Informacja

Drogi użytkowniku, aplikacja do prawidłowego działania wymaga obsługi JavaScript. Proszę włącz obsługę JavaScript w Twojej przeglądarce.

Wyszukujesz frazę "english law" wg kryterium: Temat


Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2
Tytuł:
The Constitutional Case for Making the Article 50 TEU Notification
Autorzy:
Ruairi, O'Neill,
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/902667.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
Tematy:
BREXIT
European Union law
national constitutional law
English law
Article 50 TEU
withdrawal from the EU
Opis:
In a referendum held on June 23, 2016, the United Kingdom voted in favour of leaving the European Union. For the first time since its creation in the Lisbon Reform Treaty of 2009, art. 50 TEU will probably now be invoked by the UK for the withdrawal process from the EU, envisaged by the outcome of the referendum, to commence. Article 50 TEU requires that national constitutional arrangements exist so that notification on withdrawal can be made to the European Council. Curiously, to date, the biggest consequence of the referendum outcome has not been the creation of a debate about the role of EU law in the UK legal order, but rather the separation of powers within the UK’s unwritten constitution and which organ of state has authority to activate the art. 50 TEU withdrawal: Parliament or the Executive. The debate has spawned dozens of constitutional blog posts, numerous academic articles, a High Court judicial review of the Government’s position, a second draft independence bill published by the Scottish Government and a judicial review before the Northern Irish Court of Appeal. On one side of the debate, the Government maintains that it alone possesses the Royal Prerogative to ratify and withdraw from international treaties, and thus to make the notification of withdrawal. On the other hand, Parliament and the ’Bremainers’ maintain that any unilateral action by the Government exceeds its authority, and Parliament must provide authorisation; a position which could ultimately result in the referendum outcome being ignored and the UK remaining a Member State. In a third corner, the governments of Scotland and Northern Ireland, two countries within the UK whose electorates voted to remain in the EU, demand a voice in both the decision to leave and in the subsequent negotiations with the EU institutions (note, however, that the status of the devolved administrations will not be addressed in this article, as the issue is considered by the author as being too unclear in the absence of any judicial statement on matters of devolution and institutional hierarchy, including but not limited to the limitations imposed on the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty by the Sewel Convention). The judgment of the High Court has not yet been published, and even if it were there will inevitably be an appeal to the Supreme Court, so it is only possible to speculate on what will happen, but this article intends to provide clarity on the legal principles currently under discussion in the most important constitutional discussion to happen in the UK since it joined the EU in 1973.
Źródło:
Studia Iuridica; 2016, 68; 249-262
0137-4346
Pojawia się w:
Studia Iuridica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Odpowiedzialność karna za przestępne współdziałanie w prawie angielskim po wyroku R v. Jogee; Ruddock v. The Queen
Autorzy:
Piotr, Brzostek,
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/902731.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019-01-17
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
Tematy:
English criminal law
criminal complicity
joint enterprise liability
Jogee; Ruddock
mens rea
angielskie prawo karne
przestępne współdziałanie
orzeczenie w sprawie Jogee; Ruddock
strona podmiotowa
Opis:
The combined decisions of the UK Supreme Court and Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in R v. Jogee; Ruddock v. The Queen caused upheaval in the English law on criminal complicity. The Supreme Court/Privy Council decided that the law on criminal complicity „took a wrong turn” 33 years ago in the Privy Council ruling in Chan Wing-Siu which concerned a controversial doctrine of parasitic joint enterprise liability. According to the said doctrine, if A and B set out to commit a crime X (e.g. robbery) and B foresees that A might commit crime Y (e.g. murder) in the course of committing crime X, B will be liable for crime Y, even if he does not intend that crime Y be committed. The mere fact of foresight on B’s part is enough for him to be criminally liable. Decision in Jogee; Ruddock is of seminal importance as it overturned the doctrine of parasitic joint enterprise liability. It is doubtful, however, to what extent the Supreme Court has resolved the problems that have bedeviled this area of law. This article presents in outline the English law on criminal complicity and attempts to assess the changes that were introduced in Jogee; Ruddock. A number of issues still call for further refinement and resolution. It appears, however, that the emphasis the Supreme Court put on intention as a required standard of fault, draws, at least superficially, the continental (Polish and German) and English criminal law closer together in terms of mens rea requirements for secondary liability.
Źródło:
Studia Iuridica; 2018, 76; 98-121
0137-4346
Pojawia się w:
Studia Iuridica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2

    Ta witryna wykorzystuje pliki cookies do przechowywania informacji na Twoim komputerze. Pliki cookies stosujemy w celu świadczenia usług na najwyższym poziomie, w tym w sposób dostosowany do indywidualnych potrzeb. Korzystanie z witryny bez zmiany ustawień dotyczących cookies oznacza, że będą one zamieszczane w Twoim komputerze. W każdym momencie możesz dokonać zmiany ustawień dotyczących cookies