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    Wyświetlanie 1-10 z 10
    Tytuł:
    O pewnym błędzie logicznym, czyli co paradoks Lewisa Carrolla ma wspólnego z problemem Humea
    On a Certain Flacy, or What Lewis Carroll's Paradox Hs in Common with Hume's Problem
    Autorzy:
    Paprzycka, Katarzyna
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/965309.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2008-03-01
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
    Opis:
    The paper is a warning against an unreserved use of reasoning, which is designed to show that a premise in an argument is missing. The reasoning is susceptible to a common equivocation. As a result, it can be systematically misleading, making us judge that certain premises are missing where they are not. It is argued that the equivocation in question lies at the bottom of Lewis Carroll's paradox, a version of Hume's problem as well as some arguments in philosophy of mind and ethics. The paper is first and foremost a warning because it turns out that there is some didactic value in playing on the equivocation.
    Źródło:
    Filozofia Nauki; 2008, 16, 1; 41-54
    1230-6894
    2657-5868
    Pojawia się w:
    Filozofia Nauki
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Wyjaśnienie epistemicznego efektu Knobea
    Explanation of the Epistemic Side-Effect Effect
    Autorzy:
    Paprzycka, Katarzyna
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/965435.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2016-09-01
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
    Opis:
    On the omissions account, in Knobe’s harm case people attribute an intentional omission, which is linguistically expressed as if it were an intentional action. I extend the omissions account to the epistemic side-effect effect. In the harm case, there is a salient knowledge claim (knowledge of a possible harmful consequence) that is relevant to the intentionality of the omission. In assenting to the claim that the chairman knew that the environment would be harmed, people endorse the claim that the chairman knew that a possible harmful consequence of his action was that the environment would be harmed. Such a claim is independent from the predictive claim that the chairman knew that the environment would be harmed; which explains why people assent to the knowledge claim even in the slight chance of harm conditions.
    Źródło:
    Filozofia Nauki; 2016, 24, 3; 117-133
    1230-6894
    2657-5868
    Pojawia się w:
    Filozofia Nauki
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    O krytyce i pochwale zewnętrznej, o życzliwości interpretacyjnej i ludzkiej - w odpowiedzi Mariuszowi Grygiańcowi
    On External Criticism and External Praise, on Interpretive and Personal Charity - A Reply to M. Grygianiec
    Autorzy:
    Paprzycka, Katarzyna
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/967111.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2012-03-01
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
    Opis:
    The paper is a reaction to M. Grygianiec’s reply in a discussion sparked on by his paper on the status of the epiphenomenalism objection. I correct some misunderstandings. In addition I offer an intuitive summary of my reconstruction of the debate. I show that Grynianiec’s reply does not undermine the reconstruction. I argue that to the extent that (external) praise of Davidson’s ideas is possible, so is external criticism. Moreover, I argue that interpretative charity demands a charitable stance not only to Davidson but also to his critics.
    Źródło:
    Filozofia Nauki; 2012, 20, 1; 117-125
    1230-6894
    2657-5868
    Pojawia się w:
    Filozofia Nauki
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    O argumentacji Lowe’a na rzecz koncepcji przyczynowości intencjonalnej i fizycznej
    On Lowe’s Argument for His Conception of Intentional and Physical Causation
    Autorzy:
    Paprzycka, Katarzyna
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/965221.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2013-03-01
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
    Opis:
    Lowe argues for a dualistic account of mental causation. He claims that the agent’s decision as well as a neural event both causally determine the resulting behavior in parallel and complementary ways. The decision determines that the arm arising occurs at all but it does not determine the detailed physical parameters of the movement. The neural cause determines the detailed parameters but does not deter-mine that the movement occurs. Lowe’s main argument for this view is the argument from counterfactual implications, which also undermines the psychoneural token-identity thesis. He argues that if the mental event token (the decision to raise an arm) had not occurred, the arm would not have risen, while if the neural event token (the complex neural event, which causes the arm to rise) had not occurred, the arm would still have risen albeit slightly differently. I first raise two counterexamples. Parallel arguments can be constructed to show that token identity fails at other micro-macro junctures. A token splash of hot water could be argued not to be identical with the token event of the motions of H2O molecules characterized by appropriate kinetic energy. A token expression of the will of the people could be argued not to be identical with the token event of such and such voting behavior on an election day. I then diagnose the problems with Lowe’s arguments for either counterfactual. The argument for the mental counterfactual relies on a premise that is quite plausibly false. The argument for the neural counterfactual is questionable because it involves the application of the possible-worlds semantics to counterfactuals with disjunctive antecedents. His argument against the token-identity thesis thus fails and his dualistic ac-count of mental causation is called into question.
    Źródło:
    Filozofia Nauki; 2013, 21, 1; 91-112
    1230-6894
    2657-5868
    Pojawia się w:
    Filozofia Nauki
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Zarzut epifenomenalizmu jako zarzut zewnętrzny względem monizmu anomalnego
    The Epiphenomenalism Charge as an External Objection to Anomalous Monism
    Autorzy:
    Paprzycka, Katarzyna
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/966712.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2011-06-01
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
    Opis:
    The paper is a critical reaction to M. Grygianiec’s discussion of the status of the epiphenomenalism objection to anomalous monism. Grygianiec argues that the objection does not arise for Davidson if one takes his nominalism seriously. I show that Grygianiec construes the epiphenomenalism charge as an internal one. I argue that it can be viewed as an external objection to anomalous monism, moreover one that is justified, adequate and charitable. I distinguish two interpretations of the objection and show that an appeal to charity can explain why an apparently inadequate form the objection is often preferred.
    Źródło:
    Filozofia Nauki; 2011, 19, 2; 135-152
    1230-6894
    2657-5868
    Pojawia się w:
    Filozofia Nauki
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Fałszywa świadomość psychologii intencjonalnej. O pewnym dogmacie współczesnej analitycznej filozofii umysłu
    The False Awareness of Intentional Psychology: About the Certain Dogma of Modern Analitic Philosophy of the Mind
    Autorzy:
    Paprzycka, Katarzyna
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/967012.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2003-03-01
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
    Źródło:
    Filozofia Nauki; 2003, 11, 1; 89-116
    1230-6894
    2657-5868
    Pojawia się w:
    Filozofia Nauki
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Kilka uwag o omylności i meta logu. Na marginesie książki Andrzej Nowakowskiego Uzasadnienie epistemiczne
    Some Remarks on Fallibility and Meta Logu. Comments on Andrzej Nowakowski’s Uzasadnienie epistemiczne
    Autorzy:
    Paprzycka, Katarzyna
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/967232.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2014-09-01
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
    Opis:
    The paper is a critical notice of Andrzej Nowakowski’s book on epistemic justification (Andrzej Nowakowski, Uzasadnienie epistemiczne, Wydawnictwo UMCS, Lublin 2011). I examine the author’s discussion of the third condition on knowledge and expose multiple errors. The main problem with Nowakowski’s proposal is that it is seriously underdeveloped. Moreover, under the most natural interpretation, it suf-fers from many of the same problems as some of the accounts Nowakowski criticizes.
    Źródło:
    Filozofia Nauki; 2014, 22, 3; 137-154
    1230-6894
    2657-5868
    Pojawia się w:
    Filozofia Nauki
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Rozwiązanie problemu Butlera i wyjaśnienie efektu Knobea
    A Solution to Butlers Problem and an Explanation of the Knobe Effect
    Autorzy:
    Paprzycka, Katarzyna
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/968678.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2014-06-01
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
    Opis:
    Butler's and Knobe's cases appear to show that our attributions of intentional actions are sensitive to moral considerations. The puzzles can be solved if (a) we reject the assumption that the puzzling attributions of intentionality are attributions of intentional actions, (b) we further reject the assumption that the concepts of intentional action and of intentional omission have a common genus, (c) we adopt certain (not unprecedented) assumptions about each concept, in particular about the relation to the notions of intention and of ability. The presented solution makes use of a reconstruction of the notion of what is within the agent's power to do. I argue that the characteristic asymmetry in attributions of intentionality in Butler's and Knobe's cases is derivative from the asymmetry in intentional omissions. Since the intentional omissions in question are omissions to fulfill negative duties, they are easily mistaken for intentional actions.
    Źródło:
    Filozofia Nauki; 2014, 22, 2; 73-96
    1230-6894
    2657-5868
    Pojawia się w:
    Filozofia Nauki
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Teza Lowe’a w świetle semantyki Lowe’a
    Lowe’s Thesis in Light of Lowe’s Semantics
    Autorzy:
    Paprzycka, Katarzyna
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/968856.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2014-12-01
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
    Opis:
    Lowe’s thesis (essential for his argument against identity theory) is the claim that if not all neurons had behaved the way they actually did, the arm would have risen anyway. Lowe’s argument for the thesis depends on a controversial delimitation of the class of the closest possible worlds (on Lewis’ semantics). I show how one could use Lowe’s semantics in the evaluation of Lowe’s thesis. I demonstrate that a weaker version of the principle of the simplification of disjunctive antecedents holds on this semantics. One can use the principle to argue for or against Lowe’s thesis. On Lowe’s semantics, the debate between defenders and opponents of Lowe’s thesis in fact mimics the standstill concerning the question which possible worlds are the closest to the actual world on Lewis’ semantics. However, Lowe’s semantics offers a way out of the impasse. I argue that the opponents of Lowe’s thesis are ultimately at an advantage.
    Źródło:
    Filozofia Nauki; 2014, 22, 4; 71-90
    1230-6894
    2657-5868
    Pojawia się w:
    Filozofia Nauki
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Epistemiczny efekt Knobe’a a problem Butlera. Test hipotezy zaniechaniowej
    Epistemic Side-Effect Effect and Butler’s Problem: A Test for the Omissions Account
    Autorzy:
    Paprzycka-Hausman, Katarzyna
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/964128.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2018-10-31
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
    Opis:
    The omissions account offers structurally close explanations of the Knobe effect, the Butler problem, and the epistemic side-effect effect. Moreover, it predicts that the epistemic side-effect effect should be present not only in Knobe-type stories but also in Butler-type stories. Since the probability that the effect takes place is not greater than 1/6, the attribution of knowledge that it will take place is prima facie irrational. However, according to the omissions account, in the immoral situations, the knowledge claim can be read as a consequence-knowledge claim, which can be rationally accepted. I report the results of two studies, based on Nadelhoffer’s study of the Butler problem, where ascriptions of knowledge in Butler-type scenarios are investigated.
    Źródło:
    Filozofia Nauki; 2018, 26, 3; 49-77
    1230-6894
    2657-5868
    Pojawia się w:
    Filozofia Nauki
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-10 z 10

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