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Wyświetlanie 1-15 z 42
Tytuł:
Examining the Structured Uses of Concepts as Tools: Converging Insights.
Autorzy:
Smith, Eden T.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/909511.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019-12-31
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Tematy:
concepts-as-used
experimental practice
neuroscience
philosophy of science as practiced
history and philosophy of science
science and technology studies
Opis:
Examining the historical development of scientific concepts is important for understanding the structured routines within which these concepts are currently used as goal-directed tools in experiments. To illustrate this, I outline how the concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations each draw on an older interdependent set of associations that, although nominally discarded, continues to structure their current independent uses for pursuing discrete experimental goals. In doing so, I highlight how three strands of literature offer mutually instructive insights into how the uses of current scientific concepts contribute to experimental practices. The first strand of literature includes recent scholarship examining how the uses of scientific concepts can enable scientific practices (e.g., Boon 2012, Brigandt 2012, Feest 2010, Steinle 2012), the second strand comes from the technoscientific studies focused on non-human agency (Pickering 1995), and the third draws attention to how the functions of concepts are grounded by the set of historically contingent experimental practices (e.g., Canguilhem 2008, Tiles 1984).
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2019, 27, 4; 7-22
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Theology Under Siege: Reflections of a Troubled Philosopher and a Believer
Autorzy:
Grygiel, Wojciech P.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/560004.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Papieski Jana Pawła II w Krakowie
Tematy:
theology
philosophy of science
picture of the world
logic
Opis:
The transposition of  the theological expression into the framework of  epistemology suggested by the contemporary philosophy of science is a long-desired project. The presented article offers an overview of the different epistemological and methodological issues that arise when this expression is carried out in the common sense paradigm. It turns that once the necessary change into the mode of knowledge acquisition of contemporary science is made, one can significantly improve theology’s both methodological and conceptual foundations. In particular, this concerns the use of abstract concepts to better penetrate the intricacies of the Divine nature as well as the non-classical logics to improve theology’s inferential basis. The resulting question of the contextuality of theology, namely, its dependence on the conceptual framework and the picture of the world, is also surveyed. Consequently, theology can be perceived as a lexically open project. In conclusion it is argued that while the contemporary theology should retain its common sense exposition for the pastoral and catechetical purposes that allows for the efficient transmission of faith through intuitive knowledge, the state-of-the-art theological research must reach out to to abstract conceptual frameworks to assure the depth of its penetrative insight.
Źródło:
Theological Research. A Journal of Systematic Theology; 2016, 4; 7-33
2300-3588
Pojawia się w:
Theological Research. A Journal of Systematic Theology
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
How is philosophy in science possible?
Autorzy:
Heller, Michał
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/690864.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
philosophy in science
philosophy of science
metaphilosophy
interdisciplinary research
science and religion
analytic philosophy
Opis:
The Michael Heller’s article entitled “How is philosophy in science possible?” was originally published in Polish in 1986 (see Heller, 1986) and then translated into English by Bartosz Brożek and Aeddan Shaw and published in 2011 in the collection of essays entitled Philosophy in Science. Methods and Applications (Heller, 2011). This seminal paper has founded further growth of the ‘philosophy in science’ and become the reference point in the methodological discussions, especially in Poland. On the 40th anniversary of Philosophical Problems in Science we wanted to make this paper freely available to the international public by reprinting its English version. In this issue it is followed by two additional articles-commentaries (by Paweł Polak and Kamil Trombik).
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2019, 66; 231-249
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Ontogenesis of the “why” question from the perspective of genetic epistemology, and its philosophical implications
Autorzy:
Duchliński, Piotr
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/426939.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Papieski Jana Pawła II w Krakowie
Tematy:
genetic epistemology
epistemology
philosophy of science
Thomism
developmental psychology
Opis:
The question “why” is generally thought to be one of the most important of philosophical questions. Indeed, many philosophers hold that it is responsible for defining the essential contours and identity of philosophical discourse itself. Moreover, all attempts to reject it are perceived as a manifestation of minimalist tendencies in philosophical research. This article presents Piaget’s views concerning the ontogenesis of the “why” question. After having reconstructed the latter, it seeks to spell out their potential philosophical implications. The author argues that ontogenetic considerations can certainly play a heuristic role in the formulation of philosophical theses and hypotheses, and that they can lead to a correcting of the conceptions we tend to have of certain philosophical questions – namely, ones that do not refer to any empirical data.
Źródło:
Logos i Ethos; 2019, 51; 7-39
0867-8308
Pojawia się w:
Logos i Ethos
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Post-Empiricism and Philosophy of Science
Autorzy:
Marsonet, Michele
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1037876.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018
Wydawca:
Academicus. International Scientific Journal publishing house
Tematy:
science
philosophy of science
logical positivism
post-empiricism
pragmatism
methodological anarchism
Opis:
The aim of this paper is to provide some sketchy remarks on the post-empiricist phenomenon in philosophy of science, taking into account the themes of the relationships between language on the one side and reality on the other, and the parallel problem of the alleged elimination of metaphysics. Unlike the logical empiricists, Popper believes that a clear separation between (i) analytic and synthetic sentences, and (ii) between theory and observation, is an impossible task. According to his view, theory and observation are intimately linked to each other, and no pure observation is ever possible. A position very similar to Popper’s was endorsed by the American pragmatists in the last two centuries with Charles S. Peirce, William James and John Dewey. There also are important similarities between what Popper says and William James’ theses. It is clear that if we recognize that the theoretical dimension precedes observation, and if we claim furthermore that scientific theories have a creative character, then we may explain the “jumps” that often take place in the history of science. Later on Feyerabend and his followers have turned philosophy of science into something mysterious and not easily classifiable in philosophical or scientific terms. The anything goes undermines the meaning itself of the discipline. If science is equated to any other dimension of spirit - art, religion, or even witchcraft - the specific and cognitive character of scientific rationality is eliminated. It follows that philosophy of science loses any meaningful role within the field of human knowledge, while even philosophy as such becomes more similar to a joke than to a serious endeavor.
Źródło:
Academicus International Scientific Journal; 2018, 18; 26-33
2079-3715
2309-1088
Pojawia się w:
Academicus International Scientific Journal
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The Copernican Hypotheses Part 2
Autorzy:
Dersley, Stephen
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/699340.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
N. Copernicus hypothesis
T. S. Kuhn
philosophy of science
Opis:
The Copernicus constructed by Thomas S. Kuhn in The Copernican Revolution (1957) is a decidedly non-revolutionary astronomer who unwittingly ignited a conceptual revolution in the European worldview. Kuhn’s reading of Copernicus was crucial for his model of science as a deeply conservative discourse, which presented in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). This essay argues that Kuhn’s construction of Copernicus and depends on the suppression of the most radical aspects of Copernicus’ thinking, such as the assumptions of the Commentariolus (1509-14) and the conception of hypothesis of De Revolutionibus (1543). After comparing hypothetical thinking in the writings of Aristotle and Ptolemy, it is suggested that Copernicus’ conceptual breakthrough was enabled by his rigorous use of hypothetical thinking.
Źródło:
Journal of Applied Cultural Studies; 2015, 1
2392-0661
Pojawia się w:
Journal of Applied Cultural Studies
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The Copernican Hypotheses Part 1
Autorzy:
Dersley, Stephen
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/699342.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
N. Copernicus hypothesis
T. S. Kuhn
philosophy of science
Opis:
The Copernicus constructed by Thomas S. Kuhn in The Copernican Revolution (1957) is a decidedly non-revolutionary astronomer who unwittingly ignited a conceptual revolution in the European worldview. Kuhn’s reading of Copernicus was crucial for his model of science as a deeply conservative discourse, which presented in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). This essay argues that Kuhn’s construction of Copernicus and depends on the suppression of the most radical aspects of Copernicus’ thinking, such as the assumptions of the Commentariolus (1509-14) and the conception of hypothesis of De Revolutionibus (1543). After comparing hypothetical thinking in the writings of Aristotle and Ptolemy, it is suggested that Copernicus’ conceptual breakthrough was enabled by his rigorous use of hypothetical thinking.
Źródło:
Journal of Applied Cultural Studies; 2015, 1
2392-0661
Pojawia się w:
Journal of Applied Cultural Studies
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Philosophical foundations of statistical research
Autorzy:
Pociecha, Józef
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1043922.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020-02-26
Wydawca:
Główny Urząd Statystyczny
Tematy:
philosophy of science
philosophy of truth
theory of probability
statistical learning
socio-economic investigations
Opis:
Every researcher desires to uncover the truth about the object of the undertaken study. When conducting statistical research, however, scientists frequently give no deeper thought as to their motivation underlying the choice of the particular purpose and scope of the study, or the choice of analytical tools. The aim of this paper is to provide a reflection on the philosophical foundations of statistical research. The three basic understandings of the term ‘statistics’ are outlined, followed by a synthetic overview of the understanding of the concept of truth in the key branches of philosophy, with particular attention devoted to the understanding of truth in probabilistic terms. Subsequently, a short discussion is presented on the philosophical bases of statistics, touching upon such topics as determinism and indeterminism, chance and chaos, deductive and inductive reasoning, randomness and uncertainty, and the impact of the information revolution on the development of statistical methods, especially in the context of socio-economic research. The article concludes with the formulation of key questions regarding the future development of statistics.
Źródło:
Przegląd Statystyczny; 2020, 67, 3; 195-211
0033-2372
Pojawia się w:
Przegląd Statystyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Some Philosophical Remarks on the Concept of Structure: Framing Michał Heller’s Perspective
Autorzy:
Oleksowicz, Michał
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2142964.pdf
Data publikacji:
2021-12-31
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Tematy:
structure
structural realism
James Ladyman
Michał Heller
philosophy of science
Opis:
Perceiving objects in a structural or relational way in the ontology of physics and mathematics, as opposed to the classical way, shows how the concept of structure remains crucial for contemporary philosophy of physics and philosophy of science. In this paper, a particular emphasis is placed on certain philosophical concepts proposed by Michał Heller, concerning the context of the structural understanding of theories and the world. The first aim is to provide a general critical survey of the main assumptions of structural realism (SR). The second aim is to interpret Heller’s philosophy of structure in accordance with the principal tenets of SR, illuminating certain criticisms of Heller’s approach. Having analyzed Heller’s approach, a question arises concerning the type of dependence on structuralism in the philosophy of physics and the philosophy of mathematics, in addition to certain metaphysical assumptions regarding the concept of structure. It is argued that Heller’s SR conflates the adoption of mathematical structures in theories (the case of the realism–anti-realism debate) with the debate on mathematical explanations and the explanatory role of mathematical constraints.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2021, 29, 4; 57-82
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
A conventionalist account of distinctively mathematical explanation
Autorzy:
Povich, Mark
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/28763422.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
scientific explanation
philosophy of science
philosophy of mathematics
mathematical explanation
ontic conception
conventionalism
Opis:
Distinctively mathematical explanations (DMEs) explain natural phenomena primarily by appeal to mathematical facts. One important question is whether there can be an ontic account of DME. An ontic account of DME would treat the explananda and explanantia of DMEs as ontic items (ontic objects, properties, structures, etc.) and the explanatory relation between them as an ontic relation (e.g., Pincock, 2015; Povich, 2021). Here I present a conventionalist account of DME, defend it against objections, and argue that it should be considered ontic. Notably, if indeed it is ontic, the conventionalist account seems to avoid a convincing objection to other ontic accounts (Kuorikoski, 2021).
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2023, 74; 171-223
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Value-free paradise is lost. Economists could learn from artists
Wolny od wartości raj został utracony. Ekonomiści mogli uczyć się od artystów
Autorzy:
Ostapiuk, Aleksander
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2028231.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020-12-30
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
Tematy:
philosophy of science
methodology of economics
value-free economics
Max Weber
Opis:
Despite the conclusions from the contemporary philosophy of science, many economists cherish the ideal of positive science. Therefore, value-free economics is still the central paradigm in economics. The first aim of the paper is to investigate economics’ axiomatic assumptions from an epistemological perspective. The critical analysis of the literature shows that the positive-normative dichotomy is exaggerated. Moreover, value-free economics is based on normative foundations that have a negative impact on individuals and society. The paper’s second aim is to show that economics’ normativity is not a problem because the discussion concerning values is possible and unavoidable. In this context, Weber and other methodologists are investigated. The conclusion of the paper is that science can thrive without strict methodological rules thanks to institutional mechanisms. Therefore, economists could learn from artists who accept the world without absolute rules. This perspective opens the possibility for methodological pluralism and normative approaches.
Źródło:
Annales. Etyka w Życiu Gospodarczym; 2020, 23, 4; 7-33
1899-2226
2353-4869
Pojawia się w:
Annales. Etyka w Życiu Gospodarczym
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Leo Strausss “An Epilogue”: Political Science as Political Philosophy
Autorzy:
Jokubaitis, Alvydas
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2046438.pdf
Data publikacji:
2021
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Jagielloński. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego
Tematy:
Leo Strauss
political philosophy
political science
philosophy of political science
Opis:
Leo Strauss‘s article “An Epilogue” is made up of many different critical arguments about political science. The guiding principles of these arguments are not revealed clearly enough. One can even get the impression that “An Epilogue” is an unfinished article. Only after finding the guiding principles we can understand the Strauss‘s critique. He emphasized the difference between the philosophical and scientific approach to politics. “An Epilogue” shows that he understood political science as philosophy.
Źródło:
Teoria Polityki; 2021, 5; 193-203
2543-7046
2544-0845
Pojawia się w:
Teoria Polityki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The Philosopher Ahead of His Time. Ludwik Fleck and the Complexity of Science (Communication and Notes)
Autorzy:
Coco, Emanuele
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/41305356.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii PAN
Tematy:
philosophy of science
sociology of science
Thomas Kuhn
Ludwik Fleck
thought collective
thought style
Opis:
The new edition in Italian of the articles by the Polish microbiologist and philosopher Ludwik Fleck (1896-1961) edited by Francesco Coniglione offers the opportunity for some considerations around this significant scholar. Fleck anticipates Kuhn's ideas as well as those of the sociology of science. For him, any epistemology that does not take psychological and sociological methods into account, or that does not concern itself with economics, technology, art, and even politics, is an epistemology imaginabilis. Here we discuss some key points of the essays collected in the book, some observations taken from the rich introduction of the editor, and an inevitable question: Why has Fleck been neglected for so long?
Źródło:
Filozofia i Nauka; 2020, 8, 2; 177-183
2300-4711
2545-1936
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia i Nauka
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Science of science at Sussex University
Naukoznawstwo na Uniwersytecie w Sussex
Autorzy:
Outhwaite, William
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/577313.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017-07
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
Tematy:
SPRU
Science of Science
philosophy of science
sociology of science
science policy
naukoznawstwo
filozofia nauki
socjologia nauki
polityka naukowa
Opis:
The aim of this paper is to discuss the history of the Science Policy Research Unit and place it within the broader framework of the University of Sussex and the intellectual context of the period. This brief introduction helps to understand the origins of the Unit and the role played by such figures as Chris Freeman, Geoffrey Oldham, Jackie Fuller, and Roy MacLeod. The description of intellectual context includes the influence of sociological approaches to science which were strong in the second half of the 20th century.
Celem artykułu jest omówienie historii jednostki badawcze Science Policy Research Unit, wskazanie jej miejsca i sposobu funkcjonowania w ramach struktur Uniwersytetu w Sussex oraz przedstawienie kontekstu „intelektualnego” towarzyszącego jej powstaniu. To krótkie wprowadzenie pozwala zrozumieć genezę powstania jednostki oraz rolę jaką odgrywali w niej m.in. Chris Freeman, Geoffrey Oldham, Jackie Fuller, czy Roy MacLeod. Opis kontekstu „intelektualnego” dotyczy głównie wpływu podejść socjologicznych na naukę, które były szczególnie silne w drugiej połowie 20. wieku.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa; 2017, 53, 2(212); 149-156
0044-1619
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Elements of Greek Scepticism in Richard Feynman’s Views on Science
Autorzy:
Dembiński, Bogdan
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/665274.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego
Tematy:
philosophy of science
Richard Feynman
criticism
scepticism
ancient scepticism
epistemology
continuity of philosophical tradition
Opis:
The article considers some aspects of Richard Feynman’s philosophy of science. The basic assumptions of Feynman’s views on science refer back to the tradition of Greek scepticism. Interestingly, Feynman was probably unaware of this relation, still he became an outstanding modern continuator of this tradition. The analysis is based on Feynman’s lectures included in The Character of Physical Law.
Źródło:
Folia Philosophica; 2015, 34
1231-0913
2353-9445
Pojawia się w:
Folia Philosophica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Wyświetlanie 1-15 z 42

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