Autor: Bonusiak, Włodzimierz - Katalog OPAC zbiorów

Skocz do pozycji: 1.

Tytuł:: Ukraina–Polska: nadzieja na powrót do „strategicznego partnerstwa”
Poland – Ukraine: hope for a return to a „strategic partnership”
Autorzy:: Bonusiak, Włodzimierz
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2035136.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2020
Wydawca:: Krakowska Akademia im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego
Tematy:: prezydenci Polski i Ukrainy
antypolskie i probanderowskie wydarzenia
polityka historyczna
presidents of Poland and Ukraine
anti-Polish and pro-Banderian events
historical policy
Opis:: Kolejni prezydenci Ukrainy – Wiktor Juszczenko i Petro Poroszenko, swoją probanderowską polityką doprowadzili do zmiany wzajemnych relacji między Polską a Ukrainą. Realizując politykę historyczną preferowali osoby, które podsycały antypolskie nastroje i realizowały propagandę oraz skłaniały się ku narracji szerzonej przez banderowców w czasie II wojny światowej. Już w czasie wojny banderowcy negowali swój udział w ludobójczych działaniach wobec Polaków i Żydów. Obecnie część historyków ukraińskich zaprzecza, że było to ludobójstwo, a jeśli przyznają oni, że doszło do antypolskiej akcji to stara się ją usprawiedliwić przy pomocy najróżniejszych argumentów. Nowy prezydent Ukrainy Wołodymyr Zełenski swym działaniem chce nawiązać do okresu, kiedy to oba kraje mówiły o strategicznym partnerstwie i należy mu życzyć, aby nie skończyło się tylko na zamiarach.
Successive presidents of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko and Petro Poroshenko have changed their relations between Poland and Ukraine with their pro-fl ag policy. In implementing historical policy, they preferred anti-Polish people and those who carried out propaganda propagated by Banderites during World War II. Already during the war, the Banderites negated their participation in genocidal activities against Poles and Jews, and at present some Ukrainian historians deny that it was genocide, and if confess to anti-Polish action, they try to justify it with various arguments. The new president of Ukraine Volodymyr Zełeński wants to refer to the period when both countries talked about strategic partnership and should be wished that it would not end only on intentions.
Źródło:: Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe; 2020, 2; 247-258
1733-2680
2451-0610
Pojawia się w:: Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 2.

Tytuł:: Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie po Euromajdanie.
Impact of the Ukrainian crisis on Polish – Ukrainian relations.
Autorzy:: Bonusiak, Włodzimierz
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/506276.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2015
Wydawca:: Krakowska Akademia im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego
Tematy:: Euromaidan
Verkhovna Rada Ukraine
act inspection pro bandera
politices Poland
perspective
Opis:: Since condemnation of operation Vistula by the Senate, we have conducted a „strategic partnership” policy towards Ukraine, expecting at most symbols, not calling for the memory of thousands of victims murdered in Volyn and Cherven Cities. Driven mainly by Russophobia, we supported the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan. On the latter, our politicians didn’t hesitate to join banderite shouts in front of portraits of Bandera and Shukhevych. We should not be surprised then that two hours after the address of the President of Poland Bronislaw Komorowski, The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted without discussion four Acts, which aim were: the recognition of the OUN and the UPA as fighters for Samostijna Ukraine, erasing from the collective memory shared 70-year history of the Ukrainian nation and increase of divisions in Ukrainian society. In Poland, the Acts have been passed over by the mass media (except for ”Przegląd” and “Nie”). Neither the issue have been raised by the Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz in talks with the chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Volodymyr Groysman, nor by the Interior Minister Grezgorz Schetyna during his parliamentary speech on Polish foreign policy and it is even quite carefully sidestepped in the presidential campaign by all parties. Answering the question posed by “Przegląd” – “How Poland should react to the decisions of the authorities of Ukraine regarding members of the OUN and the UPA?” – advisor to the President of Poland, Professor Tomasz Nałęcz, stated, among others, “Let us remember that Ukraine is our neighbour and friend, therefore we should talk to it. I do not think the best way of conversation with a friend is to send a note of protest”. In 2010, we had the courage to raise the question of granting a title of Hero of Ukraine to Bandera and Shukhevych by W. Yushchenko and to persuade the European Parliament to express deep indignation (initiator: Paweł Zalewski from PO) and withdraw this Act. Now, all indications are that we lack this courage. It is very difficult to speak now about the future of Ukraine and Polish – Ukrainian relations. There are only very few groups, which speak now about the need to change of our eastern policy. The borderland communities haven’t obtained in our country organizations which would have an impact on foreign or even economic policy. It can therefore be assumed that regardless of who wins the presidential and parliamentary elections, Poland will continue to pursue a realistic and pragmatic policy, although resulting from Russophobia of Polish political elites and conducted by them historical policy. Previous actions of the Ukrainian authorities suggest that there may occur a scenario known to us from the period after the Orange Revolution. The current Ukrainian authorities do not seek to unite his people for a common goal, but they increase divisions in society. Ukrainian nation needs an agreement and consensus, not creation of new barriers. Polish experience shows that the actual legal, economic and political transformation needs a national consensus rather than replacing it with settlements with the past and nationalism. It seems that Poland irretrievably lost its positions of expert on East. As correctly pointed out Professor Andrzej Walicki “the prestige of Poland as a supposed export on Russia ceased to exist, because our position in Russian affairs is predictable and does not help to solve real problems”. Poland should act in order to end the conflict in Ukraine, at the same time attempting to understand both sides of the conflict. Different economic and geopolitic interests causes that the positions of various countries on the events in Ukraine are and will remain diverse. Louis Stomma wrote that “the sudden and incredible love of Poles for modern Ukraine is a sad love without reciprocity”. In the interest of Poland is striving for consensus and sensible mediation rather than setting up as a front-line state. A compromise is always possible, but if interest is not mixed with morals and national resentments. Preventing from compromise would reflect on the fate of the whole region and Ukraine would be harmed the most.
Źródło:: Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe; 2015, 2; 131-140
1733-2680
2451-0610
Pojawia się w:: Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki