la promotion de la stabilité du système bancaire et de l'euro. Toutefois, à long terme, elle a contribué à l'endettement souverain sans précédent en Europe et a contribué à accroître l'instabilité économique et politique de l'UE, en particulier dans son segment d'Europe centrale et orientale le plus vulnérable.
    Źródło:
    Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies; 2016, 9(14); 145-158
    1689-9024
    2545-0115
    Pojawia się w:
    Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-6 z 6

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