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Wyszukujesz frazę "Non-being" wg kryterium: Temat


Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2
Tytuł:
Il male in sé e il nulla in Proclo
Evil Itself and Nothingness in Proclus
Autorzy:
Napoli, Valerio
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1178736.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020-12-23
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
Proclus
Evil
Nothingness
Non-being
Neoplatonism
Opis:
In his reflection on the nature of evil, the Neoplatonic philosopher Proclus affirms that evil itself (to autokakon) is “also beyond the absolute non-being” (epekeina kai tou mēdamōs ontos). With this assumption, he intends to reinforce the thesis of the non-existence of absolute evil, conceived as totally separate from good, and contrasted with the collateral and parasitic existence of evil mixed with good. He thus maintains a distinction between absolute evil and relative evil, conceived with reference to the distinction between absolute non-being (i.e., nothingness) and relative non-being. In Proclus, the thesis of the non-existence of absolute evil is presented as a necessary consequence of the non-dualist theory of evil in the sphere of a protology that identifies the first Principle of all things in the primary Good (identical to the supra-essential One), and which aims to reconcile the absolute primacy of the latter with the presence of evil in some orders of reality.
Źródło:
Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2020, 11, 1; 143-170
2082-7539
Pojawia się w:
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Opposizione e verità: l’enigmatica via di Parmenide
Opposition and Truth: Parmenides’ Enigmatic Way
Autorzy:
Tarca, Luigi Vero
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/938304.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
Parmenides
not-being
negation
difference
truth of being
negation of non-being.
Opis:
In Parmenides’ B 8 37–41, we find a question that raises a difficult problem: how can Parmenides handle the opposition between “being and not” (i.e. being and not being) in the same way as the oppositions which characterize the mortals’ opinions? This question is especially relevant for answering the following theoretical question: how do we to treat the fundamental philosophical question of oppositions at large? To answer these question we need to reinterpret some major points of Parmenides’ thought: the second part of his poem, but also the identification of πέλειν and εἶναι in B 6 8, as well as other passages of the poem. But, above all, the question makes us introduce some distinctions within the concept of negation and, consequently, between difference and negation. This allows us to distinguish the affirmation of the truth of being from the negation of the negation of being (i.e. the negation of nonbeing). This distinction has a major philosophical relevance, as can be seen by referring it to such thinkers as Plato, Hegel and Heidegger.
Źródło:
Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2013, 4, 1; 105-124
2082-7539
Pojawia się w:
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2

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