Autor: Komorowska-Mach, Joanna - Katalog OPAC zbiorów

Skocz do pozycji: 1.

Tytuł:: O pochodzeniu pojęć
Where do Concepts Come From?
Autorzy:: Komorowska-Mach, Joanna
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/966792.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2011-12-01
Wydawca:: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:: The review discusses the book The Origin of Concepts by Susan Carey, in which she presents three main theses - the innateness of some kind of conceptual representations, the presence of a qualitative change during conceptual development and the existence of a special learning mechanism that achieves that discontinuity called bootstrapping. The general reception of the work is positive. Minor doubts are presented regarding two claims: first, the speculation about the iconic format of core cognition representations, which seems to be underdeveloped and slightly unclear, second, the claim that core cognition representations are innate, which seems to be insufficiently supported by empirical data presented.
Źródło:: Filozofia Nauki; 2011, 19, 4; 139-145
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:: Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

Artykuł

Skocz do pozycji: 2.

Tytuł:: Emergencja – podręcznik dla mało opornych
Emergence – a Textbook for Non-restive
Autorzy:: Komorowska-Mach, Joanna
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/968736.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2010-12-01
Wydawca:: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:: The review tries to summarize the main topics covered by the book "Między redukcją a emergencją" by Robert Poczobut and also to highlight certain points that might be controversial to the philosophically-oriented reader. In particular, Poczobut's methodological claims regarding the boundary between natural sciences and philosophy of mind are brought under scrutiny. While the book presents a broad range of views on matters regarding emergence and reduction, especially with respect to the psychophysical problem, it remains to be proven that the views presented by the author are in reality the most viable option that a philosopher of mind wishing to conform to scientific results has at her disposal.
Źródło:: Filozofia Nauki; 2010, 18, 4; 135-142
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:: Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

Artykuł

Skocz do pozycji: 3.

Tytuł:: Negatywny program filozofii eksperymentalnej a odwołania do intuicji w argumentacji filozoficznej
Negative Program of Experimental Philosophy and Appealing to Intuition in Philosophical Argumentation
Autorzy:: Komorowska-Mach, Joanna
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/967702.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2013-09-01
Wydawca:: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:: The aim of this paper is to undermine one of the main assumptions of the negative program of experimental philosophy. Experimental philosophers claim that it is possible to verify the validity of some classical philosophical arguments which appeal to intuitions by empirically testing whether those intuitions are in fact commonly shared. I argue that experimental philosophers wrongly identify the function that appealing to intuition plays in such arguments. By analyzing several classical philosophical arguments quoted by experimental philosophers, I show that declaring that something is intuitive does not play a role of a premise in an argument. My claim is that its purpose is rather to set common ground between the author of the argument and her audience. Therefore questioning the commonness of intuitions does not lead to the falsification of such arguments.
Źródło:: Filozofia Nauki; 2013, 21, 3; 157-165
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:: Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

Artykuł

Skocz do pozycji: 4.

Tytuł:: Przypisywanie sobie emocji - wyrażanie czy wykrywanie? Elementy detektywistyczne w modelu neoekspresywistycznym
Self-Ascribing Emotions - Expressing or Detecting? Detectivist Components in Neo-expressivism
Autorzy:: Komorowska-Mach, Joanna
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/967885.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2015-12-01
Wydawca:: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:: The main aim of this article is to explain why expressivist models of self-ascribing emotions should include a detectivist component of some kind. I argue that the transition from natural to verbal expression requires the ability to recognize and classify some states of the body. Under certain assumptions such an ability can be interpreted as the ability to detect our own emotions. Thus neo-expressivism should not entirely reject detectivism. On the contrary, in order to understand and explain the ability to self-ascribe emotions, we should combine both accounts.
Źródło:: Filozofia Nauki; 2015, 23, 4; 41-54
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:: Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

Artykuł

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